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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Since English lawyers started writing text books about the law of evidence, they have 
denied that religious confession privilege exists at common law. However, that statement 
of the law surprises those who recognise confessional secrecy dating back into the first 
millennium AD. It is also counter-intuitive in Federal Australia since the one human 
freedom which the Constitution has guaranteed since 1901 is the “free exercise of any 
religion”.
1 
 
This thesis analyses the legal conclusion that there is no religious confession privilege at 
common law against available historical materials. Those materials include the origin of 
confessional secrecy in Christian practice and the entrenchment of that practice in canon 
law; the recognition and even the reception of canonical practices in the custom that 
became the common law; and all the English common law cases that have affirmed or 
denied religious confession privilege whether in passing or in an arguably precedential 
way. The reason why clear evidence of the existence of the privilege even seventy years 
after the English Reformation has been ignored by the text writers is traced to an 
uncorrected interpretive error made by the text writer Peake in 1801.
2 His error has been 
uncritically followed and affirmed by later commentators and judges. However, until 
Gavan Duffy J decided Cook v Carroll
3 in Ireland in 1945 and the Supreme Court of 
                                                 
1 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (63 & 64 Vict, c 12 ) (The Australian Constitution 1901), 
section 116. 
 
2 Peake, T, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence, London, E&R Brooke and J Rider & E Rider, 1801. 
 
3 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir Rep 515 
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Canada decided R v Gruenke
4 in 1991, there was no reported decision on religious 
confession privilege anywhere in the British Commonwealth. All else that had been 
written was at best obiter dicta. 
 
The factors that influenced those two courts to recognise not a narrow religious 
confession privilege but a more encompassing confidential religious communications 
privilege are then measured against Australian jurisprudence to suggest whether the 
High Court of Australia would come to a similar conclusion. 
                                                 
4 R v Gruenke (1991) 3 SCR 263 
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PREFACE 
 
Since 1991 I have been employed as International Legal Counsel by The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints servicing the Pacific Area out of Sydney, Australia. 
Occasionally, that work has involved me in advising ecclesiastical personnel on the 
extent of religious confession privilege in the secular jurisdictions where they provide 
pastoral care to members of that Church. Though I was not surprised to learn that the 
police in Australia and New Zealand were unaware of the law that privileged the clergy 
from the disclosure of confessional secrets, I was surprised to meet a New South Wales 
District Court Judge in 1999 who seemed similarly unilluminated. When faced with what I 
have come to learn is one of the strongest religious confession privilege statutes in the 
world
1, not only would the Judge not accept that the words of that statute denied him the 
opportunity to review the evidence concerned for confessional status and relevance, he 
found it inconceivable that Parliament could have intended to deny him that access.  
 
While preparing for that 1999 case
2, I discovered that several lay members of the New 
South Wales Parliament had expressed almost entirely opposite expectations where 
religious confession privilege was concerned. For example, after he had expressed his 
dismay that one of Her Majesty’s Counsel should have called for the gaoling of a priest 
who would not testify of that which he had learned in confession, the Hon. B.H. Vaughan 
said “[it] became necessary to legislate what every member of this House, and probably 
                                                 
1 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s.127 not only privileges the contents of a religious confession from disclosure; 
it states that the member of the clergy concerned need not even confirm whether there was a confession. 
Arguably, that second protection makes the member of the clergy the final judge of whether or not what was 
heard was a confession within the meaning of the section. 
 
2 R v Mills (1999) District Court, Orange, NSW, heard 1 September 1999, unreported. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON - PREFACE  xxv
every person in the community, would have taken for granted – that a clergyman in the 
circumstances is protected from the sanctions of the law”
3.  
 
I have since learned that the Church’s decision not to appeal the District Court Judge’s 
decision on the religious confession privilege point - because a successful appeal would 
have unsettled what the Church considered was a just result on the criminal facts of that 
case - is one of many eminently practical reasons why there have been very few 
reported cases on religious confession privilege
4. Suzanne McNicol has observed that 
one reason why the New South Wales decision to create such a strong religious 
confession privilege statute was “sensible”
5, was because it would 
“reduce…unnecessary friction between church and state”
6. The Churches are similarly 
concerned that child abuse cases, which generate secular anger against ancient 
privileges, are not the perfect stage upon which to consolidate principled constitutional 
freedom for this manifestation of religious practice. 
 
Further research was prompted by the discovery that while evidence law texts almost 
universally denied religious confession privilege at common law, those denials were not 
borne out by the cases cited as authority for those denials. I developed a growing 
suspicion that several of the early revered text writers had simply quoted one another 
without independently verifying what the sources actually said. 
 
                                                 
3 Parliamentary Debates (N.S.W.) Legislative Council, 21 November 1989, p 12829. 
 
4 Other reasons of course include that the confidential nature of religious communications make it a rarity for 
law enforcement authorities to find out that such evidence exists and the fact that law enforcement 
authorities are reluctant to bring such testimony when they recognise “the undeniable fact that ministers will 
universally disobey a law compelling confidential confessional communications” (McNicol, SB, Law of 
Privilege, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1992, p 329). 
 
5 McNicol, op cit, p 337. 
 
6 McNicol, op cit, pp 330, 337. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON - PREFACE  xxvi
Though there were two monographs on religious confession privilege at common law
7 
and a Roman Catholic canon law masterpiece on the origin of the seal of confession
8, I 
ultimately felt I had enough material to write a book of my own on the subject. No one 
had previously explained how the seal of confession in Catholic canon law had found its 
way into the common law, nor treated thoroughly the reasons why it was said to have 
been extinguished. This was territory where I was ill-equipped to go by myself, since my 
previous dissertations in law
9 had only involved methodical historical research in 
common law records since case reporting began. 
 
I am thus grateful to the Law Faculty at Sydney University who first accepted my 
enrolment to treat the subject at a Doctoral level and suggested that it was worthy of full 
PhD treatment rather than the slightly shorter thesis that is required as a part of an SJD 
degree. Les McCrimmon was a great help during the research phase of the project. I 
regard his observation that a proper understanding of the common law behind modern 
religious confession privilege statutes should change the way courts interpret them, as 
his greatest contribution to my work. That insight suggested that a proper understanding 
of religious confession privilege could lead to more tolerant judicial interpretations of 
religious confession privilege statutes which would improve freedom of religion in 
practice. The Supreme Court of Canada’s 1991 decision in R v Gruenke
10 has confirmed 
                                                 
7 Baddeley, EL, The Privilege of Religious Confessions in English Courts of Justice, London, Butterworths,, 
1865; Winckworth, P, The Seal of the Confessional and the Law of Evidence, London, S.P.C.K., 1952. 
 
8 Kurtscheid, TRB, A History of the Seal of Confession, Authorised translation by the Rev FA Marks, Edited 
by Arthur Preuss, St Louis, Missouri and London, B Herder Book Co, 1927. 
 
9 “The Thomas Case: Aspects of Criminal Procedure in their Historical Perspective”, LLB(Hons) dissertation, 
Auckland University, 1981; “The Marketing of Law in English History: The Professional Self-Interest of 
Lawyers at Work”, M Jur thesis, Auckland University, 1993. 
 
10 R v Gruenke (1991) 3 SCR 263. 
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the thought that a multicultural society based on constitutional freedoms and equality will 
not allow the public interest in the search for truth and justice to trump all other values. 
 
Also at Sydney, Terry Carney and Hilary Astor helped reduce my prolix sentences and 
think outside my conventional structural boxes. Helen Irving’s life before law school as a 
gifted historian was a particular blessing and I have appreciated the time she took to 
read draft chapters about history. Lee Aitken and Fiona Burns also provided some 
helpful suggestions. 
 
At Auckland, Julia McMahon O’Higgins was the law school librarian when I was a law 
undergraduate in the 1970s. She was an absolute treasure when it came to 
understanding obscure historical citations. Shortly after I commenced researching 
towards the doctorate, she found me sitting in that University’s Law Library some 25 
years after we had first met and she insisted I consult her whenever I felt the urge. She 
simply would not let me reimburse even the postage after she had spent hours finding 
obscure historical references which authenticated the true story of Friar John Randolf’s 
demise
11. Other great research helpers were: Eileen Crane, whose close friends at 
Harvard and Yale finally found for me the two missing first edition Evidence law texts I 
could find nowhere else; Stephen E. Smith who rapidly helped me track down electronic 
copies of Canadian commentary while he was completing his first law degree at Queens, 
and Mark Durham who took time away from his own doctoral work at Yale to help me 
track down yet another first edition Evidence text. 
 
                                                 
11 Though Sir Edward Coke cited his case as authority for his treason exception to religious confession 
privilege (Coke, Sir E, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, New York, Garland 
Publishing Co, 1979, p 629), there was no trial and the Friar was murdered in prison after some years’ 
incarceration, by a fellow inmate. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON - PREFACE  xxviii
However, the greatest help and academic mentoring has come from Gabriel Moens. I 
have followed his career since I first met him as the Garrick Professor of Law at the 
University of Queensland. I have met him again on some of his teaching stints at Loyola 
and Brigham Young Universities in the United States and more recently at Notre Dame 
and Murdoch Universities in Western Australia. Gabriel has given me the checklists that I 
needed to get unstuck and to complete the thesis. He has done things that supervisors 
are not supposed to have to do with PhD students – he has tidied my grammar, and 
painstakingly helped me chop up remaining long sentences when I thought I had finished 
all such editing. When I have considered all else he does and all else for which he is 
justifiably renowned, I am grateful that he was genuinely interested enough in my work to 
convince Murdoch University to take me on and see the thesis through to what, I hope, is 
a worthy conclusion. 
 
I would be remiss indeed, if I did not mention my Legal Assistant at work, Alice Debchi, 
my secretary Susan Watkins who holds a PhD in history of her own, and my wife Anita. 
Alice has typed the whole thesis, save a few pages. When I have typed, she has 
proofread and tidied the formatting because everyone who knows me, knows that I know 
nothing about the mysteries of word processing computer software. Additionally Alice is 
a master at helping me think outside my boxes and her deep knowledge of and interest 
in English history has often corrected my antipodean misconceptions.  Sue’s experience 
and encouragement has kept me going – assuring me so often that my PhD academic 
struggles were not unique. Anita however, is the one who has borne the brunt of it all. 
Though I like to say that my thesis was largely written when I was already away from the 
family and from her on business in dingy hotel rooms on desert islands, Anita knows how 
many times she sacrificed time we might have spent together because I went 
downstairs, to the office on a Saturday – or to one more library. On a 2001 trip to RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON - PREFACE  xxix
England, she was the one who encouraged me to go to Oxford. There I found and 
copied the original eighteenth and early nineteenth century first edition texts which no 
one would send me on interlibrary loan because they were too fragile and she took the 
photo of me on the floor of that empty library - surrounded by piles of musty books, 
oblivious to the world and completely absorbed because at last I had the original 
editions. She has been with me to all the law libraries I have physically used: Sydney, 
Melbourne, Auckland, New South Wales, Macquarie, QUT, Australian Catholic 
University, Utah, J Reuben Clark, and Oxford to name most but not all of them. Anita 
always believed I could finish but was at her most helpful when in my misguided 
hesitancy about changing Universities for the home straight, she almost plead with me to 
accept Gabriel’s kind offer to supervise me through to completion. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – INTRODUCTION 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When John H Wigmore produced the first edition of his monumental work on 
evidence in the United States in 1904,
1 he stated: 
 
It is perhaps open to argument whether a privilege for confessions to priests 
was recognised in common law courts during the period before the 
Restoration.  The only available data appear to be an indecisive incident in 
the Jesuit trials under James I, and a statute of much earlier date and of 
ambiguous purport, together with the general probabilities to be drawn from 
the recognition of Papal ecclesiastical practices prior to Henry VIII.  But since 
the Restoration, and for more than two centuries of English practice, the 
almost unanimous expression of judicial opinion (including at least two 
decisive rulings) has denied the existence of a privilege.
2 
 
Though the work has been both edited and revised since,
3 the essential “no [religious 
confession] privilege at common law”
4 message has not been varied and it has been 
                                                 
1 Wigmore, JH, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in trials at common law: 
including the statutes and judicial decisions of all jurisdictions of the United States and Canada, 
Boston, Little Brown, 1904. 
2 Wigmore, JH, Evidence in trials at common law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, 
Little Brown, 1961, Vol 8, p 869. 
3 1
st edition 1904; 2
nd edition 1923; 3
rd edition 1940; McNaughton Revision in 1961 with a most 
recent 1999 supplement current as at the time of this writing. 
4 The quoted words form part of the heading which introduces the quote in note 2 in the 1961 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – INTRODUCTION 
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accepted as an authoritative statement of the British common law by the majority of 
succeeding American lawyers.
5 But Wigmore’s summary gloss upon religious 
confession privilege at common law is not a uniquely American interpretation.  The 
majority of British and Australian evidence text writers have agreed with his 
conclusion,
6 and he has also had significant direct influence in Australia.
7 
 
It will be the purpose of this thesis to test this historical conclusion and summary 
against the primary materials which Wigmore and other text writers have used to 
support it.  Those materials include the historical and canonical practices from which 
the common law evolved, and the common law decisions recorded from the genesis 
of legal reporting through to the present day.  This thesis will not address the modern 
law reform question of whether there should be a religious confession either in 
twenty-first century common law or in statute.  That is a question for another thesis.  
What this thesis will do is review in careful detail, the historical materials which still 
exist, to authoritatively establish that there not only was a religious confession 
privilege at common law extant at the Restoration, but that it has never been 
extinguished and thus survives to the present day. 
 
Because the text writers almost universally deny these assertions, primary materials 
_______________________ 
 
McNaughton Revision. 
5 American writers who have cited Wigmore as authority for this proposition include Allred, VC, 
“The Confessor in Court” (1953) 13 The Jurist 2, 6; Callahan, MJ, “Historical Inquiry into the 
Priest-Penitent Privilege” (1976) 36 The Jurist 328, 329; Yellin, JM, “The History and Current 
Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege” (1983) 23 Santa Clara LR 95, 102; and Smith, MC, 
“The Pastor on the Witness Stand: Towards a Religious Privilege in the Courts” (1984) 29 
Catholic Lawyer 1, 4. 
6 For example, Heydon, JD, Cross on Evidence (6
th Australian ed, 2000), p 743; Lord Hailsham 
(ed), Halsbury’s Laws of England (4
th ed, 1976), Vol 17, para 237, n 4; Stephen, JF, A Digest of 
the Law of Evidence (12
th ed, 1948), p 220; Buzzard, JH, May, R, and Howard, MN, Phipson on 
Evidence (12
th ed, 1976), para 588. 
7 For example, the Australian Law Reform Commission has stated that “[i]t is generally accepted that the 
better view of the common law cases is that no privilege is recognised as arising out of the priest-
penitent (or minister-parishioner) relationship” though “the law in Ireland acknowledges such a privilege 
… formulated using Wigmore’s four conditions” (ALRC, Report No 26 (1985), Vol 1, para 202, p 253). RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – INTRODUCTION 
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are the focus of this thesis.  For these purposes, primary materials means case law, 
canon law and established legal history.  However before I set out the places where I 
have found those primary materials, it is necessary to state that readers will find more 
cases about legal professional privilege discussed in this work than they might 
expect in a thesis about religious confession privilege.  That is because many text 
writers have conflated legal professional privilege and religious confession privilege. I 
will argue that these two privileges have separate and discrete origins in common 
law.  However, it is necessary to review cases about legal professional privilege to 
establish just what the facts were, to decide whether the conclusions drawn from 
them about religious confession privilege had any substance at all.  Sometimes, the 
generalisations of the text writers may seem fair on a superficial review of the facts 
because a clergyman was involved.  However, if it was claimed that a communication 
with a clergyman was entitled to “legal professional privilege" because he was 
consulted as a professional confidante despite the fact that no religious confession 
was made, then it is not accurate to draw a “no religious confession privilege” 
principle from the decision.
8  Similarly, cases about confession to someone other 
than a member of the clergy,
9 and cases about criminal confessions by members of 
the clergy,
10 ought not to be generalised as authority against religious confession 
privilege either. 
 
_______________________ 
 
 
8 These are not the facts of a specific case.  It is the hypothetical conflation of several, including 
Anonymous (1693) Skin 404; 90 ER 179-180 and Greenlaw v King (1838) 1 Beav 137; 48 ER 
890. 
9 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186; 168 ER 1235 and R v Wild (1835) 1 Moody 452; 168 ER 
1341.  These cases may also be considered as cases about whether spiritual duress or 
inducement should make certain confessions inadmissible.  They are discussed in detail in 
chapter four. 
10 Randolph’s case (1413) as cited in Coke, Sir E, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of 
England, New York, Garland Publishing Co, 1979, p 629.  The spelling of the surname of Friar John 
Randolph varies from Randolf to Randolph and to Randolphe.  Except when I am quoting another 
source, I will use the “Randolph” spelling. 
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The historical and canonical practices from which the common law evolved will be 
treated in detail because despite academic recognition that canon law has had a 
large influence on common law,
11 the nature of that contribution has never been 
satisfactorily identified where religious confession privilege is concerned.  Richard 
Nolan, the Irish barrister who contributed the article entitled “The Law of the Seal of 
Confession” to the original Catholic Encyclopedia in 1913,
12 certainly strove to do just 
that.  But his “Catholic” purpose and his muted conclusion against the existence of a 
modern religious confession privilege at common law, have had limited impact on 
legal scholarship.  Bursell’s more recent claim that religious confession privilege has 
always existed and still exists,
13 has similarly not attracted much attention in legal 
texts because it reads like a conservative Anglican apologetic.
14  Others have been 
less complete in either their treatment of the canon law, or its historical antecedents.  
Finlason’s contribution in the editorial footnotes to his report of R v Hay
15 in 1861 
maintained that confessions in Anglican practice were sacramental and that Hill J 
was wrong to have found Father Kelly in Hay guilty of contempt – in effect Finlason’s 
thesis was an early version of Bursell’s view that religious confession privilege 
                                                 
11 For example, Helmholz has observed that there are “three evident ways” in which the canon law and 
English common law related – they clashed, they cooperated and they reciprocally influenced one 
another (Helmholz, RH, Canon Law and the Law of England, London and Ronceverte, The Hambledon 
Press, 1987, p 2).  Milsom says that it was ecclesiastics with canonist learning “who guided the common 
law in its greatest formative period” (Milsom, SFC, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London, 
Butterworths, 1969, p 15). 
 
12 Nolan, RS, “The Law of the Seal of Confession”, (1913) 13 Catholic Encyclopedia 649. 
13 Bursell Judge, RDH, “The Seal of the Confessional”, Ecclesiastical Law Journal (1990) 84. 
14 Note that liberal Anglicans hold that confession went out with the English Reformation.  For 
example, Norman Doe quotes the 1938 Doctrine Commission as authority for his proposition 
that the 1603 canons only bind in conscience (Doe, N, The Legal Framework of the Church of 
England, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, p 354).  JH Blunt (The Book of Church Law, 10
th ed, 
London, New York and Bombay, Longmans Green & Co, 1905, p 173) and Judge Rupert 
Bursell (“The Seal of the Confessional”, Ecclesiastical Law Journal (1990) 84, 87) state that the 
secrecy of confession has the virtual force of statute law and will concede only that it was used 
less frequently when it was made voluntary.  See more detailed discussion in chapter three, 
infra, pp 112-124. 
15 R v Hay (1860) 2 Foster & Fin 4; 175 ER 933. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – INTRODUCTION 
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existed in English law and still existed in 1861.  Badeley’s monograph in 1865
16 was 
a very Catholic defence of religious confession privilege written in response to the 
publicity that accompanied R v Constance Kent,
17 including the debate that the case 
occasioned in both houses of parliament.
18  Winckworth’s essay, “The Seal of the 
Confessional and the Law of Evidence”
19 concluded in 1952 only that “the question 
has never really been raised in any English court since the Reformation”.
20  Hogan 
and Yellin writing respectively in 1951
21 and 1983
22 both doubted Wigmore’s 
suspicion that there was no religious confession privilege in Reformation pre-
history,
23 but did not consider whether that raised questions about the alleged non-
existence of the privilege after the Reformation – they simply accepted that it does 
not exist thereafter.
24  And though Wright and Graham’s more complete historical 
review
25 disagreed with the Wigmore interpretation of the history,
26 they effectively 
                                                 
16 Badeley, E, The Privilege of Religious Confessions in English Courts of Justice considered in 
a letter to a Friend, London, Butterworths, 1865. 
17 R v Constance Kent (1865), unreported but referred to in Attlay’s Famous Trials of the 
Nineteenth Century, 1899, p 113.  See also Tiemann, WH and Bush, JC, The Right to Silence, 
2
nd ed, Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1983, pp 117-120, and Phipson, SL, Best’s Law of 
Evidence, 11
th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911, pp 565-566.  The absence of any legal 
report of the case is the understandable consequence of Constance Kent’s guilty plea following 
the depositions hearing where the religious confession privilege issue was raised. 
18 Reported in detail in Nolan, RS, “The Law of the Seal of Confession”, Catholic Encyclopedia 
13 (1913) 649, 658.  The parliamentary debate in the House of Lords is discussed infra in 
chapter four, pp 171-177. 
19 Winckworth, P, The Seal of the Confessional and the Law of Evidence, London, S.P.C.K., 
1952. 
20 Ibid, p 15. 
21 Hogan, EW, Jr, “A Modern Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional” (1951) 6 Loyola LR 
1. 
22 Yellin, JM, “The history and current status of the clergy-penitent privilege” (1983) 23 Santa 
Clara LR 95. 
23 Hogan, op cit, pp 7-13; Yellin, op cit, pp 96-101. 
24 Hogan, op cit, p 13; Yellin, op cit, p 101. 
25 Wright, CA, and Graham, KW, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence, 3
rd Ed., St Paul 
Minnesota, West Publishing Co, 1992, chapter six, section 5612. 
26 Ibid, pp 29-30, 35. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – INTRODUCTION 
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agreed with Nolan that the privilege was extinguished by institutionalised anti-
Catholic prejudice after the seventeenth century.
27 
 
This thesis will relate the historical roots of the common law and customary canonical 
practices to the case law which evolved from them.  That approach will enable a 
more balanced view and conclusion than results from Wigmore’s doubt of religious 
confession privilege in history and his denial of religious confession privilege in 
common law.  The resulting understanding of this ancient privilege has growing 
significance in a secular world which doubts any value premised solely in religious 
belief and practice. 
 
The thesis divides the subject into seven chapters.  In chapter one I observe that the 
misinterpretation of cases in 1790,
28 1828
29 and 1881
30 has significantly 
misrepresented common law on religious confession privilege ever since.  Even 
though these errors have been much repeated in subsequent commentary and 
judicial decisions, I suggest that a complete review of religious confession privilege is 
required – a review which takes account of what the historical practices were and 
what the cases actually said. 
 
Chapters two and three will deal with the history of religious confession and of 
religious confession privilege in England.  In chapter two, I commence by identifying 
the shifts in perspective required of modern lawyers to understand historical legal 
institutions and practice, with particular recognition of the modern difficulty in 
                                                 
27 Ibid, p 42. 
28 R v Sparkes (1790), unreported but cited by Garrow, counsel for the plaintiff in Du Barré v 
Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108, 170 ER 96. 
29 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody  Cr Cas 186, 168 ER 1235. 
30 Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – INTRODUCTION 
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understanding a society where church and state were undivided.  I then use Coke’s 
commentary
31 upon Edward II’s Statute Articuli Cleri
32 in the fourteenth century and 
his prosecution arguments as Attorney-General in Garnet’s case,
33 to identify 
recognition of religious confession in common law to the beginning of the 
seventeenth century.  That recognition will necessarily introduce consideration of the 
influence of canon law and ecclesiastical religious confession practice upon common 
law both before and after the English Reformation.  In chapter three I will then identify 
the development of the canon law pertaining to religious confession and will trace the 
evolution of the Catholic seal of confession and its diluted reception into Anglican 
canon law as a part of the law of England. 
 
In the next three chapters, four, five and six, I discuss the common law after Garnet’s 
case.  In chapter four, I begin treatment of the common law between the seventeenth 
and twentieth centuries with the insight that the law of evidence has largely grown up 
“around” religious confession privilege. That insight is helpful in explaining why it is 
that the evidence law texts treat religious confession privilege in a superficial way as 
if religious confession privilege were a sub-category of legal professional privilege.  
That categorisation also explains why religious confession privilege has often been 
confused with legal professional privilege, and why cases about irregular confession 
and confessions obtained under duress have not been distinguished from cases 
about religious confession privilege.  Chapter four concludes that the residual 
inaccuracy that lingers in evidence law texts cannot be said to have extinguished 
religious confession privilege from the common law.  
 
                                                 
31 Coke, Sir E, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, New York, Garland 
Publishing Co, 1979. 
32  9 Edward II St.1. 
33 Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – INTRODUCTION 
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In chapter five I explain how better analysis of the cases discussed in chapter four 
reveals them as authority for the proposition that there are two distinct privileges 
arising at common law from religious confession practice.  These are, first, a narrow 
religious confession privilege, and secondly, a broader, non-discriminatory religious 
communications privilege.  The existence of this broader privilege sourced in judicial 
discretion which weighs competing public policies, is demonstrated with late 
twentieth century decisions from the English House of Lords
34 and the Supreme 
Court of Canada.
35 
 
In chapter six I discuss the theories that have been advanced to explain how or why 
religious confession privilege was lost to the common law.  Because Sir George 
Jessel MR’s error in his obiter statements against the privilege in Wheeler v 
LeMarchant
36 will have been identified in chapter one, that theoretical justification for 
the extinction of the privilege will only be refreshed.  Similarly brief reference will be 
made to the idea that the English Reformation somehow extinguished religious 
confession privilege since that theory will have been discredited in chapter two.  But 
the suggestions that pure anti-Catholic prejudice and the need for a religious 
confession privilege statute demonstrates a void at common law
37 will be examined in 
detail and dismissed. 
 
In chapter seven of the thesis, I review Australian authority relating to religious 
confession privilege, though noting that there is no binding decision such as would 
conclusively answer the question, “Is there a religious confession privilege at 
common law in Australia?”  That uncertainty is identified as the unsurprising result of 
                                                 
34 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171. 
35 R v Gruenke (1991) 3 SCR 263. 
36 Wheeler v LeMarchant  (1881) 17 Ch D 675. 
 
37 R v Gruenke (1991) 3 SCR 263, 287-288 per Lamer CJ. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – INTRODUCTION 
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a complete absence of decided cases on religious confession facts in Australia’s 
residual common law jurisdictions.
38  But obiter dicta comments about religious 
confession privilege by Sir Owen Dixon in the High Court
39 and Chief Justice 
Spigelman in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
40 are closely reviewed 
for their likely contribution to a common law decision on religious confession 
privilege, should such a case arise in the future.  In the absence of any conclusive 
authority on the point, I then review other ideas that are likely to have some influence 
on whether a common law religious confession privilege would be recognised in 
Australia or not. 
 
Those ideas include insights 
   (a)  that recent judicial statements to effect that common law  privileges or 
immunities
41 cannot be abrogated without clear and unambiguous 
statutory words, may protect common law religious confession 
privilege if a court could be convinced that religious confession 
privilege was indeed well established; 
(b)  that existing religious confession privilege statutes in Victoria,
42 
Tasmania,
43 the Northern Territory,
44 New South Wales
45 and the 
                                                 
38 Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia at the time of this writing. 
39 McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73. 
40 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681. 
41 Particularly  in Daniels Corporation v ACCC (2002) 192 ALR 561 and in R v Young (1999) 46 
NSWLR 681. 
42 The original Victorian statutory religious confession privilege was created by the Evidence 
Act 1890, c 55, 54 Vict No 1088.  The current statute is the Evidence Act 1958, section 28(1). 
43 The original Tasmanian statutory religious confession privilege was the Evidence Act 1910, 
section 96. However, Tasmania adopted the Uniform Commonwealth Evidence Act in 2001 
(Tasmanian Evidence Act 76/2001) and it was proclaimed effective 1 July 2002. 
44 The Evidence Ordinances 1939, section 12. 
45 The Evidence (Religious Confessions) Amendment Act 1989 inserted section 10(6) into the 
New South Wales Evidence Act 1898.  The current provision is section 127 of the New South 
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Commonwealth
46 would exert  “gravitational pull”
47 in Australian 
jurisdictions without such statutes;
48 and 
(c)  the notion that Australia’s commitment to various international human 
rights instruments which affirm constitutionally established freedom of 
religious belief in Australia may provide some protection for religious 
confession privilege in the future. 
 
However, though I suggest that the High Court of Australia might recognise religious 
confession privilege at common law if a suitable case arose for adjudication, I 
concede that Australian trial courts and even intermediate Courts of Appeal
49 in 
Australia may not answer so confidently. 
 
The thesis concludes with my finding that there always has been a religious 
confession privilege at common law.  Further, that even though judges looking for 
relevant evidence may have been inclined to narrow its scope, that judicial habit does 
not justify the textual denials that religious confession privilege has ever existed.  
However, I conclude that if the High Court of Australia is ever asked to decide a 
religious confession privilege case in a common law jurisdiction, it will likely follow the 
approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada and prefer a “case by case” 
discretionary religious communications privilege
50 over a fixed religious confession 
                                                 
46 The current provision is section 127 of the Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995.  The Uniform 
Commonwealth Evidence Act was adopted by the Australian Capital Territory in 1995, by 
Tasmania in 2001 and Norfolk Island in 2004. 
47 The quoted words are original to Mason P in Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539, 
547-548.  Both Beazley, JA and James, J reference the concept in discussion of a proposed 
common law sexual assault communications privilege in R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 
respectively at p 719, para 205 and p 743, para 326. 
48 Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia. 
49 These words were used to describe the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal by 
Spigelman CJ in R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, at p 698, para 84 and at p 699, para 88.  
50 R v Gruenke (1991) 3 SCR 263.  
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privilege category.
51  That is not so much because Australia’s constitutional 
protection of freedom of religion
52 is equivalent to Canadian charter protection,
53 but 
because such a broader accommodative approach resonates with Australian multi-
cultural values and international human rights obligations.
54 
 
 
                                                 
51  Gruenke was decided by a majority of 7-2.  The minority (Heureux-Dube and Gonthier JJ) preferred 
that a fixed religious confession privilege category be recognised rather than a discretionary privilege 
because the lack of certainty implicit in a discretionary approach could have an undesirable chilling effect 
on religious practice. 
 
52 Section 116.  The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (63 & 64 Vict, c 12 ) was 
passed by the Imperial Parliament in July 1900 and was proclaimed to take effect on 1 January 
1901. 
53 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into force as Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK) Clause 11 on 17 April 1982.  In Canada it is known as the Constitution Act 1982. 
54 See particularly the High Court of Australia judgements in Daniels Corporation v ACCC 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
REVIEW OF RELIGIOUS CONFESSION 
PRIVILEGE IN EARLY EVIDENCE 
TEXTS 
 
Introduction 
Wigmore is a relative latecomer to the field of evidence law commentary.
1  He credits 
Thayer and Stephen as his authoritative predecessors,
2 but there were many others, 
and the number of editions which were published of the more popular texts
3 manifest 
the demand for understanding of this new body of law.
4 
 
This thesis recognises that development at the beginning of the nineteenth century in 
the pioneering work of Peake,
5 who was also the reporter of the alleged leading case 
                                                 
1 The first edition of his monumental work on Evidence Law was published in 1904 (Wigmore, JH, A 
Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in trials at common law: including the statutes and 
judicial decisions of all jurisdictions of the United States and Canada, Boston, Little Brown, 1904). 
 
2 Wigmore, JH, op cit, Preface to the First Edition, p 2. 
 
3 For example, Roscoe published the original text of Digest of the Law of Evidence in 1827 (London, 
Joseph Butterworth and Son), but Powell’s 18
th edition was still in demand when it was published in 
1907 (London, Stevens and Sweet and Maxwell).  Similarly, the 11
th edition of Taylor’s Treatise on the 
Law of Evidence, originally published in 1848 (London, A Maxwell & Son), was published in 1920 
(Matthews, JB and Spear, GF, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence by his Honour the Late Judge Pitt 
Taylor, London, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd). 
 
4 Sir James Stephen observed in 1876 “that the modern Law of Evidence is not so old as the 
Reformation, but has grown up by the practice of the Courts, and by decisions in the course of the last 
two centuries” (Stephen, JF, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, London, MacMillan and Co, 1876, p 172). 
 
5 Professor Julius Stone (whose work was revised and published by WAN Wells after his death) notes 
that the pioneering texts on the law of evidence were those written by Peake (A Compendium of the Law 
of Evidence, London, E&R Brooke and J Rider & E Rider, 1801), Phillipps (A Treatise on the Law of 
Evidence, London, E & R Brooke and J Rider and by E Rider, 1814) and Starkie (A Practical Treatise of RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER ONE 
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on the subject of religious confession privilege – Du Barré v Livette.
6  Peake’s 
conclusion that “a confession to a clergyman or priest … [is] not within the protection 
of the law”
7 was followed as gospel by contemporary text writers and judges alike, 
without any apparent critical review of his conclusion from the case cited. 
 
When Park J adopted Peake’s summary of the law in R v Gilham
8 in 1828, he 
compounded the problem.  For Park J’s generalisation of Peake’s conclusion against 
religious confession privilege
9 as authority for the admissibility of evidence allegedly 
obtained under spiritual duress in R v Gilham, was thereafter cited as the leading 
authority against any religious confession privilege.  Indeed, Park J’s obiter statement 
against religious confession privilege in R v Gilham endured as the most authoritative 
word upon the subject until Sir George Jessel’s several obiter comments against 
religious confession privilege in the English Court of Appeal between 1876
10 and 
1881.
11  However Winckworth has suggested that Peake’s influence is in evident 
_______________________ 
 
the Law of Evidence and Digest of Proof in Civil and Criminal Proceedings, London, J & WT Clarke, 
1824).  These are discussed infra in chapter four, pp 133-140, in relation to the development of the 
common law concerning religious confession privilege after the seventeenth century.  The influence of 
Peake’s original work on the development of the law of evidence where religious confession privilege is 
concerned, is discussed in infra, pp 16-19. 
 
6 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 86. 
 
7 Peake, op cit, Vol 1, p 175. 
 
8 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186; 168 ER 1235. 
 
9 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 198; 168 ER 1235, 1239. 
 
10 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) LR 2 Ch D 644. 
 
11 Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675.  Though Sir George Jessel MR’s decision in Slade v 
Tucker (1880) 14 Ch D 824 is sometimes also referenced as authority against religious confession 
privilege, the case contains no express reference to that privilege and simply denies that professional 
privilege extends to puirsuivants of the Herald’s College. 
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even Sir George Jessel’s dictum in Wheeler v LeMarchant for he observes “how 
closely Lord Jessel [sic] followed Peake’s dictum”.
12 
 
This chapter will review these three influential textual and judicial conclusions against 
the primary materials from which they were drawn, to enable assessment of their 
validity as a true statement of the common law in the nineteenth century.  The 
question of whether the errors identified invalidate the common law as thereafter 
developed, will be deferred till later in the thesis, after all of the other influences upon 
that common law development have also been considered.  Thus insulated, the 
prevalent nineteenth century legal view of religious confession privilege at common 
law will then be weighed against the historical and canonical materials from which the 
common law grew – the subject of chapters two and three.  However chapter one will 
establish that a reconsideration of the nineteenth century common law on religious 
confession privilege is in order.  
 
The error in R v Sparkes 
13 
Du Barré v Livette
14 was a case about legal professional privilege.  The issue was 
whether an interpreter used by defence counsel in a case of jewellery theft, could be 
subpoenaed to provide evidence of a conversation between Livette (one of the 
defendants) and his defence counsel.  Lord Kenyon CJ gave judgement as follows: 
 
                                                 
12 Winckworth, P, The Seal of the Confessional and the Law of Evidence, London, S.P.C.K., 1952, p 14.  
Note that Sir George Jessel MR never became a peer of the realm, which is not surprising in the 
nineteenth century given his Jewish descent (Simpson, AWB (ed), Biographical Dictionary of the 
Common Law, London, Butterworths, 1984, p 281; Lee, S, (ed), Dictionary of National Biography, 
London, Smith Elder & Co., 1908, Vol X, p 805). 
 
13 Unreported but referred to in Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 86. 
 
14 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96. 
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[T]he relation between attorney and client is as old as the law itself.  It is 
absolutely necessary that the client should unbosom himself to his attorney, 
who would otherwise not know how to defend him.  In a case like the present, 
it is equally necessary that an interpreter should be employed ... everything 
said before that interpreter was equally in confidence ... he was the organ 
through which the prisoner conveyed information to the attorney, and ... it 
ought equally to remain locked up in the bosoms of those to whom it was 
communicated.
15 
 
Straightforward enough, but the case has religious confession privilege interest 
because the plaintiff’s counsel raised in his argument an unreported case one year 
previous (R v Sparkes), where “Mr Justice Buller on the Northern circuit”
16 had 
permitted a confession of the crime indicted made by a papist prisoner to a 
Protestant clergyman “to be given in evidence on the trial”, with the result that the 
prisoner “was convicted and executed”.
17 Plaintiff counsel adduced the case to show 
that confidentiality per se did not protect communications.  Accordingly, since the 
interpreter was not the beneficiary of any recognised privilege, his evidence should 
be admitted.  Because the Sparkes’ case report is not available, we can only 
conjecture at the reasons why Mr Justice Buller denied the claim of religious 
confession privilege made for Sparkes.
18  What is more enduring, is that even though 
                                                 
15 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108, 110; 170 ER 96, 97. 
 
16 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108, 109; 170 ER 96, 97. 
 
17 Idem. 
 
18 For example, like Sir Edward Coke who had prosecuted at Henry Garnet’s trial (Garnet’s case (1606) 
2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 245-246), Buller J may have considered that the confession in R v Sparkes 
was not a “sacramental confession” since a papist cannot make a sacramental confession to anyone 
other than a Catholic priest. If that were true, the communication in R v Sparkes arguably might not 
qualify as a religious confession at law on theological grounds.  However, in light of the firm position 
Buller J took on the narrow scope of legal professional privilege in Wilson v Rastall (1792) LTR 753; 100 
ER 1283; (1775-1802) All ER 597 (discussed in more detail in chapter four, pp 151-153), it seems 
unlikely that Buller J was making a technical theological distinction.  RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
16
Lord Kenyon CJ distinguished R v Sparkes on its facts
19 and said that the religious 
communication in that case was not essential, he still said he would “have paused 
before [he] admitted the evidence there admitted.
20  Clearly Lord Kenyon CJ had a 
different view of religious confession privilege than had Buller J only one year 
previously.  Buller J appears to have considered that established authority prevented 
any extension of the attorney privilege.
21 
 
Though it is surprising that Peake (who reported the Du Barré v Livette case, and 
who also authored evidence texts titled Nisi Prius Cases and A Compendium of the 
Law of Evidence) should prefer Buller J’s view, it appears that Peake’s opinion as the 
commentator has endured.  For not only did Starkie
22 and Park J
23 expressly follow 
Peake, but a whole line of other commentators did so as well,
24 until Sir George 
Jessel’s obiter opinions upon religious confession privilege in 1876 and 1881
25 found 
_______________________ 
 
 
19 Lord Kenyon CJ chose not to accept plaintiff counsel’s submissions on the basis that “this case 
materially differs from that cited” and the prisoner in the Sparkes case did not need to make that 
communication to enable his attorney to adequately defend him (Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108, 
110; 170 ER 96, 97). 
 
20 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108, 110; 170 ER 96, 97. 
 
21 Buller J later said there were “cases where it [was] much to be lamented” that privilege for 
confidences did not extend (Wilson v Rastall (1775-1802) All ER 597, 600 ).  Since he noted that a 
confidential privilege in respect of communications to a medical person in the Duchess of Kingston’s 
case ((1776) 20 Howell’s St Trials 355) had been declined , it is evident that he considered he was 
following an established and broad rule of precedent that confined confidential privilege to “attornies” 
and their clients. 
 
22 Starkie, T, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence, London, J & WT Clarke, 1824, cited by Park J 
along with Peake as one of his authorities against the existence of religious confession privilege in R v 
Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 198; 168 ER 1235, 1239. 
 
23 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186; 168 ER 1235. 
 
24 See infra, pp 17-19. 
 
25 While Sir George Jessel MR opined upon religious confession privilege in both Anderson v Bank of 
British Columbia (1876) LR 2 Ch D 644 and Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675, the latter is 
more frequently cited.  
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greater favour with contemporary commentators.
26  To demonstrate and make put 
the point beyond any doubt, Peake’s commentative conclusion that “a confession to a 
clergyman or priest ... [is] not within the protection of the law”
27 was followed by 
Phillipps in the 1815
28 second  and in the 1843 ninth editions of his Treatise on the 
Law of Evidence;
29 Roscoe in the 1827 original text of his often revised Digest of the 
Law of Evidence
30 (without variation in the conclusion either in the fifteenth edition
31 
in 1928 or the eighteenth edition of Roscoe’s Nisi Prius
32 in 1907); Gresley in his 
Treatise on the Law of Evidence in 1827,
33 Taylor in his Treatise on the Law of 
Evidence in 1848
34 and in the eleventh edition in 1920;
35 Powell in the 1859 second 
                                                 
26 The first edition of SM Phillipps’ Treatise on the Law of Evidence in 1814 (published in London by E & 
R Brooke & J Rider, and by E Rider) interprets Du Barré v Livette as authority only for the proposition 
that “[a] person who acts as interpreter between an attorney and his client, stands precisely in the same 
situation as the attorney himself, and under the same conditions of secrecy” and does not generalise the 
conclusion as Peake had done as early as 1801.  But when the second edition of Phillipps’ work was 
published a year later in 1815, the conclusion that privilege does not extend outside the legal profession 
had been generalised to read “[t]his privilege extends to the three enumerated cases of counsel, 
solicitor, and attorney; but it is confined to those cases alone” (Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 2
nd ed, 
London, J Butterworth and Son, 1815, p 104). 
 
27 Peake, T, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence, London, E & R Brooke & J Rider, 1801, p 128. This 
statement was still being repeated word for word in the 5
th edition in 1822 (London, J & WT Clarke). 
 
28 Phillipps, SM, Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 2
nd ed, London, J Butterworth and Son, 1815, p 104, 
where he wrote simply that “this privilege extends to the three enumerated cases of counsel, solicitor 
and attorney [but not elsewhere, where] ... it is much to be lamented that the law of privilege is not 
extended”.  His first edition in 1814 had not so generalised the precedential rule.  See note 26 supra. 
 
29 Phillipps, SM, Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 9
th ed, London, Saunders and Benning, 1843, Vol 1, p 
165, where he says more simply, “A confession to a clergyman is not privileged.” 
 
30 Roscoe, H, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, London, Joseph Butterworth and Son, 1827, p 72, where 
he said that “physicians, surgeons and divines are bound to disclose [confidential] communications”. 
 
31 Hawke, A, Roscoe’s Digest of the Law of Evidence,15
th ed., London, Stevens and Sons & Sweet and 
Maxwell Ltd, 1928, p 178, where it was said, “Other professional persons, whether physicians, surgeons 
or clergymen, have no such privilege”. 
 
32 Powell, M, ed, Roscoe’s Nisi Prius, 18
th ed, London, Stevens and Sweet and Maxwell, 1907, p172, 
where it was said, “So physicians, surgeons and divines are not privileged from compulsive disclosures 
of communications, howsoever confidential”. 
 
33 Gresley, RN, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, Philadelphia, Nicklin PH & Johnson T, 1837, p 281, 
where Gresley said that “the still more sacred confidence which criminals often repose in their spiritual 
adviser receives no recognised protection”. 
 
34 Taylor, JP, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, London, A Maxwell & Son, 1848, Vol 1, p 618, where 
he said, “[t]hus clergymen and medical men are bound to disclose any information, which by acting in 
their professional character they have confidentially acquired”, though he does discuss the conflicts 
which this strict rule invokes in its contest with the canonical rules of both the Catholic and Anglican 
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edition of his The Principles and Practice of the Law of Evidence,
36 (and by W Blake 
Odgers in the 1910 ninth edition called Powell’s Principles and Practice of the Law of 
Evidence
37); Hageman in his 1889 Privileged Communications as a Branch of Legal 
Evidence;
38 and Phipson in the 1892 first edition of his Law of Evidence
39 (though 
Phipson later reconsidered his research when he edited the eleventh edition of Best’s 
Law of Evidence in 1911
40); but Peake himself was cited as one of the authorities in 
Phillipps’ 1815
41 and 1843
42 editions. Peake’s decision to cite the Duchess of 
Kingston’s case as one of the authorities for the absence of both clerical and medical 
privileges
43 (though the Duchess’s case only dealt with medical privilege), seems 
also to have profoundly influenced the first edition of Roscoe’s Digest in 1827
44 and 
the second edition of Powell’s Principles and Practice in 1859,
45 since those authors 
_______________________ 
 
 
35 Matthews, JB & Spear, GF, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence by His Honour the Late Judge Pitt 
Taylor, London, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 1920, Vol 1, pp 622-624, where His Honour’s statement of the 
law is not varied at all and his discussion of canon law is merely reworded in part with no effective 
change in meaning. 
 
36 Powell, E, The Principles and Practice of the Law of Evidence, London, John Crockford, 1859, pp 79-
80, where Powell says, “[t]he rule of privileged communications ... does not extend to communications 
made confidentially to stewards, medical men or clergymen”, though he does note judicial “indisposition 
to receive communications made to clergymen as such”. 
 
37 Odgers, WB, Powell’s Principles and Practice of the Law of Evidence, 9
th ed, London, Butterworth & 
Co, 1910, where Odger’s rearranges the original Powell words, but not the meaning. 
 
38 Hageman, JF, Privileged Communications as a Branch of Legal Evidence, Littleton Colorado, Fred B 
Rothman & Co, reprint of the 1889 edition, pp 122-125, where he says “[t]he clerical minister, or priest ... 
is not privileged as attorneys and legal advisers are ... in the absence of statutory protection, clergymen 
are bound to disclose any information acquired by them confidentially in their professional character”. 
 
39 Phipson, SL, The Law of Evidence, London, Stevens and Haynes, 1892, p 109, where he says, 
“[p]rofessional privilege is strictly confined to the case of legal advisers; and does not extend to that of 
doctors, priests, confidential friends, clerks, stewards or pursuivants”. 
 
40 Phipson, SL, Of the Law of Evidence by the Late WM Best, 11
th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911. 
 
41 Phillipps, SM, Treatise on the Law of Evidence, London, J Butterworth and Son, 1815, p 104. 
 
42 Phillipps, SM, Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 9
th ed, London, Saunders and Benning, 1843, Vol 1, p 
165. 
 
43 Peake, T, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence, 5
th ed, London, J & WT Clarke, 1822, Vol 1, p 175. 
 
44 Roscoe, H, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, London, Joseph Butterworth and Son, 1827, p 72. 
 
45 Powell, E, The Principles and Practice of the Law of Evidence, London, John Crockford, 1859, p 79 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER ONE 
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cite the Duchess’s case as their only or principal authority (respectively) for the 
absence of a clerical privilege. 
 
Peake’s indirect influence on generations of subsequent judges and commentators 
cannot be fully calculated, though since his text is cited, he is certainly partly 
responsible for Park J’s proposition that R v Sparkes conclusively decided
46 that “a 
minister is bound to disclose what has been revealed to him as a matter of religious 
confession”.
47 
 
The error in R v Gilham
48
 
Richard Gilham was “tried and convicted ... in 1828 ... for the wilful murder of Maria 
Bagnall ... but [sentence] was respited ... in order that the opinion of the Judges might 
be taken whether the various confessions of the prisoner, after his interviews with the 
chaplain, ought ... to have been received in evidence”.
49  Gilham and Maria Bagnall 
had both been servants in the house of Mrs Coxe at Bath.  Gilham had been 
interviewed on various occasions about the murder, including an examination at the 
Coroner’s inquest into Maria Bagnall’s death.  The day after he was arrested, he 
admitted having stolen goods from Mrs Coxe, his employer, but steadfastly denied 
the murder, though he told the gaoler that he thought he would be hanged for his 
_______________________ 
 
. 
46 While they do not cite the Peake commentary that Park J cited, or indeed R v Sparkes, in citing R v 
Gilham as authority for the proposition that there is no religious confession privilege, JP Taylor (A 
Treatise on the Law of Evidence, London, A Maxwell & Son, 1848, Vol 1, p 618), Edward Smirke’s 10
th 
ed of Roscoe’s Nisi Prius (London, V & R Stevens and Sons & H Sweet and W Maxwell, 1861, p 142), 
JF Hageman (Privileged Communications as a Branch of Legal Evidence, Littleton Colorado, Fred B 
Rothman & Co, 1983 reprint of the 1889 edition, pp 122-123), as well as M Powell’s 1907 18
th ed of 
Roscoe’s Nisi Prius, all repeat Peake’s mistake. 
 
47 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 198; 168 ER 1235, 1239. 
 
48 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186; 168 ER 1235. 
 
49 Idem. 
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thefts.  The gaoler told him not to “add lies to crime”,
50 expressing his firm opinion 
that Gilham was guilty of Maria Bagnall’s murder as well, and suggesting that Gilham 
might find solace in reading the Bible and in talking with the chaplain of the gaol as a 
spiritual advisor. 
 
At length, Gilham accepted the gaoler’s invitation to meet the chaplain, and two 
extensive interviews with him on the same day followed.  In particular, the chaplain 
emphasised to Gilham the need for complete repentance, which entailed the 
confession of all his sins; the need to repair any injury done to his fellow man and to 
the laws of his country; and his belief that Gilham had done “the dreadful deed” and 
could not be reconciled to God without confession. 
 
After the chaplain departed, and despite a very clear caution from the gaoler that he 
was obliged to pass on anything he learned from Gilham to the mayor and 
magistrates, Gilham confessed his commission of Maria Bagnall’s murder to the 
gaoler.  The following day, the mayor saw Gilham in the gaoler’s room and said that 
he believed Gilham wanted to tell him something.  When Gilham affirmed that he did, 
the mayor cautioned him that anything he said “would probably be given in evidence 
against you”,
51 but Gilham confessed the murder anyway.  It was assumed in all the 
reported argument and in the judgements that the chaplain was a clergyman, and the 
argument revolved around the defence contention that the conviction could not be 
sustained because the confession had been “illegally obtained”.
52  Because Gilham’s 
confessions “were ... made under the influence of hopes and terrors created in the 
                                                 
50 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 187; 168 ER 1235. 
 
51 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 191; 168 ER 1235, 1237. 
 
52 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 193; 168 ER 1235, 1238. 
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prisoner’s mind, both by the gaoler and the chaplain; they were ... not voluntary and 
consequently were inadmissible”.
53  The prosecution countered that even if the 
confession made to the gaoler was “not receivable in evidence, still the confession 
made to the mayor was receivable”
54 since it had been preceded by a clear caution. 
 
It is evident that no clergyman or priest received a confession from Gilham, and 
neither Gilham nor such priest sought to assert a religious confession privilege in 
respect of any confessional communication.  All the argument in the case instead 
revolved around the question of whether the spiritual advice given by the chaplain 
amounted to an illegal inducement which invalidated the probative value of Gilham’s 
confessional evidence. 
 
While Mr Justice Littledale at first instance had thought that none of the mayor’s 
warnings to Gilham that his confession might be used against him “could do away 
with the effect which the chaplain had produced in his mind”,
55 Gilham’s case 
“differed from those cases where a confession [had] ... been made under 
circumstances which prevented its being received in evidence”.
56 
 Counsel for the 
prisoner sought to have the conviction set aside because the “confession or set of 
confessions [had been] illegally obtained”,
57 and he sought to favourably compare the 
spiritual inducements used to elicit the confessions in this case with other cases, 
                                                 
53 Idem. 
 
54 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 193; 168 ER 1235, 1237. 
 
55 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 193; 168 ER 1235, 1237. 
 
56 Idem. 
 
57 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 193; 168 ER 1235, 1238. 
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where the “undue means” used to elicit confession had invalidated that evidence, 
though that undue means involved only “the impression of hope or fear”.
58  
 
The case thus concerned the need for a more precise definition of what inducements 
would render general confessional evidence inadmissible.  Though the inducements 
relied upon in the argument were admittedly spiritual in nature, and while Richard 
Gilham may have felt that he confessed for a religious purpose, no religious 
confession privilege was asserted nor decided upon.  The one reference to the law of 
religious confession privilege arose in Park J’s commentary upon R v Radford,
59 
where Best CJ had “refused to allow the clergyman to state the confession”.
60  
 
Disagreeing with Best CJ’s refusal to allow confessional evidence to be given in R v 
Radford, Park J then opined – and it is this opinion that has been cited as authority 
for the absence of any religious confession privilege in English common law: 
 
And his lordship could not have excluded this evidence because it was a 
breach of confidence in the clergyman to give it, because a minister is bound 
to disclose what has been revealed to him as matter of religious confession, 
Rex v Sparkes, cited Peake, N.P.C. 79, 1 Starkie on Evidence, 105.
61 
 
Park J’s reliance upon the Peake and Starkie analysis of Buller J’s decision in R v 
Sparkes led him into error.  That error does not originate in the statement of what 
                                                 
58 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 194; 168 ER 1235, 1238. 
 
59 Unreported and only referenced in the Gilham report as an 1823 decision of Best CJ on circuit at the 
Exeter Summer Assizes. 
 
60 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 197; 168 ER 1235, 1239. 
 
61 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 198; 168 ER 1235, 1239. 
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was decided in R v Sparkes, but in Peake and Starkie’s failure to add that Buller J’s 
decision in that case had been disapproved by Kenyon CJ in Du Barré v Livette,
62 the 
only place where R v Sparkes had been mentioned at all. 
 
Peake’s failure to identify the difference between Buller J (R v Sparkes, unreported) 
and Kenyon CJ (Du Barré v Livette, reported) is the more difficult to understand since 
the only report available about either case was the report made of Du Barré v Livette 
by Peake himself.  Perhaps it can be fairly observed that Peake preferred the 
unreported conclusion of Buller J in R v Sparkes about religious confession privilege 
when he heard it cited by counsel in argument before Kenyon CJ in Du Barré v 
Livette, before Kenyon CJ rejected it.  If that is a fair observation, it is surely ironic 
that the reporter’s analysis of the common law where religious confession privilege is 
concerned, has prevailed over that of the Chief Justice of the day.  But in his 
enduring though brief reference to Peake and Starkie on the point in his judgement in 
R v  Gilham, Park J apparently knew none of this.  He simply relied on Peake’s 
summary of the law. 
 
The first edition of Peake’s A Compendium of the Law of Evidence in 1801
63 cites 
only R v Sparkes, an unreported case in 1790 and the Duchess of Kingston’s case
64 
(a 1776 case where the Duchess asserted that her communications as a patient with 
her physician were privileged) as authority for his conclusion that “a confession to a 
                                                 
62 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 86. 
 
63 Peake, T, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence, London, E & R Brooke and J Rider, 1801.  The 
authorities were unchanged in the 5
th edition (Peake, T, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence, 5
th ed, 
London, J & WT Clarke, 1822).  Though not the work Park J cited which was evidently Peake’s Nisi 
Prius Cases, the conclusion in Peak’s Compendium is consistent with what Park J drew from the 
different text by the same author. 
 
64 Duchess of Kingston’s case (1776) 20 Howells St. Tr. 612. 
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clergyman or priest ... [is] not within the protection of the law”.
65  Starkie’s 1824 
Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence
66 cites Peake’s Nisi Prius Cases (referred 
to by Park J), Butler v Moore
67 and Vaillant v Dodemead
68 as authority for his 
proposition that “it has ever been held that a minister is bound to disclose that which 
has been revealed to him in a matter of religious confession”.
69  The authors of his 
eighth American and fourth London edition in 1860,
70 citing only the additional 
authority of R v Gilham, make no change in Starkie’s original text. 
 
This blind following of earlier commentators without reference back to the primary 
case materials has misled later commentators and the judges who have relied on 
them into the mistaken view that religious confession privilege had no support 
whatever in common law. An accurate understanding of the decision in R v Sparkes 
and its limited value as precedential authority is an important step in disabusing 
modern lawyers of this error. 
 
 
                                                 
65 Peake, T, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence, London, E & R Brooke and J Rider, 1801, p 128.  
See also the same conclusion with the same limited authority in the 5
th edition in 1822 (Peake, T, A 
Compendium of the Law of Evidence, 5
th ed, London, J & WT Clarke, 1822, p 175). 
 
66 Starkie, T, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence, London, J & WT Clarke, 1824. 
 
67 Butler v Moore  (1804-1806) 2 Sch & Lef 249.  Butler v Moore is discussed in chapters four (pp 149-
150, 159) and five (pp 219, 221) where its dismissal as precedential authority by WM Best (A Treatise 
on the Principles of Evidence, London, S Sweet, 1849, pp 459-460) and Mayor Clinton as the Judge in 
an 1813 US case (The People v Phillips (1813) NY Ct. Gen. Sess., reprinted in “Privileged 
Communications to Clergymen”, The Catholic Lawyer 1 (1955) 198) on account of its marked anti-
Catholic bias, are referenced. 
 
68 Vaillant v Dodemead (1743) 2 Atk 524; 26 ER 715.  This case about legal professional privilege with 
only generalised comment confining privilege to “persons of the profession, as counsel, solicitor or 
attorney” is discussed in detail in chapter four, p 140. 
 
69 Starkie, T, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence, London, J & WT Clarke, 1824, Vol 1, p 105. 
 
70 Starkie, T, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence, Doudeswell, GM and Malcolm, JG, eds, 
Philadelphia, T & JW Johnson & Co, 1860, p 40. 
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The error in Wheeler v LeMarchant 
71 
The issue in Wheeler v LeMarchant
 was whether legal professional privilege 
extended to protect communications between a solicitor and his client’s surveyor.  
That submission was denied on the simple grounds that while germane to the subject 
matter of the litigation, the written exchanges before the dispute arose were not 
communications by or with a “representative ... employed as an agent ... to obtain the 
legal advice of the solicitor”.
72  Sir George Jessel MR’s full obiter quotation cited by 
both Powell’s 9
th edition
73 and Taylor’s 11th
74 reads as follows: 
 
[T]he principle [protecting confidential communications] is of a very limited 
character.  It does not protect all confidential communications which a man 
must necessarily make in order to obtain advice necessary even for the 
protection of his life, or of his honour, to say nothing of his fortune.  There are 
many communications which are quite unprotected, but which must be made 
because, without such communications being made, the ordinary business of 
life cannot be carried on.  The communication made to a medical man, whose 
advice is sought by a patient with respect to the probable origin of the disease 
as to which he is consulted, and which must necessarily be made in order to 
enable the medical man to advise or to prescribe for the patient, is not 
protected.  All communications made to the priest in the confessional, on 
matters perhaps considered by the penitent to be more important even than 
                                                 
71 Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675; 50 LJ Ch 793; [1881-5] All ER 1807. 
 
72 Wheeler v LeMarchant [1881-5] All ER 1807, 1811 per Cotton LJ. 
 
73 Odgers, WB, Powell’s Principles and Practice of the Law of Evidence, 9
th ed, London, Butterworth & 
Co, 1910, p 240. 
 
74 Matthews, JB and Spear, GF, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence by His Honour the late Judge Pitt 
Taylor, 11
th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 1920, Vol 1, p 622. 
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the care of his life or his fortune, are not protected.  Communications made to 
a friend with respect to matters of the most delicate nature on which advice is 
sought, with respect to a man’s honour or reputation, are not protected.  
Therefore it must not be supposed that there is any principle which says that 
every confidential communication which, in order to carry on the ordinary 
business of life, is necessary to be made, is protected.  The protection is of a 
very limited character.  It is a protection in this country restricted to the 
obtaining the assistance of lawyers as regards the conduct of litigation, or the 
rights to property.  It has never gone beyond the obtaining legal advice and 
assistance, and all things necessary in the shape of communication to the 
legal advisers are protected from production or discovery, in order that that 
legal advice may be obtained safely and sufficiently.
75 
 
No authority was cited anywhere in Sir George Jessel’s judgement.  Two cases were 
cited in Brett LJ’s judgement when, with Cotton LJ, he concurred in the result, but 
neither is relevant to religious confession privilege.  However, the report indicates 
that Anderson v Bank of British Columbia
76 was referred to in argument.  This was a 
case in the Court of Appeal over which Sir George Jessel presided as Master of the 
Rolls six years earlier.  Since he cited authority for his similar obiter denial of religious 
confession privilege in Anderson v Bank of British Columbia, it is appropriate to 
review his reasoning there to determine whether it supports his restated denial of 
religious confession privilege in Wheeler v LeMarchant. 
 
                                                 
75 Wheeler v LeMarchant [1881-5] All ER 1807, 1809. 
 
76 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) LR 2 Ch D 644; [1874-80] All ER 396.  Anderson is also 
cited by some commentators as authority for the non-existence of religious confession privilege at 
common law (for example, GD Nokes ( “Professional privilege” (1950) 66 LQR 88, p 98 note 56 who 
does not accept the proposition outright).  But it is not mentioned at all by Phipson, Odgers rewriting 
Powell, or any of the editions of Cross here cited. 
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In Anderson v Bank of British Columbia,
77 the English Court of Appeal declined a 
submission that legal professional privilege extended to cover information prepared 
for the client by its overseas bank after litigation had started even though it was 
argued that the client’s request for information was a direct and necessary result of 
his solicitor’s request for the information.  While it was accepted that the privilege 
extended “to all communications made by the client to the solicitor through 
intermediate agents”,
78 and though the client submitted that his London bank was in 
fact acting as his solicitor’s agent for the purposes of collecting the requisite 
information from Canada,
79 the court did not accept that the bank “in transmitting that 
information, was discharging a duty which properly devolved upon the solicitor”.
80  
For Mellish LJ, “the object here was, not to obtain evidence, but to learn what the 
facts were, in order to know whether the claim should be resisted”.
81  The statements 
confirm the English Court of Appeal’s late nineteenth century conviction that 
evidential privileges should be construed narrowly so as to ensure that all the 
relevant evidence might be available for consideration. 
 
Sir George Jessel MR quoted only Lord Cottenham’s decision in Reid v Langlois
82 
before stating that the common law “has not extended that privilege, as some foreign 
laws have, to the medical profession, or to the sacerdotal profession”.
83 Lord 
Cottenham had said: 
                                                 
77 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) LR 2 Ch D 644; [1874-80] All ER 396.  
 
78 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) LR 2 Ch D 644, 649 per Jessel MR.  
 
79 Ibid, p 650 per Jessel MR. 
 
80 Ibid, p 652 per Jessel MR. 
 
81 Ibid, p 655. 
 
82 Reid v Langlois (1849) 1 Mac & G 627; 41 ER 1408. 
 
83 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) LR 2 Ch D 644, 650.  In 1880, Sir George Jessel MR 
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Now the argument turned on this, that although a party may communicate 
with his legal advisor, and that production of the documents arising out of that 
communication will be protected, yet if the message is sent through a third 
person in writing it is not protected.  It is obvious that no such distinction as 
this can be maintained; the object is to protect the party who wishes to take 
the advice of professional men.
84 
 
Sir George Jessel MR elaborated “that privilege” further: 
 
We know that in some foreign countries communications made to a medical 
man are privileged upon the ground that it is desirable that a man shall be 
perfectly free in his communication with his medical man as that he shall be 
free in his communications with his lawyer.  That has not been recognised in 
this country.  Again, in foreign countries where the Roman Catholic faith 
prevails, it is considered that the same principles ought to be extended to the 
confessional, and that it is desirable that a man should not be hampered in 
going to confession by the thought that either he or his priest may be 
compelled to disclose in a Court of Justice the substance of what passed in 
such communication.  This, again, whether it is rational or irrational, is not 
recognised by our law.  When Lord Cottenham says “professional men” he 
means members of the legal profession and nothing else – “and he would be 
_______________________ 
 
genealogist in supporting a formal protest against a pedigree was not acting in the same capacity as a 
barrister or solicitor.  Indeed, he put the matter quite simply in terms reflective of his reasoning in 
Anderson when he said “professional advice in England is confined to legal advice” (Slade v Tucker 
(1881) LR 14 Ch D 824, 827).   
 
84 As quoted by Sir George Jessel MR in Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) LR 2 Ch D 644, 
650. 
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prevented from taking such advice if there was the hazard of having it 
revealed on entering into a contest with an opponent”.
85  
 
Of the four judges who heard the appeal in Anderson v Bank of British Columbia in 
the Court of Appeal,
86 only Sir George Jessel MR and James LJ commented on the 
common law as to the state of religious confession privilege.
87  When one reviews the 
cases referred to in argument
88 and more particularly those referred to in all seven 
judgements (that is, in both Anderson v Bank of British Columbia and Wheeler v 
LeMarchant), there is no reference to any case that dealt directly with religious 
confession privilege.
89  All of the cases discussed were about the metes and bounds 
of legal professional privilege.  It does not seem that any of these judges considered 
that religious confession privilege might have been a separate and discrete head of 
privilege from that which Lord Cottenham had discussed as the privilege of 
professional men.
90 
 
                                                 
85 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) LR 2 Ch D 644, 650-651. 
 
86 Jessel MR, James LJ, Mellish LJ and Baggally JA. 
 
87 The other two judges were Brett and Cotton LJJ. 
 
88 In Anderson v Bank of British Columbia, those cases were Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 1 My & K 98; 
Reid v Langlois (1849) 1 Mac & G 627; 41 ER 1408; Curling v Perring (1835) 2 My & K 380; 39 ER 989; 
Steele v Stewart (1843) 1 Ph 471; 41 ER 711; Lafone v Falkland Islands Company (1857) 4 K & J 34; 70 
ER 14, 17; Ross v Gibbs (1869) Law Rep 8 Eq 522; Woolley v North London Railway Company (1869) 
Law Rep 4 CP 602; Casey v London Brighton and South Coast Railway Company (1870) Law Rep 5 CP 
146; Skinner v Great Northern Railway Company (1874) Law Rep 9 Ex 298; and Chartered Bank of 
India v Rich (1863) 4 B & S 73; 32 LJ (QB) 300; 122 ER 387. 
 
89 The cases referred to earlier in this chapter (R v Sparkes, Du Barré v Livette and R v  Gilham), 
despite their errors, are not mentioned and neither are Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528; 
R v Wild (1835) 1 Moody 452; 168 ER 1341; R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219 and R v Hay (1860) 2 
Foster & Finlason 4; 175 ER 933 which are treated in subsequent chapters and more directly approach 
the point. 
 
90 In chapters two and three, I document the origins of religious confession privilege long before legal 
professional privilege was mooted.  A significant portion of chapter four will identify the confusion that 
has resulted from a failure to recognise the separate existence of the two privileges despite some 
superficial similarities. 
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The context of Lord Justice James’ obiter comment about religious confession 
privilege, was again the need to define legal professional privilege.  He observed that 
the established legal professional privilege rule had not been changed by Vice-
Chancellor Stuart’s “casual and hasty generalization [in Ross v Gibbs
91] not called for 
by the facts of the case”.
92  In Ross v Gibbs, the Vice-Chancellor was submitted to 
have licensed the argument “that any communication made by a person with a view 
to litigation, whoever that person is, must be protected”.
93  Lord Justice James’ recoil 
was: 
 
If the rule had been as was supposed to be laid down in that case, all that is 
said in text books by learned authors with regard to the origin of the principle, 
and with regard to the justification of the privilege – all that is said about its 
being confined to lawyers and not extending to doctors and priests ... the 
whole of that would be, to my mind, puerile nonsense.
94 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, Lord Justice James’ observation appears ironically as a 
“hasty generalization” in its own right.  For this comment about religious confession 
privilege was unnecessary in a case about the metes and bounds of legal 
professional privilege when litigation was in prospect, and he cited no authority.  And 
the irony is deeper than that.  For neither Vice-Chancellor Stuart nor Lord Cottenham 
had any idea that they were generalising about religious communications privilege 
when they wrote their respective judgements in Reid v Langlois
95 and Ross v 
                                                 
91 Ross v Gibbs (1869) Law Reports 8 Eq 522. 
 
92 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) Law Reports 2 Ch D 644, 656. 
 
93 Idem. 
 
94 Idem. 
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Gibbs.
96 Certainly these two “casual and hasty generalizations [were] not called for 
by the facts of [the Anderson v Bank of British Columbia] case”
97 and equally 
represent a departure from the common law
98 where religious confession privilege is 
concerned.  Though they concurred in the result in Anderson v Bank of British 
Columbia, neither Mellish LJ nor Baggallay JA saw any similar need to generalise. 
Wheeler v LeMarchant is the decision of Sir George Jessel MR most often cited as 
authority for the absence of a religious confession privilege at common law after 
1890.  For example, when Phipson wrote his original text in 1892,
99 he wrote: 
 
Professional privilege is strictly confined to the case of legal advisers; and 
does not extend to that of doctors, priests, confidential friends (Wheeler v 
LeMarchant 17 Ch.D. 681), clerks, stewards, or  pursuivants of the Herald’s 
College employed to oppose enrolment of a pedigree (Slade v Tucker, 14 
Ch.D. 824).
100  (Italics original) 
 
However, when he added full notes to his eleventh edition of Best’s Law of 
Evidence,
101 (including comments on Wheeler v LeMarchant) to the extended 
coverage of Best’s original text
102 which had doubted the common interpretive denial 
_______________________ 
 
 
96 Ross v Gibbs (1869) Law Rep 8 Eq 522. 
 
97 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) Law Reports 2 Ch D 644, 656 per James LJ. 
 
98 Idem. 
 
99 Phipson, SL, The Law of Evidence, London, Stevens and Haynes, 1892. 
 
100 Ibid, p 109. 
 
101 Phipson, SL, Of the Law of Evidence by the late WM Best, 11
th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911. 
 
102 Best, WM, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, London, S. Sweet, 1849. 
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of religious confession privilege,
103 Phipson was more guarded.  He also left intact 
both Best’s doubt of the standard denials of the privilege
104 and Best’s certainty that 
there was a religious confession privilege “previous to the Reformation”.
105  On this 
occasion, Phipson wrote of Wheeler v LeMarchant: 
 
In 1881, ... where the question was whether letters between solicitors and 
surveyors were privileged, and the court held that they were not, with the 
exception of those prepared confidentially after dispute, Jessel, M.R., 
observed that “the principle protecting confidential communications is of a 
very limited character”, and that, amongst others, “communications made to a 
priest in the confessional, in matters perhaps considered by the penitent to be 
more important even than his life or his fortune, are not protected”.
106 
 
However, Phipson’s rather more direct statement in the 5
th edition of his own work,
107 
suggest that he believed strong obiter statements in Normanshaw v Normanshaw,
108 
Gedge v Gedge
109 and Wheeler v LeMarchant put the extinction of religious 
confession privilege beyond doubt.  In that work, he wrote that “the privilege attaching 
                                                 
103 Ibid, pp 458-460. 
 
104 Best, WM, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, London, S. Sweet, 1849, pp 458-460 and 
Phipson, SL, Of the Law of Evidence by the late WM Best, 11
th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911, pp 
561-563. 
 
105 Best, WM, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, London, S. Sweet, 1849, pp 460-463 and 
Phipson, SL,  Of the Law of Evidence by the late WM Best, 11
th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911, pp 
563-567. 
 
106 Phipson, SL, Of the Law of Evidence by the late WM Best, 11
th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911, 
pp 562-563. 
 
107 Phipson, SL, The Law of Evidence, 5
th ed, London, Stevens and Haynes, 1911. 
 
108 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468.  This case is discussed in chapters four (pp 159 
and 162) and five (pp 184-187). 
 
109 Gedge v Gedge cited only from 1909 newspaper reports in Phipson (Globe, 13 July 1909 and Times 
14 July 1909), “where a claim made by a cleric to withhold a communication to his Bishop was 
disallowed” (Phipson, op cit, Book II, p 188). 
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to confidential professional disclosures is confined to the case of legal advisers and 
does not protect those made to clergymen”
110 despite what he had written the same 
year in his 11
th edition of Best’s work which is quoted above.  
 
The editors of the 13
th edition of his work in 1982
111 seem equally convinced in their 
straightforward assertion that “[t]he privilege does not protect disclosures made to 
clergymen”,
112 citing again Normanshaw v Normanshaw, Gedge v Gedge and 
Wheeler v LeMarchant.  However, like Phipson himself, they do not acknowledge 
Jeune P’s prefatory comments in Normanshaw v Normanshaw  “that each case of 
confidential communication should be dealt with on its own merits [though] ... in the 
present instance, he saw no reason why the witness should not speak as to his 
conversation with the respondent”.
113  
 
While Odgers, who rewrote and rearranged Powell’s Principles and Practice of the 
Law of Evidence, in the ninth edition,
114 notes Best, Stephen and Taylor’s objections 
to the simple assertion that “[c]ommunications to clergymen and priests are strictly 
not privileged”,
115 he concludes his commentary with a full quote from Jessel MR in 
Wheeler v LeMarchant dismissing the privilege.
116  However, he does not include any 
                                                 
110 Ibid, Book II, p 188. 
 
111 Buzzard, JH, May, R and Howard, MN, Phipson on Evidence, 13
th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1982. 
 
112 Ibid, para 15-09.  However, these authors concede idem that “there exists a strong body of opinion 
against the enforcement of the rule”, citing R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219; Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 
Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528; R v Hay (1860) 2 Foster & Finlason 4; 175 ER 933; Re Keller (1887) 22 LR Ir 
158; Tannian v Synott (1903) Ir LT 275 and Ruthven v De Bour (1901) 45 Sol J 272. 
 
113 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468, 469. 
 
114 Odgers, WB, Powell’s Principles and Practice of the Law of Evidence, 9
th ed, London, Butterworths, 
1910. 
 
115 Ibid, p 240. 
 
116 Idem.  The full quote is recorded in context supra at pp 25-26. 
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indication that this obiter statement was made in a case about extending legal 
professional privilege to surveyors. Taylor’s 1928 authors
117 similarly cite the same 
full quote from Jessel MR in Wheeler v LeMarchant
118 to justify their statement that 
“clergymen and medical men are bound to disclose any information which by acting 
in their professional character they have confidentially acquired”
119 without noting its 
obiter context. 
 
Both Cross on Evidence’s seventh English edition
120 and its sixth Australian edition
121 
cite Sir George Jessel MR’s “dictum” in Wheeler v LeMarchant “against the existence 
of the privilege”,
122 though with some variation in the strength of the statements 
against the existence of religious confession privilege.  While the 1990 English 
version of the text says that “the opinion of all the text-writers ... is against the 
existence of any privilege”,
123 and the 2000 Australian edition bluntly states “[t]here is 
no such privilege at common law”,
124 both note that it “must have existed at the time 
of the Reformation”.
125 
 
                                                 
117 Matthews, JB and Spear, GF, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence by His Honour the late Judge Pitt 
Taylor, 11
th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 1920. 
 
118 Ibid, Vol 1, p 622. 
 
119 Idem. 
 
120 Cross, Sir R and Tapper, C, Cross on Evidence 7
th ed, Butterworths, London, Dublin, Edinburgh, 
1990. 
 
121 Heydon, JD, Cross on Evidence 6
th Australian ed, Butterworths, Sydney, Adelaide, Brisbane, 
Canberra, Melbourne, Perth, 2000. 
 
122 Cross, Sir R and Tapper, C, op cit, p 447; Heydon, JD, op cit, p 743. 
 
123 Cross, Sir R and Tapper, C, op cit, p 447. 
 
124 Heydon, JD, op cit, p 743. 
 
125 Cross, Sir R and Tapper, C, op cit, p 447; Heydon JD, op cit, p 743. 
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As will be seen, Nokes’ gloss on Sir George Jessel MR’s dictum in Wheeler v 
LeMarchant as one of many cases “extending over 250 years which suggest or 
assert that no privilege exists”,
126 is much more accurate.  He also points up the 
irrelevance of many of the cases that are cited against the privilege.
127  McNicol has 
similarly cited Sir George Jessel MR’s dictum behind her observation that there is “a 
paucity of judicial authority to support the claim that there is no privilege arising out of 
the priest-penitent relationship”.
128 
 
Sir George Jessel MR’s often quoted denial that a religious confession privilege has 
ever existed in English law, is thus questionable. 
 
Conclusion to chapter one 
The primary materials underlying the nineteenth century commentary on the law of 
evidence have not been adequately considered.  When the facts of the decisions in R 
v Sparkes (1790) as reported in Du Barré v Livette (1791), R v Gilham(1828) and 
Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) are reviewed against the denial of any religious 
confession privilege attributed to them by the majority of the text writers, it is difficult 
to accept that they justify that authority. It is similarly difficult to accept the bald 
proposition that either Buller J’s opinion in R v Sparkes or Park J’s statement of his 
understanding of the law in R v Gilham could have changed the pre-existing law 
(whatever that was) since Chief Justice Kenyon contemporaneously disagreed with 
Buller J and Park J was clearly mislead by Peake and Starkies’ commentary. But Sir 
George Jessel MR’s obiter statements in Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) 
                                                 
126 Nokes, GD, “Professional Privilege”, 66 LQR 88, 97-98. 
 
127 Ibid, pp 96-97. 
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and Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) stand in a different category since they can be 
interpreted as his simple assertion of what the common law of England had become, 
regardless of the past.  Before that interpretation can be weighed, it is necessary to 
identify what the law relating to religious confession privilege was in the past – and 
since that law originated in custom, the next part of the thesis will closely review the 
relevant custom in its social and canon law historical context.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE 
IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of chapters two and three of the thesis is to demonstrate with historical 
and canonical evidence, that religious confession was practised and privileged in law 
before the Magna Carta was signed in 1215.  It was still practised, privileged and 
recognised in legal practice in the seventeenth century when Sir Edward Coke 
published his Second Part of the Institutes.
1 This part of the thesis will therefore 
attempt to rebut Wigmore’s assertion that: 
 
[t]he only available data [in favour of pre-Reformation common law religious 
confession privilege] appear to be an indecisive incident in the Jesuit trials 
under James I, and a statute of much earlier date and ambiguous purport, 
together with the general probabilities to be drawn from the recognition of 
Papal ecclesiastical practices prior to Henry VIII.
2 
 
                                                 
1 Coke, Sir E, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, New York, Garland Publishing 
Co, 1979.  Coke’s Second Part of the Institutes is believed to have been published some time between 
1630 and 1640, after Charles I (1625 – 1649) initially banned publication (Hostettler J, Sir Edward Coke, 
a force for freedom, Chichester, Barry Rose Publishers Ltd, 1997, pp xiv, 160).  
 
2 Wigmore, JH, Evidence in trials at common law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown, 
1961, Vol 8, p 869. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER TWO  
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Chapter two will focus on the historical materials and chapter three on the 
significance of the canonical law and practice.  However, to enable modern lawyers 
to correctly understand the historical and canonical evidence that will be cited, 
chapter two will begin by reminding readers that some modern ideas must be set 
aside to understand historical evidence.  Specifically, the modern idea that the church 
and state do and must always live in separate and distinct domains, does not help a 
modern lawyer understand the significance of historical and canonical materials.   
Similarly, the modern idea that the common law is what one finds in the cases, does 
not assist understanding before those cases were reported at all or before they were 
reported in a consistent and scholarly way.  Lawyers in different times have 
understood the relationship between case law and statute law as common law in 
different ways.  Custom and practice played a much larger role in the formation of 
common law before there were extensive law reports. 
 
The evidence then considered will include Sir Edward Coke’s recognition of religious 
confession privilege in his Second Part of the Institutes
3 on the strength of the Statute 
Articuli Cleri in 1315;
4 the validity of his assertion that treason was an exception to 
the privileges of the church known as “sanctuary and abjuration”, “benefit of clergy” 
and “priviledge of confession”; that “benefit of clergy” and “priviledge of confession” 
were separate ‘privileges’; and the facts, reasoning and decision in Garnet’s case in 
1606
5 when religious confession privilege was defensively asserted in a highly 
antagonistic environment. 
 
                                                 
3 Coke, op cit, p 629. 
 
4 9 Edward II St.1. 
 
5 Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217. 
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Chapter three will consider the origins of the seal of confession in canon law and its 
recognition in secular law; King Henry VIII’s retention of the existing established 
religious doctrines and practices (including the seal of confession with penalty) 
despite his religious reformation; and the historical and current influence of canon law 
upon secular law where religious confession privilege is concerned.  In particular it 
will weigh the conservative opinions of Bursell
6 and others
7 to the effect that 
ecclesiastical law is still “a part of the general law of [England]”
8 against the more 
liberal implication of Doe
9 and others
10 that any residual effects of canon law may 
now be discounted when they collide with the dictates of secular policy.  Despite his 
pessimistic conclusion that the common law protection of religious confession 
privilege was probably lost during the centuries of Catholic persecution which 
followed the English Reformation, Nolan’s arguments in favour of the existence of 
religious confession privilege in common law until at least after Coke, will be 
reviewed for contemporary relevance.
11 
 
I conclude chapters two and three with the finding that religious confession was 
practised and privileged  in legal practice before and after the English Reformation.  
Accordingly, Wigmore’s discounting of the available historical materials documenting 
                                                 
6 Bursell, Judge RDH, “The Seal of the Confessional”,7 Ecclesiastical Law Journal (1990) 84. 
 
7 For example, Finlason’s editorial comments on R v Hay (1860) 2 Foster & Fin 4; 175 ER 933; Badeley, 
E, The Privilege of Religious Confessions in English Courts of Justice considered in a letter to a Friend, 
London, Butterworths, 1865 and Winckworth, P, The Seal of the Confessional and the Law of Evidence, 
London, S.P.C.K., 1952. 
 
8 Bursell, op cit, p 108. 
 
9 Doe, N, The Legal Framework of the Church of England, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996 p 354. 
 
10 For example Nokes, CD, “Professional Privilege” [1950] 66 LQR 88,101; Elliott, DW, “An Evidential 
Privilege for Priest-Penitent Communications”, 16 Ecclesiastical Law Journal (1995) 272 and Leeder, L, 
Ecclesiastical Law Handbook, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, p 555. 
 
11 Nolan, RS, “The Law of the Seal of Confession”, (1913) 13 Catholic Encyclopedia 649. 
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religious confession privilege was an inaccurate gloss upon them.  More evidence 
was available than Garnet’s case
12 which he characterised as “an indecisive incident 
in the Jesuit trials under James I”
13 and the Statute Articuli Cleri,
14 which he said was 
of “ambiguous purport”.
15  His mere acknowledgment of the “general probabilities to 
be drawn from the recognition of Papal ecclesiastical practices prior to Henry VIII”
16 is 
also the reasonable subject of criticism.  The seal of confession as a sacrament of 
the Catholic Church was never, as Wigmore asserts, only an “ecclesiastical 
practice”,
17 and endures in established Anglican canon law to the present day.
18  
 
The problem with modern perspective 
Both Milsom
19 and Helmholz
20 say that modern lawyers frequently misunderstand 
historical legal practice and institutions because they assume an “anachronistic 
viewpoint”.
21  They ask “unreal questions ... [that are] preoccupied with today’s 
details”
22 that would have no meaning to a medieval English layperson, let alone a 
                                                 
12 Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217. 
 
13 Wigmore, JH, Evidence in trials at common law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little 
Brown, 1961, Vol 8, p 869. 
 
14 9 Edward II St.1. 
 
15 Wigmore, op cit, Vol 8, p 869. 
 
16 Idem. 
 
17 Wigmore, op cit, Vol.8, p 869. 
 
18 See the report of “The Clergy Discipline Working Group” 
(www.anglican.org.au/generalsynod2001/presynod/book4/CLERGY%20Discipline.doc  last visited 5 July 
2003). 
 
19 Milsom, SFC, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London, Butterworths, 1969. 
 
20 Helmholz, RH, Canon Law and the Law of England, London and Ronceverte, Hambledon Press, 
1987. 
 
21 Milsom, op cit, p xii; Helmholz, op cit, p 101. 
 
22 Idem. 
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medieval English lawyer, if there were such a person.
23  Two particular modern 
patterns of thinking have to be recognised if the origins and place of religious 
confession privilege in English common law are to be correctly understood.  Those 
patterns are the modern notion that church and state are or should be legally 
separate, and the idea that the common law is that body of reported judicial 
decisions, separate from the statutes, which provides guidance as to what the courts 
will do in the future when faced with similar cases.  
 
Church and state  
To someone living in the twelfth century in England, the very concept of the 
separation between church and state
24 is hard, if not impossible, to comprehend.  In 
that hypothetical person’s mind, there was no separation between the church and the 
state and the two together constituted the governing influence in life.  They presided 
at birth and marriage, and they pronounced upon the disposal of goods following 
death.
25  The idea of any separation between church and state “introduces a sort of 
polytheism utterly repugnant to medieval thought”.
26  It thus requires a change in 
thinking if twenty-first century lawyers are to understand the role of the church in 
medieval England.  The idea that ecclesiastical courts had final legal jurisdiction in 
                                                 
23 While Paul Brand traces the origin of the English legal profession to the twelfth century (The Origins of 
the English Legal Profession, Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA, Blackwell, 1992), he is not convinced 
that such lawyers as there were could be described as anything more than “narrators” (ibid, p 85) in that 
century.  It is not until the late thirteenth century in the reign of Edward I when he finds “controls on 
practice” (ibid, p 115) and “the education of professional attorneys” (ibid, p 119) that he is satisfied with 
the use of the term, “the legal profession”. 
 
24 Plucknett says that it is Machiavelli (1469-1527) “who gave us the word ‘state’ and filled it with the 
content we now associate with it” (Plucknett, TFT, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5
th ed, 
London, Butterworths, 1956, p 41). 
 
25 Pollock, Sir F, & Maitland, FM, The History of English Law, 2
nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 1968, 
Vol 1, p 439, and Holdsworth, WS, A History of English Law, 2
nd ed, Boston, Little Brown and Co, 1923, 
Vol 1, pp 614-632. 
 
26 Plucknett, op cit, p 40. 
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questions of marriage, bigamy, divorce and adultery, estate administration, crime and 
contract,
27 is unfamiliar to us. Pollock and Maitland helped explain this involvement of 
the church in secular matters when they wrote: 
 
Every layman, unless he were a Jew, was subject to ecclesiastical law.  It 
regulated many affairs of his life, marriages, divorces, testaments, intestate 
succession; it would try and punish him for various offences, for adultery, 
fornication, defamation; it would constrain him to pay tithes and other similar 
dues; in the last resort it could excommunicate him and then the state would 
come to its aid.  Even the Jews ... were ... within the sphere of ecclesiastical 
legislation and subject to some of the processes of the spiritual courts.
28 
 
Though complete ecclesiastical jurisdiction in criminal matters endured beyond the 
twelfth century only in respect of the clergy,
29 the essential and continuing premise 
for the church interest in criminal matters arose out of its acknowledged jurisdiction 
over matters of sin.
30  Where matters arising from marriage were concerned, 
                                                 
27 Holdsworth says that the church “claimed criminal jurisdiction in all cases in which a[n ecclesiastical] 
clerk was the accused”; contractual jurisdiction where its justification was the need “to enforce all 
promises made with oath or pledge of faith”; and “jurisdiction over matrimonial and testamentary causes” 
(op cit, p 614), which last jurisdictions were not really removed from the church until 1857 when Probate 
and Divorce Courts were established by the Statute 20, 21 Victoria c 77 and c 85 respectively 
(Holdsworth, ibid, pp 624, 630). 
 
28 Pollock, Sir F, & Maitland, FM, The History of English Law, 2
nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 1968, 
Vol 1, p 439. 
 
29 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 615. 
 
30 Helmholz says “that the medieval and ecclesiastical courts regularly exercised jurisdiction over 
secular crimes like theft and murder” (Helmholz, RH, Canon Law and the Law of England, London and 
Ronceverte, The Hambledon Press, 1987, p 120), particularly where such jurisdiction was “allowed by 
local custom or where secular justice was not available to punish a crime” (p 122).  However, he adds 
the insight even when secular justice did provide a remedy “[c]ommission of a secular crime ... clearly 
might bar a man from seeking ordination ... for crimes were also sins and must therefore have brought 
the sinner within the Church’s admitted competence” (p 122).  Berman observes that the real issue was 
the church’s effective denial of jurisdiction over sin to the secular courts from the end of the eleventh 
century.  From that time onwards, a “sharp procedural distinction” meant that “[a]ny act punishable by 
royal or other law officials was [t]henceforth ... punished as a violation of secular law and not as sin ... RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER TWO  
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Holdsworth notes simply that “the temporal courts had no doctrine of marriage”.
31  He 
then points up the complexities of the jurisdiction thus left to the church since issues 
of dowry, inheritance, legitimacy, de facto marriage, and divorce all fell into church 
jurisdiction by practical consequence.
32 
 
In what became the law of contract, it was the element of a promise with a religious 
oath that both attracted and justified in medieval minds ecclesiastical involvement 
and some parallel jurisdiction, even while the royal courts sought complete control.
33 
The Church was thus an omnipresent player in medieval life.  It was as involved in 
the regulation of day-to-day life as the modern state and could invoke the aid of the 
King’s officers to apprehend and force compliance from its recalcitrants.
34  In any 
event, “the temporal consequences of excommunication [which was the most severe 
penalty that the church could invoke] were obvious”.
35  Quoting Bracton (thirteenth 
century), Holdsworth notes that: 
 
_________________________ 
 
[against the] law of God” (Berman, HJ, Law and Revolution: The formulation of the Western Legal 
Tradition”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1983, pp 185-
186). 
 
31 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 622. 
 
32 Idem. 
 
33 Helmholz observes that while the ecclesiastical court judges would obey a writ of prohibition from the 
King instructing them to stop their trial in a temporal matter, the church would often have the last word 
by threatening ecclesiastical sanctions against the litigants in the temporal court if they continued their 
use of the royal judicial machinery (see op cit, chapter five, “Writs of Prohibition and Ecclesiastical 
Sanctions in the English Courts Christian”, p 77). 
 
34 Holdsworth says that “[t]he process by which the ecclesiastical courts enforced obedience to their 
decrees was excommunication ... If the excommunicate did not submit within forty days, the 
ecclesiastical court signified this to the Crown, and thereon a writ de excommunicato capiendo issued to 
the sheriff.  He took the offender and kept him in prison till he submitted.  When he submitted the bishop 
signified this, and a writ de excommunicato deliberando issued” (Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, pp 630-631). 
 
35 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 631. 
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[a]n excommunicated person ... cannot do any legal act, so that he cannot 
act, or sue anyone, though he himself may be sued ... And if he has obtained 
a writ it is not valid.  For except in certain cases, it is not lawful either to pray 
or speak or eat with an excommunicate either openly or secretly”.
36 
 
Holdsworth observes that the law is not much altered in Blackstone’s day (eighteenth 
century), when an excommunicate still “cannot ... serve upon juries, cannot be 
witness in any court, and ... cannot bring an action either real or personal, to recover 
lands or money due to him”.
37  The Church’s place at the centre of what we now 
consider very secular matters, gave it a position of privilege that is unfamiliar in the 
absence of extensive ecclesiastical jurisdiction.  But in Bracton’s time, the word 
‘privilege’ itself was used to earmark that piece of ecclesiastical jurisdiction which 
was reluctantly preserved to the church even after the King’s secular courts had 
assumed general criminal jurisdiction.
38  
 
Thus, if someone from Bracton’s (thirteenth century) or Henry VIII’s (sixteenth 
century) England were asked whether the law recognised a religious confession 
privilege, the question would cause confusion.  Milsom and Helmholz are right.
39  To 
obtain a meaningful answer, we would have to ask different questions – perhaps, 
“Would a judge in one of the King’s temporal courts ever ask a priest to disclose a 
                                                 
36 Idem. 
 
37 Idem. 
 
38 “Privilegium clericale” or ‘benefit of clergy’ is discussed infra, pp 61-66.  By successfully claiming to be 
a member of the clergy, a person accused of crime was delivered into the relevant Bishop’s custody for 
trial in the Bishop’s court. Church courts would not adjudicate capital punishment though even pre-trial 
imprisonment could last for years (Pollock, Sir F, & Maitland, FM, The History of English Law, 2
nd ed, 
Cambridge University Press, 1968, Vol 1, p 444). 
 
39 Milsom, SFC, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London, Butterworths, 1969, p xii; 
Helmholz, RH, Canon Law and the Law of England, London and Ronceverte, Hambledon Press, 1987, p 
101.  See also notes 19-23 and supporting text. 
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secret learned in the confessional, and would that judge send the priest to gaol if 
disclosure of such secrets was refused?”  Both questions would be answered in the 
negative, but the reasons are difficult to frame without anachronism.  
 
In essence, the reasons are fivefold.  First, priests could not be tried in a secular 
court.  This was not just a criminal prohibition.  A personal suit against a religious 
clerk could only be brought in an ecclesiastical court.
40  Secondly, since not only 
priests, but lesser clergy, were entitled to claim “benefit of clergy”
41 when charged 
with serious criminal matters other than treason, it is difficult to imagine a royal judge 
threatening priests with some early contempt equivalent.  For an effective claim of 
“benefit of clergy” resulted in the immediate transfer of criminal cases to an 
ecclesiastical court unless the charge was high treason.
42  Thirdly, until Pope 
Innocent IV (1243-1254) “prohibited priests from acting as judges”
43 in the  thirteenth 
century, the judges in the King’s Courts were frequently priests and were thus 
unlikely to try and coerce a disclosure which they knew would subject a priest to 
severe ecclesiastical penalties.
44  Even after this thirteenth century prohibition took 
                                                 
40 Pollock, Sir F, & Maitland FW, The History of English Law, Cambridge University Press, 1968, Vol 1, p 
446.  Note, however, that this statement is only a general statement of “the full extent of the clerical 
[jurisdictional] claim” (idem).  Despite Thomas A’Becket’s martyrdom in 1170, ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
over the clergy, was in a state of continuing erosion until “benefit of clergy” was finally abolished in 1827 
(7, 8 George IV. c.28). 
 
41 “Benefit of clergy” is discussed infra, pp 61-66. 
 
42 Pollock and Maitland observe that misdemeanours (transgressio) “enjoyed no exceptional privilege” 
but felonies ranking between transgressio and treason were within the criminal jurisdiction over clergy 
reserved to the church as early as the thirteenth century (Pollock and Maitland, op cit, Vol 1, pp 444-
446).  Note also that Father Henry Garnet’s trial (Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217) 
resulted in his execution for various reasons including arguably, because his defence of religious 
confession privilege was held inapplicable in a case of treason.  Garnet’s case is considered in detail 
infra, pp 77-81. 
 
43 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 584.  See also Nolan, RS, “The Law of the Seal of Confession” (1913) 13 
Catholic Encyclopedia 649, 652. 
 
44 The Catholic canon law applicable through the entire medieval period and applicable during the reign 
of Henry VIII is discussed in detail in chapter three.  For current purposes, it is sufficient to note that 
Canon 21 of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 subjected a priest disclosing a confession or giving any RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER TWO  
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practical effect, the King’s judges still belonged to the church and would know that 
confessional disclosures would have serious ecclesiastical consequences both for 
the priest, and perhaps for the judge personally as the coercive agent.
45  Fourthly, 
though Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) condemned Thomas A’Becket’s denial of the 
royal right to further punish an ecclesiastical clerk who had “already suffered 
degradation”
46 (an innovative double jeopardy argument), Becket’s martyrdom for this 
principle gave it a currency
47 that would likewise have seen a temporal judge hesitate 
before compelling a priest to breach a vow with ‘foreign’ legal consequence.
48  Fifthly, 
members of the Catholic Church through the years between Bracton and Henry VIII 
subscribed to the view that the priest receiving a confession did not know the 
confession himself, but only as God’s representative.
49  Catholic judges could thus be 
expected to shrink at the vicarious prospect of compelling God in their courtroom.  
_________________________ 
 
hint of a penitent’s identity, to deposition from the priestly office and confinement thereafter in a 
monastery to do perpetual penance (Nolan, op cit, p 649).  The influence of clerics who served as 
judges in the secular courts on respect for church privileges is discussed in chapter three, pp 101-103. 
 
45 Helmholz treats the interplay and competition of ecclesiastical sanctions, including excommunication 
against litigants and even judges as effective deterrent to the pursuit of remedies in the King’s courts, 
notwithstanding the powers of the King’s writs of prohibition which were used to restrain the courts of the 
church.  See particularly his chapters entitled “The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian before 1500" 
and “Writs of Prohibition and Ecclesiastical Sanctions in the English Courts Christian” in Canon Law and 
the Law of England, London and Ronceverte, Hambledon Press, 1987, pp 59-100.   
 
46 Pollock and Maitland, op cit, Vol 12, p 455. 
 
47 Idem.  Becket’s jurisdictional contest with Henry II was well known.  The backlash in public opinion 
which followed the martyrdom saw Henry II, in penance, walk barefoot to Canterbury and submit to a 
papal legate renouncing those portions of his 1164 Constitutions of Clarendon which the church deemed 
offensive (Berman, HJ, Law and Revolution, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, Harvard 
University Press, 1983, p 256).  The investiture struggle, of which the jurisdictional contest between 
Becket and Henry II formed part, is discussed in chapter three, pp 97-101. 
 
48 While McNicol (McNicol, SB, Australia, Law of Privilege, Law Book Co, 1992, p 326), among others, 
has doubted that modern courts would respect a self-incrimination defence citing ecclesiastical legal 
penalty following confessional disclosure, the argument would have been compelling in medieval times 
when it is unlikely that a priest would be tried before temporal courts in the first place. 
 
49 Nolan cites the great English canonist Lyndwood as authority for this response to any malicious judge 
who presses to know the details of a confession (Nolan, RS, “The Law of the Seal of Confession” (1913) 
13 Catholic Encyclopedia 649, 651).  Holdsworth advises that Lyndwood “finished his commentaries 
upon the provincial constitutions of the Archbishops of Canterbury in 1438" (Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 
582).  Taylor notes this same argument from the canonist Mascardus (sixteenth century) in his Treatise RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER TWO  
 
 
 
47
 
Plucknett puts modern understanding of church/state separation in its historical 
context, when he says that “the spirit of the Renaissance [questioned]...law itself”.
50  
He notes that Machiavelli’s novel “distinction between public and private morality”
51 
evolved “the State, as a sort of anti-Christ, to wage war with the idea of law”,
52 and he 
explains the difference between historical and modern understanding with the 
statement:  
 
Instead of the medieval dominion based upon divine right and subject to law, 
we have the modern State based upon force and independent of morality.  
And so, where many a medieval thinker would ultimately identify law with the 
will of God, in modern times it will be regarded as the will of the State.
53 
 
Holdsworth gives this dawning of the modern notion of ‘state’ some English context 
when he explains Henry VIII’s “theory of Royal Supremacy”.  For Henry VIII, says 
Holdsworth, “[t]he Crown is ... supreme over all persons and causes”, including the 
church, and Henry promoted this theory through Parliament in his statutory 
preambles.  For Holdsworth, this new theory, which denied the Church autonomy in 
ecclesiastical matters, was the catalyst that broke the medieval paradigm, since 
_________________________ 
 
on the Law of Evidence (11
th ed, by Matthews, JB, and Spear, GF, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1920, 
Vol 1, p 623). 
 
50 Plucknett, TFT, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5
th ed, London, Butterworths, 1956, Vol 1, p 
40. 
 
51 Idem. 
 
52 Idem. 
 
53 Ibid, p 41. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER TWO  
 
 
 
48
parliamentary acts of law promoted by a King with an agenda, had turned the old 
theory upside down.
54 
 
The contests between the church and state over jurisdiction will be further detailed in 
chapter three as the influence of historical canon law upon common law is explained.  
That detail will further confirm that the modern concept of separated church and state 
was not comprehensible until after the Renaissance and the Reformation.  For it was 
not until then that questions were raised about the foundational medieval paradigm 
which accepted that the rights of Kings and that revelations of law came from God 
through His Church. 
 
The common law 
When twenty-first century Anglo-American lawyers speak of the common law, they 
speak of that body of reported judicial decisions, separate from the statutory codes of 
their nations, which provide guidance upon what the courts will decide in similar 
cases in the future.  Black’s law dictionary acknowledges the customary origins of 
common law, but it is the definitional reference to “judgments and decrees of courts 
... [and] judicial decisions, as distinguished from legislative enactments”
55 that 
resonates as a definition of common law in a contemporary lawyer’s mind.  Black 
defines common law thus: 
 
As distinguished from statutory law created by the enactment of legislators, 
the common law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action ... 
                                                 
54 Holdsworth, WS, A History of English Law, 2
nd ed, Boston, Little Brown and Co, 1923, pp 588-591. 
 
55 Black, HC, Black’s Law Dictionary, 6
th ed, St Paul, Minnesota, West Publishing Co, 1990, p 276. 
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which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial 
antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of courts recognizing, affirming 
and enforcing such usages and customs; and, in this sense, particularly the 
ancient unwritten law of England.  In general, it is a body of law that develops 
and derives through judicial decisions, as distinguished from legislative 
enactments.
56 
 
Milsom says that “the common law [is] the acceptance for all England of a single rule 
on any matter, the suppression of contrary customs leaving ... something special ... 
deep-rooted enough to survive ... [as] the slow result of institutional centralisation”.
57  
But despite the “single rule on any matter” which looms large in the modern mind, the 
common law began from materials
58 that existed before there were law reports.  
Those materials were the customs of discrete geographical communities and the 
decisions of the courts which governed them.
59 
 
In his “The Path of the Law”,
60 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr sought to expose 
paradigmatic thinking about law when he said: 
 
History must be part of the study [of law], because without it we cannot know 
the precise scope of rules which it is our business to know ... it is a part of the 
rational study, because it is the first step towards an enlightened skepticism, 
                                                 
56 Idem. 
 
57 Milsom, SFC, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London, Butterworths, 1969, p 2. 
 
58 Idem. 
 
59 Idem. 
 
60 Holmes, OW, Jr, The Path of the Law, Bedford Massachusetts, Applewood Books. 
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that is, towards a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules ... It is 
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was so laid 
down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the grounds upon 
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists 
upon blind imitation of the past.
61 
 
While it is certainly true that social morés and pressures can influence the common 
law of the twenty-first century, in our age of “rapid social change ... we [are more 
accustomed to] make use of [direct] legislation”
62 to accommodate the law to the 
social pace of life.
63  In an earlier age, these necessary accommodations were 
facilitated by dexterous lawyers whose lateral thinking furnished courts with palatable 
ways around older rules in the interests of contemporary justice.
64  Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr confirms that judicial lawyers have also participated in this quest to 
accommodate contemporary needs when the solutions suggested by the available 
precedents do not feel quite right even in an age of abundant legislation.  He has 
written: 
 
The training of lawyers is a training in logic.  The processes of analogy, 
discrimination, and deduction are those in which they are most at home.  The 
language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic.  And the logical 
method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in 
                                                 
61 Ibid, pp 20, 21. 
 
62 Milsom, op cit, p xii. 
 
63 Idem. 
 
64 Milsom is emphatic that “lawyers have always been preoccupied with today’s details, and have 
worked with their eyes down” (idem), so that they have seldom seen “the violence” (idem) their work has 
done to “the conceptual economy” (idem) of their present, or the vast social and economic changes to 
which they have incrementally contributed. 
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every human mind.  But certainty generally is illusion ... [b]ehind the logical 
form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing 
legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, 
and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding ... We do not realize 
how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in 
the habit of the public mind.  No concrete proposition is self-evident, no matter 
how ready we may be to accept it.
65 
 
But Milsom explicitly confirms the genealogy of common law in historical custom 
when he writes that: 
 
the materials of the common law ... were the customs of true communities ... 
[b]ut within each body of custom, what we think of as the law was not marked 
off from other aspects of society ... [t]he needs of society were divers and 
constant, and they were for the most part supplied by the customary 
obligations resting upon ordinary people.
66 
 
In his 1991 article in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, AWB Simpson summarises 
the shift in thinking that is necessary if modern lawyers are to really understand 
where any particular common law doctrine came from, and what it means in the 
present – including, the writer suggests, the doctrine of religious confession privilege.  
To really understand, modern lawyers must abandon their picturesque and even 
fanciful notion that: 
 
                                                 
65 Holmes, OW, Jr, op cit, p 16. 
 
66 Milsom, op cit, p 2. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER TWO  
 
 
 
52
the common law system and the rules and principles are in fact nothing more 
than the products of an inexorable Darwinian movement towards economic 
efficiency, which for some reason or other, lay dormant for six hundred years 
or so, but suddenly burst out in the 19th century to produce the tort of 
negligence and the rule in Hadley v Baxendale and other marvels.
67 
 
Fortunately, he continues, that one system view of legal history has been outgrown, 
so that: 
 
there is now a generous sympathy with the idea that you cannot really 
understand law without attending to both its history, and to the way in which 
the operations of the various legal systems and the professional culture of 
lawyers, interacts with what may ... be called society generally.  At a 
theoretical level, what is involved is a denial of the notion that law is in a 
simple sense autonomous, [and] that its development can be understood ... 
by an analysis of legal reasoning alone.
68 
 
The message of legal history is that there was common law before there were law 
reports of any kind.  That common law originated in custom.  In the context of this 
thesis, the custom and common law of England respected and privileged the 
sacraments of Catholicism, including the sacrament of confession before the 
Reformation.  
 
                                                 
67 Simpson, AWB, “Legal Education and Legal History” (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 106, 
109. 
 
68 Ibid, p 111. 
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One final observation about our twenty-first century expectation of what constitutes 
the common law from which we extract our precedents is appropriately made before 
the historical evidence for a religious confession privilege before Henry VIII is 
discussed in detail.  That point is that the ancient statutes were as much a part of the 
common law in medieval times as were judicial decisions.  While the term ‘common 
law’ in its widest sense, still embraces both statute and common law, when searching 
for precedential authority, modern lawyers narrow that generality to reference only 
that law made by judges in cases.
69  While modern statutory law can codify or 
change the common law, it is not generally referenced as a source of common law in 
its own right.  If it is referenced at all for precedential guidance, a modern reference 
involving a statute is to a case which considered similar statutory language to see 
how it was interpreted by a judge in that case. In historical times, the King’s statutes 
were regarded in the same way as a modern judicial interpretation. The King was an 
authoritative judge, and the statutes were his statements of the common law.  This 
point may be succinctly made with an example from Coke’s commentative treatment 
of religious confession privilege. 
 
Pre-Reformation statutes and common law 
In his Second Part of the Institutes, Sir Edward Coke cited the Statute Articuli Cleri of 
1315
70 as one of his authorities for the existence of a religious confession privilege in 
common law with these words: 
 
                                                 
69 See Black’s definition of common law supra, pp 48-49. 
 
70 9 Edward II St.1. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER TWO  
 
 
 
54
This branch declareth the common law, that the priviledge of confession 
extendeth only to felonies ... and not to appeales of treason.
71 
 
Though Wigmore thought this early statute “ambiguous”,
72 it was common law 
authority for Coke. Milsom confirms Coke’s interpretation when he says: 
 
To lawyers in the fourteenth century a statute was not something external to 
the law: it was an internal alteration, and it lived in its context so that its 
application was neither mechanical nor unalterable.
73 
 
While the Statute Articuli Cleri may seem “ambiguous” if we expect it to fulfil the 
function of a modern statute, it is not “ambiguous” at all when we understand that the 
King was using a statute to answer a petition and clarify the common law.  Since the 
whole statute is lengthy, only that section which deals with religious confession 
privilege need be considered to highlight the interrelationship of what is now called 
the common law, with custom and statute.  That is, the King’s judicial declaration of 
what the law is and will be in the future.  Translated from the original Latin
74 it reads: 
 
                                                 
71 Coke, Sir E, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, New York, Garland Publishing 
Co, 1979, p 629. 
 
72 Wigmore, JH, Evidence in trials at common law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little 
Brown, 1961, Vol 8, p 869. 
 
73 Milsom, op cit, pp 365-366. 
 
74 Since neither Coke nor his commentators have provided a full translation of the relevant portion of 
Cap X, the writer  commissioned  a translation from the original Latin. The original Latin text is most 
readily available at pp 628-629 of Coke’s Second Institute (Coke, Sir E, The Second Part of the 
Institutes of the Laws of England, New York, Garland Publishing Co, 1979).  The author is indebted to 
Dr Will Richardson of the Classics and Ancient History Department at the University of Auckland for this 
translation. 
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Also, whenever any who flee to the church abjure the land (abjurant terram),
75 
according to the custom of the Kingdom, the laity or their enemies prosecute 
them and they are dragged away from the public street and hanged or 
decapitated (decapitantur) forthwith, and while they are in the church they are 
guarded by armed men within the cemetery and sometimes within the church 
so closely that they cannot leave the sacred place for the purpose of setting 
aside their superfluous weight [that is, emptying their bowels], and it is not 
permissible that the necessaries of life be served to them. 
 
Reply: While they are in the church their guards must not linger within the 
cemetery, unless necessity or the risk of escape requires this.  Nor should 
fugitives be confined while they are in the church so that they cannot have the 
necessaries of life (quin possint habere vitae necessaria) nor go outside freely 
in order set down their unmentionable load.  Our Lord the King also requires 
that thieves and approvers (latrones vel appellatores) may, whenever they 
wish, confess their crimes to priests; but the confessors must take care that 
they do not wrongfully inform these approvers. 
 
Holdsworth writes that “these articles [Articuli Cleri] were an attempt to delimit 
accurately the sphere of the lay and spiritual jurisdictions, and they were the basis of 
all subsequent legislation
76 upon this subject during the remainder of the medieval 
period”.
77  These articles were framed as a church petition for redress of perceived 
                                                 
75 The parenthesised italicised original Latin words are those upon which Coke chose to comment.  His 
commentary and its accuracy will is discussed infra, pp 58-61. 
 
76 Holdsworth suggests that Edward III added clerical immunities to “exempt priests from liability to 
arrest while performing divine service”, and he added clerical powers in relation to heresy (Holdsworth, 
WS, A History of English Law, 2
nd ed, Boston, Little Brown & Co, 1923, Vol 1, p 585). 
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anomalies in the law during a period when the influence of the church was waning 
from the high point achieved after Becket’s martyrdom (1170).  Thus the petition 
evidences the problem and the response is the King’s judicial solution.  Modern 
statutes simply state law.  In this example, the judicial and deliberative component of 
early legislative process is manifest.  The issues which the king resolved are stated 
as problems for judicial solution and the King’s answers are his judgement. The only 
difference between a judicial case and the questions which drew forth the King’s 
judgement laid down in his statute Articuli Cleri, was that this was a hypothetical case 
without individual parties – though as in court, it was framed as a petition.  While we 
would be reluctant to cite a statute as if it were some kind of judicial statement of the 
common law today, the interplay between church, Parliament and King which is 
demonstrated in the statute Articuli Cleri, shows that the King’s role as a judge in the 
fourteenth century amounted to a judicial decision of what the common law of the 
realm would be from that time forward. 
 
The problems upon which the King was asked to pronounce, appear to have been: 
first, what to do with abjurers who had illegally returned to England and sought 
sanctuary a second time to avoid the customary penalty (hanging or decapitation); 
secondly, how to stop the perceived sacrilege involved in having armed men present 
in a church or cemetery to prevent the escape of returned abjurers, or the provision 
of life support to either returned abjurers or those who had outstayed the forty days’ 
grace before they must abjure;
78 and finally, how to appropriately manage the guards 
appointed to prevent escape from the sanctuary, some of whom were overzealous to 
the point that they would not let returned abjurers outside to take simple toilet breaks. 
                                                 
78 Pollock and Maitland write simply that “the clergy resented this interference with the peace of the Holy 
Church” (Pollock, Sir F, & Maitland, FW, The History of English Law, Cambridge University Press, 1968, 
Vol 2, p 591). 
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The King’s solution for the time was: to direct that guards might only stay in the 
church cemetery if there was a real risk of escape; to confirm that such intensive one-
on-one guarding as prevented nourishment and toilet breaks was excessive and a 
sacrilege and should cease; and to confirm that it was consonant with his will that 
felons be able to confess their sins in accordance with the established canon law of 
the land. 
 
The section of Articuli Cleri that dealt with clerical concern about secular intrusions 
into holy church sanctuaries, demonstrates that the statutes of medieval times 
interrelated with the underlying law of the land in a different way than they do today.  
In this case, the King was called upon not so much to change the law as to shape or 
define its metes and bounds. The petition asked that the traditional privilege in favour 
of recalcitrant abjurers be reinstated. Manifesting the respect in which Edward II still 
held the church in the fourteenth century – and at the same time, attesting the 
enduring power of the church in medieval English society – the King honoured the 
church request to reaffirm the right of sanctuary.  He also confirmed religious 
confession privilege which was not requested in the petition.  But his sentence or 
judgement may not have been completely satisfactory to the church. That is because 
his exception allowing guards to stay in the church cemetery only if there was a real 
risk of escape provided obvious licence for those guards to stay outside the church 
but on church property and his confirmation of confession privilege came with a 
warning about clerical abuse.
79 
 
                                                 
79 The likely substance and focus of the warning is discussed infra, pp 73-75. 
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As a symbol of enduring church power, the existence of churches as sanctuaries 
from the reach of the royal courts endured until Coke’s time. They were abolished 
during the reign of King James I in the early seventeenth century.
80  Holdsworth 
records that earlier attempts to circumscribe continuing perceived abuse of 
sanctuaries during the reign of Henry VIII
81 were unsuccessful and that some of the 
more powerful church sanctuaries continued in de facto operation until they were 
extinguished in practice, by the advent of meaningful police services in the early 
nineteenth century.
82 
 
The purpose of this chapter again, however, is to identify the state of religious 
confession, and the privilege attaching to it, in pre-Reformation England.  To enable a 
more objective and rational consideration of the historical evidence that supports the 
existence of a religious confession privilege before Henry VIII’s Reformation, the 
writer has thus proposed: first, that modern lawyers should not expect that historical 
proof of the existence of religious confessions will come in a recognisable modern 
form which presupposes a separation between church and state ; and secondly, that 
the common law is and always has been more than the reports of decided cases, 
howsoever reported.  It partakes of the social expectations of its time and this was 
especially true before there were any law reports at all. 
 
Coke’s commentary on the Statute Articuli Cleri 
Coke chose to comment on four phrases from Cap X of the Statute.  As quoted 
above they are “Abjurant regnum”, “decapitantur”, “quin possint habere vitae 
                                                 
80 21 James 1.c.28 §7. 
 
81 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 3, pp 306-307. 
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necessaria” and “latrones vel appellatores”.  His comments upon the first and third of 
these phrases are largely explanatory of fourteenth century sanctuary practice and 
need not be considered further here.
83  The full text of his two other comments are 
necessary if an accurate assessment of his precedential insight into religious 
confession privilege is to be made.  He wrote: 
 
Decapitantur.  This was mistaken in the petition: for no man can be beheaded 
but for treason; and no man could abjure for treason, because the Coroner had 
no power to take any confession for treason, albeit the Coroner had a special 
commission from the King to doe it.
84 
 
Latrones vel appelatores.  This branch extendeth only to theeves and approvers 
indited of felony, but extendeth not to high treasons: for if high treasons be 
discovered to the Confessor, he ought to discover it, for the danger that 
thereupon dependeth to the King and the whole Realme; therefore this branch 
declareth the common law, that the priviledge of confession extendeth onely to 
felonies: And Albeit, if a man indited of felony become an approver, he is sworne 
to discover all felonies and treasons, yet is hee not in degree of an approver in 
law, but onely of the offence whereof he is indited; and for the rest, it is for the 
benefit of the King, to move him to mercy: So as to this branch beginneth with 
theeves, extendeth onely to approvers of theevery or felony, and not to appeales 
                                                 
83 The statute 21 Jac. Regis of 1623-1624 during the reign of King James I and passed shortly before 
Coke wrote his Second Part of the Institutes abolished sanctuary and abjuration, though Holdsworth 
notes that “certain ... sanctuaries existed till the eighteenth century ... [when] the arm of the law was 
strengthened by the establishment of an efficient police system” (Holdsworth, WS, A History of English 
Law, Boston, Little Brown and Co, 2
nd ed, 1923, Vol 3, p 307; see also Plucknett, TFT, A Concise 
History of the Common Law, 5
th ed, London, Butterworths, 1956, p 431), though Plucknett says effective 
policing was achieved in the early nineteenth century. 
 
84 Coke, Sir E, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, New York, Garland Publishing 
Co, 1979, p 629. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER TWO  
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of treason; for by the common law, a man indited of high treason could not have 
the benefit of Clergy (as it was holden in the Kings time, when this Act was 
made) nor any Clergyman priviledge of confession to conceale high treason: and 
so it was resolved in 7 Hen. 5.  Whereupon Frier John Randolphe the Queene 
Dowagers Confessor, accused her of treason, for compassing the death of the 
King: And so it was resolved in the case of Henry Garnet, superieur of the 
Jesuites in England, who would have shadowed his treason under the priviledge 
of confession, although in deed he was not onely consenting, but abetting the 
principal conspirators of the Powder Treason, as by the record of his attainder 
appeareth: and albeit this Act extendeth to felonies onely, as hath been said, yet 
the caveat given to Confessors is observable, ne erronice informant.
85 
 
The thrust of Coke’s commentary is not to prove that there was a religious confession 
privilege in the common law at the time of writing in the early seventeenth century, 
but that there was a treason exception to it.  The existence of the underlying religious 
confession privilege is for Coke, self-evident.  The premises of Coke’s justification of 
a treason exception to religious confession privilege are that: the public interest in the 
King’s safety demands it; since treason was an exception to “benefit of clergy”,
86 it is 
also an exception to this other example of religious privilege; because treason was 
involved, Friar John Randolph disclosed the Queen Dowager’s complicity in the 
death of King Henry V, though he only knew of that from her confession; and though 
Father Henry Garnet was convicted as one of the principal Gunpowder plotters, his 
religious confession privilege defence would not have been accepted anyway since 
the privilege does not apply in a treason case. 
                                                 
85 Idem.   
 
86 “Benefit of clergy” is discussed infra, pp 61-66. 
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Coke relies upon the fact that treason was an established exception to the religious 
privilege known as “benefit of clergy” to justify a treason exception to religious 
confession privilege.  He then cites two cases which he says confirm the principle 
that religious confession privilege did not apply in treason cases.  Was treason an 
exception to “benefit of clergy”?  In order to understand Coke’s statement that 
treason was an exception to the ecclesiastical privilege known as “benefit of clergy”, 
it is necessary to understand what this privilege was and how it worked.  
 
“Benefit of clergy” and church jurisdictional claims 
Though in its later history “benefit of clergy” became the privilege of the accused 
clerk, it began its life as a privilege of the church.
87  Early records confirm that it was 
as significant a feature of French criminal law as it was in England.  Though “the 
clerical privilege developed quite differently in the two countries”
88 in later centuries, 
Gabel has established that the history of the privilege in France and the Frankish 
criminal procedure are “a valuable aid in forming opinions about the practice followed 
in Norman England”.
89  Gabel suggests that there are two perspectives to be 
considered if one is to really understand the privilege – “that of the secular law and 
that of the Church”.
90  She explains: 
 
According to common law this privilege may be defined as the exemption of 
members of the clergy from the jurisdiction of the temporal courts in certain 
                                                 
87 Pollock, Sir F, & Maitland, FM, The History of English Law, 2
nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 1968, 
Vol 1, p 445; Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 3, p 294. 
 
88 Gabel ,LC, “Benefit of Clergy in England in the Later Middle Ages”, Smith College Studies in History, 
Fay, SB, and Faulkner, HU, eds, Vol XIV, Nos 1-4, Oct 1928 – July 1929, Northampton Mass, cit, p 5. 
 
89 Idem. 
 
90 Ibid, p 7. 
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criminal cases which normally would not have come within the competence of 
the ecclesiastical courts ... From the ecclesiastical point of view ... the 
privilege rested upon the principle that clergy should not be judged by laymen 
but only by their own judges according to the ecclesiastical law.
91 
 
For the church, “the benefit” was not an exemption or a privilege at all, but rather a 
practice or a right claimed “at common law only because of the comprehensive”
92 
jurisdictional claims of that common law.  The different perspective of the church and 
state where benefit of clergy was concerned, accounts for the tension between the 
secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions.  But despite the tension, “benefit of clergy” 
endured and remained as a symbol of the different perspective of church and state in 
the criminal law arena.  During its “long and curious history”,
93 benefit of clergy 
changed from being “a special privilege of the clergy”
94 into “a complicated series of 
rules exempting certain persons from the death penalty incurred by those found guilty 
of certain felonies”.
95  Although those later “absurd and capricious”
96 rules were 
completely disconnected from the church, they were not abolished until 1827.
97 
 
                                                 
91 Idem. 
 
92 Idem. 
 
93 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol.3, p 294. 
 
94 Idem. 
 
95 Idem. 
 
96 Ibid, p 302.  Holdsworth also traces the see-sawing later statutory history of the rules as to who could 
claim clergy and how they could claim it noting at various times; partial abolition, partial restoration, 
mitigation of punishment, escape from punishment on first offence and declaration of various felonies to 
be without benefit of clergy (ibid, pp 299-302). 
 
97 7, 8 George IV. c.28. Gabel traces the severance of connection “between the privilege and the 
church” to the reign of Henry VII (1485-1509) and in particular to the statute 4 Henry VII c.13 (op cit, 
pp123-125). 
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Thomas A’Becket’s martyrdom (1170) was the high water mark of church 
jurisdictional claims, but through contemporary eyes it was a demarcation dispute 
between related political powers.
98  It was a part of the larger Investiture struggle
99 
which Henry VIII resurrected to justify his separation from Rome in the sixteenth 
century.
100  Pollock and Maitland’s summarise the typical procedures before the 
thirteenth century ended: 
 
A clerk is charged with murder; it is the sheriff’s duty to arrest him.  Probably 
his bishop will demand him.  If so, he will be delivered up; but the bishop will 
become bound in a heavy sum, a hundred pounds, to produce him before the 
justices in eyre.  The bishop can keep him in prison and very possibly will do 
so, for, should be escape, the hundred pounds will be forfeited.  In the middle 
of the thirteenth century it is a matter of complaint among the clergy that 
owing to this procedure clerks may languish for five or six years in the 
episcopal gaol without being brought to trial.  At last the justices come, and 
this clerk is brought before them ... And ... the words of  the enrolment [say] ... 
“And the said A.B. comes and says that he is a clerk and that he can not – or, 
that he will not – answer here.  And the official of the bishop [the Ordinary] ... 
                                                 
98 For Berman, “the struggle of the papacy to wrest from emperor and kings the power to ‘invest’ bishops 
with the symbols of their authority” during the papacy of Gregory VII (1075-1083) was an outgrowth of 
feudal political ideas which had previously been unsystematised (Berman, HJ, Law and Revolution, 
Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, Harvard University Press, 1983, pp 85,86). 
 
99 Berman traces the origins of the western legal tradition as a whole to the “investiture struggle” and the 
reforms promulgated by Pope Gregory VII (also known as the “Hildebrand Reforms” and the “Gregorian 
Reforms”).  But he says that the term “investiture struggle” is something of an understatement.  The 
transformation involved was much more revolutionary than that term implies and sought the complete 
“disengagement of the sacred and profane” spheres (Ibid, pp 87-88). 
 
100 Discussed in chapter three, pp 104-112 (105, 109-110). 
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comes and demands him as a clerk – or, comes and craves the bishop’s 
court”.
101 
 
Though this formality was diluted and the claim of the benefit in cases of treason was 
unlikely by the end of the thirteenth century,
102 “benefit of clergy” was not completely 
abolished until the nineteenth century.
103  In the meantime, ‘the benefit’ was 
institutionalised as a part of the secular criminal law system though it had lost any 
enduring meaning for the church.
104 Holdsworth quotes Blackstone’s indiscriminate 
praise of all the laws and institutions of England
105 favouring what “benefit of clergy” 
became after some statutory adjustment:
106 
 
The wisdom of the English legislature has, in the course of a long and 
laborious process, extracted by a noble alchemy, rich medicines out of 
poisonous ingredients, and converted, by gradual mutations, what was at first 
                                                 
101 Pollock and Maitland, op cit, Vol 1, pp 441-442. 
 
102 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 3, p 297. 
 
103 7,8 George IV, c.28. 
 
104 Holdsworth says that the meaning of benefit of clergy was “completely changed” during its “long and 
curious history”. “It ceased to be a special privilege of the clergy, and became ... a complicated series of 
rules exempting certain persons from the death penalty incurred by those found guilty of certain 
felonies”, although it was not “till the end of the sixteenth century that it began to lose its original 
character of a privilege of the clergy” (op cit, Vol 3, p 294). 
 
105 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 3, p 302. 
 
106 Holdsworth attributes the change in character of benefit of clergy as a “special privilege of the clergy” 
to the “complicated series of rules exempting certain persons from the death penalty” which it became 
after the sixteenth century, “mainly to the action of the legislature; and a series of statutes of the two 
following centuries” (op cit, Vol 3, p 294).  For example, “[a] statute of Henry VII had attempted to restrict 
its scope by drawing a distinction between those who were actually in orders and those who were not” 
(op cit, Vol 3, p 299, citing 4 Henry VII. c 14).  More radical changes were made in Henry VIII’s reign to 
limit the privilege (op cit, Vol 3, p 299-300, citing the statutes 23 Henry VIII.c.I; 23 Henry VIII.c.II and 23 
Henry VIII. c.3).  “But the reaction against the severity of Henry VIII’s statutes, which produced the 
abolition of many of the new treasons and felonies created in his reign, produced also the partial 
restoration of the benefit of clergy” (op cit, Vol 3, p 300, citing I Edward VI. c.12).  There then follows in 
Holdsworth’s narrative a catalogue of extensive statutory amendments both extending and then 
restricting the privilege through to 1769 when “Blackstone ... says that at that date no less than 160 
offences had been declared to be felonies without benefit of clergy” (op cit, Vol 3, pp 300-302). 
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an unreasonable exemption of popish ecclesiastics into a merciful mitigation 
of the general law with respect to capital punishment.
107 
 
Gabel agrees with Blackstone and Holdsworth’s summary of the evolution of benefit 
of clergy but adds “that the privilege at all times served to temper the rigor of the 
common law in an age in which the death penalty was employed to an absurd 
degree.
108  Of its later development, she summarises: 
 
[T]he privilege, after many mutilations, was preserved in English common law 
two-and-a-half centuries after it had ceased to have any connection with the 
church ... [perhaps] as a way around an inelastic harsh criminal code.
109 
 
Pollock and Maitland find the seeds of this development in “the elementary rule that 
the church would never pronounce a judgement of blood”.
110  Pollock and Maitland’s 
close procedural account of a claim of “benefit of clergy” before the end of the 
thirteenth century demonstrates the jurisdictional contest between England’s 
temporal and ecclesiastical courts.  But the history of “benefit of clergy” manifests 
that it was not simply a matter of which jurisdiction was the more powerful at a given 
time.  For if it was simply a matter of jurisdictional power, the history of “benefit of 
clergy” would have been progressively marked by the narrowing of its scope and the 
development of exceptions at the same time as the secular courts gradually assumed 
                                                 
107 Blackstone, W, Commentaries on the Law of England, New York and London, Garland Publishing 
Inc, 1978, Vol 1, p 364. 
 
108 Gabel, op cit, p 126. 
 
109 Ibid, pp 126-127. 
 
110 Pollock and Maitland, op cit, Vol 1, p 444. 
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the ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
111  But the secular jurisdictions not only recognised this 
‘clerical’ right to remove criminal charges into an ecclesiastical forum to avoid the 
rigours of the criminal penalties imposed by the secular jurisdiction.  They nurtured 
and encouraged the longevity of the benefit by their broad and fictional interpretations 
of which defendants were clergy which enabled the privilege.
112  That a religious 
privilege which constituted a significant part of the argument between Archbishop 
Thomas A’Becket and Henry II in the twelfth century, could endure as an entrenched 
feature of secular criminal law through into the early nineteenth century, is illustrative 
of a sense of seamlessness in the legal system as one great whole.  
 
However, this understanding of “benefit of clergy” demonstrates more than mere 
seamlessness.  It demonstrates that clerical privileges became common law rights.  
Was treason an exception to “benefit of clergy”, as Coke claimed? 
 
A treason exception to “benefit of clergy”? 
In medieval criminal law, there were three different levels of offences: 
misdemeanours,
113 felonies and treasons.  But there were many degrees of treasons 
– from those which affected the King’s forests, through those which affected his 
                                                 
111 Holdsworth documents the erosion of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts from the conclusion 
of the investiture contest in England which he dates to 1106 (Holdsworth, op cit Vol 1, p 584) through to 
the beginning of the twentieth century when he says that the only remaining ecclesiastical jurisdiction “is 
a certain criminal or corrective jurisdiction over the clergy” (ibid p 614).  Though the ecclesiastical 
jurisdictional claims “were at no time admitted by the state in their entirety ,... in the course of time most 
of these branches of jurisdiction have been appropriated by the state” (idem). 
 
112 For example, Holdsworth observes statutory extensions allowing claims of benefit of clergy “[i]n 1547 
to ‘bigami’ and in 1692 [to] women” though preserving the 1489 “distinction between those actually in 
orders and those not”. That 1489 distinction had differentiated between real clergy and those only 
allowed the benefit but “convicted of a clergyable offence”, by branding the latter.  In 1576, “the court 
was given power to imprison such persons for ... one year” and “[i]n 1717 it was enacted that such 
persons...were to be transported for seven years instead of being branded” (Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 3, p 
300). 
 
113 “Transgressio” in the definition of Pollock and Maitland (Pollock, Sir F, & Maitland, FW, The History of 
English Law, 2
nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 1968, Vol 1, p 446). 
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coinage, to those which affected his person and were called high treasons to 
distinguish them from the lesser treasons.  Infidelity against one’s lord also amounted 
to petty treason in the twelfth century, though by the thirteenth century it was unusual 
to use the word treason in relation to personal crimes against anyone other than the 
King.
114  Pollock and Maitland state that misdemeanours never qualified for “benefit 
of clergy” but expect that “in the thirteenth century a clerk charged with ... one of the 
worst forms of high treason, such as imagining the King’s death or levying war 
against him, would in vain have relied on the liberties of the church”.
115  Holdsworth 
agrees with both Coke and Pollock and Maitland that treason was excepted from the 
scope of “benefit of clergy”, but says the treason exception was not settled until the 
reign of Edward III.  That was sixty years after the Statute Articuli Cleri was passed in 
1315.
116   
 
Did treason become an exception to other church privileges? 
Does the logic transfer?  Did treason become an exception to religious confession 
privilege because it became an exception to “benefit of clergy”?  Is Coke also correct 
that the church privilege of abjuration
117 (generally following sanctuary) was not 
available when the charge was treason?  Certainly as Pollock and Maitland say, “the 
                                                 
114 Bellamy, JG, The Law of Treason in England in the Late Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press, 
1970, p 225. 
 
115 Pollock and Maitland, op cit, Vol 1, p 446. 
 
116 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 3, p 297. 
 
117 To abjure was to flee the realm of England forever and thus escape its criminal jurisdiction.  If 
someone accused of crime escaped first to the sanctuary of the church, by ”taking an oath to abjure the 
kingdom of England” after confessing to the Coroner, the criminal could “proceed safely to a port 
assigned to him” but never return without capital penalty.  Though the institution of “sanctuary and 
abjuration” was probably “not a product of Christianity”, it was administered by the church (Holdsworth, 
op cit, Vol 3, pp 303-307). 
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liberties of the church”
118 may not have protected a clergyman personally charged 
with direct complicity in treason against the King (such as Coke charged against 
Garnet
119).  It seems quite another matter to suggest that an innocent fourteenth 
century or fifteenth century priest who knew of treason only in confession would be 
coerced to disclose and found guilty of misprision
120 of treason if the knowledge 
somehow came to light.  Not only the practicalities of discovering the priest’s 
knowledge, but also the suggestion that judges would coerce priests to reveal their 
secrets when universal canon law forbade such disclosure
121 exposes Coke’s 
theoretical deduction as a fiction.  But perhaps the deduction was reasonable seventy 
to one hundred years after the English Reformation,
122 if Coke’s other precedential 
assertions which support it, have merit.  
 
In his Second Part of the Institutes, Coke asserted that two cases supported his 
statement that treason had always been an exception to religious confession 
privilege.  The first of those was Randolph’s case (circa 1419).  In what way was 
Randolph’s case a precedent for Coke’s treason exception to religious confession 
privilege?  Coke says Friar Randolph accused the Dowager Queen of treason 
                                                 
118 Pollock and Maitland, op cit, Vol 1, p 446. 
 
119 Garnet’s case discussed infra, pp 77-81.  Garnet’s case was the last case in which Coke functioned 
as the Attorney-General prosecutor. 
 
120 Failing to report a crime to the authorities.  See discussion infra in connection with Garnet’s case, pp 
77-81, and particularly notes 157 and 158. 
 
121 Nolan, RS, “The Law of the Seal of Confession” (1913) 13 Catholic Encyclopedia, 649, 652.  The 
universality of both the Catholic and Anglican canon law prohibitions against priests disclosing 
confessional secrets is discussed in detail in chapter three.  However, Coke’s historical references are to 
a time when the only relevant canon law was Catholic and had forbidden such disclosure from the ninth 
century.  The Fourth Lateran Council’s 1215 restatement of that canon law was still in force in the 
fourteenth century period upon which Coke was commenting. 
 
122 Garnet’s case in 1606 was argued seventy years after Henry VIII’s religious Reformation was all but 
complete and Coke’s Second Part of the Institutes is believed to have been published some time 
between 1630 and 1640, after Charles I initially banned publication.  All the Institutes were first 
completed in 1628 (Hostettler, op cit, pp xiv, 160).  See also note 1, supra. 
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against the current King (Henry V) – which suggests he had broken the seal of 
confession because he saw protection of the King’s life as a greater cause.  Yet 
history records that Randolph was himself imprisoned as some sort of accomplice.
123  
Would Friar John Randolph have been protected from disclosure of Dowager Queen 
Joan’s confession (presumably that she was guilty of treason in “compassing”
124 the 
death of the King Henry V) if the existence of a confession was suspected and was to 
be extracted from him?  Or would withholding the confessional evidence in protection 
of the seal have seen the priest found guilty of misprision of treason, as is Coke’s 
hypothesis?  There is no Year Book or other law report of the Randolph case 
available.  However, Edward Hogan Jr has commented on Coke’s citation of the 
Randolph case in his commentary: 
 
He referred to the trial of Friar John Randolph who was tried with Queen 
Dowager Joan, the widow of Henry IV, for conspiring to kill the King.  History 
shows that Friar John admitted his share of the conspiracy, although this 
apparently had nothing to do directly with the fact that he was the Queen’s 
confessor.  The record, meager as it is, establishes no breach of the privilege 
of the confessional.
125 
                                                 
123 The Brut or the Chronicles of England record that “Randolf” was “taken in yle of Gernesey” and 
imprisoned first at Chirbourne in Normandy, then transferred to “Maunte” and then to the Tower (The 
Brut or the Chronicles of England, edited from MS Rawl. B 171, Bodleian Library by Friedrich, WD, Ed. 
Brie, Part II, London, EETS, 1908, pp 422-423). 
 
124 Coke, op cit, p 629. 
 
125 Hogan, EA, Jr, “A Modern Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional” (1951) Loyola LR 1, 10-11.  
Other historical reports of the case suggest that “Queen Joan, second wife and widow of King Henry IV 
was arrested on 1 October 1419 as a result of an accusation by her confessor, John Randolf, a 
Franciscan” (Bellamy, JG, The Law of Treason in England in the later Middle Ages, Cambridge, 
England, University Press, 1970, p 126) on the basis that she had plotted to destroy King Henry V by 
sorcery and necromancy (Idem.  See also Vickers, KH, Humphrey Duke of Gloucester: a biography, 
London, Archibald Constable & Co, 1907, pp 276-278).  Other accounts still suggest that Randolph 
confessed his own complicity in the plot and that his personal confession of crime was what constituted 
the accusation against Queen Joan (Kittredge, GL, Witchcraft in the Old and New England, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1929, p 79; Vickers, op cit, p 278). 
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Though both the Dowager Queen and Randolph were imprisoned in 1419, neither 
was ever tried for the treason alleged.  Queen Joan was restored by King Henry V 
two months prior to his death in 1422,
126 and Randolph was murdered in prison in 
1429 by another priest said to have been mad.
127  Randolph’s case thus does not 
establish Coke’s treason exception to religious confession privilege.  
 
Coke’s citation of Garnet’s case as authority for a treason exception to religious 
confession privilege, is somewhat circular.
128  Since Garnet’s case was a jury 
decision and the verdict was guilty, Coke may be seen as citing his own prosecutorial 
arguments as precedent for the conclusion in his Second Part of the Institutes 
published more than twenty years later.  But the jury decision had become a part of 
history.  However, Coke’s commentary on the word “decapitantur”
129 as it appeared in 
the Statute Articuli Cleri – that beheading was only allowed as punishment for 
treason; that one could not abjure for treason and that the reference to beheading, 
was thus a “mistake in the petition”
130 which originated the statute – is inaccurate.  
Bellamy notes a number of cases of penalty mitigation (including mitigation from 
“drawing and hanging” and “drawing and quartering” to “beheading”
131 and 
“abjuration”
132 respectively) during the reign of Edward II in response to Edward’s 
                                                 
126 Kittredge, op cit, p 80. 
 
127 Kittredge, idem.  See also The Brut or the Chronicles of England, op cit, pp 422-423. 
 
128 Garnet’s case is discussed in detail infra, pp 77-81, where its contribution to the common law of 
religious confession privilege is weighed. 
 
129 Coke, op cit, p 629. 
 
130 Idem. 
 
131 Bellamy, op cit, p 51. 
 
132 Ibid, p 56, n3.  In this case, Bellamy notes Sir John Maltrevor’s conviction by attaint for a treason 
following his flight to the Continent in 1429 (practical abjuration), from where “he endeavoured to win his RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER TWO  
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uncertain and arbitrary use of the charge of treason for political purposes.
133  
Bellamy’s further insight that Edward II’s unpopular summary trial methods
134 and his 
“tampering with the scope of treason”
135 fell into disuse during Edward III’s reign,
136 
may explain Coke’s unfamiliarity with the variability of the criminal penalties for 
treason when the Statute Articuli Cleri was issued in 1315.  Bellamy certainly 
confirms that statute’s assumption that abjuration was a penalty used in cases of 
treason during Edward II’s reign despite Coke’s denial of the fact.  
 
But Coke needed to deny the availability of abjuration for treason, however 
transparent it may now appear, to prove his point that religious confession privilege, 
like the other religious privileges – “benefit of clergy” and “sanctuary and abjuration”, 
were only available in cases of felony, not treason.
137  The reality is that the logic 
does not transfer.  Treason was not an exception even to benefit of clergy until some 
time after 1315, and sanctuary and the right to abjure, were available for treason in 
1315 to avoid the death penalty by beheading. Holdsworth’s additional observation – 
that the additional penalties of the forfeiture of one’s possessions and the legal 
_________________________ 
 
way back into royal favour”.  He cites the case as a fourteenth century case of practical penalty 
mitigation connected with abjuration (ibid, p 82). 
 
133 Ibid, p 63. 
 
134 Bellamy notes that King Edward II developed ‘the King’s record’ as a means of summary trial (ibid, pp 
35-53) which deprived defendants of the right to ‘put themselves on the country’ (jury trial).  The theory 
which lay behind the new trial mode was that “[t]he king’s own word or record that a fact was so, was the 
most perfect form of proof obtainable since it was incontrovertible” (ibid, p 35). 
 
135 Ibid, p 63. 
 
136 This “tampering with the scope of treason” (Bellamy, op cit, p 63) was answered by the Great Statute 
of Treasons in 1352 (25 Edward III) following a petition in the Commons (ibid, p 71). 
 
137 Coke had asserted at Garnet’s trial “by the common law, howsoever ... [Garnet came to know of the 
Gunpowder Plot] (it being crimen laesae majestatis) he ought to have disclosed it” (Carswell, D, Trial of 
Guy Fawkes and Others, Glasgow and Edinburgh, William Hodge and Company Limited, 1934, p 170; 
Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 246). Garnet’s case is discussed in detail infra, pp 77-
81. 
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widowhood of one’s wife
138 which were the further consequences of abjuration, were 
far too great to justify that sacrifice for lesser crimes which only amounted to 
felonies
139 – also resonates with these conclusions which follow from Professor 
Bellamy’s research. 
 
What does all this mean in this consideration of the existence of religious confession 
privilege in the early seventeenth century?  First, that there was no doubt that 
religious confession privilege existed when Coke wrote his Second Part of the 
Institutes (circa 1625).  And secondly, that “Coke’s treason exception” as prosecutor 
in Garnet’s case, had no legitimate foundation in the English common law of that day.  
 
There may, however, have been other authority for the treason exception which Coke 
chose not to cite in his magnum opus on the common law.  There are hints of that 
alternative authority in his use of the Latin “crimen laesae majestatis” in Garnet’s 
prosecution, rather than the more familiar French phrase “lese-majesté”,
140 and in the 
then new Anglican canon law exception
141 to the seal of confession.
142  The Anglican 
canon law exception was only two to three years old at the time when Garnet’s case 
                                                 
138 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 3, p 305. 
 
139 Holdsworth cites Brooke, who doubts that sanctuary and abjuration were used for minor offences, 
and says “that it was confined to cases where the criminal was in jeopardy of his life; considering the 
serious consequences of abjuration it was probably mainly used in these cases” (Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 
3, p 305). 
 
140 Kurtscheid, B, A History of the Seal of Confession, Marks FA, Trans, Preuss A, ed, St Louis and 
London, 1927, pp 164, 166. 
 
141 The first canons of the Anglican Church were published in 1603/4 and are discussed in chapter three.  
Canon 113 deals with religious confession and includes an exception which has been considered 
ambiguous by some canon law commentators.  Lynn Leeder has contributed that “treason would seem 
to be the only candidate” for the meaning of the exception to the new canon (Ecclesiastical Law 
Handbook, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, p 355). 
 
142 Canon 113, Constitutions and canons ecclesiastical/treated upon by the Archbishops of Canterbury 
and York, London, printed by Robert Barker and by the assigns of John Bull, 1640. 
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was tried.
143  The French authority can be dated to the early fifteenth century.
144  For 
from the fifteenth century, the canonists carried on an extensive debate as to whether 
priests were entitled to refuse to disclose knowledge they had gained in confession in 
the wake of “an ordinance of Louis XI, of December 22, 1477, commanding every 
citizen under pain of death to report any plot against the king or State of which he 
might have knowledge”.
145  The French canonical conclusion, which was deplored by 
the more conservative canonists,
146 was that treason was an exception to the seal of 
confession. 
 
The only remaining question about Coke’s otherwise clear confirmation of a common 
law religious confession privilege in the early seventeenth century are the closing 
words of the 1315 Statute Articuli Cleri – “ne erronice informent”.  Coke did not see 
the need to comment on these words as he had in relation to four other phrases in 
the part of the statute that is relevant to religious confession privilege.  He simply 
repeated them.  The relevant text of which they form part reads, “but the confessors 
must take care that they do not wrongfully inform these approvers”.
147 
 
Tiemann and Bush are uncertain about the existence of a religious confession 
privilege in Coke’s time, because they consider these closing ambiguous words 
                                                 
143 The canons were promulgated in 1603/1604.  Garnet’s case was tried on 26 March 1606. 
 
144 Kurtscheid, B, A History of the Seal of Confession, Marks, PA, transl, St Louis and London, B Herder 
Book Co, 1927, pp 152-169. 
 
145 Ibid, p 153. 
 
146 Ibid, pp 163-169. 
 
147 Translation courtesy of Dr Will Richardson of the Classics and Ancient History Department at the 
University of Auckland, New Zealand. 
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diluted the privilege and limited it only to “certain prisoners”
148 – namely the thieves 
and approvers (informers) listed.  It is submitted that Best’s view of the caution is 
more compelling.  He wrote: 
 
We may be permitted to doubt whether the caveat at the end was inserted to 
warn the confessor against disclosing the secrets of the penitent to others.  
The grammatical construction and context seem to show that it was to prevent 
him abusing the privilege of access to the criminal by conveying information to 
him from without.
149 
 
Best noticed that the warning was generally interpreted as an affirmation, not only of 
religious confession privilege itself, but also of the clerical obligation to observe the 
seal imposed upon them by Canon 21 of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.  Best 
doubted that either of those suggested purposes explained the warning. Instead Best 
opined, in view of the connection of the phrase to clerical communication with 
approvers (informers), that the King was more concerned that the clergy not abuse 
their access and provide prisoners with otherwise unknown information about crime 
in general.  The essence of Best’s insight is that the King suspected the clergy of 
providing information about unsolved crime to prisoners so that those prisoners might 
then disclose that new information to the King as informers in better hope of receiving 
his mercy.  It is submitted that Best’s view is the best explanation of the words “ne 
erronice informent” and does not dilute either Edward II or Coke’s recognition of the 
accepted privilege. 
                                                 
148 Tiemann and Bush suggest that “the plain meaning of the Statute [Articuli Cleri is] ... that certain 
prisoners had the right to be confessed by a priest” and that “Lord Coke [in his commentary] is citing 
what he feels to be the common law at that time, as it would apply to all priests” (Tiemann, WH, and 
Bush, JC, The Right to Silence – Privileged Clergy Communications and the Law, Nashville, Abingdon 
Press, 1983, pp 46-47). 
 
149 Best, WM, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, London, S Sweet, 1849, p 460. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER TWO  
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What the context of Coke’s reference to religious confession privilege does confirm is 
that his point was not to affirm the existence of religious confession privilege.  That 
confirmation is merely an aside which fact he treats as axiomatic.  Because Coke did 
not think the “ne erronice informent” codicil to the Statute Articuli Cleri needed any 
explanation, it is not clear what he understood it to mean.  The point he laboured was 
the treason exception and that is where he cited his authority.  That focus is clearer 
still when it is remembered that his commentary upon the statute was provided as an 
example of the interrelationship of the common law with the church and its privileges.  
The treason exception to religious confession privilege was cited as an example of 
the common law’s successful assertion of its supremacy.  What Coke was 
demonstrating was that even the established privileges of the church had been part 
trumped by a treason exception evolved at common law.  He did not choose 
Randolph’s case or Garnet’s case to establish religious confession privilege except 
as a concession on the way to proving his premise.  His premise was that the 
common law was so powerful that it had established a treason exception to the 
privileges of the church.  
 
As has been explained above, his logic in explaining the historical context of the 
Statute Articuli Cleri in 1315 is not completely accurate because first, it was not 
correct for him to state that the ecclesiastical privilege known as ‘sanctuary and 
abjuration’ was not then available for treason
150; and secondly, because even the 
treason exception to ‘benefit of clergy’ was not established until more than sixty years 
after the Statute Articuli Cleri was passed.
151  
                                                 
150 Supra, pp 67-72. 
 
151 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 3, p 297.  See also supra, pp 66-67. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER TWO  
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Religious confession privilege in Garnet’s case. 
The real question in defining the metes and bounds of religious confession privilege 
at common law at the beginning of the seventeenth century, thus comes down to the 
impact of Garnet’s case upon that common law.  Coke’s concern in his Second Part 
of the Institutes more than twenty years later was to affirm that ‘his treason exception’ 
to religious confession privilege was established by historical and common law 
authority.  It is noteworthy that the extensive report of Garnet’s case includes no 
mention at all of either the debatable treason exceptions to ‘benefit of clergy’ or 
‘sanctuary and abjuration’ that he cites as authority in the Second Part of the 
Institutes, or to Randolph’s case, the other common law authority which he cites in 
that Second Part of the Institutes.  While it is possible that he did not consider such 
evidence appropriate when he argued Garnet’s case before a jury, his prosecution of 
the case did include a great deal of other historical material of arguably less 
relevance.  More likely it is that his defence of the treason exception to all church 
privileges in the Second Part of the Institutes was the result of twenty years further 
thought.  Since King James was personally involved in academic debate with 
continental canonists after the Garnet decision to defend ‘Coke’s treason exception’ 
to religious confession privilege,
152 it seems likely that Coke felt pressure to justify the 
exception from the common law. It is therefore not surprising that he endeavoured to 
do that exclusively from English common law materials.   
 
 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
152 See note 178 infra and supporting text. 
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Garnet’s case 
153 
Despite Coke’s statement in his Second Part of the Institutes
154 that Garnet’s case 
affirmed that treason was an exception to both ‘benefit of clergy’ and “priviledge of 
confession”,
155 it is difficult to confirm that precedential finding from the facts of the 
case.  However, “priviledge of confession” was certainly raised as a defence 
personally
156 by the Jesuit Superior of England, Father Henry Garnet.  Though the 
report of the case is extensive, it is not clear whether he was charged with treason, in 
what modern lawyers might call the first degree (direct involvement in development 
and prosecution of the crime), treason in the second degree (an accessory before or 
after the fact) or misprision of treason
157 (knowing of a treason and not divulging it to 
the authorities).  In practice it did not matter since all high treasons (treasons against 
the person of the King) and misprision of high treason, carried the death penalty and 
these close modern distinctions have no significance in the way the case was 
                                                 
153 Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217. 
 
154 Coke, op cit, p 629. 
 
155 Idem. 
 
156 Prisoners were not “allowed counsel at the trial itself ... until 1696 in cases of treason, [and] until 
1836 in cases of felony” (Milsom, SFC, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London, 
Butterworths, 1969, 360.  Stone and Wells say that the year of this change occurred in 1695 but confirm 
that this change was not available to criminal defendants till near the beginning of the seventeenth 
century (Stone, J, Evidence, Its History and Policies, Revised by WAN Wells, Sydney, Butterworths, 
1991, pp 34-35). 
 
157 One modern legal dictionary defines “misprision” as “[a] word used to describe an offense which does 
not possess a specific name ... But more particularly and properly the term denotes either: (1) a 
contempt against the sovereign, the government, or the courts of justice, including not only contempts of 
court, properly so called, but also all forms of seditious or disloyal conduct and leze-majesty [sic]; (2) 
maladministration of public office; neglect or improper performance of official duty, including peculation 
of public funds; (3) neglect of light account made of crime, that is failure in the duty of a citizen to 
endeavor to prevent the commission of a crime, or ,having knowledge of its commission, to fail to reveal 
it to the proper authorities” (Black, HC, Black’s Law Dictionary, 6
th ed, St Paul, Minnesota, West 
Publishing Co., 1990, p 1000).  The dictionary goes on to indicate that “misprision of felony” connotes 
concealment “but without such previous concert with or subsequent assistance to the felon as would 
make the party concealing an accessory before or after the fact” (idem). 
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argued.
158  Because it was a jury trial, the only precedent value the result carries
159 is 
that Coke’s final prosecution as Attorney-General
160 was successful.  Henry Garnet 
was found guilty of a high treason and was beheaded in St Paul’s churchyard on 3 
May 1606,
161 five weeks after his trial on 26 March 1606.
162  
 
Coke’s case for the prosecution connected disparate threads of circumstance to 
establish that Garnet not only knew of the plot, but that he had certainly encouraged 
and assisted it if he was not its primary author.  His reasoning may be summarised 
down to four essential propositions. First, that it was a secret confederacy involving 
only “Catesby of the laity”.
163  Secondly, that it was oath-bound for seriousness and 
                                                 
158 Professor Bellamy traces how the offence of “misprision”, which first had reference to a mistake 
(Bellamy, JG, The Law of Treason in England in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press, 
1970, p 216) “took on additional meanings as the years passed” (idem).  Though he says that “it has 
been [an error] to hold misprision as almost the equivalent of treason” (idem), yet his findings that Tudor 
statutes and Sir Edward Coke so used the word, suggest to the writer that it is not a very large error.  
“For as early as 1415, to know of yet to conceal treason was treason” (ibid, p 222), which suggests that 
the words “misprision of treason” had become, by Tudor times, simply an adjectival way of describing a 
particular type of treason.  The fact, too, that Coke devotes “a separate if slender chapter” (Bellamy, op 
cit, p 216) to “misprisions diverse and several”, yet does not mention Garnet’s case in that chapter as he 
does when discussing the Statute Articuli Cleri of 1315 (Second Part of the Institutes, p 629), suggests 
that either he considers that Garnet had been charged with treason proper, or that “misprision of 
treason” had indeed become a legal term of art to describe a species of treason, and that it no longer 
denoted a lesser version of the principle offence in the case of treason. 
 
159 That is, the jury made the decision after hearing all the evidence.  Only the jury could thus technically 
spell out the reasons why they decided Garnet was guilty of treason, but of course juries have never 
been required or even allowed to give reasons. 
 
160 Coke was appointed Chief Justice of Common Pleas on 20 June 1606 and served till his dismissal in 
the autumn of 1613.  He was appointed Chief Justice of King’s Bench on 25 October 1613 (which was a 
less lucrative post and considered a demotion) until he was again dismissed by the King on 14 
November 1616 (Hostettler, op cit, pp 61, 79, 93). 
 
161 Carswell, D, ed, Trial of Guy Fawkes and Others (The Gunpowder Plot), William Hodge and 
Company Ltd, Glasgow and Edinburgh, 1934, p 188; Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 
355. 
 
162 Each of the trials of the Gunpowder plotters lasted only one day.  The first took place on 27 January 
1606 and Garnet’s on 26 March 1606.  Those executed following the earlier trials were Sir Everard 
Digby, Robert Writer, John Grant, Thomas Bates, Thomas Winter, Ambrose Rookwood, Robert Keyes 
and Guy Fawkes (Lyon, H, and Block, H, Edward Coke – Oracle of the Law, Littleton Colorado, Fred B 
Rothman & Co, 1992, pp 158-159).  Robert Catesby, Thomas Percy, John Wright and his brother had 
been killed in the pitched battle that attended the capture and arrest of the fleeing conspirators in 
Hobeach House on the Welsh border on 8 November 1605 (Pollen, JH, “The Gunpowder Plot”, 7 
Catholic Encyclopedia (1913) 81, 82; Mockler, A, op cit, p 17). 
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secrecy’s sake.
164  Thirdly, that it was Jesuit blessed by their administration of the 
sacraments to all the conspirators.
165  And fourthly, that it was further disguised by 
the Jesuit’s careful indoctrination of the conspirators in the art of equivocation.
166 
 
The “priviledge of confession” arose as an issue in the case because Garnet denied 
he was a principal conspirator in the case as Coke alleged.
167  Garnet stated that he 
only knew about the issue because Greenwell
168 (another Jesuit) had consulted him 
about the matter.  This consultation, Garnet maintained, was itself protected by the 
privilege of confession.
169  Garnet further defended that he had done what he 
reasonably could to dissuade the plotters without breaching the seal of confession.  
He also cited his loyalty to the English King and counsel against treason in other 
plots as proof of his good faith.
170 
_________________________ 
 
 
164 Carswell, D, op cit, p 147; Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 229. 
 
165 Idem. 
 
166 Carswell, D, op cit, p 153-154; Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 234-235. 
 
167 Carswell, D, op cit, p 136: Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 221. 
 
168 The law reports in the writer’s possession (Cobbett’s Complete Collection of State Trials and 
Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanours from the earliest period to the 
present time, London, Printed by TC Hansard, Published by R Bagshaw, Brydges Street Covent 
Garden, 1809 and herein cited as “Howell’s State Trials”; along with Donald Carswell’s edition of The 
Trial of Guy Fawkes and Others (The Gunpowder Plot), London, Butterworth & Co, 1934) both name 
this particular Jesuit priest as “Greenwell” and so the writer has used that name for him throughout.  
However, readers should note that other commentators variously name him as “Greenway” (Kurtscheid, 
B, A History of the Seal of Confession, Authorized translation by the Rev FA Marks, Edited by Arthur 
Preuss, St Louis and London, B Herder Book Co, 1927; Lyon, H, and Block, H, Edward Coke – Oracle 
of the Law, Littleton, Colorado, Fred B Rothman & Co, 1992; Pollen, JH, “Henry Garnet” (1913) 6 
Catholic Encyclopaedia 386 and  “The Gunpowder Plot” (1913) 7 Catholic Encyclopaedia 81) and 
“Greenaway” (Mockler, A, Lions Under the Throne, London, Frederick Muller Ltd, 1983). 
 
169 Other religious confessions were referenced at the trial.  For example, the first five plotters’ 
confession to the Jesuit Gerard in May 1604 immediately after they had made their “collective oath of 
secrecy and constancy” (Carswell, D, op cit, p 147; Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 
229) and Garnet’s own overheard confession to his brother Jesuit Hall while both were incarcerated in 
the Tower (Pollen, JH, “The Gunpowder Plot”, 7 Catholic Encyclopedia (1913) 81, 84).  But the 
“priviledge of confession” was not raised as a defence to either of them. 
 
170 Carswell, D, op cit, p 161-162; Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 240-241. 
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Coke’s rebuttal of Garnet’s defence appears to have convinced the jury.  Coke said 
Garnet’s conversation with Greenwell was not a sacramental confession because: it 
contemplated a future wrong which could not be repented of in advance; the 
confidante was not penitent; it was told him “not as a fault, but by way of consultation 
and advice”;
171 and it was told on behalf of others, and not by the sinners 
themselves.
172  Coke added that even if it were a confession, it was not privileged for 
two reasons.  First, because “[Garnet] might and ought to have discovered the 
mischief, for preservation of the State, though he had concealed the persons”
173 (the 
implication being that Garnet would not then have broken the Seal).  And secondly, 
because “it [was] crimen laesae majestatis ... by the common law
174 ... he ought to 
have disclosed it”.
175  
 
Cross-examination and comment from two
176 of the nine Commissioners present
177 
doubting that Garnet’s communication with Greenwell could ever have been a 
                                                 
171 Carswell, D, op cit, p 169; Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 246. 
 
172 Carswell, D, op cit, p 169-170; Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 245-246. 
 
173 Carswell, D, op cit, pp 169-170; Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 246. 
 
174 The report provides no detail of what common law Coke was referring to.  In light of the fulsome 
detail otherwise provided in what reads close to a verbatim report, it appears that the simple assertion 
stood on its own and was not contested. 
 
175 Carswell, D, op cit, p 170.  Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217, 246.  Though Coke 
referred to “the common law” at the trial, the report does not reveal whether he cited any authority or 
whether any authority was discussed.  Given the otherwise thorough fulness of the report, it seems 
unlikely that he did cite those authorities that he later referenced in his Second Part of the Institutes. 
 
176 The Earls of Northampton and Salisbury. 
 
177 The other seven Commissioners were Sir Leonard Holyday, Lord Mayor; the Earls of Nottingham, 
Suffolk and Worcester; the Lord Chief Justice of England, Sir John Popham; the Lord Chief Baron of the 
Exchequer; and Sir Christopher Yelverton, kt., one of His Majesty’s Justices of the King’s Bench 
(Carswell, D, op cit, p 131; Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217). 
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religious confession, must also have reinforced Coke’s prosecutorial rebuttal of 
Garnet’s religious confession privilege defence in the minds of the jurors.  
 
Though these facts and this result in a jury case may not meet modern precedential 
standards in establishing a rule of law, they do prove that the “priviledge of 
confession” was not unknown to English law.  If Garnet’s religious confession 
privilege defence had no substance whatever, Coke would surely have said so both 
in his prosecution of the case and in his later commentary.  That King James himself 
subsequently entered into a correspondence with canon law authorities in Europe in 
an apparent effort to establish “Coke’s treason exception” to religious confession 
privilege as a matter of Catholic practice,
178 is similarly probative of acceptance of the 
standing of “the priviledge of confession” more than 60 years after King Henry VIII’s 
Reformation was complete. 
 
Conclusion to chapter two 
Chapter two has demonstrated that there was practical recognition of religious 
confession privilege as late as the seventeenth century.  Certainly the doctrine was 
not as defined as it is when expressed in modern statutes.  However, it is clear that a 
priest would not be compelled to disclose the contents of any confession made to him 
in the course of his ministry, unless perhaps the facts confessed to him disclosed a 
high treason. 
 
                                                 
178 Kurtscheid has written that “James I ... (1607) wrote an apology of the oath of allegiance under the 
title Triplici Nodo Triplex Cuneus, sive Apologia pro Iuramento Fidelitalis, in which he attacked ... the 
doctrine of the Jesuits concerning the Seal. [Cardinal] Bellarmine answered under [a] pseudonym ... In 
reply, James republished his apology with an amplified preface and sent it to the various courts, which 
induced Bellarmine to write a reply in his own name” (Kurtscheid, B, A History of the Seal of Confession, 
Marks, PA, transl, St Louis and London, B Herder Book Co, 1927, p 157). 
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Chapter three will document the evolution of the “priviledge of confession” in canon 
law and will explain how and why it became embedded in the common law.  In 
particular, King Henry VIII’s reception of all existing canon law as his ecclesiastical 
law of England will rebut Wigmore’s implication that “Papal ecclesiastical practices 
prior to Henry VIII”
179 including the seal of confession had been abolished at the time 
of the English Reformation. 
 
                                                 
179 Wigmore, JH, Evidence in trials at common law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RELIGIOUS CONFESSION AND 
PRIVILEGE IN CANON LAW 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Coke’s recognition of a religious confession privilege in the seventeenth century does 
not define its metes and bounds.  He simply says that there is a religious confession 
privilege save in cases of treason, but the exception does not explain the privilege 
itself.  Readers of his Second Part of the Institutes are expected to know what 
constitutes a privileged religious confession – which lack of definition is itself 
testimony to the joinder of church and state which was a theme of chapter two.  While 
Garnet’s case suggests that there was a distinction even in the seventeenth century 
between regular and irregular confessions, it is doubtful that the case has common 
law precedential value since it was a jury trial and the prosecution’s untested 
assertions about regularity were swamped in the end by the circumstantial case that 
Garnet was guilty of treason in the first degree. 
 
The purpose of chapter three is to explain what religious confession meant when 
Coke acknowledged its existence in the common law – and what it was about 
religious confession that was privileged.  The influence of canonical recognition of the 
seal on the common law will then be discussed before various expressions of its 
continuing status as part of the fabric of the general law of England are weighed.  RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER THREE 
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This chapter two and three historical part of the thesis concludes that recognition of 
religious confession privilege was so thoroughly respected as a common law 
principle in the seventeenth century that there is no record of its ever being contested 
except in Garnet’s case.  And that case was only “indecisive”
1 in the sense that the 
existence of religious confession privilege itself was uncontested.  
 
Origins of confession 
While Roman Catholic apologists like to trace modern confessional practice to 
various biblical statements made by Christ himself,
2 there is fairly general consensus 
that the early Christian church that was developed after his death, practiced a form of 
public confession.
3  While it is not clear exactly what form that confession took, the 
use of the Greek word “exomologesis”
4 to describe it suggests that intending new 
converts would address the congregation and renounce their old sins in a public and 
generalised way.  “Exomologesis” however, is only a reference to a form of public 
confession and it is not clear whether it was available only to new converts or to 
existing members with something to shrive; whether the confession had to be made 
in a public meeting or simply in front of representatives of the relevant congregation; 
whether it was a regular occurrence for example repeated weekly or monthly; 
whether it was preceded by private interview with clerical leaders; whether it was 
                                                 
1 Wigmore’s use of the word “indecisive” to describe Garnet’s case does not acknowledge that the 
historical and canon law roots of the common law might have justified a more careful review (Evidence 
in Trials at Common Law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown, 1961, Vol 8, p 869). 
 
2 For example “the keys of the kingdom” given Peter to bind and loose on earth and in heaven (Matthew 
16:16-19). 
 
3 McNeill, JT, A History of the Cure of Souls, New York, Evanston and London, Harper & Row, 1951, pp 
90, 91. Note also that EF Latko says that “exomologesis ... has a variety of meanings, but ordinarily 
signifies an avowal of sin, made either to God or to man”, but “etymologically [it] denotes open 
declaration and implies public confession [and was employed] in the primitive Church ... for confession 
of sins and for the sacramental procedure involving austere discipline” (Latko, EF, “Auricular 
Confession” (1966) 4 New Catholic Encyclopedia 131).  See also  Meninger, K, Whatever became of 
sin?, New York, Hawthorn Books Inc, 1973, p 25. 
 
4 Literally, exomologesis means “to confess in full” or “to make full acknowledgement” 
(http://monarch.gsu.edu/jcrampton/foucault/techterms.html last visited 8 July 2006). RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER THREE 
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accompanied by some public imposition of penitential restitution; or whether it was 
only used in connection with public as opposed to secret sins. It may be that all of 
these further questions were the later questions of a successful institution grown 
large and forced to grapple with issues of administrative consistency and efficiency. 
McNeill is confident that before the end of the second century it routinely took place 
in Sunday meetings and necessarily took place before the clergy when the sins were 
more serious, though it seems congregational publicity was all that was required 
since persecution often required that the ‘public’ meetings themselves took place in 
secret.
5  This process was soon embellished, for Murray recounts an elaborate liturgy 
of St Ambrose in 383 AD which took days and saw all penitents, as Adam and Eve, 
symbolically expelled from the church on Ash Wednesday before being readmitted on 
Holy Thursday.
6 
 
McNeill says that none of “the third century fathers authorized the repetition of the 
exomologesis”,
7 but notes that the “considerable numbers who lapsed into ‘idolatry’ in 
persecution, and afterward insistently sought restitution”,
8 probably explains the 
advent of confessional repetition.  Meninger is probably cynical when he suggests 
that confession became private after Constantine to make the church more attractive 
to would-be converts
9 but McNeill and Kurtscheid propose a more reasoned 
explanation.  McNeill suggests that from “an early period a private interview normally 
preceded the public act”,
10 and cites authority in Origen (died 253 AD) and Ambrose 
                                                 
5 McNeill, op cit, p 91. 
 
6 Murray, L, Confession: Outmoded Sacrament?, London, Geoffrey Chapman, 1972, pp 156, 157. 
 
7 McNeill, op cit, p 93. 
 
8 Idem. 
 
9 Meninger, op cit, p 26. 
 
10 McNeill, op cit, p 94. 
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(died 397 AD) for private confession to a priest, but notes that reconciliation still 
required the further step of public confession.
11  For Tertullian, writing shortly before 
200 AD, public penance was still required for “secret grievous sins”,
12 but in the 
Spanish Church before 400 AD, “only a confession to the bishop or to the 
presbytery”
13 was required and the public aspect was reduced to a generalised 
acknowledgement of sin and a request for pardon and support from the 
congregation.
14  While Kurtscheid apologetically suspects that even Tertullian’s public 
penance around 200 AD was generalised, the detail and penance having been 
prescribed in private,
15 he is certain that St Augustine’s failure to mention public 
confession means “that since the close of the fourth century secret confession of 
secret transgressions was deemed sufficient”.
16  While McNeill is not so convinced by 
this failure to mention public confession in St Augustine, since he “offers no evidence 
for the existence of private penance with absolution”
17 either, he acknowledges “the 
African father[’s] ... habitual ... use of a private interview to receive confessions”.
18 
 
But though confession had become a private affair by the end of the fourth century, 
there was no canonical seal nor reference to an expectation of confidentiality in the 
priest.  Formal approval of secret confession and a disapproval of public recitation of 
                                                 
11 Ibid, pp 94-95. 
 
12 Kurtscheid, op cit, p 18. 
 
13 Ibid, p 19. 
 
14 Ibid, p 17. 
 
15 Ibid, pp 16-18. 
 
16 Ibid, pp 21, 37. 
 
17 McNeill, op cit, p 96. 
 
18 Idem. 
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sin at a papal level is variously attributed,
19 but it is in Celtic custom in Ireland that the 
penitential discipline which led to the seal is sourced.
20  Though Kurtscheid “finds no 
specific evidence in Church law of insistence upon secrecy before the middle of the 
ninth century”,
21 “Ambrose in the fourth century had felt obligated to tell none but the 
Lord the nature of offenses revealed to him in private”.
22  Kurtscheid says that “the 
rudiments of the Seal are recognizable”
23 from this early date, since the church was 
endeavouring “to remove everything that might deter the faithful from confessing their 
sins”
24 but it is the fact that public penance was never even introduced into Ireland 
that focuses his attention on that country as the source of the seal.
25 
 
Murray says the idea that people can “go to a priest to get absolution ... any time they 
take it into their heads to sin”
26 was an idea that had germinated in Spain though 
“[t]he Council of Toledo, AD 589 [had] thunder[ed] against this intolerable abuse”, 
considering it “disgusting” that “people [would use] a form of penance contrary to the 
canonical institutions”.
27  For McNeill, that the Irish and Welsh Penitential Books 
which were copied by “English and Continental imitators, from the sixth to the 
sixteenth century”
28 evidences a penitential discipline quite different to that which had 
                                                 
19 Ibid, pp 98-99.  See also Kurtscheid, op cit, pp 51-64. 
 
20 The Irish origins of the seal attached to confessional practice are discussed infra, pp 79-81. 
 
21 McNeill, op cit, p 117 – summarising Kurtscheid’s conclusions. 
 
22 Idem.  See also ibid, pp 45-46. 
 
23 Ibid, p 47. 
 
24 Idem. 
 
25 Ibid, p 65. 
 
26 Murray, L, Confession: Outmoded Sacrament?,  London, Geoffrey Chapman, 1972, p 160. 
 
27 Ibid, p 159. 
 
28 McNeill, op cit, p 113. 
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obtained in the Patristic Age.
29  “Instead of being public and unusual,
30 confession 
and penance had become private, frequent and common to all”,
31 and the roots for 
these Irish origins lay “in the culture of the Celtic peoples”.
32  Murray says that 
 
[w]hen St Patrick landed in Ireland [in] AD 432, he seems never to have 
thought of introducing the classical penitential system [but rather] ... his 
missionaries developed a new style by grafting ecclesial penance on to an old 
monastic custom whereby novices went to the old for spiritual advice and to 
confess their faults.
33 
 
In fact, the Irish even had “a word for penitence (aithrige or athirgi etc) ... in old ... 
tales scarcely affected by Christianity”.
34  The Celts in Wales and Gaul too had pre-
Christian confessional traditions and some scholars have even “shown remarkable 
parallels between ancient Irish and ancient Indian practice”
35 where their spiritual 
directors, judges and wise men were involved, and the people “accepted the 
obligations they imposed”.
36  For McNeill, “the private character of ... Celtic 
penance”
37 is manifest in its complete “disassociati[on] from church assemblies”
38 
                                                 
29 Ibid, p 112.  The Patristic Age is the age of Christ’s Apostles, and the Bishops who succeeded them, 
who governed the church in the early centuries after Christ was crucified. 
 
30 Idem.  “Unusual” in the sense that confession to the congregation in the Patristic Age seems to have 
been  a one-off event in the life of the penitent and the discipline imposed was unique to individuals.  
The Penitential Books gradually standardised discipline for similar offences. 
 
31 Idem. 
 
32 Ibid, p 115. 
 
33 Murray, op cit, p 160. 
 
34 McNeill, op cit, p 115. 
 
35 Ibid, p 116. 
 
36 Idem. 
 
37 Idem. 
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and there is no “public exposure”
39 nor need as in the classical tradition for a “public 
act of reconciliation”.
40  Accordingly, when the Greek Theodore of Tarsus became 
Archbishop of Canterbury,
41 he found the Irish system so well established and 
accepted, even in England, that “he yielded to the Irish practice”.
42  Kurtscheid 
suggests that this surrender was so as not to “render the conversion of Anglo-Saxons 
more difficult”
43 which would have been the result of insisting on the “humiliating 
[classical] penance”.
44  Murray says that it was the imprimatur of Theodore’s 
authority, who was well seasoned in the classical Roman and Greek penitential 
systems but who nonetheless adopted the Irish development, which enabled it to 
flourish and gradually spread through the whole church.  In time, the process by 
which the Irish church developed their traditions into sacramental confession “came 
to be recognized as a stroke of genius”.
45  Her useful summary of that development 
records four changes.  First, “[a] transition from a communal, social, ecclesiastical 
celebration to a private ceremony”; secondly, “[a] transition from a statement in which 
all the people of god have an active role to one in which ordained priests are active”; 
thirdly, “[a] transition from a sacrament in which only serious sins are confessed to 
_________________________ 
 
38 Idem. 
 
39 Idem. 
 
40 Idem. 
 
41 There is variation in the dates of Theodore’s archbishopric at Canterbury.  Kurtscheid dates his 
penitential manual from which the information upon which all the commentators rely to 568 AD 
(Kurtscheid, op cit, p 65), whereas McNeill dates his term as Archbishop in England to 668-690 AD 
(McNeill, op cit, p 117).  Murray also dates the commencement of his bishopric to 668 AD (Murray, op 
cit, p 160), which suggests there is a typographical error in the earlier work of Kurtscheid. 
 
42 McNeill, op cit, p 116. 
 
43 Kurtscheid, op cit, p 65. 
 
44 Idem. 
 
45 Murray, op cit, p 160. 
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one in which venal sins and imperfections are confessed”; and fourthly, “[a] transition 
from a sacrament rarely received, to a commonly frequented sacrament”.
46 
 
The evolution of confession thus manifests the church’s desire to ameliorate the 
severity of its classical penitential regime as it grew internationally, both because 
such severity was difficult and time-consuming to administer,
47 and because it was 
unattractive to would-be converts. All that remains to complete a tracing of the 
modern Catholic sacrament of confession and penance is to identify the origins of the 
seal itself and its penalties, for they have remained virtually unchanged since they 
were finally enshrined in the 21
st canon of the 4
th Lateran Council of 1215. 
 
Origins of the seal 
In his endeavour to prove the historical and doctrinal seamlessness of the Catholic 
practice with regard to the seal of confession, Kurtscheid finds it fairly thoroughly 
established in practice if not in canon law by Pope Leo I’s papal letter in 459 AD.
48  In 
that letter, the Pope addressed “the bishops of Campania, Samnium and Picenum”, 
in whose diocese it had been “customary, when public penance was accepted, to 
read publicly in church, not only the names of the penitents ... but also the 
transgressions for which each one did penance”.
49  Kurtscheid calls this letter “the 
first papal decretal safeguarding the secret of confession”.
50  The Pope identified the 
                                                 
46 Ibid, pp 167-169. 
 
47 McNeill, op cit, p 98. 
 
48 Kurtscheid, op cit, pp 51-58, 83-84. 
 
49 Ibid, p 51. 
 
50 Idem. 
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custom of so reading secret transgressions in open assembly
51 as an abuse that 
must “by all means cease”
52 – that “the manifestation of conscience (secret sins) in 
secret confession to the priests fully suffices”.
53 
 
Kurtscheid does however recognise the existence of other commentary down to the 
ninth century, which drew an evolutionary distinction between secret or conscience 
sins and those public sins which came to be defined in church canon law as 
scandal.
54  In the earlier days of this evolution, the nature of the sin was more 
indicative of whether a public penitential sanction should attach,
55 but gradually, the 
question of whether the sin itself was publicly known – in which event the sinner 
would need to be excommunicated and readmitted to the church
56 – became the 
factor most determinative of whether any public penance was required.  Cases of 
clerical penance created particular problems if the seal was not inviolable, since the 
withdrawal of clerical office after secret confession of secret sins – a very public 
penance – was incongruous with the lay rule which required only secret penance for 
secret sins.
57 
 
However, in England, more than a century before the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 
put the inviolability of the seal beyond doubt anywhere in the church,
58 the seal was 
                                                 
51 Ibid, p 52. 
 
52 Ibid, p 54. 
 
53 Ibid, p 55. 
 
54 Ibid, pp 57-76. 
 
55 Ibid, p 62. 
 
56 Ibid, p 70. 
 
57 Ibid, pp 69-76. 
 
58 McNeill, op cit, p 113. 
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already inviolable.  For Lanfranc, whom William the Conqueror had appointed 
Archbishop of Canterbury in 1070,
59 wrote “in his treatise De Celanda Confessione”
60 
 
He sins against this sacrament [i.e., Penance] who in any manner whatever 
arouses public suspicion regarding what has been confessed to him, or 
causes penitents to be defamed.
61 
 
Lanfranc is emphatic on the point for the duty of confidentiality remains even if the 
supposed penitent turns out to be a recidivist sinner and “persevere[s] in his guilt”.
62  
In these circumstances, Lanfranc holds that “the confessor should bear with, after the 
example of Christ, who bore with Judas to the end”.
63  “He who reveals a confession 
commits a crime deserving of death”.
64  Lanfranc’s successor as Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Anselm (1093-1109), was similarly firm about the inviolable secrecy of 
confessional secrets and held that confessions must be kept “absolutely secret, if 
confession is to serve its purpose”
65 and unbar “the salutary road to penance ... 
against those who would rather conceal their transgressions until death than expose 
themselves to the suspicion of crime”.
66  Though there were controversies in Europe 
in later centuries about internal church use of confessional information and whether 
confessional information might be used to warn a monarch of a plot, so long as the 
                                                 
59 Lanfranc was Archbishop of Canterbury 1070-1089. 
 
60 Kurtscheid, op cit, p 92. 
 
61 Idem. 
 
62 Ibid, p 93. 
 
63 Ibid, pp 93-94. 
 
64 Ibid, p 93. 
 
65 Ibid, p 75. 
 
66 Idem. 
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penitent was not revealed,
67  Kurtscheid concludes that the position in England was 
well settled against any disclosure for any cause whatever by the end of the eleventh 
century.
68 
 
The need for such strong pronouncements in favour of the inviolable seal of 
confession and against any disclosure whatever of the contents of a confession were 
essentially a response to abuse.
69  Lanfranc’s concern, shared and expressed later 
by the renowned canonist Peter Abelard (1079-1142), was the need for discretion in 
choosing one’s confessor, since some “priests are light-minded and careless, and it 
is difficult for them to control their tongue”.
70  The seal was imposed and finally 
canonised with penalty in the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 because respect for the 
sacred confidence due the sacrament of confession had not proven sufficient to 
impress this obligation of secrecy upon all priests.  Hence the 21
st canon of the 
Fourth Lateran Council declared: 
 
Let the priest absolutely beware that he does not by word or sign or by any 
manner whatever in any way betray the sinner: but if he should happen to 
need wiser counsel let him cautiously seek the same without any mention of 
person.  For whoever shall dare to reveal a sin disclosed to him in the tribunal 
of penance we decree that he shall be not only deposed from the priestly 
office but that he shall be sent into the confinement of a monastery to do 
perpetual penance.
71 
                                                 
67 Ibid, pp 129-169. 
 
68 Ibid, pp 94-95. 
 
69 Ibid, p 95. 
 
70 Ibid, p 96. 
 
71 Nolan, RS, “The Seal of Confession” (1913) 13 Catholic Encyclopedia 649 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER THREE 
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For Kurtscheid, this canon “contains no essential innovation either concerning the 
seal or the precept of annual confession”
72 because “the direct violation of the seal 
was looked upon as a crime”
73 from the eighth century onwards.  Though Nolan
74 
with Kurtscheid notes the “renew[al of this law] during the succeeding centuries by 
numerous provincial councils and diocesan synods”,
75 these ordinances merely 
repeated and inculcated the Lateran canon which remained as the canon law of the 
church in place down to and through Henry VIII’s Reformation.
76  The seal of 
confession, protecting as it did the Sacrament of Penance, was one of those papal 
laws which was “meant to have the force of ‘binding statute law’ in a modern 
sense”.
77 
 
But did these papal laws indeed have effect as “‘binding statute law’ in a modern 
sense”,
78 as Helmholz suggests was their intent?  In the remainder of chapter three I 
answer that question by tracing the canon law and church influence in three 
chronological periods.  First, in the pre-Norman period when canonical sources 
suggest that the seal had become respected in English practice, I note the congruity 
of the catholic canon law and such so-called secular law as English kings passed.  
_________________________ 
 
 
72 Kurtscheid, op cit, p 115. 
 
73 Ibid, p 79. 
 
74 Nolan, op cit, p 650. 
 
75 Kurtscheid, op cit, p 127. 
 
76 The practical effect of the seal of confession in Roman Catholic canon law has remained the same to 
the present day, though the expression has been modernised.  King Henry VIII’s retention of all of the 
Roman Catholic canon law operative at the time of the separation from Rome, other than changes which 
he personally approved, is discussed infra, pp 109-111. 
 
77 Helmholz, RH, Canon Law and the Law of England, London and Ronceverte, The Hambledon Press, 
1987, p 261. 
 
78 Idem. 
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Secondly, in the two centuries which followed the Norman conquest, I show the 
growth of church power before it slowly declined ending in England with King Henry 
VIII’s Reformation.  And thirdly, despite that decline, I explain that Henry VIII’s 
Reformational decision to retain intact all previous canon law including the canon law 
regarding the seal of confession, operated to preserve religious confession privilege. 
 
England’s Catholic history before the Norman conquest  
Plucknett observed that Roman Catholic influence in Britain began in Roman times 
as the church gradually took over the empire and the Roman Empire became the 
Holy Roman Empire.
79  While that influence began with Agricola’s “systematic 
conquest of the island”
80 beginning in 43 AD, barbarian defence preoccupation at 
home diluted both Roman and Christian influence until the end of the sixth century 
under St Gregory the Great (590-604).
81  
 
Following the visit of the monk Augustine,
82 Pope Gregory’s emissary in 597,
83 the 
catholicisation of England continued in earnest.  Hence by the reign of Edward the 
Elder (921-924), Nolan noted secular (as opposed to canon laws passed by the 
church) “laws concerning confession”:
84 
                                                 
79 Plucknett observes that despite Roman efforts to “incorporate with [the Hellenistic religion] ... the 
religions of Isis, Mithras, Christ and others ... as an official department [with] ... its priests as civil 
servants ... Christianity would not accept this inferior position” (A Concise History of the Common Law, 
5
th ed, London, Butterworths, 1956, p 4). Accordingly, “slowly, but certainly, the Empire ruled from Rome 
was being replaced for many purposes by Christendom ruled by the papacy” (ibid, p 5).   
 
80 Plucknett, op cit, p 6. 
 
81 Ibid, p 8. 
 
82 Not to be confused with St Augustine who lived between 354 and 430 AD. 
 
83 Berman, HJ, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge 
Massachusetts and London England, Harvard University Press, 1983, p 54. 
 
84 Nolan, op cit, p 649. 
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And if a man guilty of death (ie who has incurred the penalty of death) desires 
confession let it never be denied him.
85 
 
This injunction from Edward the Elder’s laws was repeated in the forty-fourth of the 
secular laws of King Canute (1017-1035), with the following preface: 
 
This then is the secular law which by the counsel of my ‘Witan’ I will that it be 
observed all over England.
86 
 
Ethelred’s laws (978-1016) declared: 
 
And let every Christian man do as is needful for him: let him strictly keep his 
Christianity and accustom himself frequently to shrift (i.e., confess): and 
fearlessly declare his sins.
87 [The parentheses are Nolan’s.] 
 
Nolan concluded that this 
 
very close connection between the religion of the Anglo-Saxons and their 
laws, many of which were purely ordinances of religious observance enacted 
by the State [and] the repeated recognition of the supreme jurisdiction of the 
pope ... led conclusively to the opinion that the ecclesiastical law of the 
                                                 
85 Idem. 
 
86 Idem. 
 
87 Idem. 
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secrecy of confession was recognized by the law of the land in Anglo-Saxon 
England.
88 
 
Though Nolan is a little generous in his conclusion, since neither Edward the Elder, 
Ethelred nor Canute said anything about canonical secrecy, his identification of 
congruity between church and state in matters of law seems fair before the Norman 
Conquest.  But is it fair to say that there was congruity between such secular laws as 
were passed after the Norman Conquest as there had been before 1066? 
 
England’s Catholic history after the Norman conquest 
Though Plucknett notes that William the Conqueror (1066-1081) was a “devout 
Christian”
89 himself, 
 
he yet insisted that the Church should keep the place which he assigned to it, 
and in fact he secured an effective control over its policy, notably in 
appointments to the higher dignities.
90 
 
Plucknett further notes that William’s long quarrel with the church in the twenty years 
before the English expedition was settled with “the help of Lanfranc whom he 
afterwards appointed Archbishop of Canterbury”.
91  These disputes with the church 
were not an English specific issue and, in the wider European historical context, are 
                                                 
88 Idem. 
 
89 Plucknett, TFT, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5
th ed, London, Butterworths, 1956, p 11. 
 
90 Idem. 
 
91 Idem.  There were seven separate popes in power during this twenty year period beginning with 
Clement II (1046-1047) and ending with Alexander II (1061-1073) see 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12272b.htm (last visited April 10, 2004).  Lanfranc served as 
Archbishop of Canterbury between 1070 and 1089. 
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variously discussed as the “Investiture Contests”,
92 the Hildebrand Reforms and the 
Gregorian Reforms.
93 
 
There are a number of threads which trace the ebb and flow of the English King’s 
relationship with ‘The Church’.  The question of whose was the right to appoint the 
highest clerical officeholders was one of those; another was what temporal roles the 
clergy could fulfil in the King’s realm; and another, perhaps the most famous of all, 
was how much jurisdiction the King’s courts could exercise over the clergy – and in 
the explicit context of this thesis, what were the privileges of the clergy before the 
King’s courts. 
 
The writer has dated the investiture contests in England to at least William the 
Conqueror’s time, and has already explained that the history of “benefit of clergy”
94 
demonstrates the power of the church and thus the respect in which its privileges 
were held.  The unlikelihood that the clergy would be coerced to disclose 
confessional secrets during a period when even secular judicial roles were held by 
clergy will be explained below.
95  But William’s practical power to appoint his own 
choice even as Archbishop of Canterbury demonstrates that modern separation of 
church and state still lay in the future and that in eleventh century England, it was 
simply a question of who had what political power over church appointments. For the 
spirit of the Reformation which blended sixteenth century nationalism with changed 
                                                 
92 Berman says the term “Investiture Struggle” is something of an understatement.  The transformation 
involved was much more revolutionary than that term implies and sought the complete “disengagement 
of the sacred and profane” spheres (Berman, HJ, Law and Revolution, Cambridge Massachusetts and 
London England, Harvard University Press, 1983, pp 87-88). 
 
93 These reforms are named after the monk, Hildebrand, who became Pope Gregory VII (Berman, op cit, 
p 87). 
 
94 Supra, chapter two, pp 61-66. 
 
95 Infra, pp 101-103. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
99
concepts of church and state planted during the Investiture contests from the 
eleventh to the thirteenth centuries was still hundreds of years in the future.  
Plucknett has noted that before William had appointed the priest Lanfranc as 
Archbishop of Canterbury,
96 that same Lanfranc had helped William settle his 
struggle with the church in Normandy before he crossed the channel.  Though 
William may have broken protocol when he made the appointment as Archbishop 
instead of the Pope, the reality is that a political compromise had been reached which 
reconciled the personalities (William and the Pope) and suggests that their 
institutions were never separated in practice. 
 
Although Harold Berman believes that the Investiture struggle was the revolutionary 
watershed from which the entire separate church/state western legal tradition 
flowed,
97 he confirms that the contest was contemporarily fought as an internal 
political struggle in which the upper hand see-sawed back and forth.
98  William the 
Conqueror not only “appointed the bishops in his domain and controlled them
99 ... he 
declared that the King of England and Duke of Normandy had the power to determine 
whether a pope should be acknowledged by the church in England and 
Normandy”,
100 and asserted a veto power over the promulgation of new canon law 
and “ecclesiastical penalties imposed on his barons and officials”.
101  While the 
Conqueror’s son William Rufus (William II, 1081-1100) defied the efforts of Pope 
Gregory VII (1073-1085) and his successors to assert papal authority over the 
                                                 
96 Plucknett, op cit, p 11. 
 
97 Berman, op cit, pp 99-100. 
 
98 Ibid, p 94. 
 
99 Ibid, p 437. 
 
100 Idem. 
 
101 Idem. 
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English clergy, William Rufus’ brother, King Henry I (1100-1135), made “substantial 
compromises with respect to the appointment of clergy”
102 in return for papal support 
for his claim of Normandy from his brother Robert.  Indeed, “[t]he Concordat of Bec 
(Normandy) in 1107
103 anticipated the Concordat of Worms of 1122"
104 which settled 
the so-called Investiture Contest in Europe when the Emperor transferred the right “to 
invest bishops and abbots”
105 to the Pope though retaining “the right to be present at 
[their] elections”.
106  However the European settlement was more of a settlement than 
the Concordat of Bec, since it followed Pope Gregory VII’s successful deposition of 
the Emperor Henry IV in 1080
107 and the sporadic civil war which followed “between 
the papal and imperial parties” until Worms in 1122.  In England, papal assertion of 
the “independence of the clergy from secular control”
108 was not really complete until 
after Becket’s martyrdom in 1170. 
 
The point for this thesis is that the power of the church grew stronger in England after 
the Norman Conquest and reached its high water mark after Becket’s martyrdom.  
That high water mark was amply demonstrated by the public penance that the 
English King Henry II (1154-1189) was obliged to do “by walking barefoot to 
Canterbury”
109 – and by his submission in 1172  “to a papal legate on the heights of 
Avranches …[where] before its cathedral [he] publicly renounced those portions of 
                                                 
102 Idem. 
 
103 Henry I ruled both Normandy and England, as had his brother (William Rufus) and his father (William 
the Conqueror) before him.  Bec is in Normandy and was the place where he settled his controversy 
with the Papacy  -- the Pope at the time of the Concord was Paschal II (1099-1118). 
 
104 Berman, op cit, p 437. 
 
105 Idem. 
 
106 Idem. 
 
107 Ibid, pp 87, 522. 
 
108 Ibid, p 87. 
 
109 Ibid, p 256. 
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[Henry II’s] Constitutions of Clarendon that were ‘offensive’”.
110  In such an age it is 
unthinkable that any judge in any jurisdiction would have tried to force a priest to 
disclose a sealed and sacred confession, and certainly not soon after the 4
th Lateran 
Council in 1215 had made that seal canonically binding upon the whole church.
111  
Though the power of the Church waned subsequently, its authority and the King’s 
willingness to pass ‘secular laws’ protecting and restating its privileges just as 
Edward the Elder, Ethelred and Canute had done in pre-Norman times, are 
demonstrable one hundred years later in 1315 when Edward II passed his Statute 
Articuli Cleri
112 which was discussed in chapter two.
113  That most of the judges who 
manned the royal courts were clerics until Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254) banned 
such service, also demonstrates the pervasive influence of the church in the secular 
realm.  
 
Clerical service in the royal courts 
Nolan quotes Pollock and Maitland extensively as he makes his point that it was 
highly unlikely that a secular judiciary, manned by ecclesiastics, would deny the 
inviolability of the confessional seal when the confession was a sacrament of their 
faith. 
 
Again, let us remember that in some districts such as Durham and Chester, 
bishops exercised temporal jurisdiction.  Even in the King’s Courts, as Lord 
Coke points out, oftentimes the judges were priests before Innocent IV 
                                                 
110 Idem. 
 
111 The evolution of the confessional seal was explained supra, pp 90-95. 
 
112 9 Edward II, st.1. 
 
113 Chapter two, pp 53-61. 
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prohibited priests from acting as judges.  Pollock and Maitland’s “History of 
the Laws of England” gives us a specimen date, that of 16 July 1195, on 
which there sat in the Court of King’s Bench an archbishop, three bishops and 
three archdeacons.  The same book tells us that “it is by popish clergymen 
that our English common law is converted from a rude mass of customs into 
an articulate system, and when the ‘popish clergymen’ yielding at length to 
the pope’s commands no longer sit as the principal justices of the King’s court 
the golden age of the common law is over.”
114 
 
Holdsworth suggests that the churchmen were reluctant to relinquish these secular 
seats, some being “more at home when ... hearing assizes as justiciarii domini regis 
than when they were sitting as judices ordinarii”
115 and others were concerned that 
without their direct involvement in the secular courts, church influence and jurisdiction 
would be eroded – which is exactly what happened.
116  But it is again the question of 
another paradigm to ask why Pope Innocent IV would direct this retreat.  Eight 
centuries later, it seems easy to see that this retreat to ministerial duties diluted the 
influence and jurisdiction of the church, but even in the present no one has such 
twenty-twenty prescience.  In his discussion of the later interplay between the royal 
writs of prohibition and ecclesiastical sanctions,
117 Helmholz observed: 
 
                                                 
114 Nolan, op cit, p 652.  Berman confirms that “[i]n the twelfth and thirteenth centuries ... most of the 
men who served as officials and judges and counsellors of Kings and emperors were clerics who owed 
at least half of their allegiance to the pope” (op cit, p 147). 
 
115 Holdsworth, WS, A History of English Law, 2
nd ed, Boston, Little Brown and Co, 1923, Vol 1, p 584. 
quoting again Maitland, P, “Church, State and Decretals” in Roman Catholic law in the Church of 
England, Methuen & Co 1898, Reprinted in New York, The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1992, pp 51, 74. 
116 Holdsworth, idem.  Holdsworth observes that as “the common law courts gradually ... began to be 
staffed by common lawyers who had made their career at the bar ... the professional jealousy of the 
common lawyers led them to restrict the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts whenever it was possible 
to restrict it.” 
 
117 See chapter two, note 45 and supporting text.  
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It may have seemed unwise to push royal claims too far.  Community 
acceptance of the place of the ecclesiastical courts and generally shared 
agreement about the proper jurisdictional boundaries may have stood behind 
the procedural features which kept the writ from being determinative.
118   
 
The same church influence that later slowed the march of the royal writ of prohibition 
in its assertion of royal judicial jurisdiction, was being asserted by Pope Innocent IV 
when he curtailed clerical service in the royal courts.  The most likely reason for his 
direction of an end to such service seems to have been his wish to dilute the respect 
in which royal courts were held because of the authority those courts enjoyed when 
clerical personnel presided.  Regardless of the reason why Pope Innocent IV directed 
that clergy should no longer sit as secular justices, that service underscores 
unavoidable respect for clerical practice in the royal courts.  
 
What difference did the English Reformation make to the practical protection which 
canon law afforded to sealed religious confessions?  That question will be answered 
in two parts.  First, by consideration of the mechanical steps that Henry VIII took to 
reform and control the church.  And secondly, by reviewing the status and content of 
the canon law of the Anglican Church that resulted, and its arguably even enhanced 
status as a part of the law of England. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118 Helmholz, Canon Law and the Law of England, London and Ronceverte, Hambledon Press, 1987, p 
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Effect of the English Reformation on pre-existing Catholic 
canon law 
 
As the sixteenth century opened throughout Europe, “centralised territorial states 
were taking the place of the previous loose ... feudal monarchies”.
119  Henry VIII and 
Cardinal Wolsey both wanted to control the clergy and reform the admitted corruption 
in the church – “particularly the abuses of the ecclesiastical courts [which] were 
exciting extreme unpopularity”.
120  Initially, Protestantism did not even feature in their 
minds as a method to achieve such reform.  Indeed, if the Pope had agreed to 
Henry’s wish for a divorce, there would likely have been no break with Rome.  But the 
unalterable Roman attitude towards divorce made a separation from the orthodox 
Western church inevitable.
121 
 
Plucknett says that the English Reformation fitted the philosophical theme of the 
times and Henry VIII’s personal need for a divorce was merely a symptom of a 
universal questioning of “religion ... as the basis for civil government”.
122  Not only did 
scholarly re-examination of the Bible’s New Testament lead to a “denial of the validity 
of [the Catholic] theological development [of] ... custom”, but the whole “doctrinal 
basis of Catholicism was questioned”.
123  The people [were] brought into the equation 
as it [was] perceived “that Kings [do not] exist ... for the convenience of their subjects 
(as in the Middle Ages), [but] both King and people work ... together for the glory of 
                                                 
119 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 588. 
 
120 Idem. 
 
121 Marius, R, Thomas More, A Biography, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, Harvard 
University Press, 1984, p 385. 
 
122 Plucknett, TFT, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5
th ed, London, Butterworths, 1956, p 41. 
 
123 Idem. 
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God”.
124  A whole new theory of state was emerging and as Berman has said, the 
church victory in the Investiture struggle centuries earlier had provided an unlikely 
conceptual basis upon which the church and the state could be separated.
125 Indeed, 
the principle underlying Bernard of Clairvaux’s old justification for church influence in 
temporal matters – that the church wielded two swords, one spiritual and the other 
temporal
126 – could be and, in England, was conceptually reversed so that the King 
and not the unpopular Pope, wielded both swords.  
 
Thus even before the separation with Rome was an accomplished fact, the 
preambles to Henry VIII’s statutes began to manifest his growing assertion of 
authority over church matters.  He began by legislating against abuses within the 
church, but when he could not get his divorce, he began chopping away at the 
authority of Rome in domestic ecclesiastical matters. Holdsworth notes that these 
changed “relations between Church and State – the theory of Royal Supremacy”
127 – 
were the result of Henry VIII’s collaborative work with “the Reformation Parliament 
which sat from 1529-1536".
128 
 
The first Acts of this Parliament, carried on in spite of the opposition of the 
clergy, were directed against certain abuses in the church and its courts [21 
                                                 
124 Ibid, pp 41-42. 
 
125 Berman says that it was the Papal Revolution which began the process of “disembedd[ing law]...from 
the social matrix of which it was part” (op cit, p 50). 
 
126 Though this idea undoubtedly had its roots in St Augustine’s (345-430AD) largely theological concept 
of the two cities, one earthly and the other heavenly, with “the true Christian” (Berman, op cit, p 110) 
living in both, Brian Tierney sources the political development of a separation to Pope Gregory VII in his 
March 1075 Dictatus Papae (No 26), “which contained the first explicit claim that a Pope could depose 
an emperor” (Tierney, B, The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300, Prentice-Hall Inc, Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ, 1964, p 46), though the “two swords” phrase was coined only later by Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-
1153) (Tierney, op cit, p 88). 
 
127 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 588. 
 
128 Ibid, p 589. 
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Henry VIII, c.5 dealt with Probate; 21 Henry VIII, c.6 dealt with Mortuaries and 
21 Henry VIII, c.13 dealt with Pluralities]; and the clergy were compelled in 
1531 to recognize the Royal Supremacy ‘so far as the law of Christ allows’.  In 
1532 it was so clear, from the unsatisfactory progress of the divorce, that 
there would be legislation aimed more directly at Rome, that Warham, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, drew up a formal protest against all statutes to be 
passed in the ensuing session, which should prejudice the ecclesiastical or 
papal power.  Parliament passed an Act against the payment of Annates [23 
Henry VIII, c.20]; but the Act was respectful to ‘our Holy Father the Pope’, 
who was still allowed to charge certain fees for the consecration of bishops; 
and the King was given a discretion as to its enforcement.
129 
 
The Statute of Appeals,
130 which cut off appeals to Rome, followed in 1533.  Later 
statutes of Henry’s reign further amplified and defined the supremacy which he 
claimed.
131  The Act of Supremacy (1534)
132 recognised the King as the head of the 
Church of England;
133 “Annates and all other payments to Rome were cut off”
134 by 
the statute 25 Henry VIII, c.20 (1534); the Act for the Submission of the Clergy 
(1535)
135 forbade the enactment of new church canon law “except in convocations 
                                                 
129 Idem. 
 
130 24 Henry VIII, c.12. 
 
131 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 591. 
 
132 26 Henry VIII, c.1. 
 
133 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 591. 
 
134 Ibid, p 592. 
 
135 25 Henry VIII, c.19. 
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summoned by the King’s writ”;
136 and the Act of Six Articles (1539)
137 reaffirmed 
Roman Catholic doctrine as the doctrine of the by now separate Church of England. 
 
On one historical view, Henry VIII, was doing nothing that had not been done by 
English Kings before him.  William the Conqueror had appointed his own Archbishop 
of Canterbury
138 and Henry II had asserted royal or secular jurisdiction over criminous 
clerks.
139  But Henry VIII was doing more than resurrect the spirit of the old investiture 
contest.  Holdsworth says that Henry VIII “[m]anufacture[d] history upon an 
unprecedented scale”
140 as he postulated temporal supremacy over the church.  His 
genius was “the Tudor genius for creating a modern institution with a medieval 
form”
141 at a time when his agenda resonated with the nationalism of the age.  Marius 
says that “[t]he Act in Restraint of Appeals constituted a revolution”
142 because it 
cleared the way “for an Archbishop of Canterbury with the proper credentials to 
declare the marriage between Catherine and Henry null and void and to leave the 
                                                 
136 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 592. 
 
137 31 Henry VIII, c.14. 
 
138 Berman, op cit, p 437; Plucknett, op cit, p11. 
 
139 “Benefit of clergy” was discussed supra in chapter two, pp 61-66.  It was Archbishop Thomas 
A’Becket’s resistance to Henry II’s ‘Constitutions of Clarendon’ (1164) and in particular Henry’s assertion 
of royal jurisdiction over clergy accused of crime, that lead to the Archbishop’s murder by the King’s 
knights in 1170.  The Constitutions of Clarendon asserted secular authority in what was considered 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in a number of other ways including: that all disputes about church offices were 
to be decided in the King’s court (article 1); that clergy could not depart the kingdom without the King’s 
permission (article 4); specifying procedural safeguards for laymen fronting ecclesiastical courts (article 
6); that the King’s officers and tenants-in-chief could not be excommunicated without his permission 
(article 7); that appeals lay from the Archbishop’s court to the King’s court (article 8); dictating royal 
jurisdiction in the decision of what land belonged to the church (article 9); that the election of bishops 
and other beneficed clergy was to occur in the King’s chapel – though this was merely a restatement of 
the 1107 Concordat at Bec (article 12); royal jurisdiction over “pleas of debt under pledge of faith” (article 
15) and the prerequisite consent of the lord to the priesthood ordination of the sons of villeins who were 
born on his land (article 16) – see Berman, op cit, pp 256-257. 
 
140 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 591. 
 
141 Idem. 
 
142 Marius, R, Thomas More, A Biography, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, Harvard 
University Press, 1984, p 433. 
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mournful queen no appeal to higher earthly authority”.
143  And that is, of course, 
exactly what Henry VIII’s newly nominated Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas 
Cranmer, did as soon as “the official papal documents certifying Rome’s approval of 
[his] ... elevation arrived in England”.
144 
 
Baker says that the 1533 Statute of Appeals
145 “severed [the Church of England] from 
Rome [from January 1534] and appeals to the pope were forbidden”,
146 and though 
Marius maintains that Henry VIII would still have accepted the pope’s jurisdiction if he 
had thereafter ruled in favour of the divorce, he agrees with Baker that in practice 
“the act ended the papal jurisdiction in England”.
147  Both Marius and Holdsworth find 
the Act’s preamble revelatory of Henry VIII’s new theory of church and state.  For 
Marius, “[t]he ecclesiastical theory behind the act was that the church was inspired in 
the whole body by the Holy Spirit and that the pope was unnecessary to the unity of 
Catholic doctrine”.
148  For Holdsworth, the newness of the theory was at its starkest 
when compared with Bracton, who had written in the thirteenth century: 
 
Among men there are differences in status because some men are pre-
eminent and preferred and rule over others.  Our lord the Pope, for instance, 
is pre-eminent in matters spiritual which relate to the priesthood, and under 
him are archbishops, bishops and other inferior prelates.  Also in matters 
temporal there are emperors, Kings and rulers in matters relating to the 
                                                 
143 Idem. 
 
144 Idem. 
 
145 24 Henry VIII, c 12. 
 
146 Baker, JH, An Introduction to England Legal History, 3
rd ed, London, Boston, Dublin, Edinburgh, Hato 
Rey, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Sydney, Toronto, Wellington, Butterworths, 1990, p 151. 
 
147 Marius, op cit, p 432. 
 
148 Idem. 
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Kingdom, and under them dukes, counts, barons magnates or vavassors, and 
Knights.
149 
 
The preamble to the 1533 Statute of Appeals
150 which Holdsworth says manifests 
Henry VIII’s personal sketching,
151 in contrast joins the temporal and spiritual 
jurisdictions under the King: 
 
By divers sundry old authentic histories and chronicles, it is manifestly 
declared and expressed that this realm of England is an empire ... governed 
by one supreme head and King ... with plenary whole and entire power ... 
without restraint or provocation to any foreign princes or potentates of the 
world.  The body spiritual ... (now being usually called the English Church) 
which ... is sufficient and meet of itself, without the intermeddling of an 
exterior person ... to declare and determine all such doubts and to administer 
all such offices and duties as to their rooms doth appertain ... the King his 
most noble progenitors and the nobility and commons of this said realm ... 
made sundry ... laws ... for the entire and sure conservation of the 
prerogatives, liberties and pre-eminences of the said imperial crown of this 
realm, and of the jurisdictions Spiritual and Temporal of the same, to keep it 
from the annoyance as well of the see of Rome as from the authority of other 
foreign potentates.
152 
 
                                                 
149 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 590. 
 
150 24 Henry VIII, c 12. 
 
151 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 589. 
 
152 24 Henry VIII, c 12, preamble. 
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However, Henry VIII did not establish this new theory of church and state all by 
himself.  The “lawyers, theologians and ecclesiastical historians soon began to 
amplify and illustrate this historical argument ... to prove that it rested upon a solid 
basis of historic truth”.
153  Lawyers and ecclesiastics “have had and still have 
professional interest in maintaining this thesis”
154 to keep their statutes, cases and 
canon law intact.
155  Indeed, Holdsworth maintains that it was not until Maitland in the 
nineteenth century, a dissenter as he said, from both the English and Roman 
churches,
156 that “the historical worthlessness of Henry”s theory was 
demonstrated”.
157 
 
Henry VIII’s later statutes “amplified and defined the supremacy which [Henry VIII] 
claimed”,
158 the Act of Supremacy
159 being the most obvious example.  Plucknett’s 
summary of Henry VIII’s revolutionary statutes is: 
 
In one statute
160 [Parliament] declared that the supreme head of the Church 
was not the Pope, but Henry; in another it confiscated enormous quantities of 
property which had been held by the Church for centuries undisputed; in 
another even so sacred a thing as Christian doctrine was restated by 
                                                 
153 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 591. 
 
154 Idem. 
 
155 Idem. 
 
156 Holdsworth, idem.  He calls Maitland  “the greatest historian of this century” and  says that Maitland 
“was both a consummate lawyer and a dissenter from the Anglican as well as from other churches.” 
 
157 Holdsworth, idem.  Berman in contrast, implies that Henry VIII’s ‘new theory of church and state’ had 
very strong historical antecedents since the Holy Roman Emperor  held political supremacy at least in 
Europe, before Pope Gregory VII’s ‘revolution’ in the eleventh century (see discussion of England’s 
Catholic history after the Norman conquest, supra, pp 97-101). 
 
158 Idem. 
 
159 26 Henry VIII, c.1. 
 
160 Idem. 
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Parliament in the Statute of Six Articles; soon it was to establish a prayer-
book to replace the age-old formularies hitherto in use.
161 
 
Again, the lack of significant or sufficiently powerful opposition manifested the 
nationalism of this age.  Such was Henry VIII’s capture of public sentiment that “the 
bishops and archbishops took out commissions from him to exercise their ordinary 
powers and authorities”.
162  But it was not only nationalism that empowered Henry 
VIII.  He yoked clerical self-interest to patriotism when he presented the English 
church with a status quo autonomy.  In the Act for Submission of Clergy,
163 he 
affirmed that there would be “no new canons ... except in convocation summoned by 
the King’s writ”,
164 but he made no changes to the canon law as the English church 
knew and practised it.  Even the Act of Six Articles
165 “reaffirmed most of the leading 
doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church; and the existing organisation of the 
ecclesiastical courts was maintained”,
166 including the canon law surrounding the seal 
of confession.  For though the Act for Submission of Clergy
167 anticipated the creation 
of a committee of thirty-two to review existing canon law, and even though Elizabeth 
I’s Archbishop Cranmer and Peter Martyr completed the revision,
168 “it never obtained 
legislative sanction”
169 – and no change was made to the canon law surrounding 
religious confession until the first year of the reign of James I.
170 
                                                 
161 Plucknett, op cit, p 43. 
162 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 592. 
 
163 25 Henry VIII, c 19. 
 
164 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 592. 
 
165 31 Henry VIII, c.14. 
 
166 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 593. 
 
167 25 Henry VIII, c 19. 
 
168 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 594. 
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Though there is difference between the historians who maintain Henry VIII simply 
resurrected the spirit of the Investiture struggle and those who say that he effected a 
completely new theory of church and state, Henry VIII did not change the doctrine, 
canon law or practice which surrounded Roman Catholic religious confession with 
seal.  Though Church power had certainly ebbed from its high water mark after 
Thomas A’Becket’s martyrdom in the twelfth century, and though Protestant ideas 
denying the need for regular sacramental confession began to seep across the 
Channel from Europe before the first Anglican canons were promulgated, there was 
no suggestion that priests were free to disclose confessional communications and 
secrecy was retained when those canons did come forth. 
 
The seal of confession in Anglican canon law 
The purpose of this section is to briefly set out the Anglican canon law relevant to 
religious confession in 1603/1604 and to confirm that almost alone in the total body of 
that law, the canon regarding the secrecy of confession has remained intact ever 
since.  The significance of this consistent canon law position on religious confession 
will then be placed in the evolving secular legal context to identify the respect due 
this canon in English courts since James I took the English throne in 1603. 
 
The proviso to the 113
th canon of the Anglican Church enacted in 1603/1604 relevant 
to this consideration of religious confession privilege reads: 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
170 Elizabeth I died and James I succeeded to the throne on 24 March 1603.  The original canons of the 
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Provided alwayes, that if any man confesse his secret and hidden sinnes to 
the Minister for the unburthening of his conscience, and to receive spirituall 
consolation and ease of minde from him, We doe not any way bind the sayd 
Minister by this our Constitution, but doe straightly charge and admonish him, 
that he do not at any time reveale and make knowen to any person 
whatsoever, any crime or offence so committed to his trust & secrecie (except 
they bee such crimes as by the Lawes of this Realme, his own life may be 
called into question for concealing the same) under paine of irregularitie.
171 
 
It is clear that this canon represents a dilution of the standard of secrecy imposed by 
the 21
st canon of the Fourth Lateran Council
172 and technically operative even in the 
Anglican Church until these new 1603/1604 canons were promulgated.  
 
Effect of new conditional seal wording 
The most striking thing about the change to the Roman Catholic canon concerning 
the seal of confession in the first Anglican canon is the words – “we doe not any way 
bind the sayd Minister by this our Constitution” and the parenthesised exception – 
“except they bee such crimes as by the Lawes of this Realme, his own life may be 
called into question”.  They represent a clear retreat from the unconditional 
requirement operative from 1215 – 1603 under the 21
st canon of the Fourth Lateran 
Council.  Just what these two conditions mean in practice, has never been 
authoritatively determined by Anglican canonical authorities.  
 
                                                 
171 Constitutions and canons ecclesiasticall/treated upon by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, 
London, printed by Robert Barker and by the assigns of John Bull, 1640. 
 
172 The text of the 21
st canon promulgated by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 is set out in full supra, 
p 93. 
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Norman Doe’s view is that this “law of the Church of England merely recommends 
that a minister should not disclose information received in the exercise of the ministry 
of absolution”,
173 but his interpretation of the canon may be regarded as the liberal 
view premised upon the belief that confession itself fell into disuse after Henry VIII’s 
Reformation.
174  Bursell is more conservative in his observation that “auricular 
confession was specifically enjoined in the Edwardian prayer books of both 1549 and 
1552, each of which received the sanction of Parliament”.
175  And though the 
Anglican canon law authority Blunt recognised disuse of confession compared to the 
mandatory annual Roman Catholic practice after the Reformation, he observed that it 
was “distinct[ly] recogni[sed] ... in the Prayer Book [1549], the canons of 1603, and 
the Homilies [and] ... has been continuously in use by wise, orthodox, and holy 
Anglican clergy and laity [ever since] and there is no law whatever against it”.
176 
 
Though Doe says the 1938 Doctrine Commission interpreted the “not any way bynd” 
words to mean “that the ‘rule’ binds only in conscience”,
177 the Commission in fact, 
and rather more largely, said: 
 
The confession is heard under the ‘seal’ of absolute secrecy.  This rule is 
necessary in order that freedom of confession may be secured.  It is essential 
                                                 
173 Doe, N, The Legal Framework of the Church of England, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, p 353. 
 
174 The debate between Anglican authorities about the nature of the secrecy obligation of a member of 
the clergy under canon 103 is canvassed in the discussion that follows (infra, pp 115-120).  But see also 
Helmholz, RH, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England, Cambridge, 1990, pp 113-114; Rodes, RE, 
Jr, Law and Modernization in the Church of England, Notre Dame and London, University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1991, pp 114-115; Doe, N, Canon Law in the Anglican Communion, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1998, p 291. 
 
175 Bursell, Judge RDH, “The Seal of the Confessional”, Ecclesiastical Law Journal 1 (7) (1990) 84, 87. 
 
176 Blunt, JH, The Book of Church Law, 10
th ed, London, New York and Bombay, Longmans Green & 
Co, 1905, 
p 173. 
 
177 Doe, N, The Legal Framework of the Church of England, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, p 354. 
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to the due discharge of the confessor’s office that this rule should be held to 
be so binding on the priest’s conscience that he cannot consider himself 
released therefrom by the authority of the civil or other power.
178 
 
Leeder contributes that although the meaning of the “exception” words in the proviso 
have likewise never been clearly spelled out, “[t]reason would seem to be the only 
candidate”.
179  
 
Non-compulsory Protestant confession 
The debate noted above as to whether and how Anglican confessional practice 
changed after the English Reformation is licensed by the conditional nature of the 
proviso’s language.  Gone is any indication that confession is an obligatory annual 
sacramental observance incumbent upon every member of the body of Christ, and 
instead there is demonstrably Protestant language intoning that the purpose of 
confession is the unburdening of conscience.  Luther’s primary attack on Roman 
Catholic confessional practice had denied the need for obligatory priestly intervention 
between sinner and God.  Hence he and other Protestants came to downgrade 
confession’s sacramental character, though without diluting the priestly obligation of 
secrecy when confessions were heard.
180  Clearly the doctrines of Protestantism 
made their influence felt in England after Henry VIII’s break with Rome saw him 
embrace some in self-justification.
181  Holdsworth says that “the church was given a 
                                                 
178 Quoted by Doe (op cit) from Doctrine of the Church of England, London, 1938, p 192. 
 
179 Leeder, L, Ecclesiastical Law Handbook, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, p 355. 
 
180 See for example Marius, R, op cit, p 271. 
 
181 Marius, R, op cit, pp 385-394, noting Henry VIII “consort[ing] with even the most unsavory heretics if 
they offered him support” (ibid, p 394). 
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more definitely Protestant character”
182 in Elizabethan times as she sought to 
accommodate popular doctrines from Europe. 
 
However, even though the Catholic formality was certainly diluted from Anglican 
confessional practice after the Reformation, its traditional secrecy was not mitigated 
at all and arguably attracted the imprimatur of more formal legal sanction.  Bursell’s
183 
observation above
184 that Parliament had at least obliquely endorsed confession and 
its canonical secrecy when it “enjoined [it] in Edwardian prayer books”
185 is not an 
assertion he leaves to stand on its own.  He notes England-specific canon law and 
parliamentary approval with “royal assent and licence”
186 of the practice on several 
occasions down to 1662.  He cites the following eight authorities.  First, the 21
st 
canon of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) with inviolable seal has been reiternated 
by synodal statutes subsequent from Salisbury, Durham, Winchester, Worcester, 
Chichester, Ely, Wells, London, Exeter and Canterbury, leaving beyond doubt “that 
the seal of the confessional was a duty imposed by the pre-Reformation canon law of 
England”.
187  Secondly, section 7 of Henry VIII’s Act for the Submission of Clergy
188 in 
1533 provided that all existing canon and synodal law was preserved until the King 
confirmed any proposed changes, unless such law was “contrary or repugnant to the 
laws, statutes and customs of the realm, or to the damage or hurt of the King’s 
                                                 
182 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 594. 
 
183 Judge Rupert DH Bursell, QC, Chancellor of the Diocese of Durham, Ll.B(Exon), MA, D.Phil.(Oxon). 
 
184 Supra, p 114 and see note 175. 
 
185 Bursell, Judge RDH, “The Seal of the Confessional”, Ecclesiastical Law Journal 1(7) (1990), 84, 87. 
 
186 Ibid, p 88. 
 
187 Ibid, p 84. 
 
188 25 Henry VIII, c 19. 
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prerogative royal”.
189  Thirdly, the 1539 Act for Abolishing Diversity of Opinions in 
certain Articles concerning Christian religion confirmed with the King’s express 
consent “[t]hat auricular Confession is expedient and necessary to be retained and 
confirmed, and used and frequented in the Church of God”.
190 Fourthly, “[a]lthough 
[that] statute was repealed in 1547,
191 auricular confession was specifically enjoined 
in the Edwardian prayer books ... each of which received the sanction of 
Parliament”.
192  Fifthly, the proviso to the 113
th 1603/1604 canon received “royal 
assent and licence”
193 as part of the new canonical package before same was 
promulgated “demonstrat[ing] once again that the seal of confessional was not 
regarded at that time as “contrariant or repugnant to’ either the royal prerogative, the 
common law or the statute law”.
194  Sixthly, that proviso has never been altered, 
though a proposal which would have strengthened it further and removed the 
“treason” exception in 1969 lapsed in favour of the status quo.
195  Seventhly, the 
1662 Book of Common Prayer which was given statutory force by the Act of 
Uniformity in 1662 after Cromwell’s Commonwealth, reiterated the appropriate 
practice of auricular confession.
196  And finally, “the ecclesiastical law is part of the 
                                                 
189 Bursell, op cit, pp 86-87. 
 
190 31 Henry VIII, c 14, ss 1, 2 & 3 as quoted by Bursell, op cit, p 87. 
 
191 Bursell, op cit, p 87 citing 1 Edw VI c 12, s 2. 
 
192 Bursell, idem, citing  the 2
nd edition of Phillimore’s Ecclesiastical Law (pp 541-542) and the statutes 2 
& 3 Edw VI c1  and 5 & 6 Edw VI c 1 giving parliamentary sanction to these prayer books.  Though 
Bursell says the second of these statutes endorsing the prayer books was repealed by Edward’s 
successor Queen Mary (1 Mar. sess 2 c 2), he notes it was revived under Elizabeth (1 Eliz I c 2) and has 
not since been repealed. 
 
193 Ibid, p 88. 
 
194 Idem, citing the actual old English words of the Act for Submission of Clergy (25 Henry VIII, c.19). 
 
195 Ibid, p 95.  The text of the original 113
th canon of the Church of England promulgated in 1603/4 has 
never been altered.  The most recent proposal that it be amended was considered in 1969 but was not 
advanced and the original form of the canon’s language thus remains to the present day. 
 
196 Ibid, pp 99, 105. 
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general law of the land and a secular court is as much under a duty to enforce it as 
an ecclesiastical court”.
197 
 
This final point is the point which must be tested. 
 
What authority does canon law have in post-Reformation 
secular courts? 
 
Bursell cites only seventeenth century authority for his eighth proposition above
198 
and does recognise but disagrees with Nokes’ opposing view that “it is doubtful 
whether a clergyman in the twentieth century is ... likely to be censured by an 
ecclesiastical court for [breach of confessional secrecy] ... in the absence of any 
modern precedent of ecclesiastical discipline for [such] ... breach”.
199  Blackstone
200 
and Holdsworth
201 have cited more recent authority for the same proposition – but 
what does it mean?  Is Bursell’s conclusion that “[b]oth [ecclesiastical and secular] 
courts must therefore enforce that clerical duty and uphold any refusal by an Anglican 
clergyman to answer questions in breach of the seal of the confessional”
202 accurate?  
What about non-Anglican clergy?  Or is Nokes correct that a twentieth century 
secular court is no more likely to enforce ecclesiastical discipline against an Anglican 
priest than that same court would be to censure a layman for sexual immorality? 
203 
                                                 
197 Ibid, p 108. 
 
198 Ibid, p 108. 
 
199 Nokes, GD, “Professional Privilege” [1950] 66 LQR 88, 101. 
 
200 Blackstone, Sir W, Commentaries on the Laws of England, New York and London, Garland 
Publishing Inc, 1978, Vol 4, p 60. 
 
201 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 8, pp 402-420, citing variously Taylor’s case (1676) 1 Vent. 293; 86 ER 789; R 
v Woolston (1729) 2 Str 834; 93 ER 881; Briggs v Hartley (1849) 19 LJ Ch 416-417; Shore v Wilson 
(1842) 9 Cl. and Fin., pp 524-525; 8 ER 450 and MacKonochie v Lord Penzance (1881) 6 AC 424, 446. 
 
202 Bursell, op cit, p 109. 
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Norman Doe is doubtful of Bursell’s conclusion “that a cleric would be in grave 
danger of censure [even] by the ecclesiastical courts in the event of violating the 
seal”.
204  Professor Elliott
205 (also in the Ecclesiastical Law Journal) and Lynne 
Leeder are both of the view “that the general attitude of English law”
206 and “the 
weight of opinion”
207 are sufficiently against the confessional privilege that it would 
not stand against an actual judicial inquiry.
208  But the three scholars, and others,
209 
all concede that the matter has never been decided.
210 Bursell was, however, making 
finer points than most of the other commentators, who limited themselves to 
generalisations about the state of religious confession privilege at common law – a 
question which is the detailed subject of this thesis in chapters four and five infra.  
Bursell’s finer point was that the clergy of the Anglican Church are under “a duty in 
certain circumstances ... to hear a confession”
211 and a concomitant and substantive 
duty not to disclose such communications under the 1603 canons.
212  He adds that 
_________________________ 
 
 
204 Doe, N, The Legal Framework of the Church of England, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, p 354. 
 
205 Emeritus Professor of Law from the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. 
 
206 Elliott, DW, “An Evidential Privilege for Priest-Penitent Communications”, 16 Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal (1995) 272. 
 
207 Leeder, L, Ecclesiastical Law Handbook, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, p 555. 
 
208 In his letter to Gladstone about religious confession privilege, former Chief Justice Lord Coleridge 
(1880-1894), who expressed his personal belief in the existence of an enduring religious confession 
privilege at common law after the Reformation though it “had never been decided”, also doubted that 
“the English Judges” would have upheld it in 1865 (Coleridge, EH, Life and Correspondence of John 
Duke Lord Coleridge Lord Chief Justice of England, London, William Heinemann, 1904, Vol 2, p 365). 
 
209 For example, McNicol, SB, Law of Privilege, Australia, Law Book Co, 1992, p 324, where she writes, 
“At common law it is generally accepted that there is no privilege in existence which would protect 
communications between cleric and communicant ... [t]here is, however, a paucity of judicial authority to 
support the claim”. 
 
210 Bursell says simply that such cases as have raised the question of the admissibility of sealed 
confessions, have been “inconclusive” (Bursell, op cit, p 109). 
 
211 Bursell, op cit, p 104. 
 
212 Ibid, p 105. 
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that obligation was reaffirmed in both 1959 and 1969, when the 1603 canon 
upholding the confessional seal was preserved intact.
213  While Bursell
214 agrees with 
Doe
215 and Rodes
216 that habitual or compulsory confessions are not part of the 
doctrine or practice of the Anglican Church, they agree with him that voluntary 
confession is still acceptable and practised and that the obligation of secrecy 
remains.  All that is in issue between them is whether even ecclesiastical courts will 
protect the priest in his obligation of secrecy in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries.  Bursell as Chancellor of the Diocese of Durham and both a Judge and 
Queen’s Counsel when he wrote in 1991 says they will.  Doe (lecturer in law at the 
University College of Wales at Cardiff in 1996) and Nokes (appointed Professor of 
Law at the University of London after he wrote his Law Quarterly Review article in 
1950) doubt they would.  In the context of this thesis’ quest for the law in the secular 
courts, that question is moot.  But Bursell consequentially opines: 
 
The clergyman’s claim [of privilege from compulsion to disclose a confession] 
is not based on a privilege against incrimination, although it is no doubt an 
aspect that he may also pray in aid.  Furthermore, just as there is a very real 
danger that a clergyman will be prosecuted and censured for sexual 
immorality [despite Nokes’ doubt of any such possibility], there is grave 
danger that he will be proceeded against for breaching the seal of the 
confessional.  No doubt a situation in which a clergyman was compelled to 
answer would be considered both by the diocesan bishop in exercising his 
                                                 
213 Ibid, p 95. 
 
214 Ibid, pp 101-4. 
 
215 Doe, N, Canon Law in the Anglican Communion, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, p 291. 
 
216 Rodes, RE, Jr, Law and Modernization in the Church of England, Notre Dame and London, The 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991, p 254. 
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discretion and by the Chancellor when considering sentence; nevertheless, 
the ecclesiastical law is part of the general law of the land and a secular court 
is as much under a duty to enforce it as an ecclesiastical court.  Thus no 
breach should be compelled by a secular court and the absence of any 
modern precedent such as Nokes suggests is irrelevant.
217 
 
 It seems to this writer that even in England where the Anglican Church remains the 
established church of the state, a contemporary secular court would leave an 
underlying issue of clerical indiscipline to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, however 
strongly a conservative church advocate might point up the technicality that secular 
courts retain theoretical ecclesiastical jurisdiction.  However, Bursell’s recitation of 
modern English statutory recognition of judicial discretion “to exclude evidence ... 
whether by preventing questions from being put or otherwise”
218 is of much greater 
practical significance in the hands of even a secular judge, since it provides an 
opportunity to remove friction between church and state at what McNicol has 
observed is a potential flashpoint.
219  As will be seen in chapter five, the writer 
believes that this 1984 English statutory recognition of a judicial discretion to exclude 
evidence represents the codification of a common law privilege which had grown up 
and been recognised to favour confidential religious communications generally, 
rather than only the narrower class of religious confessions. 
 
While Bursell’s analysis of the position of a Roman Catholic priest is less clear
220 than 
the position of the Anglican clergy who have the backdrop of “a legal duty imposed by 
                                                 
217 Bursell, op cit, pp 107-8. 
 
218 Section 82(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 as cited in Bursell, op cit, p 109. 
 
219 McNicol, S, Law of Privilege, Australia,  Butterworths, 1992, pp 330-331, 337. 
 
220 Bursell, op cit, p 108. 
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substantive law”,
221 it is likely even in England where a formal Human Rights Act 
incorporating “a number of the articles of the European Convention on Human Rights 
into United Kingdom law”
222 was passed in 1998, that the secular courts would 
exercise their 1984 discretion to exclude evidence even-handedly regardless of what 
faith a clergyman represented.
223  
 
That no such cases have come before the courts in England in recent memory bears 
out a practical point made often in commentary.  Bursell observes: 
 
It is not surprising that there are only infrequent references to the seal of the 
confessional in the law reports: the prosecution will only be interested if the 
defendant has admitted his guilt; if the defendant has admitted guilt to a 
priest, he is most unlikely to broadcast the fact and, if he has not, that fact 
would not be admissible in evidence; the priest, if he has heard an auricular 
confession, is unlikely to make the fact of a confession known because of the 
seal of the confessional.
224 
 
                                                 
221 Idem. 
 
222 Butler, AS, “Judicial Review, Human Rights and Democracy”, in Huscroft G & Rishworth P, Litigating 
Rights, Oxford – Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2002, p 64. 
 
223 Note however, that in the European Union which includes England, the provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 Nov 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221) which bind 
all member states do not mean that all religions or religious observance need be treated in a completely 
even-handed way since many of the member states have established churches (see Evans, C, Freedom 
of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, 
pp 19-22).  Note also that the interpretation of instruments guaranteeing freedom of religious practice in 
Australia which has no established church and where the Commonwealth is constitutionally prevented 
from passing laws which would interfere with freedom of religious practice, is discussed in chapter 
seven. 
 
224 Bursell, op cit, p 89. 
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McNicol observes more simply that most clergy would rather go to gaol than break 
their sacred vow about confidentiality.
225  The reasons underlying these observations 
are likely to ensure that religious confessions remain confidential in practice.  Indeed, 
anecdotal evidence from the United States confirms that even in jurisdictions where 
the clerical reporting of child abuse has been legislatively mandated,
226 there has not 
been a significant increase in court cases about clerical privilege, though whether 
that is because priests do not report anyway, or because child abusers do not 
confess, is, and is likely to remain, unclear. 
 
Richard Nolan’s conclusion quoted on pages 96-97 supra – that there was such a 
“close connection” between the so-called spiritual and temporal domains of 
government in Anglo-Saxon England that there can be no doubt that religious 
confession was privileged from disclosure by the “law of the land”
227 has been seen 
to be a fair statement of the legal standing of religious confession privilege before the 
Reformation.  But what of his doubt that such privilege survived the official Catholic 
persecution that followed the English Reformation?
228  When his logic (though not his 
doubt) in favour of the survival of religious confession privilege after the Reformation, 
is weighed with Bursell’s ‘Anglican view’ just discussed, and Nokes’ more objective 
doubt of respect for religious confession privilege in English ‘secular’ courts in the 
1950s,
229 is religious confession privilege any more supportable in a common law 
world which has become markedly less religious but more egalitarian? 
                                                 
225 McNicol, op cit, pp 329-330, 336. 
 
226 Mitchell, MH, “Must Clergy Tell?  Child Abuse Reporting Requirements versus the Clergy Privilege 
and Free Exercise of Religion” (1987) 71 Minn. L. Rev. 723, 795, 822; Cassidy, RM, “Sharing Sacred 
Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy Penitent Privilege?” (April 17, 
2003), Research Paper No. 13, Boston College Law School Research Paper Series, 1629, 1687-1697. 
 
227 Nolan, RS, “The Seal of Confession” (1913) 13 Catholic Encyclopedia 649. 
 
228 Ibid, p 653. 
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The answer is that Nolan’s conclusion about the pre-Reformation standing of 
religious confession privilege agrees with what Bursell has said in favour of Anglican 
religious confession privilege after the English Reformation.  For since: no statute has 
been passed which expressly revokes religious confession privilege;
230 Anglican 
canon law still enshrines the secrecy of such confessions as are made to the 
clergy;
231 the Church of England remains the State Church of England by force of 
law;
232 the English courts are still jurisdictionally obliged to apply the ecclesiastical 
law when it applies in cases coming before them;
233 custom still respects established 
religious practice when it is practiced;
234 and there is still no formally decided and 
authoritative case rebutting the privilege directly once and for all
235 – English courts 
remain technically obliged to respect ecclesiastical law as a part of the law of the 
land. 
 
Historical debate about secular legal respect for canon law 
There has, however, been some doubt of the view that canon law was always 
respected in English courts.  That view states that English courts never felt 
themselves obliged to cite or follow foreign authority.  And that view resonates both 
_________________________ 
 
 
230 Nolan, op cit, pp 649, 652. 
 
231 Ibid, p 652. 
 
232 Compare similar arguments that Nolan makes in favour of Roman Catholic confession when the 
Roman Catholic Church was the State Church of England (ibid, p 650). 
 
233 Bursell, op cit, pp 107-108 as quoted supra, pp 120-121. 
 
234 Ibid, pp 650, 651. 
 
235 Compare Nolan’s argument that “there is not a single reported case, textbook or commentary, during 
the whole pre-Reformation period which contains any suggestion that the laws of evidence did not 
respect the seal of confession” (ibid, p 652). 
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with King Henry VIII’s seeming capture of nationalistic sentiment when he severed 
the church from Rome and Coke’s obvious reluctance to cite foreign authority for his 
treason exception to religious confession privilege. 
 
Bishop Stubbs’ doubt of canon law authority in even English ecclesiastical courts 
before the eighteenth century is noted by both Holdsworth and Helmholz from the 
Report of the Commissioners into the Constitution and Working of the Ecclesiastical 
Courts in 1883.
236 Those Commissioners “held ... that, even before the Restoration, 
the English Church Courts were free to pursue a path independent of foreign, and 
particularly papal direction”.
237  Stubbs’ view implies that Nolan’s conclusion of a very 
close connection between the spiritual and temporal domains even in Anglo-Saxon 
England is too strong.  For Stubbs says such a view draws respect for the canon law 
not only into English ecclesiastical law, but further into the temporal common law as 
well.  But Maitland, Holdsworth and Helmholz have all effectively rebutted the Stubbs’ 
opinion and implicitly approved the Nolan logic.  Holdsworth says that Maitland 
proved that “the supremacy of the Pope and the binding force of the canon law were 
fully recognized [in England]”
238 in his book on Roman Canon Law in the Church of 
England.
239  In his more recent review of the Stubbs-Maitland controversy,
240 
Helmholz concedes for Stubbs that “[n]ot all papal decretals
241 were meant to have 
                                                 
236 Quoted by both Holdsworth (op cit, Vol 1, p 582) and Helmholz (Helmholz, RH, Canon Law and the 
Law of England, London and Ronceverte, The Hambledon Press, 1987, p 260).  See also Stubbs, W,  
“The History of the Canon Law in England” in Selected Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol 1, 
New York, The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1992 (originally published in Boston by Little Brown and 
Company in 1907) pp 248, 263. 
 
237 Helmholz, op cit, p 260. 
 
238 Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 582. 
 
239 Maitland, P, “Church, State and Decretals”, in Roman Canon Law in the Church of England, Methuen 
& Co 1898, Reprinted in New York, The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 1992, pp 51, 84. 
 
240 Helmholz, op cit, pp 260-261. 
 
241 Papal decretals were “[p]apal decisions defining principles of canon law” (Helmholz, op cit, p 249). RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER THREE 
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the force of ‘binding statute law’ in a modern sense”.
242  However, he agrees with 
Maitland that the more important “papal law[s] ... were in fact regarded as binding 
statute law in England”,
243 but says that the whole debate was the anachronistic 
result of reading too much legal positivism into a Middle Ages context where “[l]ocal 
custom ... played a much greater role in the legal practice of the ecclesiastical courts 
than modern statute law would allow”.
244 
 
Accordingly, Nolan’s expectation that England’s secular courts and hence the 
common law were unlikely to deny a religious confession privilege when the 
confession was an essential sacrament of the national church,
245 appears well 
grounded.  It also concords with Professor Nokes’
246 statement that: 
 
There is no doubt that the Roman canon law insisted on the duty of the priest 
not to divulge the secrets of confession, and that, while the Church here was 
still in communion with Rome, English provincial councils, clerics and 
canonists reiterated that duty
247 
 
though Nokes does not enter into the controversial Stubbs-Maitland question as to 
whether that respect for canon law flowed through the ecclesiastical law and into the 
common law. 
_________________________ 
 
 
242 Ibid, p 261. 
 
243 Idem. 
 
244 Idem. 
 
245 Nolan, op cit, p 652. 
 
246 Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of London, though not when he wrote the article cited in 
note 229. 
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Conclusion to chapter three 
Sir Edward Coke confirmed except in cases of treason, that religious confessions 
were privileged from disclosure in English courts in the seventeenth century.  The 
canon law and practice of the English church was so entrenched in English custom 
that it became a part of the common law as that common law evolved.  Since 
religious confession was a sacrament of the established church at least until the first 
Anglican canons were promulgated in 1603/1604, there can be no doubt that 
recipients of religious confessions were privileged from any obligation to disclose 
them – to anyone.  Even in Garnet’s case in 1606, when Catholic persecution was 
raging after the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot, Coke as Attorney-General and 
prosecutor, and the Earls of Salisbury and Northampton must be interpreted as 
recognising that privilege attached to sacramental religious confessions.  Coke 
subsequently reaffirmed that view when he published his Second Part of the 
Institutes more than twenty years later.  Though there was no discrete body of 
evidence law in existence before it evolved following the advent of defence 
representation in criminal trials, the ancient “priviledge of confession” was deeply 
imbedded in the common law – and unlike its sister privilege, ‘benefit of clergy’, has 
never been statutorily abrogated. 
 
The thesis will now review the evolution of the common law regarding religious 
confession privilege since Garnet’s case and the publication of Coke’s Second Part 
of the Institutes.  RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FOUR   128
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE 
AT COMMON LAW FROM 
THE SEVENTEENTH TO 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Sir Edward Coke’s recognition of religious confession privilege at common law with a 
treason exception
1 has never been cited in a reported English case.  Though the 
common law evolved markedly in the almost two centuries that elapsed before the first 
evidence law texts began appearing, it is also surprising that WM Best
2 was the first to 
cite Coke’s Second Part of the Institutes in his treatment of religious confession privilege 
in 1860 – more than two hundred and thirty years later.  While the rigour and accuracy of 
Coke’s scholarship has been criticised since, and while the law of evidence became a 
specialty in those intervening years, it is still surprising that neither his last case as 
Attorney-General in so celebrated a matter as the prosecution of the last alleged 
Gunpowder plotter,
3 nor his Second Part of the Institutes warranted such mention.  Was 
religious privilege abolished by statute in the meantime?  If there were no cases, was 
                                                 
1 Coke, Sir E, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, New York, Garland Publishing Co, 
1979, p 629. 
 
2 Best, WM, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, London, S Sweet, 1849. 
 
3 Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217. 
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there some prerogative edict which directed the extinction of this ‘aberration’ imported 
into the common law from the old canon law?  There is no obvious explanation for the 
silence – and yet there was a significant volume of judicial comment before the twentieth 
century dawned.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the cases in detail to determine why the early 
text writers were so fixed in their belief that there was no privilege that ever protected a 
member of the clergy from evidential compulsion.  I start chapter four with a summary of 
the general evolution of the law of evidence and explain that religious confession 
privilege existed long before other any other evidential privilege was born.  Evidence law 
and the privileges that were developed to protect some witnesses from being compelled, 
are identified as the product of a newly independent judiciary regulating the evidence 
that the jury should properly hear.  Religious confession privilege is identified as having 
predated any of that though it may have provided some conceptual support for the new 
ideas.  The need to categorise the cases about evidential privileges in text books 
primarily designed as handbooks for barristers, is identified as the reason why religious 
confession privilege and legal professional privilege were treated together and why 
religious confession privilege was treated as an afterthought, a qualification and even a 
mere sub-category.  Then I analyse the cases themselves.  First, I discuss the legal 
professional privilege cases which are cited in connection with religious confession 
privilege.  Secondly, I identify why cases about irregular confessions are not really 
relevant to deciding whether there was a religious confession privilege or not.  Thirdly, I 
consider whether there have been any clear religious confession privilege cases and 
conclude that the very few that there are, do not advance an understanding of religious 
confession privilege very much.  Finally, I discuss the variety of extra-judicial comment 
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publicised case of R v Constance Kent
4 in 1865 but note once again that no authoritative 
conclusion emerged.  Chapter four concludes with a restatement of the opening 
observation that since there has been no statute to abolish religious confession privilege, 
and since the cases do not justify that firm conclusion, then religious confession privilege 
survives at least in theory. 
 
Religious confession privilege existed before there was a 
discrete law of evidence 
 
In connection with religious confession privilege, in 1876, Sir James Stephen wrote that 
“the modern Law of Evidence is not so old as the Reformation, but has grown up by the 
practice of the Courts, and by decisions in the course of the last two centuries.”
5  Stone 
and Wells affirm that though “the rules of evidence relation to documents ... are of 
immemorial antiquity … the rules relating to oral testimony … are little older than the 
seventeenth century”.
6 
 
I have demonstrated in chapters two and three that there was a practical religious 
confession privilege functioning in England until at least the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, despite doubt or denials in legal commentary.  Since the law relating to religious 
confession privilege is a part of the law of evidence, and since in practice it is not a 
documentary privilege, the law relating to religious confession privilege is older than 
most if not all of the rest of law relating to oral evidence.  This insight is important when it 
is recognised that the other privileges and immunities which form part of what Sir James 
                                                 
4 Unreported because Constance Kent ultimately pleaded guilty to the murder with which she was charged. 
 
5 Stephen, JF, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, London, MacMillan and Co, 1876, p172. 
 
6 Stone, J, Evidence, Its History and Policies, Revised by WAN Wells, Sydney, Butterworths, 1991, p 24. 
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Stephen called “the modern law of evidence”
7 evolved as a part of that new and discrete 
body of law.  Stone and Wells explain the relative modernity of the law of oral evidence 
with proof from the evolution of the criminal trial. They observe that it was not necessary 
to regulate oral testimony when trials were a procedure to ascertain the will of God.
8  
However, when the jury was transformed into an institution that was required “to give its 
verdict only on evidence of witnesses duly sworn in the case”,
9 it became necessary to 
standardise the quality of what jurors heard. Similarly, before the English Revolution of 
the seventeenth century established the supremacy of Parliament, judicial dependence 
“on the goodwill of the Crown”, particularly in cases of treason, acted as a restraint on 
the development of “rules for preventing prejudice”, such as the hearsay and similar fact 
evidence rules.
10  The absence of defence counsel for accused persons till 1695 in 
cases of treason,
11 until the late eighteenth century in cases of felony and universally in 
1837,
12 was another contributor to the late development of evidentiary rules intended to 
prevent prejudice. 
 
Stone and Wells tie the development of “the rule exempting attorneys from the duty to 
disclose communications made to them in professional confidence”
13 and “the rule that 
no witness will be compelled to answer questions, if the answer may tend to render him 
                                                 
7 Stephen, op cit, p 172. 
 
8 Stone and Wells, op cit, p 23. 
 
9 Idem. 
 
10 Ibid, p 34. 
 
11 Ibid, p 35.  Milsom dates the availability of defence counsel in treason cases to 1696 (Milsom, SFC, 
Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London, Butterworths, 1969, p 360). 
 
12 Stone and Wells, op cit, p 35.  Note, however, that Milson dates the availability of defence counsel in 
cases of felony to 1836 (Milsom, op cit, p 360). 
 
13 Stone and Wells, op cit, p 33. 
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liable to criminal prosecution”
14 to the appearance of the idea that “witnesses might be 
compelled to appear”.
15  Since it was quickly apparent that the Crown’s power to compel 
witnesses might become an “instrument of tyranny”, and since particularly after the 
English Revolution, parliament and the judiciary were acutely conscious of the need to 
control tyranny, legal professional privilege
16 and self-incrimination privilege were 
originated as policy exceptions to the practice of witness compulsion.
17  
 
Though the cases that have developed legal professional privilege in particular 
numerically dwarf those reported in connection with religious confession privilege, it is 
clear that the two privileges have completely discrete origins.  For when “the modern law 
of evidence”
18 began to appear in the seventeenth century, the privileges of the church 
were established and still respected.  Though the Catholic Father, Henry Garnet, had 
relied on religious confession privilege in vain in 1606 during the furore which followed 
the Gunpowder Plot,
19 canon law sanctions were still recognised and enforceable by 
                                                 
14 Idem. 
 
15 Ibid, p 32.  Stone and Wells explain that witness compulsion was a consequence of the perception of trials 
as a rational “search to discover truth from those who knew” (idem).  The same Crown self-interest that had 
promoted “the jury mode of trial” (ibid, p 30) as preferable to older ecclesiastical modes of trial “established 
the idea that witnesses might be compelled to appear” (idem).  Though the transition from the Jury as an 
Inquest of Neighbours (in the thirteenth century) into what Stone and Wells call the Judicial Jury was 
complete by the end of the fifteenth century (ibid, pp 16-23 (20)), there was further development between 
1500 and 1700 before the jury was transformed completely into the modern body that decides case on the 
basis of evidence “put before them by witnesses called by the parties” (ibid, p 32). 
 
16 Though Baron Alderson analogised from legal professional privilege to religious confession privilege to 
justify the privilege he extended to the confession Griffin made to the workhouse chaplain in R v Griffin 
(1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219, it is possible that legal professional privilege originated in an analogy from the 
privilege extended to priests, since they intercede between sinner and God.  However, the author can find 
no trace of this idea in any of the authorities on the evolution of legal professional privilege. 
 
17 Note, however, that Wigmore says that legal professional privilege was already “unquestioned” during the 
reign of Elizabeth 1 (Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, 
Little Brown, 1961, Vol 8, p 542). 
 
18 Stephen, op cit, p 172. 
 
19 Supra, chapter two, pp 77-81. 
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secular authorities,
20 judges could still be excommunicated if they offended the church,
21 
and “benefit of clergy” was still an integral part of criminal law practice.
22  Indeed, since 
the ecclesiastical law, including the new Church of England canon law, was respected as 
a part of the law of the land,
23 it is hardly surprising that religious confessions to the 
king’s clergy were not the subject of testimonial compulsion.  It did not matter that no 
case had raised the subject of religious confession privilege for adjudication.
24  This 
privilege of the clergy was still a contextual given.  Why then, was religious confession 
privilege inaccurately represented in the early evidence texts that began appearing in the 
early nineteenth century?  The answer lies in the orientation and analyses of the early 
evidence text writers. 
 
The practical purpose of early evidence texts as handbooks for 
barristers 
 
For Stone and Wells, “[t]he principal pioneering books on evidence in our modern sense 
were Peake on Evidence, 1801, Phillips on Evidence, 1814, and Starkie on Evidence, 
                                                 
20 Holdsworth observes that even after the Restoration, “[c]hurch and king act[ed] together to make their own 
standards of political and theological orthodoxy the conditions precedent for full citizenship” (Holdsworth, 
WS, A History of English Law, 2
nd ed, Boston, Little Brown and Co, 1923,  Vol 6, p 197).  He then traces the 
Acts of Parliament which were passed to persecute non-conformists into such orthodoxy (ibid, pp 197-198). 
Helmholz notes that “the day [when] the ecclesiastical courts would obediently follow all the dictates of royal 
court rules still lay in the future” in 1600 – and that despite jurisdictional contests between ecclesiastical and 
secular courts, the two jurisdictions cooperated far more often than they struggled (Helmholz, RH, Canon 
Law and the Law of England, London and Ronceverte, The Hambledon Press, 1987, pp 4-5). 
 
21 Helmholz, op cit, pp 3, 77-99. 
 
22 Chapter two, pp 61-66. 
 
23 See supra, chapter three, pp 117-121.  This idea endured in English common law well into the nineteenth 
century.  Thus Holdsworth is able to quote Lord Blackburn in 1881 stating that “[t]he ecclesiastical law of 
England is not a foreign law.  It is part of the general law of England – of the common law – in that wider 
sense which embraces all the ancient and approved customs of England which form law ... that law 
administered in the courts ecclesiastical, that law consisting of such canons and constitutions ecclesiastical 
as have been allowed by general consent and custom within the realm, and form … the king’s ecclesiastical 
law” (Holdsworth, op cit, Vol 1, p 595, quoting Lord Blackburn from MacKonochie v Penzance (1881) 6 AC 
424, 446). 
 
24 Stephen, op cit, p 171; see also Winckworth, P, The Seal of the Confessional and the Law of Evidence, 
London, S.P.C.K., 1952, p 15. 
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1824".
25  The reporting of decisions at first instance commencing at the end of the 
eighteenth century (particularly the Nisi Prius reports of Peake, Espinasse and 
Campbell
26) and the advent of the textbooks analysing and criticising the rules there 
expressed into a “coherent, purposive system”
27 was the ‘spring-tide’ of our law of 
evidence.
28  Most telling given chapter one’s insight that Peake and Starkie had profound 
influence on Park J who referenced them as he gave judgement in R v Gilham, is Stone 
and Wells’ summary of the influence of the text writers: 
 
To contemporaries like Peake and Phillips, whose reports and textbook played 
the major roles in the development, it must have seemed that at last the system 
was receiving its final form in detail as well as in principle. Indeed broadly 
speaking, they were right.  The authorities we cite today for the basic rules and 
their exceptions usually date between the years 1800 and 1850.
29 
 
The text writers were barristers and reporters recording a knowledge of the law of 
evidence as they had lived and practiced it.  Often they called their books digests thus 
signaling their intent to systematically reduce, classify and summarise the relevant law – 
and they were very popular.  Roscoe’s Nisi Prius, for example, passed through eighteen 
                                                 
25 Stone and Wells, op cit, p 36.  These texts were all referenced as being principal sources of the flawed 
interpretation of R v Sparkes discussed in chapter one, pp 16-19, 22-24.  Note too that Stone and Wells 
misspell the name of Phillipps. 
 
26 Idem, quoting Wigmore. 
 
27 Idem. 
 
28 Idem, attributing the term ‘spring-tide’ to Wigmore. 
 
29 Ibid, pp 36-37. 
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editions in the course of eighty years.
30  The proliferation of the publications and the 
number of editions, demonstrates the popularity of the product and their degree of legal 
market penetration.
31  Necessarily they dealt most carefully with developing law and 
religious confession privilege was not a developing area of the law.  Perhaps because 
the clergy kept their confidences or because for a long time it was simply unthinkable to 
compel a priest to testify about confessional information,
32 there was no need to modify 
the statements about religious confession privilege in the earliest texts.  Religious 
confession privilege cases simply did not come before the courts, and if confessional 
issues were raised analogically, the obiter dicta comments which followed were 
categorised in the texts under related headings which seemed logical although 
generalised.  New cases which referred to religious confession privilege for some 
reason, were simply added to the footnotes without careful analysis.  The texts for the 
most part did not deal with history; they dealt with day to day legal practice and they 
were produced as aids for practitioners keen to master the generalised rules of the 
courts in which they would earn their bread.  But they also came to have profound 
precedential influence.  
 
Stone and Wells’ conclusion on the development of the law of evidence, is that despite 
reform “to remedy particular evils in existing law”,
33 the law of evidence alone among “all 
                                                 
30 The first edition was published in 1827 (Roscoe, H, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, London, Joseph 
Butterworth and Son, 1827) and the eighteenth in 1907 (Powell, M, ed, Roscoe’s Nisi Prius, 18
th ed, London, 
Stevens and Sweet and Maxwell, 1907). 
 
31 See the writer’s summary of some of the texts in chapter one, pp 16-18. 
 
32 Writing in 1992, Suzanne McNicol opined one good reason why religious confession privilege should be 
recognised, is to “reduce unnecessary friction between church and state”, a reason she drew from 
comments attributed to the President of the Australian Law Reform Commission (McNicol, SB, Law of 
Privilege, Australia, The Law Book Company, 1992, pp 330, 337 citing A.L.R.C., Report No. 38 (1987), para 
212, p 120). 
 
33 Ibid, p 37. 
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the great bodies of traditional rules which made up the common law in the nineteenth 
century ... is the one which has been the least changed by a century of legislation”.
34  As 
noted in chapter one, the only sure way to learn what the law of religious confession 
privilege is, is to go back to the original cases where religious confession privilege is 
concerned and decide whether Peake, Phillipps and Starkie correctly analysed the cases 
to arrive at their ‘no religious confession privilege’ conclusion since so many later judges 
and commentators have taken their summary at face value.  The error wrought by 
Peake’s report of R v Sparkes
35 despite Lord Kenyon CJ’s doubt of it in Du Barré v 
Livette
36 has already been noted.
37  This chapter will now review the cases cited in 
connection with religious confession privilege to determine whether the treatment they 
received in commentary and subsequent cases was fair and rational.  Before I proceed 
with that analysis, it is necessary to restate why so much of that analysis arises in cases 
about legal professional privilege. 
 
Categories in evidence law texts 
The methodical academic treatment of legal subject matter has always required 
categories.  In the law of evidence, ‘privilege’ is a natural subdivision of the case law. 
Legal professional privilege is by far the largest evidentiary privilege if case volume is the 
yardstick.  It is also the privilege that arises most often in legal practice and the privilege 
most conceptually familiar to all law practitioners.  That familiarity is certainly part of the 
reason why there are and always have been so many cases about it. Consequently, in 
every evidence law text, such treatment as there is of religious confession privilege, 
                                                 
34 Idem. 
 
35 Unreported but referred to in Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96. 
 
36 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108: 170 ER 96. 
 
37 Chapter one, pp 15-19. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FOUR   137
follows treatment of legal professional privilege.  There are other privileges which are 
also dwarfed by textual treatment of legal professional privilege, but they are not so 
easily analogous.  For in religions that practice confession, the priest like the lawyer, 
stands between an individual and a higher power.  Such an analogical comparison does 
not exist in the case of the privilege which protects communications between a husband 
and wife during marriage; the privilege that protects judges and juries from being 
compelled to disclose material learned while they were acting judicially; the privilege 
which protects state secrets and those who become privy to them or the privilege which 
protects matters of which decency forbids disclosure.
38  But the comparison has always 
disfavoured proper consideration of religious confession privilege.  For it became simple 
in such analysis, to group the clergy with other professionals who did not enjoy an 
evidential privilege and repeat the one sentence denial in a treatment of legal 
professional privilege considered more current, important and relevant and that often 
filled several pages with nuanced detail.  
 
So it was that in the first edition of Peake’s Compendium of the Law of Evidence,
39 he 
excluded religious confession privilege as follows: 
 
This rule of professional secrecy extends only to the case of facts stated to a 
legal practitioner, for the purpose of enabling him to conduct a cause; and 
therefore a confession to a clergyman or priest, for the purpose of easing a 
culprit’s conscience, the statement of a man to his private friend, or of a patient to 
his physician, are not within the protection of the law.  We should certainly think 
                                                 
38 These subdivisions come from Matthews, JB, & Spear, GF, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence by the late 
Judge Pitt Taylor, 11
th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1920, p 617. 
 
39 London, E & R Brooke & J Rider, 1801. 
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the friend, or the physician, who voluntarily violated the confidence reposed in 
him, acted dishonourably; but he cannot withhold the fact, if called upon in a 
Court of Justice.
40 
 
The statement had not changed in the fifth edition in 1822
41 and while Phillipps was 
faithful to the steadfast omission of clergy from the list of unfortunately unprivileged 
professionals in Wilson v Rastall
42 in his first and second editions in 1814
43 and 1815,
44 
Starkie’s first edition in 1824 states: 
 
The law will not permit any one to withhold from the information of the jury any 
communication which is important as evidence, however secret and confidential 
the nature of that communication may have been, although it may have been 
made to a physician or a surgeon, or even to a divine, in the course of 
discharging his professional duties; for it has ever been held, that a minister is 
                                                 
40 Ibid, p 128, citing R v Sparkes as reported in Peake’s cases and the Duchess of Kingston’s case (20 State 
Trials 612). 
 
41 London, J & WT Clarke, 1822, p 175. 
 
42 Wilson v Rastall (1792) 4 TR 753; 100 ER 1283. Kenyon CJ and Buller J sat together in this case.  Unless 
they were avoiding public disagreement, it is odd that they did not mention the clergy at all in their obiter 
statements in this case.  For Buller J had apparently decided against religious confession privilege in R v 
Sparkes (c 1790 unreported but referred to in Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108: 170 ER 96) while 
Kenyon CJ had disagreed with Buller J’s approach when he had referenced the Sparkes decision obiter in 
Du Barré v Livette. 
 
43 Phillipps, SM, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, London, J Butterworth, 1814, p 67. 
 
44 Phillipps, SM, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, London, J Butterworth, 1815, p 104, though in this 
second edition reference, Phillipps cites R v Sparkes (where Buller J denied protection to an irregular 
religious confession) as his footnoted authority rather than Du Barré v Livette where Kenyon CJ had doubted 
the wisdom of the finding.  In his first edition, a year earlier, Phillipps appears to have preferred Kenyon CJ’s 
statement as his authority since R v Sparkes is not mentioned in the footnotes.  Phillipps may well have 
concluded during the year between his first and second editions, that since Buller J’s decision was ratio 
decidendi, it was more authoritative than Kenyon CJ’s later obiter statement notwithstanding the latter’s 
seniority as Chief Justice. 
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bound to disclose that which has been revealed to him as a matter of religious 
confession.
45 
 
Three years later when the first edition of Roscoe’s Digest was released, the summary 
had been compressed to: 
 
Counsel, solicitors, and attornies are the only persons who cannot be compelled 
to reveal communications made to them in confidence, R v Duchess of Kingston 
20 How.St. Tr. 612, therefore physicians, surgeons and divines are bound to 
disclose such communications. Ibid.
46 
 
From 1827 onwards, with rare exceptions,
47 the commentators were steadfast in their 
denial that religious confession privilege existed at common law.  But the brief quotations 
provided show the category habit at work.  In the first from Peake, legal professional 
privilege is a professional secrecy privilege.  Peake confines it to lawyers by trivialising 
the priest’s role to that of easing a culprit’s guilty conscience.  Such is not the work of a 
professional entitled to an evidential privilege.  Starkie has generalised one degree 
further.  He says that no one can avoid giving relevant evidence to a court, unless there 
is an established common law privilege providing an exemption.  But he does not 
consider that there may be a separate exemption in favour of clergy that originates from 
a different genesis than the exemption established in favour of legal professionals.  In 
                                                 
45 Starkie, T, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence and Digest of Proofs in Criminal Proceedings, 
London, J & WT Clarke, 1824, Vol 1, p 105. 
 
46 Roscoe, H, A Digest of the Law of Evidence on the Trial of Actions at Nisi Prius, London, Joseph 
Butterworth and Son, 1827, p 72. 
 
47 Taylor references some of the arguments made in favour of extending professional privilege to clergymen 
but concludes none the less that they are compellable (Taylor, JP, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 
London, A Maxwell & Son, 1848, Vol 1, pp 618-620).  Best is altogether more doubtful about the standard 
denials of religious confession privilege and demonstrates with summaries that he has read the relevant 
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one sense, Roscoe’s summary is simply lazy.  In another sense, it is simply the best of 
the three examples of a risk that inheres in that inductive reasoning which is a feature of 
common law development.  That is, that in inductively reasoning from the specific case 
to the general principle, one is apt to over-generalise if one begins with an inadequate 
sampling of facts or cases.  That, of course, is not to say that inductive reasoning is 
fatally flawed as a logical system.  Rather, it simply underscores the absolute essentiality 
of reading each and every case available and considering all the material in detail before 
one starts to write a text book.  
 
What then do the cases say?  In the light of this explanation of why there are so many 
legal professional privilege cases tied up in the common law that does exist relevant to 
religious confession privilege, I begin this treatment by examining the statements about 
religious confession privilege in cases that are really about legal professional privilege, in 
three categories: 
 
(a)  Legal professional privilege cases that contain an obiter statement 
against the existence of religious confession privilege, 
(b)  Legal professional privilege cases that contain obiter statements that 
doubt denials of religious confession privilege, and 
(c)  Legal professional privilege cases that are cited in evidence texts about 
religious confession privilege but which do not even mention religious 
confession privilege. 
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Religious confession privilege in cases about legal professional 
privilege 
 
By simple definition, the statements about religious confession privilege in cases about 
legal professional privilege can only be obiter dicta.  Accordingly, where there are 
decided cases about religious confession privilege, the statements about religious 
confession privilege in those cases will be more authoritative since such statements will 
be the kernel of the decision making in the case.  As will be seen, there is a dearth of 
such ratio decidendi statements in recorded English common law history.  For that 
reason, it is the opinion of Sir James Stephen in 1876 and Peter Winckworth in 1952 that 
the existence and nature of religious confession privilege has never been decided in 
English common law.
48  And even Dean Wigmore, who opines that there are at least two 
ratio decidendi cases that have been decided against the existence of religious 
confession privilege, does not identify them in his long footnoted list.  This 
uncharacteristic absence of exactness makes it difficult to work out which cases he 
considered did decide against religious confession privilege.  For while all the cases 
listed in Wigmore’s footnotes are considered in the analysis that follows, it remains 
unclear which cases Wigmore considered were decided against the existence of 
religious confession privilege.  The writer therefore finds the Stephen/Winckworth view 
more accurate.  Thus the obiter dicta statements in cases about legal professional 
privilege must be considered more carefully than would be necessary if there were better 
common law material available for analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
48 See note 24 supra. 
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Legal professional privilege cases that contain an obiter 
statement against the existence of religious confession privilege 
 
In a 1693 decision called simply Anon,
49 Holt CJ would not compel an attorney named 
Saunders to provide evidence about an allegedly corrupt deed of indenture he had 
drawn between a sheriff and his under sheriff “though [the attorney] was not a 
counselor”.
50  It is evident that the Chief Justice felt pressed to explain why not and his 
explanation was that even a scrivener had been found not compellable in relation to 
advice he had given as “counsel” in conveyancing matters.  However, it is the 
qualification that he placed upon this “counsel” principle that has seen this report cited as 
authority against the existence of religious confession privilege.  “[F]or” he added, “he is 
a counsel to a man, with whom he will advise; if he be instructed and educated in such a 
way of practice, otherwise of a gentleman, parson, &c”.
51 
 
Holt CJ’s point seems to have been that if a scrivener was educated so as to give legal 
advice and gave legal advice, then he was not compellable as a witness in relation to the 
matter advised upon.  But it is there where the analysis gets difficult.  Did the Chief 
Justice mean then to say only the legally educated could give legal advice and thus not 
be compellable as witnesses in related matters; did he mean to say that since 
gentlemen, parsons and others were not legally educated they were not exempt from 
being compelled as witnesses on the basis that they were legal advisors; or did he mean 
to say that parsons could never claim an exemption from being compelled as a witness 
on any basis whatever?  The better interpretation of this thin report seems to be that only 
a legally educated person who had given legal advice in relation to a matter under 
                                                 
49 Anon (1693) Skin 404; 90 ER 179-180. 
 
50 Idem. 
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consideration by a court, could be exempt from compulsion as witnesses in that court on 
the basis of legal professional privilege.  There is no sound basis for the extraction of the 
‘no religious confession privilege at common law’ principle from this report.  Such citation 
of the case is misleading. 
 
There is more justification for the citation of Greenlaw v King,
52 Russell v Jackson,
53 
Anderson v Bank
54 and Wheeler v LeMarchant
55 as authority for the ‘no religious 
confession privilege at common law’ principle, for they all include intentional judicial 
statements intended to deny that there is a religious confession privilege at common law. 
In Greenlaw v King, the new rector of St Mary’s in Woolwich sought to have an annuity 
the late Bishop
56 had assigned to his son, Mr King, set aside on grounds that two Acts of 
Parliament established the annuity on a trust connected with the construction of a new 
rectory house.  In his effort to have the annuity set aside, Greenlaw sought to adduce 
evidence of correspondence between the Bishop and his solicitor, as well as the opinion 
of counsel given in the matter, which documents answered the Bishop’s concern about 
the validity of the annuity.
57 
                                                 
52 Greenlaw v King (1838) 1 Beav 137; 48 ER 890. 
 
53 Russell v Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387; 68 ER 558. 
 
54 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644. 
 
55 Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675. 
 
56 As in Randolph’s case, cited by Coke in his Second Part of the Institutes as authority for the proposition 
that there is a treason exception to religious confession privilege, it is fair to wonder whether one reason why 
Greenlaw v King is cited in connection with religious confession privilege is because a member of the clergy 
was mentioned in the same case where a confession or a privilege was considered.  In chapter three it was 
noted that Randolph, a priest, confessed his complicity in the crime of treason.  Sir Edward Coke used the 
fact that he was also Dowager Queen Joan’s confessor to bolster the appearance of authority for his treason 
exception to religious confession privilege.  In Greenlaw v King, it may have seemed to some commentators 
that the denial of any privilege by which a member of the clergy might have benefited, lent authority to the 
idea that there is no religious confession privilege. 
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King countered with the argument that since these documents came into being because 
of the Bishop’s concern about litigation such as might flow if the annuity was invalid, they 
could not be produced in any court.
58  The court, however, found the documents 
admissible because the privilege of a solicitor and his client “are not co-extensive”
59 and 
as executor or personal representative, the Defendant King was not the beneficiary of 
the privilege to which his late father, the Bishop, would have been entitled in this suit.
60 
Lord Langdale also referenced the relationship of friendship that had existed between 
the late Bishop and his solicitor and it was in generalising further to point out that mere 
confidences were not privileged from disclosure in a court of law, he made an obiter 
dicta statement which included reference to religious confession privilege.  He said:
 
 
[T]hey are communications which have taken place between the Defendant and 
[his father’s solicitor], not in his character of solicitor; and it cannot be said that a 
mere friend is a person so confidential that a communication with him is 
privileged: the cases of privilege are confined to solicitors and their clients; and 
stewards, parents, medical attendants, clergymen and persons in the most 
closely confidential relation are bound to disclose communications made to 
them.
61  
 
In Russell v Jackson
62 Sir GJ Turner, the Vice-Chancellor, explained that the existence 
of legal professional privilege is not premised in “the confidence reposed by the client in 
                                                 
58 Greenlaw v King (1838) 1 Beav. 137, 143-144; 48 ER 890, 893-894. 
 
59 Greenlaw v King (1838) 1 Beav. 137, 144; 48 ER 890, 894. 
 
60 Greenlaw v King (1838) 1 Beav. 137, 145; 48 ER 890, 894. 
 
61 Idem. 
 
62 Russell v Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387; 68 ER 558. 
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the solicitor”
63 but rather “on a regard to the interests of justice ... and to the 
administration of justice which cannot go on without the aid of men skilled in 
jurisprudence ... [for] if the privilege did not exist at all, everyone would be thrown upon 
his own legal resources [and,] deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not 
venture to ... tell his counsellor half his case”.
64  If it were otherwise, in this Vice-
Chancellor’s opinion, a privilege would lie “in other cases in which at least equal 
confidence is reposed: in the cases for instance, of the medical man and the patient, and 
of the clergyman and the prisoner”.
65 
 
The facts in both Anderson v Bank
66 and Wheeler v LeMarchant,
67 have been set out in 
detail in chapter one.  In Anderson v Bank the English Court of Appeal denied that legal 
professional privilege extended to protect information an overseas bank prepared for its 
client after litigation had commenced.  In Wheeler v LeMarchant, the same court denied 
that legal professional privilege protected written exchanges between a solicitor and his 
client’s surveyor before the dispute arose.  In Anderson v Bank, Sir George Jessel MR 
quoted Lord Cottenham’s judgement in Reid v Langlois
68 which denied that legal 
professional privilege extended to cover communications with a third party, even though 
those communications resulted in the production of documents in litigation.  The object 
of legal professional privilege for Lord Cottenham was “to protect the party who wishes 
                                                 
63 Idem. 
 
64 Idem. 
 
65 Idem. 
 
66 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644. 
 
67 Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675. 
 
68 Reid v Langlois (1849) 1 Mac & G 627; 41 ER 1408. 
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to take the advice of professional men”.
69  Sir George Jessel MR then denied the 
existence of both doctor-patient privilege and the religious confession privilege which is 
recognised “in foreign countries where the Roman Catholic faith prevails”
70 because 
“[w]hen Lord Cottenham says “professional men” he means members of the legal 
profession and nothing else”.
71  In Wheeler v LeMarchant, Sir George Jessel MR 
essentially repeated his Anderson v Bank obiter statement against the existence of 
religious confession privilege, but without the citation of Lord Cottenham’s authority and 
his doubtful explanation of what Lord Cottenham meant. 
 
While it remains doubtful that Chief Justice Holt in 1693 intended by his obiter dicta 
comments in his Anon decision to say anything at all about religious confession privilege, 
it is clear that Lord Langdale in Greenlaw v King, Sir GJ Turner, the Vice-Chancellor in 
Russell v Jackson and Sir George Jessel MR in both Anderson v Bank and Wheeler v 
LeMarchant intended to deny the existence of religious confession privilege. So 
elementary was that denial, that only Sir George Jessel MR referred to authority, but his 
quotation from Lord Cottenham really meant little more than res ipsa loquitur.  But as my 
historical analysis in chapters two and three has demonstrated, the thing does not speak 
for itself.  To properly assess the authority of these influential obiter dicta statements 
against the existence of religious confession privilege, they must be weighed against the 
opposing views of equally influential judicial minds who were equally sure that the 
privilege did exist.  
 
                                                 
69 As quoted by Sir George Jessel MR in Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) LR 2 ChD 644, 650. 
 
70 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) LR 2 ChD 644, 650-651. 
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Legal professional privilege cases that contain obiter 
statements that doubt denials of religious confession privilege 
 
Neither Lord Kenyon CJ in 1792, nor Chief Justice Best in 1828 agreed that legal 
professional privilege was the only privilege against evidential compulsion known to 
English law, and both disagreed with brother judges in recorded judgements promptly 
after views disavowing religious confession privilege were brought to their attention.  
Lord Kenyon’s doubt that religious confession evidence had been properly compelled the 
previous year, was discussed in chapter one as a part of the writer’s discussion of the 
error in R v Sparkes.
72  In Du Barré v Livette,
73 Lord Kenyon was asked to compel the 
interpreter who assisted defence counsel in a case of jewellery theft, to disclose 
conversations between one of the accused, Livette, and his lawyer.  Counsel for Du 
Barré used an analogy to press his case by suggesting that since Justice Buller had 
decided the previous year that a Catholic prisoner’s confession to a Protestant 
clergyman was compellable
74, the interpreter should be compelled here.  Lord Kenyon 
found that the interpreter was as protected by legal professional privilege as Livette’s 
lawyer himself since the attorney could not fulfill his proper function without the 
involvement of the interpreter.
75  However, rather than letting the analogy pass, he said 
that he would have paused before he admitted the evidence Justice Buller had admitted 
in R v Sparkes.
76  While the language was temperate, even understated, the message 
was clear.  The Chief Justice did not think that even an irregular religious confession 
should have been admitted as evidence, but he did not say why. 
                                                 
72 Unreported but referred to in Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 86. 
 
73 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96. 
 
74 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108, 109; 170 ER 96, 97. 
 
75 Idem. 
 
76 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108, 110; 170 ER 96, 97. 
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Chief Justice Best was more forthright when he learned that his decision to prevent a 
clergyman giving evidence in R v Radford
77 in 1823 had been disapproved by the banc 
of judges who decided that Gilham’s evidence was not illegally induced in 1828.  For six 
weeks after the decision in R v Gilham
78 was handed down, he took the opportunity to 
respond in Broad v Pitt,
79 another case about legal professional privilege. 
 
The facts of Broad v Pitt are not reported.  However, despite the brief report, it is clear 
that the case concerned the question of whether legal professional privilege applied to a 
conversation between Pitt and his attorney when Pitt “executed a deed which the latter 
had prepared for him as his professional adviser”.
80  Chief Justice Best decided that legal 
professional privilege only applied in cases where communications flowed from a 
person’s need for legal advice “for the purpose of defending himself or of commencing 
an action”,
81 but not, as here, where the advisor was only “consulted about a deed”.
82  
He then commented about religious confession privilege as follows: 
 
I think this confidence in the case of attornies is a great anomaly in the law.  The 
privilege does not apply to clergymen, since the decision the other day, in the 
case of Gilham (Carr. Suppl. 61).  I, for one, will never compel a clergyman to 
disclose communications made to him by a prisoner; but if he chooses to 
                                                 
77 Unreported, but referred to in R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186; 168 ER 1235. 
 
78 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186; 168 ER 1235. 
 
79 Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528. 
 
80 Idem. 
 
81 Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518, 519; 172 ER 528, 529. 
 
82 Idem. 
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disclose them, I shall receive them in evidence.  There is also no privilege of this 
description in the case of a medical man.
83 
 
While the report suggests that Chief Justice Best believed that the decision in R v 
Gilham had extinguished religious confession privilege, the Chief Justice’s opinion is 
unclear since he still says that he would not compel a clergyman to give evidence in his 
court.  It may be that the Chief Justice considered some part of what he believed was 
pre-existing common law protection for clerical confidentiality had been extinguished by 
the R v Gilham obiter.  Or perhaps he was just annoyed that his course in R v Radford 
had been disapproved.  He certainly did not believe the decision in R v Gilham had 
extinguished his discretion to exclude religious confession evidence.  He is not the only 
judge to have believed he had such discretion.  I consider the cases which arguably 
recognise a broader and discretionary religious “communications” privilege in detail in 
chapter five. 
 
What is evident is that Chief Justice Best was not present in banc when the Gilham 
decision was taken and that he had not read the report.  For if he had read the report or 
been present in banc, he could have further distinguished Park J’s obiter comments 
about religious confession privilege since that case really only decided that spiritual 
inducements could not invalidate an otherwise voluntary confession of crime.  Though 
Park J had opined against religious confession privilege when discussing Best CJ’s 
decision in R v Radford, he had done so on the basis of Peake and Starkies’ flawed 
commentary on the decisions in R v Sparkes and Du Barré v Livette. 
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Best CJ’s tenacity, despite the evident criticism of his brethren,
84 is the more remarkable 
since he maintained his opinion anyway – and offered legal justification for continued 
practical recognition of religious confession privilege by suggesting that perhaps it was 
subject to waiver by priest (R v Radford) or penitent (Best CJ’s apparent understanding 
of the facts in R v Gilham).  Indeed, given Park’s summary of the Radford facts – that 
Chief Justice Best had actually forbidden the priest from giving evidence in that case 
when he was willing to do so – Best CJ effectively said that the only change made by the 
Gilham obiter to his understanding of the underlying common law, was that judges must 
allow willing clergymen to testify, implying that judges should still exclude evidence of 
religious confessions in cases where priests declined to testify willingly. 
 
In addition to the cases about legal professional privilege cited in commentary which do 
include obiter dicta comments for and against the existence of religious confession 
privilege, there are legal professional privilege cases cited which say nothing about 
religious confession privilege at all.  The only reason why they seem to have been so 
mentioned, is because they feature strong statements denying that there is any 
evidential privilege at all except for members of the legal profession. 
 
Legal professional privilege cases that are cited in evidence 
texts about religious confession privilege but which do not even 
mention religious confession privilege 
 
That these cases carry little weight against religious confession privilege despite citation 
for that purpose in commentary is also exposed by the observation that their generalised 
denials have been used to deny the existence of other evidential privileges including 
                                                 
84 Though the report in R v Gilham cites only the opinion of Park J against Best’s decision to exclude the 
clergyman’s evidence in R v Radford, since Park’s brethren concurred with him in the result in banc, Best 
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those that protect state secrets and the privilege against self-incrimination.  Perhaps 
again, the commentators included references to these cases because the analogy 
between priests and lawyers seems more natural since both intercede between 
individuals and a higher power.
85 
 
Vaillant v Dodemead
86 was a 1743 case decided by the Lord Chancellor.  Dodemead 
had produced his clerk in court, a Mr Bristow, to provide evidence about “a collusive 
assignment made by the defendant Dodemead of a lease to one Lascells, a prisoner in 
the Fleet, in order to avoid paying a ground rent to the plaintiff”.
87  Mr Bristow demurred 
from answering questions in cross-examination on the basis “that he knew nothing of the 
matters inquired of, except what came to his knowledge as the defendant’s clerk in court, 
or agent”.
88  In overruling his demurrer, the Lord Chancellor said that “no persons are 
privileged from being examined in such cases, but persons of the profession, as counsel, 
solicitor, or attorney, for an agent may only be a steward, or servant”.
89  He also said that 
because Bristow had consented to being examined in chief, he had waived any right 
even a counsel or attorney might have had to demur on grounds of legal professional 
privilege.  
 
Wilson v Rastall
90 is possibly more significant than Vaillant v Dodemead on two counts. 
First, it was decided the year after Lord Kenyon CJ had disapproved of Buller J’s 
                                                 
85 See earlier comparison supra, p 137. 
 
86 Vaillant v Dodemead (1743) 2 Atk 54; 26 ER 715. 
 
87 Idem. 
 
88 Idem. 
 
89 Idem. 
 
90 Wilson v Rastall (1792) LTR 753; 100 ER 1283; (1775-1802) All ER 597. 
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decision to admit evidence of an irregular religious confession in R v Sparkes,
91 and 
secondly, because the current Chief Justice of the New South Wales Supreme Court, 
cited it as authority for his proposition that there is no religious confession privilege 
except by statute.
92 
 
An attorney named Mr B Handley, by convoluted circumstances, had come into 
possession of letters apparently material to a bribery case following an election “for the 
borough of Newark upon Trent”.
93  The attorney claimed that he was entitled to refuse to 
produce the letters or answer questions about them, since he had been consulted in a 
professional capacity by the owner, though he had never acted as the owner’s attorney. 
Before Baron Thomson in the first instance criminal trial, it was held that the attorney 
“was not bound”
94 to produce the letters.  Lord Kenyon and Mr Justice Buller did not 
agree.  Lord Kenyon said:  
 
The evidence of B. Handley was rejected on account of a confidence supposed 
to have been reposed in him by the defendant, for the witness said that the 
letters were delivered to him in consequence of the defendant’s consulting him 
professionally ... It expressly appears from [Mr B. Handley’s] ... own evidence 
that he was not, nor could be, employed as an attorney.  I have always 
understood that the privilege of a client only extends to the case of an attorney 
                                                 
91 Unreported but referred to in Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 86.  Note that Lord Kenyon 
CJ and Buller J sat together in Wilson v Rastall. 
 
92 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 699, para 88, per Spigelman, CJ, though note it is possible to read his 
citation of Wilson v Rastall as authority only for the first proposition (“The common law refused to afford 
privilege to exceptional sensitive confidential relationships”) and not for the statement after which it was cited 
(“No such privilege was recognised until statutory modification”).  
 
93 Wilson v Rastall (1792) LTR 753; 100 ER 1283; (1775-1802) All ER 597. 
 
94 Wilson v Rastall (1775-1802) All ER 597, 598. 
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for him ... In order to show that the privilege extends beyond the case of an 
attorney and client, a hard case has been pressed on our feelings of confidence 
reposed in a friend ... I ... think that this privilege is only allowed in the case of 
attorney and client.
95 
 
Mr Justice Buller was more direct:  
 
The privilege is confined to the cases of counsel, solicitor and attorney.  In order 
to raise the privilege ... it must be proved that the information was communicated 
to the witness in one of those characters ... as B. Handley was neither the 
attorney of W. Handley nor of the defendant, I am of the opinion that he was 
improperly prevented from producing the letters in question.
96 
 
It is noteworthy that Lord Kenyon did not reiterate or justify his extension of legal 
professional privilege to the lawyer’s interpreter the previous year in Du Barré v Livette.  
Both Judges decided Wilson v Rastall on its distinct facts and resisted the invitations of 
counsel to extend or generalise that specific privilege into a wider privilege benefitting 
confidentiality simpliciter.  Commentative assertions that Wilson v Rastall represents 
further proof that religious confession privilege had been extinguished by the turn of the 
nineteenth century
97 may thus be discounted. 
                                                 
95 Wilson v Rastall (1775-1802) All ER 597, 599. 
 
96 Wilson v Rastall (1775-1802) All ER 597,600. 
 
97 SM Phillipps (A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 2
nd ed, London, A Strahan; Dublin, J Butterworth and 
Son and J Cook, 1815, p 104), RN Gresley (A Treatise on the Law of Evidence in the Courts of Equity, 
Philadelphia, PH Nicklin & T Johnson, 1827, p 281), and A Hawke (Roscoe’s Digest on the Law of Evidence 
and the Practice in Criminal Cases in England and Wales, 15
th ed, London, Stevens and Sons Ltd; Sweet 
and Maxwell Ltd, 1928, p 178) all so use the case.  Nokes again notes that it contains dicta “confining 
privilege to the legal profession, but not referring to the position of ministers of religion” (Nokes, GD, 
“Professional Privilege” (1950) 66 LQR 88, 97).  
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In Falmouth v Moss,
98 the Earl of Falmouth sought to extend legal professional privilege 
to exclude evidence that might have been given by his steward, a sometimes 
conveyancer,
99 but who was admitted not to be an attorney.  This case may be similarly 
dismissed as not impacting on religious confession privilege.   
 
The inductive generalisation of broad principles from cases about legal professional 
privilege has contributed to the mistaken belief that religious confession privilege has 
been extinguished from the common law by a line of authoritative cases.  But it is not the 
only analytical error that has contributed to that mistaken belief.  A correct understanding 
of religious confession privilege has also been confused by cases which involve irregular 
confessions.  The entire history of the development of the law relating to legal 
professional privilege has been the story of refining the scope of that privilege and 
denying it was available to people outside the legal profession.  Judges are of course, 
uniquely qualified to decide whether a legal professional privilege claimant is a legal 
practitioner.  They are also eminently qualified to decide whether a particular 
communication has the hallmarks of a legally privileged communication.  But the 
adjudication of whether an individual is a qualified clergyman and whether a confession 
is regular according to the tenets of a particular faith, is beyond the competence of most 
judges – and there is a very strong body of common law authority that states that secular 
courts have no business adjudicating matters that have ecclesiastical content.  Yet until 
the New South Wales religious confession privilege statute passed into law in 1989 
suggested that the member of the clergy claiming religious confession privilege is the 
proper adjudicator of whether what was heard was a confession or not, that possibility 
never appeared in commentary.  While there are a number of cases where Judges have 
                                                 
98 Falmouth v Moss (1822) 11 Price 455; 147 ER 530. 
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perceived the difficulty, no common law text has ever explored whether such perplexity 
has been a valid factor in denial of the privilege.  The next section of this chapter 
therefore considers various examples of confessional irregularity to determine whether 
the decisions in these cases can be said to have extinguished religious confession 
privilege at common law. 
 
Irregular confessions 
Garnet’s case, decided in 1606, was the last prosecution flowing from the Gunpowder 
Plot of 1605.  The facts are set out in chapter three, as is the illogic of using Garnet’s 
case as authority for the proposition that there was no religious confession privilege after 
the English Reformation.  For if there was no religious confession privilege at common 
law, why such considerable effort to deny that Garnet’s communication was a religious 
confession?
100  It would have been altogether simpler to have dismissed Garnet’s 
argument that his communications with Greenwell and possibly Catesby were privileged 
out of hand since no such privilege was known to English common law.  But Coke and 
two of the nine Commissioners who sat to guide the jury on the case, went to great 
lengths to disabuse the jury of the notion that Garnet’s religious confession defence had 
any substance. 
 
Because Buller J did not make an issue of the irregularity of the confession in R v 
Sparkes, that irregularity does not underscore recognition of religious confession 
privilege at common law as does the legal argument in Garnet’s case.  Indeed, though 
the irregularity of confession point was not lost on counsel who sought to use the 
                                                 
100 As discussed in chapter two, pp 58-60, 65-76, this same reasoning makes Coke’s stretching to find a 
treason exception to religious confession privilege in English common law an argument which proves the 
existence of the underlying privilege. 
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decision as a precedent narrowing a claim of legal professional privilege in Du Barré v 
Livette argued before Lord Kenyon CJ the following year, Mr Justice Buller had 
apparently dismissed both the religious confession privilege and irregularity arguments 
summarily since no such privilege was known to English common law.  Because the 
case is not reported, we have no knowledge of the basis upon which Buller J dismissed 
the religious confession argument.  We do not know, for example, if Coke’s Second Part 
of the Institutes was cited or the argument about the privilege from the report in Garnet’s 
case. But it does seem that something was made of the irregularity of the confession 
since that is the way the argument was presented to Lord Kenyon in Du Barré v Livette.  
Though the decision in R v Sparkes may be one of the authoritative decisions against 
the existence of religious confession privilege that Wigmore says that he cited in his 
footnotes,
101 questions remain.  Since a Catholic priest of that day would probably deny 
that the alleged confession was a confession at all since it was made to a Protestant 
clergyman, did this unreported decision of Buller J authoritatively confirm once and for all 
that there was no religious confession privilege?  Was authority cited?  If so, did Buller J 
consider and then distinguish or dismiss that authority?  Or did he simply wave his hand 
and say that the argument was irrelevant either on the basis that this was not a 
confession at all, or because there was no religious confession privilege at common law?  
It may be that the evidence text writer WM Best
102 took a better approach when he 
suggested that the decision in R v Sparkes was more of a commentary on the rampant 
anti-Catholic prejudice endemic in England in 1790, than it was upon the existence of 
religious confession privilege at common law.  WM Best certainly thought it academically 
                                                 
101 Wigmore, JH, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown 
and Company, 1961, Vol 8, pp 867-870 – though the text does not spell out which of the authorities listed 
(including R v Sparkes) are his “at least two decisive rulings ... which deny ... the existence of a [religious 
confession] privilege”. 
 
102 Best, WM, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, London, S Sweet, 1849. 
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reasonable to set the decisions in both R v Sparkes and Butler v Moore
103 to one side 
and not count them as authorities against the existence of religious confession privilege 
on the basis that they were tainted by prejudice.
104 There is also the point of distinction 
asserted later by Best CJ in his obiter comments in Broad v Pitt, that the Protestant 
clergyman in R v Sparkes had evidently testified willingly and had therefore waived any 
privilege that otherwise obtained.
105  Whatever the correct analysis may be if these 
remaining questions could be answered, it is not reasonable to induce the finding that 
religious confession privilege was extinguished from common law by the argument or the 
results in Garnet’s case or R v Sparkes. 
 
The decision in R v Gilham was set out in detail in chapter one
106 and has been referred 
to earlier in this chapter.
107  Though various commentaries cite it as authority against the 
existence of religious confession privilege at common law,
108 I have shown that it actually 
decided that confessions induced by spiritual promises were admissible.  It is only an 
‘irregular confession’ case in the sense that though the confessions concerned may have 
been made for spiritual purpose, no one asserted they were religious confessions and it 
is hard to see how they could have been since none was made to a member of the 
                                                 
103 Butler v Moore  (1804-1806) 2 Sch & Lef 249.  This case is discussed in more detail infra, pp 167-168, 
and also in chapter six, pp 238, 240. 
 
104 Best, WM, op cit, pp 459-460. 
 
105 See discussion supra, pp 148-150. 
 
106 Chapter one, pp 19-21. 
 
107 Supra, pp 134, 148-150. 
 
108 JP Taylor (A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, London, A Maxwell & Son, 1848, Vol 1, p 618), Edward 
Smirke’s 10
th ed of Roscoe’s Nisi Prius (London, V & R Stevens and Sons & H Sweet and W Maxwell, 1861, 
p 142), JF Hageman (Privileged Communications as a Branch of Legal Evidence, Littleton Colorado, Fred B 
Rothman & Co, 1983 reprint of the 1889 edition, pp 122-123), as well as M Powell’s 1907 18
th ed of 
Roscoe’s Nisi Prius. 
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clergy.
109  For it does not appear from the report that anyone had to be compelled to give 
evidence against either their will or their religious scruples. 
 
Nor does the report of the decision in R v Wild
110 advance the case for or against the 
existence of religious confession privilege at common law.  William Wild was a thirteen-
year-old boy accused of murdering a three-year-old girl named Elizabeth Smith.  As in R 
v Gilham, the death sentence had been passed upon the prisoner, but the execution was 
respited so that “the opinion of the Judges [could be taken] upon the admissibility of 
certain confessional evidence, which counsel for the prosecution thought it necessary to 
adduce”.
111 
 
None of the persons who received confessional evidence from the boy held any clerical 
status whatever, though the record repeats the fact that they were not constables either.  
In particular, one William Clark had questioned the boy, having required first that he 
should kneel down and tell the truth in the presence of the Almighty.
112  After this 
admonition, the boy had responded that “he pushed one [girl] in with one foot, and the 
other with the other, but not purposely”
113 – though his formal pre-cautioned statement 
had said that both girls had fallen into the pit when he had stumbled against Martha who 
was being held by the waist by Bessy.
114  Though the banc of judges found the evidence 
given by William Clark “strictly admissible, they much disapproved of the mode in which 
                                                 
109 R v Gilham also counts as an irregular confession case since various commentaries assert that it is a 
religious confession privilege case even though the confessions involved were not asserted to be regular 
religious confessions by any measure. 
 
110 R v Wild (1835) 1 Moody 452; 168 ER 1341. 
 
111 Idem. 
 
112 R v Wild (1835) 1 Moody 452, 453-454; 168 ER 1341. 
 
113 R v Wild (1835) 1 Moody 452, 454; 168 ER 1342. 
 
114 R v Wild (1835) 1 Moody 452, 454-455; 168 ER 1342. 
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it was obtained”,
115 but they commuted the death sentence and the boy was transported 
for life.
116  It is doubtful that there was anything irregular about this confession, though it 
was not even asserted that it was privileged as a religious confession and the case was 
referred to higher authority as R vGilham had been, simply because there was doubt 
whether the confession had been properly obtained.  While one can feel some 
compassion for a thirteen-year-old boy who was first sentenced to death and then 
‘mercifully’ transported instead because he had accidentally pushed a girl who could not 
swim into the water, it is doubtful that the case should have been cited in connection with 
any form of evidentiary privilege. 
 
In re Keller
117 and Normanshaw v Normanshaw
118 are included here as cases about 
irregular confession because though cited in connection with religious confession 
privilege, they are really cases about whether religious confession privilege should 
extend to protect confidential communications with clergy, since the member of the 
clergy in both cases asserted religious confidentiality as a reason why he should not be 
compelled to give evidence.  Normanshaw v Normanshaw in particular is also discussed 
in some detail in chapter five in connection with an arguable religious ‘communications’ 
privilege at common law because of several equivocal statements Jeune P is reported to 
have made about discretion.  But the case still demonstrates how even when there was 
                                                 
115 R v Wild (1835) 1 Moody 452, 455; 168 ER 1342. 
 
116 Idem. 
 
117 In re Keller (1887) L.R. Ir. 158. 
 
118 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468. 
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no religious confession at all, such cases were nonetheless cited in the commentaries as 
authority against the existence of religious confession privilege.
119 
 
The Reverend Mr Keller had been questioned in the Irish Court of Bankruptcy in 
connection with the bankruptcy of one Patrick O’Brien, and declined to answer a 
question about his whereabouts “on the 16
th of November last?
120  When he was asked 
the reason why he declined to answer that question, he explained that he could not 
answer it because doing so “would tend to compel me to disclose secrets that I cannot in 
honour disclose, or in duty to my sacred profession”.
121  When pressed, the Reverend Mr 
Keller carefully explained further that an answer to the question “would tend to elicit 
disclosure of a conversation ... with the bankrupt, or other persons – disclosures of which 
I may have become cognizant simply and solely because of my being a priest”.
122 When 
Judge Boyd suggested that he did not believe this question concerned his clerical duties, 
the Reverend Mr Keller answered:  
 
Your Lordship, of course, is the proper interpreter of the law in this Court; but I 
beg respectfully to say that your Lordship cannot be expected to understand the 
nature of the obligations of a Catholic priest, or the laws of Catholic discipline, or 
the laws or usages of Catholic discipline that would bind him to consider as a 
sacred trust the confidence reposed in him by his parishioners, or by his Catholic 
                                                 
119 For example, Phipson in his 5
th edition (Law of Evidence, 5
th ed, London, Stevens and Haynes, 1911, Vol 
2, p 188) and the editors of the 13
th edition of his work in 1982 (Buzzard JH, May R and Howard MN, 
Phipson on Evidence, 13
th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1982, para 15-09) so treat the decision in 
Normanshaw v Normanshaw.  
120 In re Keller (1887) L.R. Ir. 158, 159. 
 
121 In re Keller (1887) L.R. Ir. 158, 160. 
 
122 Idem. 
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people.  I beg to repeat that my knowledge of my duty and my conscience must 
be my own guide in reference to any answers I make in that respect.
123 
 
In the absence of any argument evident from the record about the existence of either 
religious confession privilege or religious communications privilege, Judge Boyd 
exercised “power to commit for contempt witnesses refusing to answer a legal 
question”.
124 
 
The matter came before the Irish Court of Queen’s Bench as an application made on 
behalf of the priest for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the Governor of the prison
125 
where he had been held for six weeks since Judge Boyd’s committal order.
126  It further 
came before the Court of Appeal eight days later as an appeal from an order in Queen’s 
Bench that had refused the application for habeas corpus.  The reported legal argument 
focused upon questions not relevant to religious confession privilege
 127 and ultimately 
the Queen’s Bench order denying the application for habeas corpus was reversed 4:1 
and Father Keller was released from prison. 
 
                                                 
123 Idem. 
 
124 Idem. 
 
125 In re Keller (1887) L.R. Ir. 158, 162. 
 
126 The original examination of the Reverend Mr Keller in the Court of Bankruptcy was heard on 19 March 
1887, on which date he was committed for contempt.  The application made for habeas corpus on his behalf 
was heard in the Irish Court of Queen’s Bench on 4 and 5 May 1887, and the appeal on 13, 19, 20 and 21 
May 1887. 
 
127 The legal issues upon which the Court of Appeal focused were: firstly, whether the matter was a criminal 
matter, in which event the Court of Appeal could not hear the appeal at all under the provisions of the Irish 
Judicature Act, and second, whether the Irish Court of Bankruptcy was an Inferior or Superior Court.  If 
Inferior, it was argued that it had no power to commit for contempt in the first place; if Superior, then it had 
power to commit and the Court of Appeal allegedly had power only to examine the committal warrant itself 
for regularity.  
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The various decisions in In re Keller do not really advance our understanding of the law 
with regard to religious confession privilege.  Perhaps Nokes’ suggestion that it 
demonstrates judicial reluctance to punish the moral convictions of a priest
128 is the most 
that can be said of the decision.  That view certainly resonates with McNicol’s 
observation that the state is wise to try and avoid conflict at the church/state 
intersection.
129 
 
In Normanshaw v Normanshaw, the Reverend Wm. Richardson Linton, vicar of Shirley, 
at first objected to deposing to details of a conversation he had had with the respondent 
wife in a divorce petition on grounds of adultery.  Though Jeune P said that each case of 
confidential communications was to be treated on its own merits, he saw no reason in 
this case why the witness should not speak about the relevant conversation.  When the 
clergyman did disclose the details of the conversation that had taken place, it was clear 
there had been no confession but rather they had discussed whether the respondent 
should go to the penitentiary or not.  Whether disclosure of that conversation was 
decisive in the jury’s finding that the adultery was proven is not stated.  Once again, the 
failure in the commentary to analyse the facts and decision has seen the report of this 
case generalised as an authority against the existence of religious confession 
privilege.
130  That is clearly not correct. 
 
While R v Hay
131 is not a case about irregular confession, it is appropriately discussed 
here because it appears to demonstrate more judicial reluctance to confront the privilege 
                                                 
128 Nokes, GD, “Professional Privilege” (1950) 66 LQR 88, 97. 
 
129 McNicol, SB, Law of Privilege, Australia, The Law Book Company Limited, 1992, pp 330, 337. 
 
130 See note 119 supra. 
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head on despite the apparent availability of relevant and probative evidence.  It has been 
cited by commentators both as authority for
132 and authority against
133 the existence of a 
religious confession privilege.  
 
Hay was accused of robbing a prosecutor, Daniel Kennedy, of a silver watch.  The watch 
had been recovered from the Reverend John Kelly, a Catholic priest
134 who was called to 
give evidence as to the identity of the person from whom he had received it.  Father 
Kelly at first declined to make the court oath, but reconsidered and took the oath after 
Justice Hill explained that it was his duty “as a loyal subject”
135 to do so, especially since 
he had the right to object and have his objection sustained, if his answer might 
incriminate himself. 
 
It appears that Father Kelly might have objected to answer questions related to the 
circumstances of the confession on the grounds that his answers might incriminate him 
under canon law.  But it is not clear whether Hill J was suggesting he make such an 
objection, or indeed telling him that a self incrimination objection was not available 
because the risk of becoming subject to canon law penalties was not recognised as a 
species of incrimination in English secular courts.  It is more likely that Hill J’s reference 
to the possibility of self-incrimination, was a reference to the possibility that Father Kelly 
may himself have committed a crime in stealing the watch or in receiving stolen property. 
                                                 
132 McWilliams, PK, Canadian Criminal Evidence, 2
nd ed, Aurora Ontario, Canada Law Book Limited, 1984, 
p 923. 
 
133 For example, Hageman, JF, Privileged Communications, Princeton New Jersey, Honeyman & Co, 1889, 
p 127.  It seems that R v Hay may be one of the two cases that Wigmore considered was decisive against 
the existence of religious confession privilege (Wigmore, JH, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, revised by 
John T McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1961, Vol 8, pp 867-870). 
 
134 Though it is unusual to refer to a Catholic priest with the title “Reverend”, that is done several times in this 
report. 
 
135 R v Hay (1860) 2 F & F 4, 6; 175 ER 933, 934. 
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In any event, when the prosecutor asked the central question – “from whom did you 
receive the watch?”
136 – Father Kelly answered, “I received it in connexion with the 
confessional”.
137  It is at this point that the different interpretations of the meaning of the 
case as a precedent in the commentaries is identified.  Hill J intervened: 
 
You are not asked at present to disclose anything stated to you in the 
confessional; you are asked a simple fact – from whom did you receive that 
watch which you gave to the policeman?
138 
 
When Father Kelly explained that he could not answer that question without suspension 
for life under the laws of the Church as well as offending what he regarded as “the 
natural laws”,
139 Hill J repeated his explanation that Father Kelly was only required to 
depose to facts and that no confessional material was required from him.
140  When 
Father Kelly repeated his refusal to answer, he was adjudged guilty of contempt and 
taken into custody, and other witnesses were called,
141 though the report does not reveal 
Hay’s fate. 
 
Though some commentators maintain that R v Hay is a precedent that denies the 
existence of a religious confession privilege since the clear result of Hill J’s adjudication 
                                                 
136 Idem. 
 
137 Idem. 
 
138 R v Hay (1860) 2 F & F 4, 6-7; 175 ER 933, 934-935. 
 
139 R v Hay (1860) 2 F & F 4, 7; 175 ER 933, 935. 
 
140 R v Hay (1860) 2 F & F 4, 9; 175 ER 933, 936. 
 
141 R v Hay (1860) 2 F & F 4, 10; 175 ER 933, 936. 
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was to deny Father Kelly’s understanding of his own canon law obligations,
142 it is also 
true to state the contrary,
143 since the Judge was at pains to point out that the question 
required no breach of the confessional seal. 
 
What does the decision in R v Hay say about religious confession privilege?  Finlason, 
who reported it, clearly did not feel that Hill J had properly or adequately dealt with the 
common law of religious confession privilege – indeed, his footnotes pointing to the 
“correct” result amount to an essay longer than the report itself, setting out the pre-
existing canon and common law upon which the case might have been decided.
144  
Hageman appears to have thought Hill J’s practical decision in R v Hay decisive of the 
point in “both England ... and the United States ... that priests are not privileged”.
145  
However, Phipson
146 and Nokes
147 did not consider that the recorded facts underlying 
the decision really raised the privilege and so left the general question untouched.  It is 
submitted that those views are fairer than an assertion that the case represents a clear 
decision against the privilege, as seems the intent of Wigmore’s commentary.
148 
 
                                                 
142 See note 133. 
 
143 See note 132. 
 
144 See R v Hay (1860) 2 F & F 4, 7; 175 ER 933.  Note too that the editor of “The Jurist” in 1860 agreed with 
Finlason (“The Jurist” (1860) Part 2, 319). 
 
145 Hageman, JF, Privileged Communications, Princeton New Jersey, Honeyman & Co, 1889, p 127. 
 
146 Editing the 11
th edition of Best’s Law of Evidence, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911, p 562. 
 
147 Nokes, GD, “Professional Privilege” (1950) 66 LQR 88, 97. 
 
148 Wigmore, JH, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown 
and Company, 1961, Vol 8, pp 867-870 – though the text does not spell out which of the authorities listed 
(including R v Hay) are his “at least two decisive rulings ... which deny ... the existence of a [religious 
confession] privilege”. 
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Lord Chief Justice Coleridge’s anecdotal observation that Hill J, the judge in R v Hay, 
was a strong Ulster Protestant,
149 is not helpful either.  Though a more sympathetic 
judge such as Lord Kenyon CJ in Du Barré v Livette,
150 Best CJ in Broad v Pitt
151 or 
Baron Alderson in R v Griffin
152 might have prevented the prosecutor from pressing a 
reluctant clergyman for an answer to this question, it is reasonable to observe that Hill J 
felt he was left with little choice but to hold Father Kelly in contempt.  The report does not 
suggest any authority in favour of religious confession privilege was argued nor was any 
self-incrimination objection made, yet Father Kelly steadfastly refused to depose to facts 
which did not themselves disclose any spoken confessional secret.  However, Hill J’s 
use of a legal interpretation of what constituted a religious confession to rebut Father 
Kelly’s insistence that he could not depose the required fact without breaching canonical 
laws, echoes Coke’s theological debate with Father Henry Garnet about the definition of 
a religious confession in 1606.  That same debate recurred at first instance in In re Keller 
twenty-seven years after Hill J decided R v Hay and appears as one conceptual reason 
why the New South Wales religious confession privilege statute in 1989, sought to take 
the definition of what constitutes a religious confession away from the judiciary.  A cynic 
might take the view that the interpretive possibilities thus available to a judge, enable 
whatever decision the judge wants to take.  For a narrow interpretation of even the 
broadest statute, particularly where a definition of religious confession is provided, will 
enable a judge to admit almost any otherwise relevant evidence.  But if a judge wishes to 
respect even a very informal ecclesiastical confidentiality practice in a jurisdiction without 
                                                 
149 1890 correspondence of Lord Chief Justice Coleridge with Mr Gladstone “(later Prime Minister of 
England)” concerning the case of Constance Kent (Coleridge, EH, Life and Correspondence of John Duke 
Lord Coleridge Lord Chief Justice of England, London, William Heinemann, 1904, Vol 2, p 365).  The views 
of Lord Chief Justice Coleridge concerning religious confession privilege are considered infra, pp 175-177. 
 
150 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96. 
 
151 Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528. 
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a religious confession privilege statute, there is a line of authority that allows the 
exclusion of religious communications that are merely confidential.
153 
 
Were there any clear cases? 
There were four cases between the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries that are 
said to have involved religious confessions, but they do not send a clear signal.  The 
reasons for that uncertainty vest in the fact that one was English, one was Irish, and two 
were American, and to the extent that they do represent authority where religious 
confession privilege is concerned, they were evenly split in deciding for and against it. 
But there are other even more specific reasons why they are not compelling either way. 
 
Butler v Moore
154 was the earliest in 1801.  It was the Irish case which WM Best 
suggested was best set to one side because it was possibly tainted by anti-Catholic 
prejudice.  A Catholic priest had been called to give evidence on whether Lord 
Dunboyne had returned to the Catholic faith before his death in which event his will 
would have been invalid.  Sir Michael Smith, the Master of the Irish Rolls overruled the 
priest’s demurrer and held him in contempt of court when he would not answer related 
questions.
155  Although the law report does not detail this process, various authorities 
confirm that interrogatories were administered by the late Lord’s sister to a priest said to 
                                                 
153 That line of authority is the subject of chapter five’s treatment of a religious communications privilege at 
common law. 
 
154 Butler v Moore (1804-1806) 2 Sch & Lef 249 
 
155 This interpretation of the case is from MacNally (The Rules of Evidence, London, J Butterworth; Dublin, 
J Cooke, 1802, pp 253-255).  The Schoales and Lefroy report of the case (Butler v Moore (1804-1806) 2 
Sch & Lef 249, 254-255) does not report the interchange between the priest and Master of Irish Rolls, 
recording only that the Lord Chancellor considered that even though a certificate had been produced  from 
the Vicar-General of the diocese of Killaloe of the Church of Ireland confirming that James Butler had 
renounced “the errors and corruptions of the Church of Rome” that nonetheless “evidence might be given 
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have attended him shortly before his death.
156  When the priest refused to answer “on 
the ground that his knowledge (if any) arose from a confidential communication made to 
him in the exercise of his clerical functions ... he was adjudged guilty of contempt of 
court and was imprisoned”.
157  Since the case did not concern a religious confession but 
possibly a confidential religious communication, it does not represent authority against 
religious confession privilege at common law, though it has been so represented.
158  
 
The two American cases followed.  Though United States constitutional law was a large 
factor in both decisions, they both purported to apply existing English common law.  In 
the first, The People v Phillips,
159 Mayor Clinton was thorough in his analysis, but 
scathing in his criticism.  He dismissed the Butler v Moore decision on account of its 
manifest anti-Catholic bias, and said Justice Buller’s hurried, unresearched, and just 
plain wrong decision in R v Sparkes had, in any event, been “virtually overturned by Lord 
Kenyon, who certainly censure[d] it with as much explicitness as one Judge can impeach 
the decision of his colleague, without departing from judicial decorum”.
160  Not 
surprisingly, Mayor Clinton confirmed that Phillips’ Catholic confession could not be 
compelled from his priest, primarily on the ground that such compulsion would deny his 
freedom of religious practice which was protected under the federal United States First 
Amendment.  But in The People v Smith
161 decided four years later, a confession to a 
                                                 
156 For example, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butler_v._Moore (last visited 22 July 2006). 
 
157 Idem. 
 
158 For example in MacNally, L, The Rules of Evidence, London, J Butterworth; Dublin, J Cooke, 1802, pp 
253-255.  
 
159 The People v Phillips, as reported in “Privileged Communications to Clergymen”, The Catholic Lawyer 1 
(1955) 198. 
 
160 Ibid, p 204. 
 
161 The People v Smith , (2 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 77 (Richmond County Court 1817) as reported in 
“Privileged Communications to Clergymen”, The Catholic Lawyer 1 (1955) 198, 209. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FOUR   169
Protestant clergyman was held compellable.  Commentary affirms the latter result was a 
contributing factor in the advent of New York’s religious confession privilege statute 
eleven years later in 1828.
162  While Mayor Clinton’s interpretation of then applicable 
English common law is interesting, it has not been cited in any relevant English case 
ever since. 
 
Which brings us to R v Griffin
163 decided by Baron Alderson
164 in 1853.  Baron Alderson 
had an interest in the history of religious confession privilege.  That was manifest in 
obiter dicta remarks he made in Attorney-General v Briant
165 about Crown informant 
privilege in 1846 where he dismissed R v Gilham as wrongly decided after counsel had 
cited it for comparative purposes.  Though he did not say so in R v Griffin, his comment 
in Attorney-General v Briant makes it clear he was aware of the 1315 Statute Articuli 
Cleri and probably also of Coke’s commentary upon it in his Second Part of the 
Institutes.  
 
In R v Griffin, a workhouse chaplain “was called to prove certain conversations he had 
had with [the prisoner] with reference to the [alleged injuries she had inflicted on her 
infant child]”.
166  Baron Alderson’s full judgement reads:  
 
                                                 
162 Reese, S, “Confidential Communications to Clergy” (1963) 24 Ohio St LJ 55, 57. 
 
163 R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219. 
 
164 Baron Alderson is most famous for his judgement in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341 about 
damages in contract law. 
 
165 Attorney-General v Briant (1846) 15 LJ Exch 265; (1846) 15 M & W 169; 153 ER 808.  Baron Alderson’s 
question and comment to counsel about religious confession privilege in arguendo, is only reported in the LJ 
Exch report (Attorney-General v Briant (1846) 15 LJ Exch 265, 271). 
 
166 R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219. 
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I think these conversations ought not to be given in evidence.  The principle upon 
which an attorney is prevented from divulging what passes with his client is 
because without an unfettered means of communication the client would not 
have proper legal assistance.  The same principle applies to a person deprived of 
whose advice the prisoner would not have proper spiritual assistance.  I do not 
lay this down as an absolute rule; but I think such evidence ought not to be 
given.
167 
 
Though Baron Alderson’s statement was made in a case about a religious confession, 
and though he effectively refused to compel the evidence, he framed the relevant 
principle so as to broaden the protection provided beyond a narrow religious confession, 
to encompass any confidential religious communication.  But then he qualified the 
principle by stating bluntly that he was not to be taken as laying down an “absolute rule” 
– but that certainly in the case before him, it was not appropriate that the evidence be 
given.  Further consideration of the principle in R v Griffin is thus left to chapter five, 
where the nature and scope of a discretionary religious communications privilege is 
discussed.  While it seems likely that a religious confession would meet Baron 
Alderson’s test for non-compellable confidential religious communications, since a 
religious confession seeks spiritual response and assistance, the principle is 
insufficiently developed to provide much comfort for the clergy in practice.  
 
                                                 
167 Idem. 
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All that remains to conclude this chapter about the common law treatment of religious 
confession privilege between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, is to discuss the 
various extra-judicial comments that followed the case of R v Constance Kent
168 in 1865. 
 
Extra-judicial commentary on R v Constance Kent 
The case itself has little precedential consequence since Constance Kent eventually 
pleaded guilty to a charge of murder committed five years previously, though not before 
criminal trial processes had commenced.
169  However, her Anglican clergyman’s 
assertion “that he must withhold any further information [other than was necessarily 
involved in his helping her ‘give herself up to justice’] on the ground that it had been 
received under the seal of ‘sacramental confession’”
170 excited considerable interest 
outside the court.
171  
 
                                                 
168 Unreported, but discussed in the House of Lords (Hansard for the English House of Lords, 13 May 1865). 
The case is also discussed in Nolan, RS, “The Law of the Seal of Confession”, Catholic Encyclopedia 13 
(1913) 649, 658; Phipson, SL, Of the Law of Evidence by the late WM Best, 11
th ed, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1911, pp 565-566; “Sacerdotal Privilege in English Law” (1956) 221 LTR 268; Tiemann, WH, and 
Bush, JC, The Right to Silence – Privileged Clergy Communication and the Law, 2
nd ed, Nashville, Abingdon 
Press, 1983, pp 117-119; Bursell, RDH, “The Seal of the Confessional” (1990) Ecclesiastical LJ 1(7) (1990) 
84, 93; and Attlay’s Famous Trials of the Nineteenth Century, 1899, p 113 (cited in “Sacerdotal Privilege in 
English Law” (1956) 221 LTR 268).  
169 Nolan, RS, “The Law of the Seal of Confession”, Catholic Encyclopedia 13 (1913) 649, 658. 
 
170 Idem. 
 
171 There is some debate as to exactly what set off the public debate.  For though Nolan says that the debate 
arose because the clergyman asserted religious confession privilege, Phipson (Of the Law of Evidence by 
the late WM Best, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911) says the debate arose because the magistrates in the 
case had declined to press the clergyman “who had voluntarily tendered himself as a witness on an 
application to commit the prisoner for murder”
 (op cit, p 565).  Since Coleridge LCJ’s (infra, 
pp 163-164) who acted as barrister for Constance Kent before he was appointed to the bench, expected a 
religious privilege contest before Willes J before the defendant decided to plead guilty, Nolan’s view appears 
to be correct. 
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Nolan reports that questions were asked in both Houses of Parliament about the 
privilege,
172 though the public indignation seems to have been largely focused on the 
enduring ecclesiastical issue
173 of whether “sacramental confession” was known in the 
Church of England.
174  In the House of Lords, Lord Westbury (the Lord Chancellor), Lord 
Chelmsford (a previous Lord Chancellor), and Lord Westmeath (who had raised the 
question), all opined strongly against the privilege.  Lord Chelmsford stated: 
 
there can be no doubt that in a suit or criminal proceeding a clergyman of the 
Church of England is not privileged so as to decline to answer a question which 
is put to him for the purposes of justice, on the ground that his answer would 
reveal something that he had known in confession.  He is compelled to answer 
such a question, and the law of England does not extend the privilege of refusing 
to answer to Roman Catholic clergymen in dealing with a person of their own 
persuasion.
175 
 
Lord Chelmsford concurred in this view, and Lord Westmeath reported two recent 
cases
176 which he considered demonstrated that there was no religious confession 
                                                 
172 Nolan, op cit, p 658. 
 
173 The ecclesiastical distinction here is between the mere obligation of secrecy undoubtedly imposed by the 
113
th canon of the Church of England and the Roman Catholic doctrinal position which insists that the 
sacrament of penance or confession is one of the seven inviolable sacraments of the true Christian religion. 
The underlying canon law debate was discussed supra in chapter three, pp 113-115, 118-120. 
 
174 Nolan, op cit, p 658. 
 
175 As quoted in Nolan, RS, “The Law of the Seal of Confession”, Catholic Encyclopedia 13 (1913) 649, 658. 
 
176 The first was in Scotland, which had seen a Catholic priest imprisoned for contempt when he refused to 
give evidence and was forced to serve his sentence without remission when “the Home Secretary, Sir 
George Grey [had denied a request for remission made on his behalf and advised that such a remission] ... 
would be giving a sanction to the assumption of a privilege by ministers of every denomination which he was 
advised they could not claim” (Nolan, op cit, p 658).  The Scottish case is not cited and the writer has been 
unable to trace any other reference to it.  The second case, R v Hay, discussed supra (pp 162-166) had 
seen Father Kelly imprisoned for contempt when he refused to answer a factual question which did not touch 
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privilege.  However, the public debate escalated when the “Bishop of Exeter”
177 strongly 
protested “Lord Westbury’s statement in the House of Lords”
178 in a letter which  
 
argued that the canon law on the subject had been accepted without gainsaying 
or opposition from any temporal court, [and] that it had been confirmed by the 
Book of Common Prayer in the service for the visitation of the sick, and thus 
sanctioned by the Act of Uniformity.
179 
 
Lord Westbury had evidently incurred the Bishop’s ire with his suggestion that the 
obligation of confidentiality imposed upon a clergyman by the 113
th canon of 1603 did 
not apply in the face of a legal compulsion – and in any event that “at the time [1865] ... 
the public was not in a temper to bear [what he regarded as] an ... alteration of the rule 
compelling the disclosure of such evidence.
180  Phipson
181 rebuts Lord Westbury’s view 
from Edward Badeley’s “very learned pamphlet ... in favour of the seal of the 
confessional”
182 which “quickly followed”
183 the debate in the House of Lords: 
 
[so] far as members of the Church of England are concerned [the inviolable 
secrecy of their confessions is not] ... weakened by the undoubted fact that the 
general practice and ministerial solicitation of auricular confession is 
_________________________ 
 
 
177 Nolan, op cit, p 658. 
 
178 Idem. 
 
179 Idem. 
 
180 Idem. 
 
181 Phipson, SL, Of the Law of Evidence by the late WM Best, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911. 
 
182 Ibid, p 566. 
 
183 Idem. 
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discountenanced by the Church of England however much that Church may 
encourage it in particular cases”.
184 
 
Badeley had also stated: 
 
It is beyond all question that neither the proceedings of the 16
th nor those of the 
17
th century (including therefore the whole period of the Reformation) made any 
change whatever in the sacred and inviolable character of this religious Rite.  
They certainly did not render unlawful the general use of private penitential 
confession, and it is perfectly clear that both by parliament and Convocation the 
continuation of it in certain cases was directly encouraged.
185 
 
Badeley continued that it would take “better arguments ... to show that the privilege of 
secrecy ... attached [to the Anglican canon law of confession] ... was lost at the 
Reformation”.
186  While Badeley said that the “right of Catholics at the present day to 
have their professions respected in courts of justice rests upon a different ground”,
187 it 
clearly originated in both common and ecclesiastical law.  The alleged loss of privileged 
Catholic confession “because the religion itself was proscribed”,
188 has “happily”
189 been 
corrected:   
 
                                                 
184 Ibid, pp 566, 567 
 
185 Badeley, E, The Privilege of Religious Confessions in English Courts of Justice considered in a letter to a 
Friend, London, Butterworths, 1865, p 32, as quoted by Phipson, op cit, p 565. 
 
186 Badeley, op cit, p 32. 
 
187 Idem. 
 
188 Idem. 
 
189 Idem. 
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the religion is restored, not indeed as the religion of the State, but as one 
sanctioned and protected by law.  The Catholic therefore is reinstated in his right 
to the perfect enjoyment of all the ordinances of his creed, and of those privileges 
which are necessary to the performance of every one of his religious duties.  If he 
is not, he has not that benefit which the legislature intended to give him.
190 
 
Forty-six years later, Phipson’s concludes that the seal of confession is inviolable at law 
both because the penitent enjoys a privilege, and because the clerical witness would be 
exposed to ecclesiastical penalties if he breached the seal.
191  He continued: 
 
It is submitted that either of these is sufficient in any court, and constitutes in a 
petty sessional court a ‘just excuse’ for refusal of the witness to answer, within 
the meaning of sect. 16 of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, and sect. 7 of the 
Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848 ... The 113
th canon of 1603 ... appears to suffice 
in the case of the Anglican clergy, and the pre-Reformation canons to a similar 
effect in the case of the Roman Catholic clergy.
192 
 
Tiemann and Bush
193 add light to the commentary with their citation of a letter about 
religious confession privilege in 1890 from Coleridge LCJ (who had defended Constance 
                                                 
190 Idem. Badeley’s reference to the legislative restoration of the Catholic religion to a position of sanction 
and protection is an implicit reference to that then well-known and contemporary series of enactments which 
relaxed the law against non-conformist religion generally, and Roman Catholicism in particular, specifically 
The Roman Catholic Relief Acts of 1791 (31 Geo. 3, c 32) and 1829 (10 Geo. 4, c 7). 
 
191 Phipson, SLC, Of the Law of Evidence by the late WM Best, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911, p 567. 
 
192 Idem. 
 
193 Tiemann, WH, and Bush, JC, The Right to Silence – Privileged Clergy Communication and the Law, 
2
nd ed, Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1983. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FOUR   176
Kent when he practised as a barrister) to Gladstone, later Prime Minister of England.
194 
Stating first of all that he regarded the judge in the case, Sir James Willes, as the 
“greatest and largest lawyer [he] ever knew”,
195 ahead of Jessel,
196 Cairns,
197 and 
Campbell,
198 Coleridge LCJ said Willes J had decided to uphold any objection Coleridge 
should make to Karslake’s (the prosecutor) efforts to lead the Reverend Wagner’s 
confessional evidence – but did not need to, both because of the guilty plea, and 
because the prosecutor was too much the gentleman barrister to raise the suggestion 
that such evidence might be led.
199  Coleridge LCJ further wrote that Willes J had 
reported to him personally that he had weighed all the judicial authorities on the subject 
and “had satisfied himself that there was a legal privilege in a priest to withhold what 
passed in confession”.
200  Coleridge LCJ’s personal conclusion that “while Barristers and 
Judges are gentlemen the question can never arise”
201 do add his authority to effect that 
                                                 
194 Tiemann and Bush, op cit, pp 118-119.  The original work from which Tiemann and Bush quote is  
Coleridge, EH, Life and Correspondence of John Duke Lord Coleridge Lord Chief Justice of England, 
London, William Heinemann, 1904, Vol 2, p 365. 
 
195 Idem.  Note that Coleridge LCJ did not stand alone in this assessment of Sir James Willes.  Sir Owen 
Dixon, Chief Justice of Australia shared his view as is confirmed by his biographer, Philip Ayres (Owen 
Dixon, Melbourne, The Miegunyah Press, 2003, pp 109, 232). 
 
196 The highest judicial office held by Sir George Jessel was Master of the Rolls in the English Court of 
Appeal, where he served from 1873 till his death in 1883 (Simpson, AWB (ed), Biographical Dictionary of the 
Common Law, London, Butterworths, 1984, p 281). 
 
197 Lord Cairns served twice as Chancellor, the first time for ten months in 1868, and the second time for six 
years commencing in 1874.  He also served as a member of the Court of Appeal in Chancery for a brief 
period in 1867 (Simpson, AWB (ed), Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law, London, Butterworths, 
1984, p 98). 
 
198 Lord Campbell served as Lord Chief Justice from 1850 to 1859 and then as Lord Chancellor from 1859 till 
his death at the age of 81 in 1861 (Simpson, AWB (ed), Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law, 
London, Butterworths, 1984, p 101). 
 
199 Tiemann and Bush, op cit, p 118 
 
200 Idem. 
 
201 Ibid, p 119. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FOUR   177
there should be a privilege, though he was not certain if “English Judges would have 
upheld ‘Willes’ law’”.
202 
 
Do these extra-judicial comments prompted by the public debate surrounding R v 
Constance Kent clarify the law where religious confession privilege is concerned? 
Probably not, since there is no record that the learned Lords involved ever responded to 
the reasoned legal and ecclesiastical arguments which their strong initial statements 
drew from the public. Their certainty is also balanced by the equally non-precedential 
view expressed by Coleridge LCJ with his second hand additions from Willes J, who was 
reputedly prepared and ready to hear the legal argument.  The concurring opinions of 
Finlason (in 1860
203), Badeley (in 1865) and Phipson (in 1911) that no statute has ever 
removed the privilege, also remain uncontested. 
 
Conclusion to chapter four 
The reported cases that have mentioned religious confession privilege since Garnet’s 
case
204 in 1606, have not added to our understanding of that privilege at all.  Save 
perhaps for Baron Alderson’s analogy with legal professional privilege which justified his 
exercise of discretion in preventing compulsion of the workhouse chaplain’s evidence in 
R v Griffin,
205 there has been nothing other than unsubstantiated denials that there is or 
ever was any such privilege.  Even Butler v Moore,
206 an Irish case in 1801, which is said 
                                                 
202 Idem. 
 
203 R v Hay (1860) 2 Foster & Finlason 4; 175 ER 933.  Finlason’s footnote to the report providing his opinion 
on the continuing viability of the sacramental seal even in the Anglican church, is longer than the report of 
the case. 
 
204 Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217. 
 
205 R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219. 
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to have decided against the existence of religious confession privilege, but which did not 
overtly treat a religious confession, has been discredited on grounds of the religious 
prejudice that is apparent in its premise that a Catholic will was not valid.  Since there is 
no suggestion of statutory abolition either, then the inevitable conclusion of this chapter 
must be that religious confession privilege survived at least till the twentieth century 
began. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FIVE   179
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
RELIGIOUS COMMUNICATIONS 
PRIVILEGE AT COMMON LAW 
 
 
Introduction 
Building upon the proposition that the historical, canonical and common law materials 
confirm that religious confession privilege has never been extinguished, in this chapter I 
set out the case for the additional proposition that the common law also recognises a 
broader privilege for confidential religious communications to be applied by judges on a 
discretionary basis.  That broader discretionary privilege may be seen as a line of judicial 
recognition that there is a social interest in protecting such communications even though 
the issue rarely arises in a courtroom – and even though many text books deny the 
existence of even a narrower religious confession privilege.  Though many jurisdictions 
have turned to statutory codification
1 to provide the legal certainty required by modern 
                                                 
1 For example, all fifty United States feature some kind of religious confession privilege statute (Alabama 
Code # 12-21-166 (1975); Alaska R. Evid. 505; Arizona Rev. Stat. Ann. #13-4062; Arkansas R.  Evid. 505; 
California Evid. Code ## 1030-1034; Colorado Rev. Stat. # 13-90-107(c); Conneticut Gen. Stat.Ann. # 52-
146(b); Delaware R. Evid. 505; Florida Stat. Ann. # 90.050; Georgia Code Ann. # 38-419.1; Hawaii Rul. 
Evid. 506; Idaho Code # 9-203(3) (1990); Illinois Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-803; Indiana Code Ann. #34-1-14-5; 
Iowa Code # 622.10 (1997); Kansas Stat. Ann. # 60-429 (1994); Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. # 421.210(4); 
Louisiana Code Evid. Ann art 511; Maine R.Evid. 505; Maryland Code Ann., Cts.& Jud.Proc. #9-111 (1995); 
Massachusetts Gen. Law Ann. ch. 233, #20A; Michigan Sta. Ann. #600.2156; Minnesota Stat. Ann. #595.02 
(1)(c); Missouri Code Ann. #13-1-22(Supp. 1986); Montana Code Ann. #26-1-804 (1994); Nebraska Rev. 
Stat. #27-506 (1989); Nevada Rev. Stat. # 49.255 (1995) New Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann. #516.35 (Supp. 
1995); New Jersey Stat. Ann. #2A:84A-23; New Mexico R. Evid. 11-506; New York C.P.L.R. 4505; North 
Carolina Gen. Stat. # 8-53.2 (1995); North Dakota R. Evid. 505; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. # 2317.02(C); 
Oklahoma Stat. Ann. tit. 12, #2505; Oregon Rev. Stat. # 40.260 (1995); 42 Pennsylvania Cons. Stat. Ann. 
#5943; Rhode Island Gen. Laws # 9-17-23 (1985); South Carolina Code Ann. # 19-11-90; South Dakota 
Codified Laws ## 19-13-16 to 18 (1995); Tennessee Code Ann. #24-1-206; Texas T. Crim. Evid. 505; Utah RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FIVE   180
clerical and legal practice,
2 it is suggested here that both a religious confession privilege 
and a confidential religious communications privilege may be identified in the existing 
common law materials.  
 
Elementary religious communications privilege in cases 
already discussed 
 
It has already been observed that Judges have used various tools to avoid a frontal 
debate about the existence of a religious confession privilege.
3  For example, even 
immediately after the English Reformation when the existence of religious confession 
privilege must have seemed less questionable, both Coke as prosecutor and two of the 
Commissioners who judicially presided over Garnet’s jury trial,
4 effectively sidelined 
_________________________ 
 
Code Ann. #78-24-8(3) (1987); Vermont Stat. Ann. tit.12, #1607 (1973); Virginia Code Ann. #8.01-400; 
Washington Rev. Code Ann. # 5.60.060(3); West Virginia Code # 57-3-9; Wisconsin Stat. Ann. #905.06; 
Wyoming Stat. Ann. # 1-12-101(a)(iii) (1988)) as do three of the six Australian states and the two continental 
territories (Victoria Evidence Act 1958 s. 28(1); Tasmanian Evidence Act 2001 s.127; New South Wales 
Evidence Act 1995 s. 127; Northern Territory Evidence Ordinances 1939 s. 12(1) and the Australian Capital 
Territory by virtue of the Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995 s. 127). The list of US religious confession 
privilege statutes is taken from Chad Horner’s article entitled “Beyond the Confines of the Confessional: The 
Priest-Penitent Privilege in a Diverse Society ((1997) 45 Drake LR 697, 703-704. Similar lists may be found 
in many American articles including those of Jane E Mayes (“Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant 
Privilege Statutes: Let Free Exercise Govern”, (1986) 62 Indiana LJ 397, 397-398) and Mary Harter Mitchell 
(“Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of 
Religion”, (1987) 71 Minnesota Law Review 723, 725). 
 
2 “[T]he tendency of the law must always be to narrow the field of uncertainty” (Holmes, OW, Jr, The 
Common Law, Howe M De W, editor, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1963, p 101.  
However, Holmes also notes “that the law is always approaching, and never reaching consistency” (op cit, 
p 32). 
 
3 Judicial avoidance of religious confession privilege was discussed briefly in chapter four, pp 160-163, in 
connection with In re Keller and R v Hay.  Professor Elliott has observed that such avoidance in fact 
represents the exercise of a discretion.  He wrote: 
 
A discretion, in the strict sense of the word, is involved where a judge, having found that a rule 
covers the case before him, nevertheless decides it is not to be followed in the case.  In a looser 
sense of the word, ‘discretion’ is also used where the judge is required to follow a rule if he finds 
that it applied (and is not able to disapply it), but where he is given considerable freedom in 
deciding whether it applies at all.  Whether it applies or not depends on the judge weighing various 
factors against each other and how much weight he gives each factor and how he makes his mind 
up is largely for him (Elliott, DW, “An Evidential Privilege for Priest-Penitent Communications” 
[1993-1995] 3 Ecclesiastical Law Journal, 272, 274). 
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Garnet’s religious confession privilege defence by defining the issue out of jury 
consideration.  Hill J’s finding of contempt against Father Kelly because he refused to 
disclose not confessional material but a peripheral “fact”,
5 may be seen as another 
example of a judge avoiding confrontation even though the reporter
6 sought to expose 
the sophistry he perceived in Hill J’s distinction.  Both of these cases are examples of a 
species of judicial discretion at practical work
7 – but in a manner that does not conduce 
to certainty in the law. 
 
Kenyon LCJ and Best CJ more directly manifest their belief in the existence of judicial 
discretion at this state/church flashpoint,
8 though they did not labour the point because 
the cases before them concerned legal professional privilege and did not require 
elaboration of an unrelated privilege or discretion.  For example, in Du Barré v Livette,
9 
Kenyon LCJ said simply that he would “pause”
10 before admitting the confessional 
evidence Buller J had allowed the previous year in R v Sparkes.
11  What Kenyon LCJ 
meant by “pause” is not spelled out, but while he did not confirm an absolute immunity 
for confessional material, he did indicate the need to exercise some discretion when 
weighing the public interests which compete when it is sought to adduce confidential 
religious material at trial.  Indeed, on his limited knowledge of the Sparkes facts as 
counsel had submitted them in Du Barré v Livette, it is difficult to escape the conclusion 
                                                 
5 R v Hay (1860) 2 Foster & Finlason 4, 7. 
 
6 WF Finlason, Barrister, Middle Temple. 
 
7 See note 3. 
 
8 McNicol refers to “friction between church and state” (Law of Privilege, Australia, The Law Book Co. Ltd. 
1992, pp 330, 337) picking up the 1987 language of the Australian Law Reform Commission ( A.L.R.C., 
Report No. 38 (1987), para. 212, p 120). 
 
9 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96. 
 
10 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108, 110; 170 ER 96, 97. 
 
11 R v Sparkes (1790), but referred to in Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96. 
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that Kenyon LCJ would have excluded that confessional evidence, even though the 
confession in that case was theologically irregular. 
 
Best CJ was apparently peremptory in his refusal to admit confessional evidence in R v 
Radford,
12 as were the magistrates in R v Constance Kent
13 and Ridley J in Ruthven v 
De Bour.
14  Best CJ would not even allow the clergyman to speak of the issue and when 
he understood in 1828 that his course in Radford had been disapproved en banc in 
Gilham,
15 he found a distinction to justify the exercise of the discretion he had exercised 
in Radford.
16  Thus in Broad v Pitt,
17 he confirmed the existence of a judicial discretion 
whether or not to allow the adduction of confessional evidence by reading Gilham as 
allowing a clergyman the right to waive his religious confession privilege – though neither 
his understanding of Gilham’s ratio, nor his distinction to restate the privilege, were 
necessary if he had read the Gilham report closely.  
 
The discretionary point is much less veiled in R v Griffin,
18 where Alderson B made it 
clear that he had a discretion and that he was exercising it to exclude the workhouse 
chaplain’s evidence in that case.  Though R v Griffin  may not represent a strong ratio 
                                                 
12 R v Radford (1823) unreported but referred to in R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186; 168 ER 1235. 
 
13 R v Constance Kent (1865) unreported, but referred to in various places, including Attlay’s Famous Trials 
of the Nineteenth Century, 1899, p 113; Nolan, RS, “The Law of the Seal of Confession”, Catholic 
Encyclopedia 13 (1913) 649, 658; Phipson, SL, Of the Law of Evidence by the late WM Best, 11
th ed, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911, pp 565-566; Tiemann, WH, and Bush, JC, The Right to Silence – 
Privileged Clergy Communication and the Law, 2
nd ed, Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1983, pp 117-119; 
Bursell, RDH, “The Seal of the Confessional” (1990) Ecclesiastical LJ 1(7) (1990) 84, 93 and in “Sacerdotal 
Privilege in English Law” (1956) 221 LTR 268. 
 
14 Ruthven v De Bour (1901) 45 Sol. J. 272. 
 
15 See discussion in chapter four, pp 148-150. 
 
16 Idem. 
 
17 Broad v Pitt (1829) 3 Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528. 
 
18 R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219. 
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decision confirming a defined and inviolable religious confession privilege, it is certainly a 
ratio decidendi affirmation of the existence of judicial discretion to exclude evidence of 
confidential clerical communications, since it is not clear that “these conversations”
19 
were confessional in character.  Further, there can be no other interpretation of Alderson 
B’s qualification – “I do not lay this down as a general rule”
20 – than that he was marking 
his decision as an exercise of judicial discretion that could be similarly exercised by other 
judges in future. 
 
However, there are other more recent cases which reaffirm Alderson B’s endorsement of 
such a discretion in cases involving confidential religious communications, though his 
authority is not cited in any of them, possibly because the judges in the later cases 
considered that the existence of such discretion was a self-evident principle.  For 
example, Cockburn CJ in R v Castro
21 two years before Sir George Jessel MR’s first 
statement against the privilege
22 stated “that if a priest refused to disclose the subject 
matter of a confession, he would not be compelled to speak.”
23  While the facts of the 
case do not amplify the meaning of the statement
24 – and this statement was not even 
included in the Queen’s Bench report – the language of judicial discretion is 
                                                 
19 Idem. 
 
20 Idem. 
 
21 R v Castro (1873) 9 QB 219, 350. 
 
22 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) LR 2 Ch D 644. 
 
23 As quoted by Wigmore from the Chief Justice report of the case, since the quotation was not reported at 
Queen’s Bench – R v Castro (1874) (Tichbourne case) 2 Charge of Chief Justice 648 (Wigmore, JH, 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law, revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown, 1961, Vol 8, 
p 870). 
 
24 The case concerned an allegedly fraudulent claim to a baronetcy and did not raise a question of religious 
confession privilege in any direct way. 
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unmistakable and recalls Best’s affirmation that “[he], for one [would] never compel a 
clergyman to disclose communications made to him by a prisoner.”
25  
 
In Normanshaw v Normanshaw 
26, the existence of judicial discretion was dealt with in 
more detail.  It will be remembered that this divorce case has been cited as authority 
against the existence of any religious confession privilege at common law.
27  The vicar of 
Shirley had been called to provide details of his conversation with the respondent wife 
following her husband’s divorce petition on the ground of adultery, “but [the clergyman] 
objected to speak on the subject”.
28  The jury found the adultery proven.
29  Both 
Heydon
30 and Bursell
31 doubt that the case represents authority against the common law 
existence of religious confession privilege because it was clear before Jeune P insisted 
on an answer, that no sacramental confession had been involved.  The clergyman 
nonetheless objected to giving evidence because “he had consulted friends on the 
subject, and they had all advised him not to divulge a private conversation with a 
parishioner”.
32  Despite this explanation from the clergyman, Jeune P said that he must 
                                                 
25 Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518, 519; 172 ER 528-529. 
 
26 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468 was discussed briefly supra in chapter four, pp 148, 151. 
 
27 For example, McNicol cites it as a scarce authority against a privilege “arising out of the priest-penitent 
relationship” at common law alongside Wheeler v LeMarchant (Law of Privilege, Australia, Butterworths, 
1992, p 324).  Similar statements are made by Robilliard (“Religion, Conscience and Law” (1981) 32 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 358,359) and by the editor of The Law Times (“Sacerdotal Privilege in 
English Law” 221 LT 268).  Stone and Wells also endorses this interpretation when they cite Normanshaw v 
Normanshaw as authority for the proposition that privilege does not extend to “sacramental confessions” 
(Evidence, Its History and Policies, Sydney, Butterworths, 1991, p 586). 
 
28 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468, 469. 
 
29 Idem. 
 
30 Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence, 6
th Australian Edition, Sydney, Butterworths, 2000, p 744 
. 
31 Bursell RDH, “The Seal of the Confessional” (1990) 7 Ecclesiastical LJ 84, 94. 
 
32 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468, 469. 
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answer the questions,
33 though there does not appear to have been any legal argument 
on the religious confession point.  The report provides only a summary of the judge’s 
comments, but is helpful nonetheless.  Following the clergyman’s objection, 
 
The President said that each case of confidential communication should be dealt 
with on its own merits, but, in the present instance, he saw no reason why the 
witness should not speak as to his conversation with the respondent.
34 
 
The report does not disclose whether a voir dire was conducted to assist Jeune P, in this 
determination,
35 though since the clergyman was apparently unrepresented, it may be 
that the possibility of such a procedure was not even raised.  The brief report thus leaves 
the impression that the witness was marginally hostile and the question of the 
admissibility of the clergyman’s evidence was discussed between judge and witness in 
open court.  When he summed up, 
 
The President ... observed that it was not to be supposed for a single moment 
that a clergyman had any right to withhold information from a court of law.  It was 
a principle of our jurisprudence that justice should prevail, and no unrecognised 
privilege could be allowed to stand in the way of it.
36 
 
                                                 
33 Idem. 
 
34 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468, 469. 
 
35 Sir FH Jeune was serving as president of the Probate, Administration and Divorce Court at the time of this 
trial. In the absence of a voir dire, it is difficult to imagine how any judge could know enough of the reasons 
for a minister’s decision to withhold a confidence, to exercise his alleged discretion requiring it adduced as 
evidence or not.  It is doubtful that such material would have been heard before the jury if there was a moot 
question hanging on the validity of its admissibility. 
 
36 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468, 469. 
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Though the report denies the existence of any evidential privilege connected with 
religious confidentiality,
37 Jeune P’s earlier observation that “each case of confidential 
communications should be dealt with on its own merits” suggests that he still believed a 
discretion to exclude the clergyman’s evidence was available to him.  But it is not 
accurate to extract more from Jeune P’s comments than to point up the fact that he 
believed he had a discretion to exclude confidences as evidence in some undefined 
circumstances.  For when the Reverend Linton did disclose what had passed between 
him and the respondent, it seemed that there had not been a confession at all.  Rather, 
“there was a proposition that the respondent should go to a penitentiary, and, as he 
understood, she at first consented, but subsequently declined to do so.”
38 
 
While the reported conversation between this respondent and the clergyman may bear 
the implication that the respondent had committed some offence, else why would she 
have willingly consented to go to a penitentiary at all, there is no suggestion that she 
confessed a sin to this clergyman for any spiritual purpose, unless the clergyman was 
being precious in what he did eventually reveal to the court.
39  Though any confession in 
issue was arguably non-sacramental,
40 it seems that the clergyman sought only to 
                                                 
37 The absence of any indication of careful research and consideration of whether there was a religious 
confession privilege at common law in Normanshaw v Normanshaw is another example of a patterned 
judicial belief that it did not exist.  Since it is not clear from the report whether Jeune P referred to any 
authority, his statement that the privilege did not exist, exists as a bald unsupported misstatement of fact. 
 
38 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468, 469. 
 
39 Note that both McNicol and the President of the Australian Law Reform Commission in 1987 have cited 
“clear evidence” (McNicol, op cit, p 336) that “the clergy ... will invariably assert the primacy of the spiritual as 
against the temporal ... [so that ] a law [requiring disclosure of confidential communications] will be totally 
unenforceable” (A.L.R.C., Report No. 38 (1987), para. 212, p 120).  It is thus possible that the clergyman 
was not entirely candid in what he disclosed to the court. 
 
40 WP Finlason makes a case to effect that confession is a sacrament in the Church of England in his 
commentary/report of Hill J’s decision in R v Hay (1860) 2 Foster & Finlason 4, 8; 175 ER 933, 935.  Some 
of the ecclesiastical commentators (supra, chapter three, pp 113-114) deny that there exists a sacrament of 
confession in the Anglican Church.  For example, Norman Doe says that “[t]he English Reformation led to 
the abandonment of obligatory private auricular confession, required under the pre-Reformation Roman 
canon law, as the norm” and that “[w]hilst churches commonly agree on the nature of the rite as effecting RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FIVE   187
protect a confidential religious communication with one who had sought his counsel and 
solace when in matrimonial difficulty – and the Judge did not feel that confidentiality was 
compelling enough to require it to be protected. Jeune P’s language allows the inference 
that a confidential religious communication with more ‘merit’ may have seen him 
exercise a discretion to exclude it as evidence.  Whether a religious confession or a 
sacramental religious confession would have crossed Jeune P’s ‘merit’ threshold for 
exercise of discretion against admissibility as evidence on public interest grounds or 
otherwise, is likewise unclear.  It is also possible that Jeune P considered that he had a 
discretion to exclude the conversation in Normanshaw on the different ground that it was 
a without prejudice communication focused on reconciling this couple because of the 
public interest in saving their marriage.  As will be seen below, fifty years later Denning J 
(as he then was
41) believed that such a discretionary privilege existed in McTaggart v 
McTaggart,
42 a case where he also made a passing obiter dicta comment about religious 
confidences. 
 
Twentieth century cases in England, Ireland and Canada since Jeune P decided 
Normanshaw have further explored his notion that “each case of confidential 
communication should be dealt with on its own merits”
43 and have not always considered 
as he did in Normanshaw that the “interest of justice”
44 was “prevalent”.
45  
_________________________ 
 
reconciliation with God, that it is a sacrament does not square with traditional Anglican thought” (Canon Law 
in the Anglican Communion, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, p 291). 
 
41 Alfred Thompson Denning was appointed to the House of Lords in 1957 “[b]ut ... welcomed his transfer 
back to the Court of Appeal as Master of the Rolls five years later because, in a three-judge court, he 
needed only one ally to get a majority” (http://www.guardian.co.uk/obituaries/story/0,,313455,00.html (last 
visited 11 July 2006). 
 
42 McTaggart v McTaggart [1949] Probate 94, discussed infra p 188.  See also note 189. 
 
43 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LJR 468, 449. 
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Religious communications privilege dicta in 
twentieth century cases 
 
In McTaggart v McTaggart, the wife appealed because a “without prejudice” discussion 
in the presence of a probation officer endeavouring to reconcile the couple had been 
allowed as evidence by the Commissioner hearing competing petitions for divorce from 
both spouses.  The appeal in days of ‘fault divorce’ appears premised on the wife’s 
dissatisfaction with the Commissioner’s acceptance of the husband’s version of the 
facts, which the disputed evidence favoured.  Denning J made comment bearing upon 
religious communications privilege.  He said: 
 
The rule as to “without prejudice” communications applies with especial force to 
negotiations for reconciliation ... The probation officer has no privilege of his own 
in respect of disclosure any more than a priest, or a medical man, or a banker ... 
[however] The law favours reconciliation and the court will not normally take upon 
itself a course which would be so prejudicial to its success.  If a probation officer 
should be compelled to give evidence ... it would mean that he would not be told 
the truth, or ... the whole truth ... In this case, however, neither party claimed the 
privilege and must, therefore, be taken to have waived it.
46 
 
This was not Lord Denning’s only statement about confidentiality in a case which did not 
involve a member of the clergy.  As Master of the Rolls in 1963, Lord Denning enlarged 
_________________________ 
 
 
45 Idem. 
 
46 McTaggart v McTaggart [1949] Probate 94, 97-98. 
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his thinking on the issue of professional confidences and again made references to 
confidential communications with the clergy.  Attorney-General v Mulholland and 
Foster
47  was an appeal by two journalists from a High Court finding of contempt 
because of their persistent unwillingness to answer relevant questions asked by a 
tribunal “set up to inquire into breaches of security in connection with spying offences”
48 
under the Official Secrets Act.  The questions which Mulholland and Foster had declined 
to answer concerned the sources of their information and they defended themselves by 
saying that “a journalist has a privilege by law entitling him to refuse to give his sources 
of information ... justifi[ed by] the pursuit of truth ... in the public interest”.
49  Lord Denning 
said: 
 
It seems to me that the journalists put the matter much too high.  The only 
profession that I know which is given a privilege from disclosing information to a 
court of law is the legal profession and then it is not the privilege of the lawyer but 
of his client.  Take the clergyman, the banker or the medical man.  None of these 
is entitled to refuse to answer when directed to by a judge.  Let me not be 
mistaken.  The judge will respect the confidences which each member of these 
honourable professions receives in the course of it, and will not direct him to 
answer unless not only it is relevant but also it is a proper and indeed, a 
necessary question in the course of justice to be put and answered.  A judge is 
the person entrusted, on behalf of the community, to weigh these conflicting 
interests – to weigh on the one hand the respect due to confidence in the 
                                                 
47 Attorney-General v Mulholland and Foster [1963] 2 QB 477. 
 
48 Idem, the quotation is from the headnote. 
 
49 Attorney-General v Mulholland and Foster [1963] 2 QB 477, 489. 
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profession and on the other hand the ultimate interest of the community in justice 
being done.
50 
 
While Lord Denning, like Jeune P before him in Normanshaw, denied the existence of 
any class privilege benefiting the clergy, like Jeune P he also said that a judge would 
respect the confidences of the clergyman as well as those of the medical man and the 
banker.  That Lord Denning intended to identify the existence of judicial discretion in 
such cases is demonstrated by his response to counsel submissions made in relation to 
professional confidences in D v NSPCC.
51  For in the English Court of Appeal’s hearing 
of that case, Lord Denning clarified what he meant.  He said:  
 
where information is given in confidence to a clergyman, a medical man or a 
banker, the court will respect that confidence.  It will not compel it to be disclosed, 
save in the last resort when it is relevant, proper, and indeed necessary in the 
course of justice.
52 
 
Even though all of the Law Lords disapproved of the generality with which Lord Denning 
had expressed the respect that courts would pay to confidences,
53 they concurred with 
                                                 
50 Attorney-General v Mulholland and Foster [1963] 2 QB 477, 489-490. 
 
51 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171.  The House of Lord’s decision which affirmed Lord Denning’s minority 
decision in the Court of Appeal in this case is discussed in detail infra, pp 192-206. 
 
52 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 191. 
 
53 Lord Diplock said he felt “this House would be unwise to base its decision in the instant case upon a 
proposition so much broader than is necessary to resolve the case in issue ... A cautious judge expresses a 
proposition of law in terms that are wide enough to cover the issue in the case under consideration; the fact 
that they are not also wide enough to cover an issue that may arise in some subsequent case does not 
make his judgement an authority against any wider proposition” (D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 220).  Lord 
Hailsham said “Lord Denning MR in his dissenting judgement … seeks to found the immunity upon this 
pledge.  I do not think that confidentiality by itself gives any ground for immunity” (D v NSPCC [1978] AC 
171, 230).  After discussing Lord Denning’s opinion “in the instant case” and the view expressed by the 
English Law Reform Committee in their Sixteenth Report, Lord Simon said, “I do not think that the 
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his dissenting Court of Appeal judgement in the result by finding that the public interest 
in protecting the confidence in D v NSPCC justified the exclusion of the evidence in 
dispute.  But Lord Edmund-Davies went further and set out in detail the circumstances in 
which a court had a discretion to exclude confidential communications as evidence.
54 
Those principles are discussed below.  Despite the nuanced differences in the reasons 
provided in the four separate judgements provided by the House of Lords
55, they did 
agree that the public interest in protecting some confidences, did justify the exclusion of 
such confidential communications as evidence.  It is also noteworthy once again, that 
because neither religious confession privilege nor any species of religious 
communications privilege was an issue in McTaggart, Mulholland and Foster or D v 
NSPCC, there was neither argument nor citation of any case on that subject in any of the 
judgements.  However, even without discussion of the unique public interest factors that 
arise in a case involving religious confessions or confidences, even the careful approach 
of the House of Lords in D v NSPCC signals scope for some exercise of judicial 
judgement where confidentiality is weighed against public interest.  This view resonates 
with the opinion of a line of English judges in cases that did have reason to consider 
religious confidences.
56 
_________________________ 
 
evidence should be withheld” (D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 237).  And Lord Edmund-Davies said that “the 
mere fact that information is imparted in confidence does not, of itself, entitle the recipient to refuse to 
disclose the identity of the informer” (D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 242). 
 
54 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 243, 244.  Note too that Spigelman CJ said that Lord Edmund-Davies’ 
“expansive remarks” in D v NSPCC, “have not been adopted” where “public interest immunity” is concerned 
(R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 694) though the view of Spigelman CJ itself is questionable (see infra,  
pp 193-194) .  R v Young is discussed in detail in chapter seven. 
 
55 Lord Kilbrandon concurred entirely with Lord Hailsham and adopted his judgement. 
 
56 That line begins with Chief Justice Kenyon’s judgement in Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 
96; is continued by Chief Justice Best in Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528; expressed as ratio 
by Baron Alderson in R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219, and implicitly concurred with by Jeune P in 
Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468, Ridley J in Ruthven v De Bour (1901) 45 Sol J 272, and 
the Chief Baron in Tannion v Synnott (1903) 37 Ir. L.T. 275.  Gavan Duffy J in Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep 
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The final pure
57 common law word upon judicial discretion to exclude confidential 
communications – and in particular, how such discretion is to be weighed and exercised 
by the Judge – is provided by the House of Lords in 1978 and particularly in Lord 
Edmund-Davies’ judgement in D v NSPCC. 
 
D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
In this case, a mother, aggrieved by the NSPCC’s investigation of a complaint “about the 
treatment of her 14-month-old”
58 daughter, “brought an action against the society for 
damages for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the society’s negligence in 
failing properly to investigate the complaint”.
59  Denying the negligence, the NSPCC 
made an application “for an order that there be no discovery ... of any documents which 
revealed or might reveal the identity of the complainant on the grounds ... that the proper 
performance by the society of its duties required that the absolute confidentiality of 
information given in confidence should be preserved ... in the public interest”
60 to prevent 
its sources of information drying up.  At first instance, the Master ordered the relevant 
documents disclosed.  On appeal, that order was reversed and then reinstated by a 
_________________________ 
 
and did not see the question as a matter for the exercise of discretion.  For him, religious communications 
were prima facie privileged. 
 
57 “Pure” in the sense that in the absence of any religious confession privilege statute, the English cases do 
not mix issues of statutory or constitutional interpretation in their considerations. 
 
58 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171.  The quote is from the headnote. 
 
59 Idem. 
 
60 Idem. 
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majority in the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning dissenting)
61 before it was finally 
overturned by a unanimous decision in the House of Lords. 
 
Though the NSPCC did not assert that the confidential communication which they had 
received was privileged under any established head of privilege, the Society’s claim that 
their informers were entitled to public interest immunity on the same principles as applied 
in favour of police informants, extracted many statements about ‘privilege’ from both the 
Court of Appeal
62 and House of Lords
63 before public interest immunity was finally 
affirmed in favour of the NSPCC.  Those close comparisons and particularly the 
observation that the categories of public interest immunity are never closed,
64 indicate 
that there is an increasing degree of conflation of public interest immunity and privilege, 
particularly since the High Court of Australia has also recently described legal 
professional privilege as “an important common law immunity”,
65 a “fundamental right”,
66 
                                                 
61 The consensus of Lord Scarman and Sir John Pennycuick against Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal 
allowing the mother’s discovery of the evidence, was that the only public interest that could legitimately 
prevent disclosure was a State interest (ibid, pp 197, 201).  Though the House of Lords noted that they 
agreed with Lord Denning in the result in the case, they did not accept his generalised proposition that “the 
courts should not allow confidences to be lightly broken” (ibid, p 220, see note 53 supra.  Lord Denning 
however seems to have seen himself as merely elaborating the principle he had outlined in Attorney-General 
v Mulholland and Foster in 1963 when he had said “the court will respect ... confidence [and] ... will not 
compel it to be disclosed, save in the last resort when it is relevant, proper, and indeed necessary for the 
course of justice” (ibid, p 191). 
 
62 For example per Lord Denning (D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 192-193); per Scarman LJ though he denied 
that priests could invoke the public interest to protect their confidences (ibid, pp 198-199) and per Sir John 
Pennycuick (ibid, pp 200-203). 
 
63 For example, Lord Diplock said that “‘public interest’ as a ground for withholding disclosure of documents 
or information was but another term for what had ... been called ‘Crown privilege’” (ibid, p 220); Lord 
Hailsham of St. Marylebone observed in a conflationary way, “[t]hese questions are all manageable if the 
categories of privilege from disclosure and public interest are considered to be limited” before doubting a 
“rigid distinction ... between privilege and public interest”, and finding that the categories of public interest 
immunity are not closed (ibid, pp 225-227, 230) and Lord Simon of Glaisdale analogised between the 
existence of legal professional privilege demanded by virtue of the public interest in the administration of 
justice and the public interest that demanded that the informant’s evidence be protected from disclosure in 
this case (ibid, pp 231-233). 
 
64 Per Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone ,ibid, p 230.  See also Lord Simon, ibid, pp 236, 241. 
 
65 Daniels Corporation v ACCC (2002) 192 ALR 561, 563-564 para 11 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow 
and Hayne JJ. 
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a “common law right”
67 and even perhaps as a “fundamental human right”.
68  While 
public interest immunity and privilege are distinct concepts and have discrete historical 
origins,
69 the reasoning in D v NSPCC manifests that future consideration of a broad 
discretionary confidential religious communications privilege will certainly include 
consideration of the competing public interest factors that are an established part of 
judicial decision making in public interest immunity cases. 
 
Concerning topical allegations of child abuse as it does, not only does the decision in D v 
NSPCC provide insight into authoritative English judicial attitudes about confidential 
relationships, it also practically signalled the House of Lords’ commitment to the public 
interest in protecting children.
70  In this 1970s case, however, the public interest which 
outweighed the mother’s interest in knowing the evidence against her and the identity of 
her accuser, was the public interest in protecting the confidentiality promised to the 
NSPCC’s informants.  However, that public interest was justified by analogous 
comparison to the established privilege that protected police informants
71 rather than on 
the express ground that such confidentiality was necessary to protect mechanisms 
established by the legislature to protect children from abuse. In the twenty-first century, it 
is doubtful that the public interest would protect an alleged paedophile’s confidence in 
_________________________ 
 
66 Ibid, p 49, para. 44, per McHugh J. 
 
67 Ibid, p 65, para. 132, per Callinan J. 
 
68 Ibid, p 56, paras 85-86, per Kirby J. 
 
69 See chapter seven, infra, pp 290-297. 
 
70 For example. Lord Hailsham spoke of Crown’s concern as parens patriae for the welfare of children and 
the need to protect them from “maltreatment by adults” (D v NSPCC [1978] 171, 228).  Lord Simon referred 
to the Crown’s parens patriae jurisdiction and a line of statutes aimed at protecting children and said “all this 
attests beyond question a public interest in the protection of children from neglect of ill-usage” (ibid, p 240). 
 
71 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171.  Per Lords Diplock, Hailsham, Simon and Kilbrandon at pp 172, 218-219, 229-
230, 232, 242. 
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his priest absent the existence of a statutory religious confession privilege or recognition 
of the existence of that same privilege at common law.  One suspects that in such a 
case, the public interest in child protection would trump the public interest in protecting a 
confidential religious communication with a member of the clergy.  The Lords’ analogical 
use of police informant privilege to found a public interest immunity for NSPCC 
informants, also points up the fact that it may be easier for the crown to make a public 
interest immunity claim than for the defence in a criminal case.  For the identification of 
the NSPCC as a quasi-statutory body
72 provided a connection which enabled the Lords 
to draw on public interest immunity authority to narrow the pure confidentiality rationale 
upon which Lord Denning had relied to protect the informant in the Court of Appeal. 
Though it seems unsatisfactory to suggest that the exercise of judicial discretion to 
exclude evidence might turn on whether it was asserted by the crown or the defence, 
defensive assertions of public interest immunity made on behalf of private individuals will 
not have the same convincing power as those made on behalf of state prosecuting 
agencies. 
 
For Lord Diplock in D v NSPCC, it was “the general public interest that in the 
administration of justice truth will out”
73 that trumped the mother’s interest in knowing all 
the evidence.  For him, only the “rule of law” that enabled a defendant in a criminal trial 
to have “disclosure of the identity of the informer … to show that the defendant was 
                                                 
72 Lord Hailsham made this point most explicity when he said that since the NSPCC was the only body that 
could bring case proceedings, it had “[t]o that extent … been charges with the performance of public 
responsibility by the Home Secretary under the direct authority of an Act of Parliament” (D v NSPCC [1978] 
AC 171, 228-229).  Lord Diplock’s identification of the NSPCC as carrying out public functions was set out in 
the first full page of his judgement (ibid, pp 215-216).  Lord Simon said that the NSPCC had been statutorily 
recognised and had succeeded to part of the Crown’s historic role as parens patriae to children (ibid, p 240). 
 
73 Ibid, p 218. 
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innocent of the offence”
74 would have trumped the NSPCC informant’s immunity.  But 
the mother in D v NSPCC was not charged with a criminal offence and accordingly the 
public interest immunity claimed for the informant was justified by analogy to police 
informant privilege.  As will be seen in chapter seven, it was the fact that the party 
seeking disclosure of the confidence in R v Young
75 was the defendant in a criminal case 
seeking to defend himself by testing the credibility of his accuser, that saw the public 
interest justification for sexual assault communications privilege fail in that case. Lord 
Simon also implied that the informant’s privilege in D v NSPCC would have failed if it 
was challenged by the defendant in a criminal case.  However, he said the reason why 
the public interest immunity claim would fail in such a case, was because “[t]he public 
interest that no innocent man should be convicted of crime is so powerful that it 
outweighs the general public interest that sources of police information should not be 
divulged”,
76 not simply because it had become a “rule of law”
77 as Lord Diplock had 
suggested.  Though such ‘rules of law’ may have originated because of the 
countervailing public interests that first justified them, it is noteworthy from the High 
Court of Australia’s confirmation of the status of legal professional privilege in Daniels v 
ACCC,
78 that judges do not feel a large need to so justify them once they have been 
characterised as ‘common law rights’ or even as ‘fundamental human rights’.
79  
 
                                                 
74 Idem. 
 
75 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681. 
 
76 Ibid, pp 232-233. 
 
77 See note 73 and 74 and supporting text. 
 
78 Daniels Corporation v ACCC (2002) 192 ALR 561; (2002) 77 ALJR 40.  This case is discussed in detail in 
chapter seven. 
 
79 See note 65-68 and supporting text. 
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For both Lord Hailsham and Lord Simon, the primary justification which allowed the 
informant’s privilege in D v NSPCC was not the analogy to police informant privilege, but 
rather the fact that the categories of public interest immunity were not closed.  Lord 
Simon, however, said that the judge was not only entitled to rule on the admissibility of 
evidence “as a matter of law and practice”,
80 but that a judge could also effectively 
exclude evidence by what he called the “exercise … [of] considerable moral authority on 
the course of a trial”,
81 as for example by suggesting that counsel not press a particular 
question “in the circumstances”.
82  Though Lord Simon said that this approach meant 
that it was law and not discretion that was “in command”,
83 there remains a sense in 
which it is judicial discretion that achieves the exclusion of such evidence.  For if the 
judge concerned decided instead to say nothing disapproving of counsel’s line of 
questioning, the exercise of ‘moral authority’ would not see counsel drop the line of 
otherwise relevant questioning.  Though such an approach does not advertise itself as 
the exercise of judicial discretion, it clearly operates to avoid the necessity of formal 
precedential rulings on evidence admissibility in criminal cases.  Indeed, both Baron 
Alderson’s success in having the prosecutor drop the line of questioning which would 
have required disclosure of the workhouse chaplain’s evidence in R v Griffin
84, and Lord 
Coleridge’s observation that Karslake, the prosecutor in R v Constance Kent was too 
much the gentleman barrister to press similar questions,
85 are clear examples of the 
                                                 
80 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 239. 
 
81 Idem. 
 
82 Idem. 
 
83 Idem. 
 
84 R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219. 
 
85 Coleridge, EH, Life and Correspondence of John Duke Lord Coleridge Lord Chief Justice of England, 
London, William Heinemann, 1904, Vol 2, p 365.  See also Tiemann, WH, and Bush, JC, The Right to 
Silence – Privileged Clergy Communication and the Law, 2
nd ed, Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1983, p 119.  
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judicial approach at which Lord Simon was pointing.  But it is hard to see that the result 
was achieved other than as an exercise of a species of judicial discretion. 
 
After the other three judgements in D v NSPCC are analysed, it is apparent that Lord 
Edmund-Davies tried to synthesise a framework that might guide judges called upon to 
exercise discretion in cases involving both confidentiality and public interest in the 
future.
86  And though Chief Justice Spigelman in the NSW Court of Appeal has 
suggested that what he called Lord Edmund-Davies’ expansive remarks have not been 
adopted,
87 collectively the judgements in D v NSPCC remain the last word on public 
interest immunity in the British common law world to the present day.  For example. 
Geoghegan J delivering judgement for the Irish Supreme Court in final appeal in 
December 2005 in Howlin v The Hon. Mr Justice Morris
88 referred to the Tribunal’s 
“endorse[ment of] a view I had taken as a judge in the High Court … [when] I had 
adopted the view of the House of Lords in D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171 and in particular 
the views expressed in the speech of Lord Edmund-Davies”.
89  It is also noteworthy that 
various members of the High Court of Australia cited D v NSPCC with approval in Baker 
v Campbell in 1983
90 as did various members of the House of Lords in Ashworth 
Security Hospital v MGN Limited in 2002
91.  Though indeed most of the references to the 
decision in D v NSPCC have not been specific to the judgement of Lord Edmund-Davies, 
                                                 
86 While Lord Simon did not characterise his extensive summary of the development of the law surrounding 
privilege and public interest immunity as an endeavour to provide such an analytical framework, he observed 
that there had “been three attempts to impose a comprehensive and coherent pattern on this branch of the 
law” and he confided that he had “great sympathy with that object” (D v NSPCC [1978] AC 237). 
 
87 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 694. 
 
88 Irish Supreme Court, 121 & 139/04, 
http://www.courts.ie/judgments.nsf/GenericPrint?OpenForm&id=0.8352830417726089, last viewed 
2/06/2006. 
 
89 Ibid, p 6. 
 
90 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
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he was only one of four of the five judges in the case who confirmed that the categories 
of public interest immunity were not closed.
92  
 
Before Lord Edmund-Davies commenced his effort to provide “a comprehensive and 
coherent pattern on this branch of the law”,
93 he signalled that intention with his 
observation that the law could only “be altered … by a decision of this House, in a 
suitable case raising the issue, or by the legislature”.
94  Though his judgement would 
undoubtedly have exerted more authority in the development of the law with regard to 
public interest immunity if his was the only judgement delivered by the House of Lords in 
D v NSPCC, it will be observed that his remarks say very little more than the other 
judgements in the case.  After quoting the same Lord Denning’s comments in Attorney-
General v Mulholland and Foster
95 that I have quoted above,
96 Lord Edmund-Davies 
disposed of plaintiff counsel’s argument that it was “no longer right to say ‘that the only 
profession ... which is given a privilege from disclosing information to a court of law is the 
legal profession’”,
97 with citations to Phipson, Cross and Halsbury to effect that “the[se] 
                                                 
92 While only Lord Hailsham (with whom Lord Kilbrandon concurred) said expressly that the categories of 
public interest immunity are not closed (D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 230), Lord Simon prefaced his extensive 
summary of development of the law of privilege and public interest immunity with doubt of “the respondent’s 
argument that there is a closed number of unextendable categories of relevant evidence which may be 
withheld from forensic scrutiny” (Ibid, pp 236-239).  Lord Edmund-Davies himself clearly subscribed to that 
view as is demonstrated in the text which follows. 
 
93 These words are those of Lord Simon (D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 237). 
 
94 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 245.  In observing the precedential rule that only the House of Lords could 
make a precedential finding that could authoritatively alter the law or sets its future direction, Lord Edmund-
Davies implicitly explained why Lord Denning had been unable to do that in the English Court of Appeal with 
his simple ‘confidentiality principle’.  Not only was that principle much too broad, but even a repeated 
minority judgement in the English Court of Appeal could not achieve that result by itself. Spigelman CJ made 
a similar point in R v Young ((1999) 46 NSWLR 681, p 698, para 84, and p 700, para 91) when he observed 
that it was not open to an intermediate Court of Appeal in Australia to so amend the law. 
 
95 Attorney-General v Mulholland and Foster [1963] 2 QB 477, 489-490. 
 
96 Supra, pp 189-190. 
 
97 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 244.  Note too that the quote from Lord Denning in McTaggart v McTaggart 
(supra, p 188) affirmed his view that only the legal profession had a privilege in respect of disclosure, though 
the mother’s counsel in D v NSPCC clearly sought to cite Lord Denning as authority for the proposition that RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FIVE   200
writers [were] unanimous that only in the case of lawyers and their clients [was] the court 
... empowered”
98 to protect a confidential communication with privilege.  Though he 
noted paragraph 51 of the Sir Rupert Cross Chaired English Criminal Law Revision 
Committee’s Eleventh Report on Evidence in 1972 which proposed “that a judge is 
entitled to direct a doctor not to disclose information regarding his patient’s health”,
99 he 
rejected that proposition as being contrary to law.
100 He then stated that there was no 
judicial discretion to direct evidence not be given simply because the parties to the 
communication were in a confidential relationship.  If the evidence concerned was both 
relevant and necessary “for the attainment of justice in the particular case” even a doctor 
or a priest must be compelled to provide such evidence if “the advocate persists in 
seeking disclosure”
101 despite the efforts to the judge to dissuade the advocate from that 
course.
102  But he continued and spelled out where and how a judge might exercise his 
discretion to find evidence protected on grounds of public interest immunity.  He said: 
 
  (ii)  But where (i) a confidential relationship exists (other than that of lawyer 
and client) and (ii) disclosure would be in breach of some ethical or social 
value involving the public interest, the court has a discretion to uphold a 
_________________________ 
 
“it was no longer right to say that the only profession which is given a privilege from disclosing ... is the legal 
profession”.  That bald proposition was clearly taking Lord Denning’s dissenting generalisations about 
confidentiality in Mulholland and Foster (criticised by Lord Diplock in the House of Lords as “much broader 
than necessary” (D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 220)) – further than even Lord Denning seems to have 
intended. 
 
98 Idem. 
 
99 Idem. 
 
100 Lords Hailsham (ibid, p 227) and Simon (ibid, p 237) also noted the Criminal Law Revision Committee’s 
1967 report, but doubted the NSPCC submission that the judiciary has so wide a discretion as to permit a 
witness to refuse to disclose evidence, as was suggested. 
 
101 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 245. 
 
102 Idem. 
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refusal to disclose relevant evidence provided it considers that, on 
balance, the public interest would be better served by excluding such 
evidence. 
 
(iii)  In conducting the necessary balancing operation between competing 
aspects of public interest, the presence (or absence) of involvement of the 
central government in the matter of disclosure is not conclusive either way 
though in practice it may affect the cogency of the argument against 
disclosure ... 
 
(iv)  The sole touchstone is the public interest, and not whether the party from 
whom disclosure is sought was acting under a “duty” – as opposed to 
merely exercising “powers”.  A party who acted under some duty may find 
it easier to establish that public interest was involved than one merely 
exercising powers ... 
 
(v)  The mere fact that relevant information was communicated in confidence 
does not necessarily mean that it need not be disclosed.  But where the 
subject matter is clearly of public interest, the additional fact ... that to 
break the seal of confidentiality would endanger that interest will in most 
(if not all) cases probably lead to the conclusion that disclosure should be 
withheld ... 
 
(vi)  The disclosure of all evidence relevant to the trial of an issue being at all 
times a matter of considerable public interest, the question to be 
determined is whether it is clearly demonstrated that in the particular case RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FIVE   202
the public interest would nevertheless be better served by excluding 
evidence despite its relevance.  If, on balance, the matter is left in doubt, 
disclosure should be ordered.
103 
 
The congruence of Lord Edmund-Davies’ opinion with that of his brethren can be seen 
woven through the entire statement.  Not only did he restrict its application to civil trials in 
an effort to accord with Lord Diplock’s principle that the decision in this case not be 
broadened further that “is necessary to resolve the issue between these parties”,
104  he 
concurred with all of his brethren against Lord Denning’s statements in the Court of 
Appeal below that confidentiality alone does not invoke public interest immunity.  He also 
acknowledged Lord Simon’s observation that a judge can exercise considerable moral 
influence on the course of a trial by dissuading counsel from persisting in certain lines of 
questioning;
105 he confirmed that the involvement of government in the issue is not the 
only touchstone of public interest
106; and he confirmed the need to weigh the competing 
public interests that arise.  
 
However, even if it is accepted that Lord Edmund-Davies’ six points outlining the metes 
and bounds of a judicial discretion to exclude evidence in civil trials do capture the spirit 
of the judgements of his brethren, they are not particularly helpful in elucidating when 
such discretion might be exercised to protect a confidential religious communication.  For 
                                                 
103 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 245-246. 
 
104 Ibid, p 220. 
 
105 Ibid, p 239 per Lord Simon. 
 
106 This principle may be seen in Lord Diplock’s judgement since he invoked an analogy to police informant 
privilege even though the NSPCC was a voluntary society (ibid, pp 215-219).  It is also evident in the 
principle expressed by both Lord Hailsham and Lord Simon that the categories of public interest immunity 
are not closed (ibid, pp 225-230 per Lord Hailsham and pp 236-241). 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FIVE   203
while the decision confirms that NSPCC informants in England will likely be privileged 
from disclosure when competing public interests are judicially weighed,
107 one senses 
that the countervailing public interest in a court’s having all the evidence will not be easy 
to displace.  That Lord Edmund-Davies confined his six principles to civil cases
108 is 
particularly problematic when one considers religious confidences since even the rare 
case reports that do exist suggest that such confidentiality is most likely to challenged in 
criminal cases.  Valid concern may also be raised about the practical utility of the 
Edmund-Davies principles since they do not suggest what kinds of public interest and 
therefore what kinds of confidence are likely to attract court sympathy for an immunity 
argument in the future.  This absence of guidance may be part of the learned Lord’s 
concession to Lord Diplock’s direction that the decision in D v NSPCC not be broadened 
beyond the facts of the case.
109  But if that is so, then the decision confirms little more 
than that some form of judicial discretion exists in public interest immunity cases, but that 
so far only informants of the English National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children have qualified for its exercise.  
 
While D v NSPCC thus provides limited analogical guidance, it is not surprising that the 
House of Lords were unwilling to suggest categories where public interest immunity 
might arise in the future.  Though Lord Edmund-Davies had stated his view that the 
                                                 
107 However, it must be noted that even different cases involving the NSPCC will raise different competing 
public interests, so that the precedential value of the decision does not extend very far beyond its own 
precise facts. 
 
108 Ibid, p 245.  It would appear that this concession was a recognition of Lord Simon’s caution against 
creating principles in the law of evidence without careful consideration of the different circumstances that 
arise in criminal cases.  Lord Simon said “[e]ven though the rules of criminal evidence may differ in some 
respects from civil, any wide judicial discretion to admit or reject evidence should, I think, at least be tested 
against what would be acceptable in a criminal trial ( ibid, p 239). 
 
109 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 220.  Lord Simon also made comments about the need for judicial 
circumspection in cases involving considerations of public policy (ibid, p 240). 
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House of Lords did have the practical power to settle the law in this area,
110 he conceded 
that unlike the legislature, the nation’s highest court required a suitable case to provide 
that opportunity.  Even though the doctrine of precedent provides the House of Lords 
with a species of law making power, that power is not co-extensive with the law making 
power constitutionally vested in parliament.  For under the strict doctrine of precedent, 
obiter dicta statements alone cannot bind the future.  The House of Lords would require 
an actual case raising doctor/patient privilege or religious confession privilege before 
they could make statements about the public interests that would justify the recognition 
of public immunity in such cases.  D v NSPCC was not such a case but the Lords did 
what they could with the material thus made available to settle the law in the area.  They 
certainly rebutted Lord Denning’s idea that the existence of confidentiality alone provided 
the judge with discretionary power to exclude otherwise relevant evidence.  Public 
interest factors would also have to weighed before any exercise of discretion was 
justified.  
 
Perhaps if the facts of D v NSPCC had set constitutional values like freedom of speech 
or conscience against some thin government assertion of confidentiality outside facts in 
wartime or following a recent terrorist attack, some further analogical help might have 
been forthcoming.  But in nations without recorded and entrenched Human Rights 
legislation, there is a risk that even the constitutional values potentially raised in such 
cases, may be chilled or buried by the passion of a passing tide of public opinion.  In the 
context of this thesis, the final problem with Lord Edmund-Davies principles is once 
again, his unquestioning acceptance of the assertions of Phipson, Cross and Halsbury 
that there is no privilege from disclosing information to a court of law outside the legal 
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profession.
111  For as this thesis has already demonstrated, that commentary is not 
accurate where religious confession privilege is concerned. 
 
Though Spigelman CJ in NSW has indicated that what he called Lord Edmund-Davies’ 
“expansive remarks”
112 in D v NSPCC
113 “have not been adopted”
114 where “public 
interest immunity”
115 is concerned, Lord Hailsham’s observation that “the categories of 
public interest immunity”
116 are no more closed than those of negligence, has struck a 
chord around the British Commonwealth. Writing as a law teacher at the Faculty of Law 
in the University of British Columbia,
117 Beverley McLachlin as she then was
118 
referenced Wigmore’s “principle”
119 approach in preference to a more conservative 
“category”
120 approach to determine “the question of privileged communications”.
121  She 
                                                 
111 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 244. 
 
112 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 694.  In the context of D v NSPCC, it is difficult to characterise Sir 
Edmund-Davies’ remarks as “expansive”, since he did not accept submissions of counsel for the 
complainant that the larger remarks of Lord Denning (in the Court of Appeal) should apply, and was rather 
narrower on discretion than even his brother Lord Hailsham in his concurring judgement in the same case. 
 
113 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171.  See also notes 54 and 87 and the text supporting note 87. 
 
114 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 694.  Again see note 87 and the supporting text which suggests that 
Chief Justice Spigelman’s dismissive comments about Lord Edmund-Davies’ principles do not fairly 
recognise the degree to which those principles did capture the sentiments of his brethren who were 
unanimous in the result, or the acceptance those remarks have achieved in subsequent judicial 
consideration. 
 
115 Idem. 
 
116 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 230. 
 
117 McLachlin, B, “Confidential Communications and the Law of Privilege” (1977) 2 UBCL Rev 266. 
 
118 McLachlin CJ was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada on 30 March 1989 and was appointed 
Chief Justice of Canada on 7 January 2000 
(http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/about court/judges/ McLachlin/index_e.asp)  (last visited 28 July 2003). 
 
119 McLachlin, B, op cit, p 269. 
 
120 Ibid, p 268.  
 
121 Idem. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FIVE   206
cited Turner J’s (as he then was
122) approach to the issue in the NZ Supreme Court (as it 
then was
123) in Bell v University of Auckland.
124  “Referring to confidential 
communications between a university and its employee, he stated”:
125  
 
I cannot but think that this situation is one which, if the existing rules of privilege 
do not protect the documents from discovery, an addition should be made to the 
categories of documents regarded as privileged.  The famous dictum of Lord 
Macmillan in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 619; [1932] All ER Rep 1, 
30, that “the categories of negligence are never closed” may serve as inspiration 
for a similar remark as to the categories of privilege.
126 
 
Though Lord Hailsham in D v NSPCC
127 may have been familiar with this statement of 
Turner J in New Zealand, it is remarkable that two senior British Commonwealth judges 
within a decade of one another should choose the same generous analogy to express 
what they felt the common law on privilege and public interest immunity was or should 
be.  The Canadian courts have developed this jurisprudence much further and McLachlin 
J, before her appointment as Chief Justice of Canada, has been a significant contributor 
in that development along the lines that she spelled out in her 1977 article. 
                                                 
122 “Alexander Turner (1901-1993) was a judge of the NZ Court of Appeal from 1962 to 1973 and during his 
last eighteen months served as President” (http://www.waikato.ac.nz/law/wlr/ 1993/article4-spiller.html).  (last 
visited 28 July 2003). 
 
123 The New Zealand Supreme Court was established in 1841 and was renamed the New Zealand High 
Court in 1980 (http://www.courts.govt.nz/courts/high_court.html).  (last visited 28 July 2003).  A new New 
Zealand Supreme Court, replacing the Privy Council as New Zealand’s highest court, was established by the 
Supreme Court Act 2003 to commence hearing cases from 1 July 2004. 
 
124 Bell v University of Auckland [1969] NZLR 1029. 
 
125 McLachlin, B, op cit, p 269. 
 
126 Bell v University of Auckland [1969] NZLR 1029, 1036. 
 
127 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171. 
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Religious communications privilege in twentieth century 
Canadian cases 
 
Before the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
128 and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Slavutych v Baker,
129 the Canadian common law with respect to 
religious confessions and religious communications more generally, was 
indistinguishable from the common law of England.  However, the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s invocation of Dean Henry Wigmore’s “four fundamental conditions necessary 
to the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of communications”,
130 though 
not “carved in stone”
131 has been sufficiently affirmed in subsequent decisions of that 
court
132 to have made those principles part of the unique fabric of Canadian law. 
 
The particular relevance of the Canadian authorities in an Australian context, is the use 
made of constitutional materials
133 and Wigmore’s four canons to develop a discretionary 
religious communications privilege which resonates with the less developed thread of 
                                                 
128 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into force as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(UK) Clause  11 on 17 April 1982.  In Canada it is known as the Constitution Act 1982. 
 
129 Slavutych v Baker [1976] 1 SCR 254; (1975) 55 DLR (3d) 224 
 
130 Ibid, p 228.  The Wigmore principles are: 1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they 
will not be disclosed.  2. The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full maintenance of a 
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.  3. The relation must be one which in the 
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.  4. The injury that would inure to the relation by 
the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct 
disposal of litigation (italics original) (Wigmore JH, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Revised by John T 
McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown, 1961, Vol 8, p 527). 
 
131 R v Gruenke (1991) 3 SCR 263, 290. 
 
132 For example, the four Wigmore canons have been used as a tool to determine the availability of a 
confidentiality privilege in Reference Re Legislative Privilege (1978) 39 CCC (2d) 226; R v Big M Drug Mart 
Ltd [1985] 1 SCR 295; Re Church of Scientology and the Queen (No 6) (1987) 31 CCC (3d) 349 (Ontario 
Court of Appeal) and R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263. 
 
133 The possible application of the Canadian jurisprudence in Australia in light of both the resonance in 
Canadian and Australian multicultural values and the similarity in protection afforded religious freedom under 
the Canadian Charter and section 116 of the Australian Constitution, are considered in chapter seven. 
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authority in favour of discretionary public interest immunity in English common law 
authority traced supra.  Though Spigelman CJ did not feel that the New South Wales 
Court of Criminal Appeal could similarly adopt the Wigmore canons in a case about the 
emerging sexual assault communications privilege,
134 the Canadian reasoning is likely to 
be highly persuasive if a confidential religious communications privilege case were to 
confront an Australian appellate court. 
 
In Slavutych v Baker
135 Associate Professor Yar Slavutych of the Slavonic Languages 
Department of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Alberta
136 had been “invite[d] to 
give a confidential assessment of a colleague ... [to] determin[e] ... whether the latter 
should be granted tenure”.
137  When the university later used that communication “as a 
basis for a charge of misconduct justifying [Slavutych’s] ... dismissal”,
138 even though it 
had been made in good faith, Slavutych challenged his dismissal before the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta and lost on grounds of public policy 
notwithstanding that court’s review of the Wigmore canons.
139  But in the Supreme Court 
of Canada, Spence J, giving the judgement of the whole court, affirmed that Wigmore’s 
canons were not only appropriately reviewed to determine whether Slavutych was 
entitled to an evidential privilege in connection with his confidential communication with 
                                                 
134 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 698, para 84.  Note that while Spigelman CJ did not consider it was 
open to an intermediate Court of Appeal in Australia to adopt “the approach … propounded by Wigmore and 
adopted in Canada”, despite the fact that Beazley JA found that approach attractive (R v Young (1999) 46 
NSWLR 681, 715-716), Lord Simon cited Wigmore’s canons of privilege with approval in D v NSPCC ([1978] 
AC 171, 237). 
 
135 Slavutych v Baker [1976] 1 SCR 254; (1975) 55 DLR (3d) 224. 
 
136 Ibid, p 225. 
 
137 Ibid, p 224. 
 
138 Idem. 
 
139 Ibid, p 228. 
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the university, but that in fact all four canons were satisfied in Slavutych’s case.
140  Since 
the university’s board of arbitrators which approved the university president’s 
recommendation of dismissal had made no finding of bad faith at first instance and 
indeed had recommended “some lesser penalty”
141 to the university, the equitable 
principle “that a person who had obtained information in confidence is not allowed to use 
it as a springboard for activities detrimental to the person who made the confidential 
communication”
142 applied, and the award was quashed completely without need for 
arbitral reconsideration where its decision of dismissal was concerned.
143 
 
In Re Church of Scientology and the Queen (No 6),
144 in rejecting Osler J’s ruling in the 
Supreme Court of Ontario that the Wigmore principles “recognized and adopted for 
some purposes by the Supreme Court of Canada in Slavutych v Baker ... are not 
embraced by the [priest-and-penitent] privilege”,
145 the Ontario Court of Appeal 
reaffirmed its acceptance of both the Wigmore canons and the parallel constitutional 
protection afforded by the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms with these words: 
 
We agree with the Crown that ... there is no recognized class privilege accorded 
to the priest-and-penitent relationship ... We cannot agree, however, that it is too 
late to expand the modern law of privilege.  In the light of the constitutional 
                                                 
140 Ibid, p 229. 
 
141 Ibid, p 231. 
 
142 Ibid p 230, Spence J quoting Lord Denning MR in Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 415, 417 who 
was in turn adopting the statement of Roxburgh J in Terrapin Ltd v Builder’s Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd et al 
[1960] RPC 128, 130. 
 
143 Ibid, p 233. 
 
144 Re Church of Scientology and the Queen (No 6) (1987) 31 CCC (3d) 349. 
 
145 Ibid, p 536. 
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protection given by the Charter and having regard to the expansion of the law of 
privilege under the general principles enunciated by Dean Wigmore and 
accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Slavutych v Baker, ... we are 
satisfied that our courts will be encouraged to recognize the propriety of a priest-
and-penitent privilege, if not as a class, at least on a case-by-case basis.
146 
 
While these statements rank only as obiter dicta, since the appeals against the issue of 
the search warrants in issue were all dismissed, this statement signals a clear direction 
in Canadian judicial thought,
147 since reaffirmed and developed by the Supreme Court in 
R v Gruenke
148 which is regarded as the leading case not only on religious 
communications privilege, but on privilege generally. 
 
 
R v Gruenke 
Adele Gruenke had unsuccessfully appealed her first degree murder conviction to the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal.  When unsuccessful, she obtained leave to further appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Canada on the basis that either her communications with two 
                                                 
146 Ibid, p 541. 
 
147 In an unreported Supreme Court of Ontario case (filed in Ontario Judgements Quicklaw Database as R v 
Medina [1988] OJ No 2348), Campbell J observed that despite the Ontario Court of Appeal finding in the 
Scientology case (following Jessel MR’s obiter observations against the privilege in Wheeler v LeMarchant 
(1881) 17 ChD 675, 681) that “[t]here ... was at common law, no privilege in communications to clergyman” 
(R v Medina [1988] OJ No 2348 p 4 quoting the Scientology case at p 537)), “that was ... not the universal 
position [as] [s]ome judgements seem to recognize a priest-penitent or clergy and parishioner privilege in, or 
at least a discretion to exclude, communications made for purposes of spiritual guidance and comfort” (R v 
Medina, idem).  Campbell J then went on in Medina to find that it was “open to the accused to resist the 
admission into evidence against him of [a] ... statement to his clergyman on the ground of religious privilege” 
(R v Medina, p 5) on a “case-by-case basis” (idem) applying “the general principles set out in Wigmore” 
(idem).  Though he found Medina had not made out such a case since the fundamental reason for his 
communication on the street with a pastor was to solicit his help in fleeing the city and the country to avoid a 
murder charge, he did believe that a religious privilege did exist on a case-by-case basis, applying the 
general Wigmore principles. 
 
148 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263. 
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pastors in the Victorious Faith Centre were “protected by common law privilege, or 
alternatively, were protected confidential communications, and therefore inadmissible, 
under the common law and s 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”.
149  
Though the Full Supreme Court of nine judges concurred in their decision that the 
appeal should be dismissed, they divided over the reasons for that dismissal and their 
reasoning is enlightening in an Australian context since similar considerations arise in 
this country.  Lamer CJ delivered the judgement of the seven judges who affirmed the 
existence of a religious communications privilege on a case-by-case basis.
150  
L’Heureux-Dubé J delivered the alternative view
151 that maintained there was a religious 
communications class privilege in Canada but that, nonetheless, it did not protect 
Gruenke’s communications with her pastors in this case because these communications 
“did not originate in the confidence that they would not be disclosed”.
152  The Supreme 
Court’s recitation of the facts accepted that Ms Gruenke had already decided “to turn 
herself into the police and ‘take the blame’ ”,
153 and that her communications with her 
pastors were more “accurately described ... as being made to relieve Ms Gruenke’s 
emotional stress than for a religious or spiritual purpose”.
154 
 
The Court’s division essentially boiled down to the question of whether the Supreme 
Court should recognise a new class or category of privilege in favour of confidential 
religious communications, or whether the admissibility of evidence in cases of 
confidential religious communications should be resolved on some discretionary ‘case-
                                                 
149 Ibid, p 264. 
 
150 Lamer CJ and La Forest, Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin, Stevenson and Iacobucci JJ. 
 
151 Gonthier J concurred in L’Heureux-Dubé J’s judgement. 
 
152 Ibid, p 316. 
 
153 Ibid, p 292. 
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by-case’ basis.  Lamer CJ provided the judgement of the majority which set out the 
approach which Canadian courts should take to determine whether they should exercise 
a discretion to protect any confidential communication from disclosure.  Because the 
case concerns a confidential religious communication and because it has also become 
the leading case concerning the admissibility of confidences as evidence in Canadian 
courts, the reasoning is set out in some detail.  
 
Lamer CJ’s judgement confirming what was called a ‘case-by-case privilege’, first dealt 
with the arguments that been presented by counsel for Gruenke to prove the existence 
of a religious communications privilege at common law.  He agreed that while “English 
and Canadian courts have not, as a matter of practice, compelled members of the clergy 
to disclose confidential religious communications, this does not answer the question of 
whether there is a legal common law privilege for religious communications”.
155  Lamer 
CJ also rejected the odd suggestion from counsel for Gruenke that “the existence of a 
limited statutory religious privilege in [Quebec and Newfoundland] indicate[d] ... that a 
common law privilege exists”.
156  Logically, Lamer CJ observed that “[i]f anything ... [such 
need for statute] indicate[d] that the common law did not protect religious 
communications”.
157  
 
Lamer CJ then turned to the reasons which could justify a confidential religious 
communications privilege and considered that “the question of whether a prima facie 
                                                 
155 Ibid, pp 287-288 per Lamer CJ.  Note that the facts of the Gruenke case did not allow the Canadian 
Supreme Court to consider closely the existence of a narrower religious confession class privilege at 
common law, since it was not suggested at any of the trials (first instance in Manitoba, appeal in Manitoba, 
or final appeal to the Supreme Court) that the communication which had taken place was a religious 
confession. 
 
156 Ibid, p 288. 
 
157 Ibid, p 288.  This view that the need for the creation of a statutory privilege may have proved the non-
existence of religious confession privilege at common law is further discussed in chapter six, pp 242-246. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FIVE   213
privilege exists for religious communications is essentially one of policy”.
158 In his view, 
unless compelling policy reasons such as underlie “the class privilege for solicitor-client 
communications”
159 could be shown, “there [was] ... no basis for departing from the 
fundamental ‘first principle’ that all relevant evidence is admissible until proven 
otherwise”.
160  Proponents of a religious communications privilege could not call in aid 
the policy reason which was accepted as underlying “prima facie protection for solicitor-
client communications”.
161  That privilege was justified by the fact that those 
communications were essential “to the effective operation of the legal system ... [since 
s]uch communications are inextricably linked with the very system which desires the 
disclosure of the communication”.
162 
 
But, ‘the effective operation of the legal system’ was not the only policy reason that could 
justify a privilege.  Though confidential religious communications were “not inextricably 
linked with the justice system in the way that solicitor-client communications surely 
are”,
163 the social importance of confidential religious communications was implicit in the 
value placed upon freedom of religion in s.2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.  However, it was not necessary that “a prima facie privilege [be recognized] 
to give full effect to the Charter guarantee”.
164  Since “[t]he extent (if any) to which 
disclosure of communications will infringe on an individual’s freedom of religion will 
                                                 
158 Idem. Note that though the House of Lords’ decision in D v NSPCC was not referred to anywhere in the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Gruenke, public policy is recognised as the primary guide in 
identifying new evidentiary privileges or immunities in both decisions. 
 
159 Idem. 
 
160 Idem. 
 
161 Ibid, p 289 per Lamer CJ. 
 
162 Idem. 
 
163 Idem. 
 
164 Idem. 
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depend on the particular circumstances involved”
165  principled consideration, “on a 
case-by-case basis, having regard to the Wigmore criteria ... [was consistent with] the 
approach taken by this Court in Slavutych v Baker”
166 and the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Re Church of Scientology and the Queen (No 6).  He continued and explained that while 
“the Wigmore criteria are [not] ... ‘carved in stone’, they provide a general framework 
within which policy considerations and the requirements of fact-finding can be weighed 
and balanced on the basis of their relative importance in the particular case before the 
court”.
167  Such judicial use of the Wigmore criteria did not “preclude the [future] 
identification of a new class [privilege] on a principled basis”,
168 but the recognition of a 
new religious communications class privilege was not necessary since case-by-case 
consideration would allow Canadian courts to weigh the freedom of religion 
considerations arising under the Charter.
169 
 
Lamer CJ said that use of “the general term ‘religious communications’ [was preferable]  
... [to] the more traditional term ‘priest-penitent communication’ ”
170 because it 
recognised the need for the accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs and accordingly, 
the non-denominational approach sensitively desirable in Canada’s multi-cultural 
jurisdiction.
171  “The fact that the communications were not made to an ordained priest or 
minister or that they did not constitute a formal confession will not bar the possibility of 
                                                 
165 Idem. 
 
166 Idem. 
 
167 Ibid, p 290 per Lamer CJ. 
 
168 Idem. 
 
169 Idem. 
 
170 Ibid, p 291 per Lamer CJ. 
 
171 Idem. 
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the communications being excluded”.
172  Lamer CJ summed up with the observation that 
because “Ms Gruenke’s communications to Pastor Thiessen and Ms Frovich did not 
originate in a confidence that they would not be disclosed ... the communications in 
question [did] not satisfy the first Wigmore criterion and their admission into evidence 
[did] not infringe Ms Gruenke’s freedom of religion”.
173 
 
In essence, the Supreme Court of Canada recognised that confidential religious 
communications may be privileged from compulsory disclosure in court out of respect to 
that nation’s multicultural values, which are enshrined in the 1982 Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.  Such privilege will not protect every religious communication and indeed did 
not protect the communications in the Gruenke case.  Against the constitutional law 
backdrop provided by the Charter, Canadian judges are at liberty to weigh competing 
policy considerations that arise on the facts in individual cases.  It is possible to identify a 
measure of congruence between this Canadian approach and that set out in the House 
of Lords judgements in D v NSPCC.  For in both decisions, there is a recognition that 
public interest or policy considerations should dictate the exclusion of some confidences 
not protected by the existing privilege or immunity categories acknowledged in the text 
books.  But there is a marked reluctance to recognise new classes or categories of 
privilege when appropriate exercise of discretion can meet the purpose.  But not all the 
judges in the Supreme Court of Canada agreed.  
 
 L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ worried that the Supreme Court’s failure to recognise 
confidential religious communications as a category would have “a chilling effect on the 
                                                 
172 Idem. 
 
173 Ibid, p 292 per Lamer CJ. 
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spiritual relationship”
174 in Canadian society.  This failure unnecessarily focused “on the 
palpable need for evidence in the individual case and … neglect[ed] more intangible and 
long-term interests”.
175  The minority judgement found several public interest factors 
beyond the Charter protection of freedom of religion
176 that justified recognition of 
confidential religious communications as a distinct class of privilege.  This included 
“Society’s Interest in Promoting Religious Communications”,
177 “Privacy Interests”
178 and 
the fact that “[c]ompelling disclosure … may arguably bring disrepute to the system of 
justice”.
179  While they did not believe “that every communication between pastor and 
penitent will be protected”,
180 L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ considered it desirable to 
recognise religious confession privilege as a “class” privilege to avoid the danger of 
social prejudice where recognition of religious communications privilege was 
characterised as a mere discretion.   
 
However, the majority view of the court directed that assertions of privilege for any form 
of confidential religious communications should be assessed in accordance with the 
Wigmore principles
181 in the future.  The individual judge should weigh society’s interest 
in the confidentiality against the normal requirement that the court should hear all the 
evidence.  While the existence of a narrower religious confession privilege may still 
                                                 
174 Ibid, p 311. 
 
175 Idem. 
 
176 Ibid, pp 300-302. 
 
177 Ibid, pp 297-300. 
 
178 Ibid, pp 302-303. 
 
179 Ibid, p 304. 
 
180 Ibid, p 312. 
 
181 The Wigmore principles are set out in full in note 130. 
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seem moot in Canada
182 absent a decision considering a formal sacramental confession, 
it is unlikely the need for such a category will appear in future since judicial discretion is 
likely to be exercised in favour of the most formal confessions.  Though the English 
reasoning in D v NSPCC is different in a case that did not involve a religious 
communication, both English and Canadian courts have now stated that judicial 
discretion is the appropriate way to assess the complex public interests that arise when it 
is asserted that confidences should trump the court’s need for all the evidence.  Irish 
jurisprudence, however, has concluded that a class privilege favouring religious 
communications was necessary to protect the public interests involved.  
 
Religious communications privilege in twentieth century Irish 
cases 
 
Though the existence of any privilege, discretionary or otherwise, was discountenanced 
very early in Ireland,
183 the view of the evidence scholar WM Best that such dismissive 
treatment may have reflected judicial religious prejudice seems to have eventually 
prevailed.
184  For though the judges in In re Keller
185 seemed to go to great lengths to 
avoid both the religious confession privilege and religious communications privilege 
issue in that case, both privileges may be said to have survived that episode and to have 
been confirmed, most memorably by Gavan Duffy J in Cook v Carroll.
186 
                                                 
182 Again, note Lamer CJ’s statement that the principled case-by-case approach to such assertions of 
privilege, did not “preclude the identification of a new class on a principled basis” in the future (ibid, p 290). 
See also note 168 and supporting text. 
 
183 Butler v Moore (1804-1806) 2 Sch & Lef 249.  Discussed supra in chapter four, pp 167-168, and in 
chapter six, pp 238, 240. 
 
184 Best, WM, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, London, S Sweet, 1849, pp 459-460.  See also SL 
Phipson’s revision of his work in the eleventh edition, Best’s Law of Evidence, Sweet & Maxwell, 1911, pp 
561-562. 
 
185 In re Keller (1887) 22 LR Ir. 158, discussed in chapter four, pp 159-162. 
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In an action for damages for seduction brought by the girl’s mother against the alleged 
seducer, the Reverend WJ Behan, who was parish priest to both parties, was called to 
give evidence of a discussion that took place at a meeting between the three of them as 
he endeavoured either to “induc[e] ... the girl to withdraw a false charge, or [to] 
persuad[e] ... the man to make amends for the wrong done to her”.
187  In the Circuit 
Court, the priest was fined £10 for contempt as a result of his refusal to give evidence 
and “the plaintiff’s action was dismissed”.
188  On appeal, the priest again refused to give 
evidence, with the following statement: 
 
I respectfully decline to give evidence.  I cannot conscientiously do so, because 
any information I have, was given to me as a parish priest.  When parishioners 
come to consult the parish priest, what they tell the priest is given on the 
understanding of secrecy and should not be revealed under any 
circumstances.
189 
 
Father Behan’s demurrer raises the issue of a religious communications privilege rather 
than a narrower religious confession privilege.  Both parties waived privilege at the 
_________________________ 
 
 
187 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515, 516. 
 
188 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515. 
 
189 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515, 516.  Note that Gavan Duffy J need not have decided the case by 
confirming the existence of a religious communications privilege in Ireland.  He could have decided, as 
Denning J did four years later in McTaggart v McTaggart [1949] Probate 94, that these communications 
were protected as without prejudice communications which were protected because of society’s interest in 
preserving marriage.  Such a course was identified and approved by the House of Lords in D v NSPCC 
[1978] AC 171 (per Lord Hailsham, pp 226-227; per Lord Simon pp 236-237, and per Lord Kilbrandon who 
concurred with Lord Hailsham). 
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trial,
190 so that the priest’s continuing assertion of a personal privilege stood 
uncomplicated
191 and on its own.  As the Supreme Court of Canada would later do in R v 
Gruenke, Gavan Duffy J reviewed the historical evidence for the existence of a religious 
communications privilege.  He concluded “that the seal of confession was respected in 
the courts of England before the Reformation”,
192 but that “the attitude of pre-
Reformation courts towards any wider claim [of privilege] by a priest is probably 
unascertainable today”.
193  He observed that “rare decisions upholding the sacerdotal 
[confession] privilege to the full extent may be found up to eighty years ago, but they are 
not now regarded as law, because the preponderance of judicial opinion in England has 
denied any privilege whatever to the priest for confidences made either inside or outside 
the confessional”,
194 either overlooking or brushing the old common law aside.
195  He did 
not attribute significant weight to the dicta against religious confession privilege in 
Wheeler v LeMarchant and considered on balance, in the unique religious context in 
Ireland, that a religious communications privilege must be recognised in practice. 
Specifically he noted that though in “an action on a building contract”,
196 Sir George 
Jessel MR did opine against any religious communications or confessional privilege, 
                                                 
190 Idem. 
 
191 Contrast these facts with those, for example, in Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468, where 
Jeune P apparently convinced the clergyman to testify (supra, pp 173-176) and in Tannian v Synnott (1903) 
37 Ir. L.T. 275 (infra, pp 211-212) where the Roman Catholic priest made no objection to the request for his 
testimony.  Thus in the present case, the absence of clerical waiver of any privilege, obliged the judge to 
decide on the matter of privilege raised as an issue of law rather than on grounds of simple pragmatism.  
While there have been other judges who have asserted a privilege for a clerical witness when it may not 
have been asserted for them (eg Best CJ in Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528) and possibly 
Alderson B in R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219), here Gavan Duffy J was faced with the pure legal 
question of whether the priest owned any privilege, since neither of the parties had any objection to the 
adduction of the evidence he could give. 
 
192 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515, 517. 
 
193 Idem. 
 
194 Idem. 
 
195 Idem.  
 
196 Idem. 
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“there has long been a feeling that the community is better served by passing over 
awkward clerical incidents than by advertising a discreditable rule of law”.
197  He 
continued that “the utter futility of trying to invade the secrecy of the confessional”
198 in 
Ireland had seen the Irish courts give “clear indications ... that a priest in the witness box 
could not be asked to break the seal”.
199  “[T]hough there are some reasons common to 
the cases for the sacerdotal and for the legal privileges”,
200 the fact that “the priest is not 
hired” means that “a parishioner’s waiver of privilege should not ... destroy the priest’s 
right to keep his secret”.
201  He then concluded his review of the common law with the 
strong statement that “it would be intolerable that the common law, as expounded after 
the Reformation in a Protestant land, should be taken to bind a nation which persistently 
repudiated the Reformation as heresy”,
202 since that common law resulted from “the 
regrettable preconceptions of English Judges”.
203  
 
After thus disposing of English common law’s denials of any religious privilege, Gavan 
Duffy J proceeded to appreciate the wisdom of Wigmore’s four fundamental conditions 
precedent to the establishment of a privileged communication.
204  He found that 
protecting “the priest against having to testify [was] ... only a half measure of justice, if 
                                                 
197 Idem. 
 
198 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515, 518. 
 
199 Idem. 
 
200 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515, 519.  This statement seems to be an allusion to Baron Alderson’s 
analogy between legal professional privilege and religious confession privilege  in R v Griffin (1853) Cox Cr 
Cas 219 which was discussed in chapter four, supra, pp 169-170. 
 
201 Idem. 
 
202 Idem. 
 
203 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515, 520. 
 
204 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515, 521.  The four Wigmore canons are quoted above at note 130. 
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[the two adverse parties could] ... blurt out the conversation”
205 and ruled that “no 
conversation whatever of the secret conversation [was] ... allowable, without the express 
permission of the parish priest”.
206  “[T]he emergence of the national Constitution”
207 of 
Ireland which “affirm[ed] the indefeasible right of the Irish people to develop its life in 
accordance with its own genius and traditions”
208 was a “complete and conclusive 
answer to the objection”
209 that Gavan Duffy J had not found a certain “judicial precedent 
in favour of the parish priest”.
210  “[T]he parish priest of Ballybunion [had thus] committed 
no contempt of the High Court on Circuit”.
211  
 
As the Supreme Court of Canada has since done, Gavan Duffy J also drew authority for 
his decision to recognise a confidential religious communications privilege from 
constitutional precedent which was particular to his own jurisdiction.  Though the majority 
in Gruenke chose to apply the Wigmore canons to affirm a discretionary or ‘case-by-
case’ privilege, Gavan Duffy J’s strong statements affirm a broad confidential 
communications privilege rather than a narrow religious confession privilege in Ireland 
since the communication which he held privileged on the facts before him did not 
represent a sacramental confession.  It is also worthy of note that Gavan Duffy J’s 
interpretive approach represents a more accurate application of the Wigmore canons 
than was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada.  For Wigmore favoured the creation 
                                                 
205 Ibid, p 524. 
 
206 Idem. 
 
207 Ibid, p 523. 
 
208 Ibid, p 519. 
 
209 Ibid, p 523. 
 
210 Idem. Sir George Jessel MR’s dictum in Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675, is treated by Gavan 
Duffy J as an example of a case in which “the old common law has been overlooked or brushed aside” (ibid, 
p 517) and is not followed on that basis. 
 
211 Ibid, p 525. 
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of a class privilege for religious confessions, though it is unclear whether he saw that 
class privilege as extending beyond formal religious confessions to confidential religious 
communications generally.
212  
 
While the earlier sketchy solicitor’s journal report in Tannian v Synnott
213 does not reveal 
any consideration of “the Wigmore principles”, it does reaffirm early Irish commitment to 
a discretionary religious communications privilege to be invoked in favour of a priest’s 
refusal to admit the evidence in contest.  Heard before Palles CB, the reference to 
religious communications privilege was incidental in a civil case involving a claim of 
damages for slander.  It is also unusual since the Roman Catholic priest involved was 
willingly involved as a plaintiff witness to provide evidence of a “conversation [that] had 
taken place in the street ... and not in confession”,
214 though it was acknowledged that 
the defendant had spoken to the priest in his professional capacity.  The Lord Chief 
Baron is reported to have “stated that he would not ask the witness to depose to 
anything connected, directly or indirectly, with confession, or in reference to his advice 
as to whether a man had committed a crime ... [but] that the present occasion was not 
complicated by such matters ... [so that] he allowed the evidence to be given in spite of 
any objection on behalf of the defendant.
215  It is fair to observe in the light of Gavan 
Duffy J’s later elaboration of a larger privilege, that the Tannian v Synott facts might now 
see this priest’s evidence excluded, even though there was certainly room to admit it as 
falling outside any class of religious privilege at all. 
                                                 
212 Wigmore JH, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown, 
1961, Vol 8, pp 876-878. 
 
213 Tannian v Synnott (1903) Ir. LT 275. 
 
214 Idem. 
 
215 Idem. 
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Discretion in commentary 
Though this summary of the evolution of judicial discretion benefitting confidential 
religious communications in England, Ireland and Canada is fairly consistent, the 
commentators who have recognised argument in favour of such judicial discretion, have 
not interpreted the authority as being well established or clear.  After citing Best CJ in 
Broad v Pitt, Mc Nicol has written:  
 
There appears to be wide support among commentators for the view that judges 
have the scope to discourage attempts to force disclosure.  At this stage, 
however, there does not appear to be any clear authority in Australia to support 
the existence of a special residual discretion not to insist on evidence being 
given.
216 
 
Bursell has written of the position in England:  
 
The present state of the law as to judicial discretion (both in civil and criminal 
cases) is unclear but s 82(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 
apparently recognises the existence of such an exclusionary discretion.
217 
 
But Professor Elliott
218 doubts that s 82(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
recognises the judicial discretion identified by Judge Bursell and instead says that 
                                                 
216 McNicol, SB, Law of Privilege, Australia, The Law Book Co, 1992, p 332. 
 
217 Bursell, RDH, “The Seal of the Confessional” (1990) 1 (7) Ecclesiastical LJ 84, 109. 
 
218 Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England. 
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provision was “overtaken and overlapped”
219 (though not repealed) “by a new more 
general discretion introduced by s 78(1)”.
220  Professor Elliott summarised his view with 
the statement that “it is quite unlikely that a judge is able to protect a reluctant witness by 
discretion”,
221 and that “it would be surprising if the judges ever used [the discretion in 
s 78] to rule out a priest’s evidence of a confession.”
222  Professor Elliott’s view is 
surprising since all the cases he reviewed have been discussed above and provide 
some authority for the exercise of judicial discretion in religious confession privilege 
cases – without any statutory endorsement as arguably allowed by the two sections of 
the English Police and Evidence Act 1984 cited.  The better view of the authorities must 
be that the common law provides scope for the exercise of judicial discretion to privilege 
even religious communications (and not just formal religious confessions) where the 
public interest can be invoked to justify the exercise of such discretion.  This 
notwithstanding the fact that neither English nor Canadian authority has recognised a 
‘class’ privilege for either religious confessions or confidential religious communications.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that a long line of common law authority dating back at 
least to 1791,
223 if not to 1606,
224 provides ample scope for the recognition at common 
law of both a religious confession privilege and also a broader religious communications 
privilege.  When twentieth century authority in Ireland, England and particularly Canada 
                                                 
219 Elliott, DW, “An Evidential Privilege for Priest-Penitent Communications” [1993-1995] 3 Ecclesiastical LJ 
272, 277. 
 
220 Idem. 
 
221 Ibid, p 274.  Though Lord Simon in D v NSPCC similarly said that law rather than discretion must control 
the course of a trial, he also recognised that a judge could exercise considerable moral authority on the 
course of a trial as for example by suggesting that counsel abandon a certain line of questioning (D v 
NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 239). 
 
222 Ibid, p 278. 
 
223 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96. 
 
224 Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217. 
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is overlaid upon that older common law base, it is difficult to ignore the existence of a 
judicial discretion such as has the power to exclude evidence of confidential religious 
communications.  Whether such discretion will ever be used, and if used, whether it will 
outweigh other public interest considerations which will be factored against it, is another 
matter.  But the common law certainly confirms the existence of such discretion. 
 
Conclusion to chapter five   
Chapters four and five of the thesis have explained the development of the common law 
on religious confession privilege since Garnet’s case and the publication of Coke’s 
Second Part of the Institutes in the early seventeenth century.  Recognising that the 
existence of a religious confession privilege has never been solemnly decided
225 in an 
English court, the thesis has reviewed other judicial treatment that has confused it with 
confessions obtained under duress; misinterpretations of obiter statements in cases 
about legal professional privilege and cases that really only dealt with general 
confessions somehow involving clergy – and has confirmed that ‘never solemnly 
decided’ assessment.  But the thesis has also suggested that the reluctance of a number 
of senior English judges to compel the disclosure of confidential religious 
communications in their courtrooms must mean something.  When those many 
expressions of reluctance are considered together, a thread of emerging discretion can 
be identified.  That thread suggests that members of the clergy may be privileged from 
providing evidence obtained in confidential religious communications if a countervailing 
public interest in protecting such confidence exists.  In Canada and Ireland, local 
constitutional instruments have justified a more complete elaboration of the metes and 
bounds of religious communications privilege.  Thus in Canada, a ‘case-by-case’ 
                                                 
225 Stephen JF, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, London, MacMillan and Co, 1876, p 171. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER FIVE   226
confidential religious communications privilege has clearly existed since R v Gruenke in 
1991, and in Ireland, since Cook v Carroll in 1945, there has existed a ‘class’ privilege 
which prevents any confidential religious communication at all being lead as evidence in 
court without the consent of the priest involved having first been obtained.  This 
conclusion will now be tested against the various theories which have been advanced to 
suggest that though religious confession privilege existed before the English 
Reformation, it was extinguished before the modern law of evidence was established. 
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  CHAPTER SIX 
THEORIES ABOUT THE EXTINCTION OF 
RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE 
 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the theories for extinction of religious 
confession privilege that exist to determine whether they have any validity despite the 
tentative conclusion advanced from the materials considered to date in the thesis.  There 
are five principal arguments that religious confession privilege was extinguished before 
the commencement of the twentieth century.  They are first, that religious confession 
privilege was extinguished either at or by the English Reformation or by the Restoration. 
Secondly, that the English social system and the law it produced was so set against 
Roman Catholicism from the time of the English Reformation until the end of the 
nineteenth century reform era that religious confession privilege “must” have been 
extinguished during that period.  Thirdly, the fact that any legislature has felt the need to 
pass a religious confession privilege statute proves religious confession privilege did not 
exist at all, or has been extinguished.  Fourthly, that in Anglo-American jurisdictions 
without an established state church, the absence of parliamentary legislative authority for 
a canonical confession privilege, has extinguished the existence of any common law 
religious confession privilege.  And finally, that Sir George Jessel MR’s dicta against RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SIX  228
religious confession privilege in Anderson v Bank of British Columbia
1 and Wheeler v 
LeMarchant
2 were so authoritative or so captured the spirit of public policy where 
religious confession privilege was concerned that they extinguished any residue of the 
privilege that may endured in English common law in the late nineteenth century. 
 
After reviewing each of these theories separately, the chapter will conclude that religious 
confession privilege has not been extinguished at common law. 
 
Religious confession privilege extinguished by the Reformation 
or the Restoration? 
 
Wigmore appears to be the primary authority for the theory that religious confession 
privilege was extinguished either by the English Reformation or by the Restoration.  He 
wrote, as will be remembered
3: 
 
It is perhaps open to argument whether a privilege for confessions to priests was 
recognized in common law courts during the period before the Restoration ... But 
since the Restoration, and for more than two centuries of English practice, the 
almost unanimous expression of judicial opinion (including at least two decisive 
rulings) has denied the existence of a privilege.
4 
                                                 
1 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644. 
 
2 Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675. 
 
3 This quotation was cited previously in the Introduction to the thesis, p 1. 
 
4 Wigmore, JH, McNaughton revision, op cit, Vol 8, p 869. 
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Various editions of Wigmore’s work
5 have been cited by other commentators for his 
proposition that religious confession privilege did not survive the Stuart Restoration.  For 
example, Vincent C Allred has written: 
 
The above are all the reported English cases on the subject.  They are conflicting 
and even where the privilege is squarely denied there are indications of mental 
disquietude on the part of the judge.  Professor Wigmore sums up as follows: 
[after which follows the Wigmore quote above and then the Allred conclusion] ... 
but the privilege cannot be said to have been recognized as a rule of the 
common law in England.
6 
 
Michael James Callahan references only Wigmore’s “unequivocal assertion ... that the 
privilege was unknown at common law”,
7 and though Jacob Yellin discusses the cases 
Wigmore cites, he only uses the quotations that Wigmore used in his footnotes without 
any apparent reconsideration of the facts of those cases.
8  Sister Simone Campbell does 
not cite Wigmore for her proposition that “[a]s state interests became dominant, the 
                                                 
5 1
st edition 1904; 2
nd edition 1923; 3
rd edition 1940; McNaughton Revision in 1961, with a most recent 1999 
supplement current as at the time of this writing. 
 
6 Allred, VC, “The Confessor in Court” (1953) 13 The Jurist 2, 7. 
 
7 Callahan, MC, “Historical Inquiry into Priest-Penitent Privilege” (1976) 26 The Jurist 328, 329. 
 
8 Yellin, J, “The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege” (1983) 23 Santa Clara LR 95, 
101.  Medina uses an identical phrase – “virtually unanimous opinion” – (the writer suspects this means 
Wigmore) that the privilege ceased to exist after the Reformation (Yellin, idem, citing Medina, JH, “Evidence: 
‘Is there a time to keep silence?’ – The priest-penitent privilege in Oklahoma” (1974) 27 Oklahoma LR 256).  
Valentine A Toth, however, cites Peake’s 1801 “A Compendium of the Law of Evidence” as authority for her 
statement that “it was clearly denied that such privilege ever existed ... in the 18
th and early in the 19
th 
century” (“The Clergyman: his privileges and liabilities” (1960) 9 Clev-Mar LR 323, 330).  Peake’s 
interpretation stemming primarily from his report of R v Sparkes ((1790) unreported) was discussed and 
dismissed in chapter one, pp 16-19. 
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[religious confession] privilege was abandoned by the courts”,
9 but she does cite another 
Allred article to the same effect
10 as that quoted above. 
 
Edward A Hogan
11 apparently gave the subject of the extinction of the privilege some 
independent thought.  He considered that since Blackstone’s “only reference to privilege 
in the law of evidence [was] given to that arising out of the relationship of attorney and 
client”
12 citing Wilson v Rastall,
13 religious confession privilege had been extinguished by 
the time Blackstone’s commentaries were published in 1783.
14  Though it is unclear 
whether Anonymous
15 in 1693 was one of the “two decisive rulings”
16 Wigmore found 
against religious confession privilege after the Restoration, since he leaves no other 
indication for his choice of the Restoration as the time of the demise, it appears that 
Anonymous represented confirmation to Wigmore that religious confession privilege had 
been extinguished by the end of the seventeenth century.  
 
Perhaps because of the lack of an obvious reason for Wigmore’s choice of ‘the 
Restoration’ as the date by which religious confession privilege had been extinguished 
                                                 
9 Campbell, S, “Catholic sisters, irregularly ordained women and the clergy-penitent privilege” (1976) 9 UC 
Davis LR 523, 525. 
 
10 Allred, VC, “United States Law of Privileged Communication” (1966) 11 New Catholic Encyclopedia 810. 
 
11 Hogan, EA, Jr, “A modern problem on the privilege of the confessional” (1951) 6 Loyola LR 1. 
 
12 Hogan, op cit, p 12. 
 
13 Wilson v Rastall (1792) LTR 753; 100 ER 1283. 
 
14 Blackstone, W, Commentaries on the Laws of England, New York & London, 1978, is a reprint of the 1783 
edition, printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell, London, and D. Prince, Oxford. 
 
15 Anonymous (1693) Skin 404; 90 ER 179. 
 
16 Wigmore, McNaughton revision, op cit, Vol 8, p 869. 
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from the common law, Tiemann and Bush,
17 have gone to some trouble to understand 
the assertion and to try and explain it.  After a brief survey of the English common law 
before the Reformation
18 which they affirm that the United States inherited, they note 
that the Anglican Church moved from compulsory confession to voluntary confession.  
Though the “absolute injunctions to secrecy”
19 in Roman Catholic canon law were 
removed from the 1603 Anglican canons, Tiemann and Bush state that the seal of 
confession was still inviolable, except in cases of treason (they accept Coke’s 
exception
20) “whether ... made to a Roman Catholic priest or to an Anglican one”.
21  They 
then ponder the reasons that can be advanced to explain how “[t]he privileges of the 
confessional were withdrawn from the English clergy sometime during the seventeenth 
century”
22 as Wigmore stated.  They speculate that it was because of “the banning of the 
prayer book of the Church of England”,
23 but they confirm that “[n]o writer seems clear 
about the exact time the privilege was withdrawn, nor why”
24 and that there is an 
absence of any clear and compelling evidence that lawyers would normally cite to prove 
a change in an established common law rule.  They note with Hogan above, guided by 
Wigmore again, that Blackstone’s “monumental work on the common law about the time 
                                                 
17 Tiemann, WH, and Bush, JC, The Right to Silence – Privileged Clergy Communications and the Law, 2
nd 
ed, Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1983. 
 
18 Ibid, pp 39-48. 
 
19 Ibid, p 53. 
 
20 For detailed discussion of Coke’s treason exception to religious confession privilege, see the discussion in 
chapter two, pp 66-74. 
 
21 Tiemann and Bush, op cit, p 52. 
 
22 Ibid, p 53. 
 
23 Ibid, p 53, discussing Wigmore, JH, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, revised by John T McNaughton, 
Boston, Little Brown, 1961, Vol 8, p 869. 
 
24 Idem. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SIX  232
of the American Revolution, ignores completely the privilege of the confessional”,
25 but 
suggest that this omission proves nothing since “[n]o writer seems clear about the exact 
time the privilege was withdrawn, nor why.”
26 They think it most likely that “the withdrawal 
occurred in January, 1645, with the abolition by Parliament of the Anglican Prayer 
Book”,
27 since the replacement “Directory for Worship ... produced by the Westminster 
Assembly contained no provisions for private confession and absolution”,
28 since “[t]he 
Puritans had little patience with former Anglican ordinances”.
29  But they point out that 
this reasoning cannot have been Wigmore’s, since he does not suggest the privilege 
was ended until after Charles II’s return.  They then conjecture that Wigmore’s unstated 
reasoning may have been that when King Charles II was restored, he enacted “severe 
repressive measures ... against the Puritan ministry”.
30  In such context “[t]he withdrawal 
of the seal would have been one more act of persecution, aimed at preventing the 
Puritan pastors from holding back secrets before royal tribunals”.
31  But Tiemann and 
Bush also find this reasoning unconvincing since “the Puritans did not practice 
confession as such”.
32  Though they do not say that they end their search stumped or 
mystified as to why so respected an evidence law authority as Wigmore should leave his 
conclusion essentially unjustified, they concede that result when they abandon his post-
                                                 
25 Ibid, p 53. 
 
26 Idem. 
 
27 Idem, however they do not answer the obvious question of where religious confession privilege then stood 
once the Prayer Book was reinstated, as it was (Bursell, RDH, “The seal of the confessional” (1990), 
Ecclesiastical LJ 1 (7) (1990) 84, p 89). 
 
28 Ibid, p 53. 
 
29 Idem. 
 
30 Idem. 
 
31 Idem. 
 
32 Ibid, pp 53-54. 
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Charles II Restoration date for “[t]he withdrawal of the seal”
33 and return to their own 
thought that it must have happened during “Cromwell’s toleration”.
34  
 
Wright and Graham
35 were more direct in their doubt of Wigmore’s conclusion when they  
wrote that “[c]ourts and writers regularly assert that there was no penitent’s privilege at 
common law.  The authority cited in support of this proposition is seldom impressive, 
usually consisting of one or two judicial opinions or a citation to Wigmore.”
36  After their 
own review of the historical common law, Wright and Graham conclude that Wigmore’s 
“statements of the impact of the authorities he cites”
37 against a religious confession 
privilege after the Restoration are “exaggerated”.
38   
 
Though the existence of a religious confession privilege at English common law may 
never have been “solemnly decided”,
39 it is not correct to see Holt CJ’s passing 
reference to a person not being entitled to legal professional privilege in 1693
40 as 
extinguishing religious confession privilege which had been a part of English custom for 
                                                 
33 Ibid, p 53. 
 
34 Ibid, p 54. 
 
35 Wright, CA, and Graham, KW, Federal Practice and Procedure, 3
rd ed, St Paul Minnesota, West 
Publishing Co, 1992. 
 
36 Wright and Graham, op cit, Vol 26, p 29. 
 
37 Ibid, p 41. 
 
38 Idem. 
 
39 Stephen JF, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, London , MacMillan and Co, 1876, p 171.  Winckworth says 
“the question [of the existence of religious confession privilege] has never really been raised in any English 
court since the Reformation” (The Seal of the Confessional and the Law of Evidence, London, S.P.C.K. 
1952, p 15).  Nokes says that “the existence of the privilege might appear to be an open question” because 
“few of the judges ever referred to their brethren’s opinions ... [and] full argument ... [was never] heard, or a 
definite ruling given” (Nokes, GD, “Professional Privilege” )1950) 66 LQR 88, 98).  Allred cited an 1899 
American Law Review article for his similar conclusion that “the question had never received precise 
adjudication in England” (Allred, VC, “The Confessor in Court”, The Jurist 13 (1953) 2, 7). 
 
40 Anonymous (1693) Skin 404; 90 ER 179. 
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centuries.  Though the Commissioners in Garnet’s case
41 may not have allowed 
Garnet’s attempted religious confession privilege defence, their denial that he had 
received a confession and Coke’s belief that such an argument of religious confession 
privilege would have been defeated by “the treason exception”, confirm that the privilege 
outlasted the Reformation by more than sixty years.  The Wigmore conclusion that 
religious confession privilege did not survive the seventeenth century is also 
discountenanced by the marked reluctance of many judges to compel priests to testify 
into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  It is also appropriately observed that the 
line of authority in favour of a discretionary confidential religious communications 
privilege at common law discussed in chapter five, was well established by the time 
Wigmore wrote his first edition – and his own four canons
42 have enlightened that line of 
development subsequently.
43  
 
Before I pass to the argument that anti-Catholic prejudice extinguished religious 
confession privilege from English common law, one further historical theory as to why 
religious confession privilege did not survive the eighteenth century is appropriately 
discussed here since it too has been attributed to Wigmore.  That theory is that in the 
seventeenth century, the philosophical rationale for all privileges underwent a marked 
changed such that any enduring privilege was thereafter necessarily premised in public 
interest rather than in a duty to keep confidences.  The logic behind this theory was set 
out by Wilson J in the High Court of Australia in 1983 when that court was asked to 
                                                 
41 Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217. 
 
42 Wigmore, JH, McNaughton revision, op cit, Vol 8, p 527.  They are set out in full in chapter five, note 130. 
 
43 Gavan Duffy J in Ireland in Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515, found Wigmore’s canons helpful in 
recognising a religious communications class privilege in Ireland and the Supreme Court of Canada found 
them similarly useful in establishing a discretionary ‘case-by-case’ privilege in Canada in R v Gruenke (1991) 
3 SCR 263. 
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consider whether documents kept by a solicitor in his office were appropriately seized by 
Australian Federal Police Officers executing a search warrant.  He said: 
 
But confidentiality alone cannot supply the reason for ... [legal professional] 
privilege.  Originally it may have done so, in common with the protection which 
the law at that time afforded to other confidential relationships. In the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries the privilege was based in the duty of the solicitor to 
respect professional confidences.  It was a matter of honour and consequently 
the privilege belonged to him rather than to the client: Wigmore on Evidence, 
McNaughton rev. (1961) vol. 8, par. 2290.  However, in the eighteenth century 
the law moved decisively away from this approach, with the Duchess of 
Kingston’s Case (1776) 20 State Tr 355 providing the turning point.  The public 
interest, not merely the protection of confidentiality, became the reason for the 
rule.  Thereafter, the only profession to have the privilege of non-disclosure was 
the legal profession.  The historical evolution of the privilege is described by Lord 
Simon of Glaisdale in D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children (1978) AC 171, at pp 237 – 239.
44 
 
Though the Duchess of Kingston’s case has certainly been quoted as authority for 
Wilson J’s proposition in the text writers,
45 a judgement against any evidential privilege 
for a medical practitioner with no mention of religious confession privilege or its discrete 
history, cannot extinguish religious confession privilege from the common law. It is 
noteworthy that neither Wilson J nor Lord Simon cited any other authority for the 
                                                 
44 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 94. 
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proposition that legal professional privilege is the only evidential privilege that survived 
the eighteenth century.  
 
Did anti-Catholic prejudice extinguish religious confession 
privilege? 
Sir James Stephen QC
46 surfaced this theory in the 1876 original edition of his Digest of 
Evidence.
47  Though I have cited part of the following quote previously to identify when 
the law of evidence evolved
48, it also provides a clear indication of the influence that anti-
Catholic prejudice had upon the development of law during the same period.  He wrote: 
 
I think the modern law of Evidence is not so old as the Reformation, but has 
grown up by the practice of the courts, and by decisions in the course of the last 
two centuries.  It came into existence at a time when exceptions in favour of 
auricular confessions to Roman Catholic priests were not likely to be made.  The 
general rule is that every person must testify to what he knows.  An exception to 
the general rule has been established in regard to legal advisers, but there is 
nothing to show that it extends to clergymen, and it is usually stated so as not to 
include them.
49 
 
                                                 
46 Sir James Stephen served as a Criminal Court Judge from 1879 to 1891and was made a Baronet in 1891 
http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/AO846659.html,  (last visited 30 July 2003). 
 
47 The language in all subsequent editions, including the 12
th in 1948, is unchanged. 
 
48 See chapter four, p 130. 
 
49 Stephen, JF, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, London, MacMillan and Co, 1876, p 172. 
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Despite the fact that he was a Roman Catholic apologist, Richard Nolan thought that the 
privilege which undoubtedly existed at the time of the Reformation, was probably 
extinguished during the Catholic persecution which followed for centuries, though he 
points to no authoritative date or event which signalled its demise.
50 Wright and Graham 
contribute:  
 
By the time Catholics in England had regained their civil rights and could claim 
the privilege, English law had already set its face against all privileges other than 
attorney-client privilege.
51 
 
However, they qualify that apparent support for the idea that religious persecution 
contributed to the supposed extinction of the privilege with their acknowledgement that 
the clerics of the 
 
established Church ... were not interested in embarrassing the courts with 
divisive demands for a privilege when they could count on the religious 
sympathies of the judges to protect their secrets without the existence of a formal 
privilege.
52 
 
Such veiled reference to the evolution of a discretionary religious communications 
privilege
53 is hardly conclusive that religious confession privilege had been extinguished. 
                                                 
50 Nolan, RS, “The law of the seal of confession” (1913) 13 Catholic Encyclopedia 649, 653. 
 
51 Wright, CA, and Graham, KW, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence, 3
rd ed, St Paul Minnesota, West 
Publishing Co, 1992, Vol 2b, §5612, p 42. 
 
52 Idem. 
 
53 Discussed in chapter five, supra. 
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But there is considerably more opinion that points up the unworthiness of the notion that 
pure historic prejudice in the absence of any formal legal decision, can extinguish a 
privilege.  That such opinion pre-dates twentieth century acceptance of non-
discrimination norms is the more impressive.  Best
54 was the first who so wrote and he 
responded to the idea that Sir Michael Smith, the Irish Master of the Rolls, had 
extinguished religious confession privilege by his 1801 decision in Butler v Moore,
55 as 
follows:  
 
How far that form of religious belief being disfavoured by the law at the period, 
affected those decisions, it is not easy to say, but [it] leave[s] the general 
question untouched. [italics original].
56 
 
Badeley’s contemporary pamphlet
57 which responded to the public debate surrounding 
the case of Constance Kent noted in chapter four,
58 also referenced the effect that anti-
Catholic prejudice had had upon the development of the common law concerning 
religious confession privilege.  But he considered that error to have been corrected by 
parliamentary legislation passed between 1791 and the time of his writing in 1865.
59  He 
concludes: 
 
                                                 
54 Best, WM, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, London, S Sweet, 1849.  See also brief reference to 
this opinion of Best in chapter four at note 104 and in the supporting text. 
 
55 Butler v Moore (1804-1806) 2 Sch & Lef 249. 
 
56 Best, WM, op cit, pp 459-460. 
 
57 Badeley, E, The Privilege of Religious Confessions in English Courts of Justice considered in a letter to a 
Friend, London, Butterworths, 1865. 
 
58 Chapter four, pp 171-175. 
 
59 Chapter four, note 190. 
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The religion is restored, not indeed as the religion of the State, but as one 
sanctioned and protected by law.  The Catholic therefore is reinstated in his right 
to the perfect enjoyment of all the ordinances of his creed, and of those privileges 
which are necessary to the performance of every one of his religious duties.  If he 
is not, he has not that benefit which the legislature intended to give him.
60 
 
Though Badeley says that the “right of Catholics at the present day to have their 
confessions respected in courts of justice rests upon a different ground [than for 
Anglicans]”,
61 he says that even the Catholic privilege has a clear origin in both common 
and ecclesiastical law. 
 
Finlason’s apologetic report of Hill J’s decision in R v Hay
62 disagrees with Badeley’s 
non-sacramental interpretation of Anglican confession, but concludes that both religions 
still benefit by an unrevoked privilege with unequivocal common law origins.  For 
Badeley in 1865, the Anglican privilege is even stronger than the common law privilege 
which favours confessional privilege generally, because the practices of the state 
established church (including secret confession) have force as general law. 
 
Mayor Clinton’s decision in The People v Phillips
63 expresses a very critical view of the 
English common law still applicable in North America in the early nineteenth century.  
                                                 
60 Badeley, op cit, p 32.  Badeley’s reference to the legislative restoration of the Catholic religion to a position 
of sanction and protection is an implicit reference to that then well-known and contemporary series of 
enactments which relaxed the law against non-conformist religions generally, and Roman Catholicism in 
particular.  See specifically The Roman Catholic Relief Acts of 1791 (31 Geo. 3, c 32) and 1829 (10 Geo. 4, 
c 7). 
 
61 Badeley, op cit, p 32. 
 
62 R v Hay (1860) 2 Foster & Finlason 4; 175 ER 933. 
 
63 The People v Phillips (1813) NY Ct. Gen. Sess., reprinted in “Privileged Communications to Clergymen”, 
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Though he ultimately decided the case on constitutional grounds inapplicable in the 
English context, his reasoning is informative, particularly since it concurs in the 
conclusion to which Badeley and Finlason both came fifty years later.  He began with 
reference to the decision in Butler v Moore
64 in Ireland: 
 
With those who have turned their attention to the history of Ireland, the decisions 
of Irish courts, respecting Roman Catholics, can have little or no weight. 
 
That unfortunate country has been divided into two great parties, the oppressors 
and the oppressed.  The Catholic has been disenfranchised of his civil rights, 
deprived of his inheritance, and excluded from the common rights of man; statute 
has been passed upon statute, and adjudication piled upon adjudication in 
prejudice of his religious freedom.  The benign spirit of toleration, and the maxims 
of enlightened policy, have recently ameliorated his condition, and will 
undoubtedly, in process of time, place him on the same footing with his 
Protestant brethren; but until he stands upon the broad pedestal of equal rights, 
emancipated from the most unjust thraldom, we cannot but look with a jealous 
eye upon all decisions which fetter or rivet his chains.
65 
 
Since the decision of Buller J in R v Sparkes
66 had been cited to him as an authority 
against the existence of religious confession privilege, and since Mayor Clinton had set 
his mind to affirm the existence of such privilege he dispatched Buller J’s reasoning 
_________________________ 
 
 
64 Butler v Moore (1804-1806) 2 Sch & Lef 249.  
 
65 The People v Phillips (1813), as reported in The Catholic Lawyer 1 (1955) 198, 205-206. 
 
66 R v Sparkes (1790), unreported but referred to in Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SIX  241
without any hesitation at all.  He observed that there was no official report of the case 
and such anecdotal evidence as was available about its finding came from the interested 
counsel of one of the parties in the matter.
67  He said that the reasoning was 
unconvincing because it was the hurried decision of a single judge on circuit without 
research opportunity
68  and he said that “[i]t [was] virtually overturned by Lord Kenyon, 
who certainly censure[d] it with as much explicitness as one Judge can impeach the 
decision of his colleague, without departing from judicial decorum”.
69  And for good 
measure he added that it was just plain wrong on moral grounds.
70  But speaking from 
an American context where he saw religious confession as part of that freedom of 
religious practice which was protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution, he 
also distinguished Buller J’s decision from that which confronted him in Phillips with the 
observation that the Protestant clergyman who received the confession in Sparkes was 
not “exposed to ecclesiastical degradation and universal obloquy” if he revealed the 
relevant confidential communication.
71  
 
Though Mayor Clinton’s language is harsh and intemperate and has no precedential 
authority in the British Commonwealth, it is prescient of twentieth century opinion in the 
English common law world enlightened since by international human rights instruments 
and constitutional principle.  Mayor Clinton’s sentiments also resonate with the more 
circumspect comments made by Gavan Duffy J in Ireland in 1945 in the light of the Irish 
                                                 
67 The People v Phillips, as reported in “Privileged Communications to Clergymen”, The Catholic Lawyer 1 
(1955) 198, 204. 
 
68 Idem. 
 
69 Idem. 
 
70 Idem. 
 
71 Idem. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SIX  242
Constitution.
72  It is memorable that Gavan Duffy J also observed that “it would be 
intolerable that the common law, as expounded after the Reformation in a Protestant 
land, should be taken to bind a nation which persistently repudiated the Reformation as 
heresy”,
73 since that common law resulted from “the regrettable preconceptions of 
English Judges”.
74 
 
Since even that anti-Catholic prejudice which did find its way into common law has been 
expunged by statute and discredited by objective doubt, it is inaccurate to state that 
religious confession privilege in English common law was extinguished by more than two 
hundred years of official persecution of the Roman Catholic faith. 
 
Does the advent of statutory religious confession privilege 
prove that it had been extinguished at common law? 
 
This argument was most memorably expressed by Lamer CJ in R v Gruenke
75 when he 
gave the majority judgement of that court in 1991.
76  He said that he could not “agree 
with the appellant that the existence of a limited statutory religious privilege in some 
jurisdictions indicates that a common law privilege exists.  If anything, the fact that there 
is a statutory privilege in some jurisdictions indicates that the common law did not protect 
religious communications – thus necessitating the statutory protection.”
77  It is not clear 
from the rest of the judgement, what arguments counsel for the appellant put to the court 
                                                 
72 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515. 
 
73 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515, 519. 
 
74 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515, 520. 
 
75 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263. 
 
76 Discussed supra in chapter five, pp 210-217. 
 
77 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263, 288. 
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in support of the submission that the existence of a limited statutory religious privilege in 
some jurisdictions indicated the existence of a common law privilege.  Given that Adele 
Gruenke’s communication was not a formal religious confession, it is unlikely that her 
counsel sought to establish the existence of a narrow religious confession privilege in the 
extant common law, so that the Supreme Court of Canada did not have to consider that. 
 
In a practical sense, the same question must be said to have faced every Parliament that 
has enacted a statutory religious confession privilege – including all fifty United States,
78 
the two Canadian jurisdictions acknowledged by Lamer CJ in R v Gruenke, Victoria,
79 
Tasmania,
80 the Northern Territory,
81 New South Wales,
82 and the Commonwealth of 
Australia
83 and New Zealand.
84  The history of the origins of those statutes and their 
subsequent development manifest a variety of moving causes.  Those include in New 
York State in 1828, an apparent egalitarian concern in the then fledgling republican 
democracy, to spell out that First Amendment Freedom of Religion included religious 
confession privilege as a matter of practice;
85 in New South Wales in 1989, equivocal 
                                                 
78 But not the US federal jurisdiction where a common law religious confession privilege has been found to 
exist (Mullen v US (1959) 263 F 2d 275).  See also chapter five, note 1, for details of the statutes applicable 
in US State jurisdictions. 
 
79 The Evidence Act 1958, s 28(1) (No 6246 of 1958).  The first Victorian religious confession privilege was 
enacted in 1890 (Evidence Act 1890) (54 Vict No 1088 c 55). 
 
80 The Evidence Act 1910, s 96 (1 George V, No 20) was the first Tasmanian provision though it was 
superseded in 2001 when Tasmania adopted the Uniform Commonwealth Evidence Act (76/2001). 
 
81 The Evidence Ordinances 1939, s 12(1). 
 
82 The first religious confession privilege provision in statute in New South Wales was the Evidence 
(Religious Confessions) Amendment Act 1989 which inserted section 10(6) into the New South Wales 
Evidence Act 1898.  That provision was superseded by the Evidence Act 1995, s 127 (No 25 of 1995). 
 
83 The Evidence Act 1995, s 127. 
 
84 The Evidence Amendment Act 1980, s 31.  The first New Zealand religious confession privilege was 
enacted in the Evidence Further Amendment Act 1885, s 7 (49 Vict No 15). 
 
85 Rev. Stat. of N.Y. (1828), Pt. 3. c.7. tit. 3 §72, though note that the federal constitution was not binding 
upon the states until perhaps 1940 (see chapter seven, note 202).  Note also that Reese traces the 
Delaware (1961) statute to a similar dissatisfaction with the treatment of religious confessions at common RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SIX  244
desires both to correct the misapprehension of the judge in R v Young
86 that there was 
no common law religious confession privilege and a desire to create one if it did not 
exist,
87 and in many United States jurisdictions, legislative efforts to order seemingly 
incoherent judicial applications of both common law and statutory privileges in the face 
of voluminous academic suggestions toward improvement.
88 
 
Such a variety of moving causes for legislation manifest the diverse influences which 
press upon modern legislatures.  Nor does legislative treatment in antiquity lead to the 
conclusion that there was no common law privilege.  As was explained in chapter two, 
statutes were used by the King as a judge to answer petitions and clarify the common 
_________________________ 
 
law in that state (Reese, S, “Confidential Communications to Clergy” (1963) 24 Ohio St LJ 55), and Allred 
says that the New Jersey statute was established by the state’s legislature after it had been denied twice in 
court (Allred, VC, “The Confessor in Court” (1951) 13 The Jurist 2, 9). 
 
86 An unreported case which was celebrated in the NSW Press because Father Mark McGuigan a Catholic 
priest in Lithgow, refused to tell whether or not he had heard a confession from Pamela Young, who was 
charged with murdering her husband on New Years Eve in 1988.  The Daily Mirror reported that Ken Horler 
QC had opined that the Priest should be charged with contempt but that Attorney-General John Dowd had 
stepped in to prevent such a charge being laid (Daily Mirror (NSW) 18 August 1988).  This case is a different 
case than R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 cited elsewhere in this thesis and which dealt with that 
defendant’s challenge to sexual assault communications privilege asserted by various counsellors to the 
complainant in a rape case. 
 
87 R v Young was only reported in Sydney newspapers (Daily Mirror (NSW) 17 August 1988; The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 3 April 1989).  The reasoning of the NSW legislature is revealed in the Hansard debates 
that followed those newspaper reports and resulted in the passage of the Evidence Amendment (Religious 
Confessions) Act of 1989 (Parliamentary Debates (NSW) Legislative Council, 21 November 1989, pp 12829-
12835). 
 
88 For example, see Hogan, EA, Jr, “A modern problem on the privilege of the confessional” (1951) 6 Loyola 
LR 1; Allred, VC, “The Confessor in Court” (1953) 2 The Jurist 2; Reese, S, “Confidential Communications to 
Clergy” (1963) 24 Ohio St LJ 55; Kuhlmann, FL, “Communications to Clergymen – When are they 
privileged?” (1968) 2 Valparaiso ULR 265; Medina, JM, “Evidence – ‘Is there a time to keep silence?’ – The 
priest-penitent privilege in Oklahoma” (1974) 27 Oklahoma LR 258; Campbell, S, “Catholic Sisters, 
Irregularly ordained women and the clergy-penitent privilege” (1976) 9 UC Davis LR 523; Yellin, JM, “The 
History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege” (1983) 23 Santa Clara LR 95; Smith, MC, “The 
pastor on the witness stand: Toward a religious privilege in the courts” (1984) 29 Catholic Lawyer 1; Mayes, 
JE, “Striking down the clergyman-communicant privilege statutes: Let free exercise of religion govern” (1986) 
62 Indiana LJ 397; Mitchell, MH, “Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy 
Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion” (1987) 71 Minn LR 723; Brocker, LL, “Sacred secrets: A call for the 
expansive application and interpretation of the clergy-communicant privilege” (1991) 36 NYL SLR 455; 
Horner, C, “Beyond the confines of the confessional: the priest-penitent privilege is a diverse society” (1997) 
45 Drake LR 697; Mazza, MJ, “Should clergy hold the priest-penitent privilege?” (1998) 82 Marquette LR 
171; Whittaker, LK, “The priest-penitent privilege: Its constitutionality and doctrine” (2000) 13 Regent ULR 
145. 
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law.
89  The Statute Articuli Cleri in 1315,
90 which Sir Edward Coke cited in his Second 
Part of the Institutes as an authority for common law religious confession privilege with a 
treason exception,
91 was “an attempt to delimit accurately the sphere of the lay and 
spiritual jurisdictions”
92 as the King responded to petitions against alleged clerical abuse.  
While modern legislative treatment of a subject can still modify the pre-existent common 
law, many statutes have been passed in many jurisdictions to codify the common law in 
a simple, coherent and orderly way.  Hence, though it was reasonable for Lamer CJ in 
Gruenke to rebut the applicant’s assertion that the existence of a religious confession 
privilege statute proved the existence of such a privilege in common law by pointing out 
the familiar modern legislative use of statutes to overrule judicial lawmaking,
93 neither 
view of the relationship of common law and statute is complete even in the twenty-first 
century.  In fact, the question of whether there was or is a common law religious 
confession privilege, or a confidential religious communications privilege, stands 
independent of any statute on the subject unless the statute was passed to expressly 
abrogate or extinguish such privilege.   
 
It has been one purpose of this thesis to address the question peripherally debated by 
Lamer CJ and counsel for the appellant in R v Gruenke – “whether there is a legal 
common law privilege for religious communications”.
94  Lamer CJ’s summary was that 
                                                 
89 Supra, chapter two, pp 53-58. 
 
90 9 Edward II. St. 1. 
 
91 Coke, Sir E, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, New York, Garland Publishing Co, 
1979, p 629. 
 
92 Holdsworth, WS, A History of English Law, 2
nd ed, Boston, Little Brown & Co, 1923, Vol 1, p 585. 
 
93 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263, 287-288. 
 
94 Ibid, p 287. 
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the “conflicting interpretations of pre-Reformation history”
95 urged by the parties to that 
appeal had been “inconclusive”,
96 even though he was inclined to accept that neither the 
English nor the Canadian courts had been inclined to compel “members of the clergy to 
disclose confidential religious communications ... as a matter of practice”.
97  In the end, 
the Supreme Court of Canada saw the issue as a matter of policy and decided the 
matter by finding a “case-by-case” discretionary judicial discretion to be exercised as the 
weighed factual considerations arising dictated. 
 
Since neither the Manitoba nor Canadian legislatures have moved to overrule, abrogate 
or codify the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Gruenke, it can be stated that 
there is common law affirming a species of confidential religious communications 
privilege in that country.  This even though Gruenke may be interpreted to affirm rather 
more narrowly a judicial discretion to exclude evidence on grounds of public policy on a 
case-by-case basis.  It is thus not accurate to say that the advent of a religious 
confession privilege in statute law proves either that such a privilege did not exist at 
common law or that the statute was necessary to redeem it. 
 
Does the ‘non-establishment’ of a State Church extinguish 
common law religious confession privilege? 
 
The simple answer to this question in Australia is that when the Commonwealth was 
established in 1901, the foundational decision not to establish any state church as had 
always existed in England, did not simultaneously extinguish freedom of religious 
                                                 
95 Idem. 
 
96 Idem. 
 
97 Ibid, p 288. 
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practice.  For the same constitutional provision which forbade the establishment of a 
state church also affirmed “free exercise of any religion”.
98  It reads: 
 
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for 
imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any 
religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or 
public trust under the Commonwealth.
99 
 
There has been no Australian case that addresses the question of whether the practice 
of religious confession or confidential communication for religious purposes is an 
example of free religious exercise protected by this constitutional provision.  However it 
has been stated that a law that was expressly directed at proscribing an otherwise lawful 
religious practice, would breach this constitutional provision.
100  It is also evident from 
even the limited Australian jurisprudence on section 116, that the purpose of legislation 
which has the effect of proscribing a religious practice will be a valid consideration when 
courts decide if a law (or even an administrative decision
101) breaches the constitutional 
prohibition against Commonwealth interference in the free exercise of religion.
102 
                                                 
98 The Australian Constitution, 1901, section 116. 
 
99 Idem. 
 
100 Per Pincus J in Lebanese Moslem Association v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 11 
FCR 543, 577-578, though note that his decision was overturned by the Full Federal Court on appeal who 
considered that the Minister had not intended to prohibit the free exercise of the practice of Islam when he 
had deported an Imam. 
 
101 Note that it was an administrative decision that was in contest in in Lebanese Moslem Association v 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 11 FCR 543 and in the appeal (Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs v Lebanese Moslem Association (1987) 17 FCR 373). 
 
102 In Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 Latham 
CJ considered the statement that “civil government … can deal as it pleases with any acts which are done in 
pursuance of religious belief without infringing the principle of freedom of religion” (p 124), and decided that 
is was open to the court “to determine whether a particular law is an undue infringement of religious 
freedom” ( p 131) though he and Starke J decided that section 116 did not protect action subversive of social 
order (per Latham CJ at p 122 and per Starke J at p 155).  Latham CJ also said that the use of the word “for” RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SIX  248
Perhaps the advent of a federal religious confession privilege statute in Australia in 
1995
103 will serve to bulwark religious confession privilege in the future, since any 
statutory measure to abolish religious confession privilege after such express 
recognition, would face a stronger constitutional challenge than would be possible if 
religious confession privilege was deemed ambiguous at common law.  It is also unclear 
whether a statute passed to privilege religious confession is an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion,
104 though that seems unlikely since on the few occasions when 
the High Court has considered the meaning of the establishment clause, it has indicated 
that the clause only means that the Commonwealth cannot legislate to create a state 
church in Australia.
105  
 
Though the Australian constitutional provision does not state that religious confession 
privilege is an example of protected religious exercise, and though there is no reported 
Australian judicial decision on point, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed a similar 
_________________________ 
 
in section 116  “shows that the purpose of the legislation in question may properly be taken into account in 
determining whether or not it is a law of the prohibited character” (at  para 10).  More recently in Kruger v 
Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, the High Court variously affirmed that “[t]he purpose of the law may be 
taken into account in determining whether it infringes the free exercise clause” (Moens GA & Trone J, Lumb 
and Moens’ The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, 6
th ed, Butterworths, Australia 2001, para 
803, p 376) though Gaudron J made the even stronger suggestion that “[t]he purpose of the law is the sole 
criterion of validity” (Moens and Trone, idem). 
 
103 Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995, s 127. 
 
104 Note that this argument by Jane E Mayes in the United States, has not gained any apparent traction 
(“Striking down the clergy-communicant privilege statutes: let free exercise of religion govern” (1986) 62 
Indiana LJ 397). 
 
105 See for example the judgements of  Barwick CJ and Gibbs J in Attorney-General (Vic) ; Ex rel Black v 
Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559. Note also as explained by Moens and Trone “that the proclamation 
under the Marriage Act 1961 of religious denominations as recognised for celebrating marriage was not an 
‘establishment’ of religion, especially having regard to the Commonwealth’s power over marriage” though an 
exercise of such Commonwealth power in favour of one particular denomination would likely offend the 
constitution (Moens GA & Trone J, Lumb and Moens’ The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, 6
th 
ed, Butterworths, Australia 2001, para 799, p 373 discussing Nelson v Fish (1990) 21 FCR 430 per French J 
at p 434). 
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issue in Gruenke.
106  Counsel for the appellant had suggested that “the value of freedom 
of religion, embodied in s 2(a) [of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms] ... must 
necessarily be recognized in the form of a prima facie [confidential religious 
communications] privilege in order to give full effect to the Charter guarantee”.
107  But 
Lamer CJ stated that:  
 
The extent (if any) to which disclosure of communications will infringe on an 
individual’s freedom of religion, will depend on the particular circumstances 
involved, for example: the nature of the communication, the purpose for which it 
was made, the manner in which it was made, and the parties to the 
communication.
108 
 
However, Lamer CJ also adopted the following words of an earlier Supreme Court of 
Canada decision: 
 
A truly free society is one which can accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, 
diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of conduct.  A free society is 
one which aims at equality with respect to the enjoyment of fundamental 
freedoms and I say this without any reliance upon s. 15 of the Charter.
109 
 
                                                 
106 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263. 
 
107 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263, 289. 
 
108 Idem. 
 
109 R v Big M Drug Mart [1985] 1 SCR 295, 336. 
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He then observed “that the case-by-case analysis”
110 of confidential religious 
communications called for under the Charter, “must begin with a ‘non-denominational’ 
approach”,
111 with the informality of some confessional practices not operating as a bar 
to the exclusion of some confidential communications as evidence.
112  Lamer CJ had 
earlier quoted the Ontario Court of Appeal in the Church of Scientology No 6 case,
113 
which had observed 
 
that the fundamental freedom of conscience and religion now enshrined in s 2(a) 
of the Charter embraces not only the freedom of religious thought and belief but 
also “the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching 
and dissemination”.  This protection will no doubt strengthen the argument in 
favour of recognition of a priest-and-penitent privilege.
114 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s statement that “a truly free society [is] one which can 
accommodate a wide variety of beliefs”
115 is a characterisation of democratic religious 
tolerance that resonates with Australian constitutional values.  That the court made this 
statement without relying upon section 15 of the Charter strongly suggests that a 
common law evidential privilege for confidential religious communications need not be 
inconsistent with secular state neutrality towards religion anywhere in the Anglo-
American common law world.  But could any residue of common law religious confession 
privilege extant in England and inherited by Australia before federation have been 
                                                 
110 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263, 291. 
 
111 Idem. 
 
112 Idem. 
 
113 Re Church of Scientology and the Queen (no 6) (1987), 31 CCC (3d) 449. 
 
114 Ibid, p 540, quoting in part Dickson CJ in R v Big M Drug Mart [1985] 1 SCR 295. 
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extinguished before the guarantee of free exercise of religion was enshrined in the 
Constitution? 
 
A series of lectures given by Keith Mason in October 1989
116 explained that there has 
always been separation between church and state in Australia despite the familiar 
pronouncements in the inherited common law that “the Christian religion is part of the 
law of the land”.
117  However, though he explained why the idea that Australia had “an 
inherently Christian legal system”
118 was essentially a “myth”,
119 he confirmed in his 
fourth lecture that Australia did originally inherit England’s “establishment”
120 of the 
Church of England.
121  In the early colonial years, that establishment saw the church 
function “as an adjunct to the military establishment”,
122 among other reasons “to ... keep 
alive amongst the bulk of the people such a sense of religion as will make them 
temperate and orderly, and domestic and contented”.
123  But that establishment was 
gradually diluted by “the large numbers of non-Anglicans in the early colony”,
124 many of 
whom “ministered more effectively to the convicts” and who “railed against the privileges 
of the Anglicans”.
125  The dilution of establishment need not be traced in full, but began 
                                                 
116 Mason, K, Constancy and Change, Sydney, Federation Press, 1990.  At the time he gave these lectures, 
Keith Mason was the New South Wales Solicitor-General.  As of this writing (2006), he is President of the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal. 
 
117 Mason, K, op cit, p 4, citing Williams’ case (1797) How St Tr 654 at 703 per Kenyon CJ. 
 
118 Mason, K, op cit, chapter one, pp 1-30. 
 
119 Idem. 
 
120 Ibid, pp 93-101. 
 
121 Idem.  However, Mason notes that “[t]he Presbyterians were on firm ground when they reminded those in 
power that there were not one, but two established churches in Britain” (ibid, p 101). 
 
122 Ibid, p 102. 
 
123 Ibid, p 97, quoting William Wilberforce. 
 
124 Ibid, p 101. 
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with the provision of state subsidies in connection with the church buildings of other 
denominations,
126 and the provision of stipends for their ministers.
127  It seems that the 
dilution of religious establishment in Australia was almost complete when judicial doubt 
was expressed about the validity of letters patent issued by the state to bishops
128 and 
state aid for public worship was terminated in 1863,
129 as was “all financial aid to 
Churches and Church schools by the latter part of the 19
th century”.
130  But in answer to 
the question of whether any residual common law religious confession privilege inherited 
from England was extinguished during the period when establishment was diluted, it is 
noteworthy that there was no statute passed to specifically or impliedly abrogate 
religious confession privilege. 
 
Ultimately, it was the debates surrounding the creation of an Australian Federal 
Constitution and the decision to adopt the American constitutional language to express 
the Australian separation of church and state
131 that finalised the severance of church 
and state in Australia.  While Australia’s greater secularism
132 may explain the absence 
of the profound debates about the practical meaning of ‘the establishment clause’ that 
                                                 
126 Ibid, p 103. 
 
127 Idem. 
 
128 Idem. 
 
129 Idem. 
 
130 Idem. 
 
131 Ibid, pp 103-105. 
 
132 “Religion in American Life: The 2004 Political Landscape”, Pew Research Center for the People & the 
Press, Survey Reports, http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?Page1D=757 (last visited 17 November 
2003), where in 2003 87% of Americans are said not to doubt the existence of God, versus 81% in the late 
1980s (inter alia) – statistics which are in marked contrast with the 1996 Australian census where 73.7% of 
the population claimed a religious faith, more than 16% expressly disclaimed such, and the balance either 
did not state or gave an unintelligible answer to the census question (1996 Census of Population and 
Housing, ABS Catalogue No. 20150, p 43). 
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has contributed volumes to American jurisprudence,
133 so that Mason could 
comparatively call section 116 “something of a dead letter”,
134 Australia’s commitment to 
a version of democracy that increasingly respects multicultural values
135 suggests that 
Canadian Charter jurisprudence
136 will be more indicative of Australia’s future direction 
when it comes to adjudicating freedom of religion.  It is also relevant that Canada’s 
highest court has articulated a contemporary basis for the recognition of religious values 
including the secrecy of religious confidences at common law.
137  Though the American 
states have all passed religious confession privilege statutes to ensure similar 
tolerance,
138 the United States federal jurisdiction still recognises religious confession 
privilege at common law without the need for a statute in confirmation.
139  This suggests 
that Major Clinton’s common law finding in 1813
140 of an English common law religious 
confession privilege bulwarked by constitutional freedom of religion
141 might have 
endured without statutes had state legislatures not responded with legislation
142 when 
                                                 
133 The writer has been unable to find a significant body of scholarship about the meaning and practical 
effects of s 116 of the Australian Constitution, whereas several new articles every week on the US First 
Amendment are brought to his attention by LSRN on the internet. 
 
134 Mason, K, op cit, p 118. 
 
135 Ibid, p 105. 
 
136 For example, the majority decision in R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263 noted that while the “freedom of 
religion embodied in s. 2(a)” of the Charter did not necessitate the recognition of a prima facie class religious 
communications privilege (ibid, p 289), “both s. 2(a) and s. 27 [required] ... that the case-by-case analysis 
must begin with a ‘non-denominational’ approach” (ibid, p 291). 
 
137 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263. 
 
138 Wright and Graham note religious confession privilege statutes in 4 states by 1850, 25 states by 1904, 29 
states by 1938, 44 states in 1965 and blanket coverage in 1990 (Wright, CA, and Graham, KW, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence, Vol 26, § 5612, pp 47-49). 
 
139 Mullen v US (1959) 263 F.2d 275. 
 
140 The People v Phillips, Court of Sessions, New York (1813), reported in Allred, VC, “Privileged 
Communications to Clergymen” (1955) 1 The Catholic Lawyer 198. 
 
141 Idem. 
 
142 The first religious privilege statute in the world (Revised Statutes of N.Y. (1828), Pt. 3. c.7.tit.3 §72) is 
said to have been a response to the decision in The People v Smith, 2 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 77 
(Richmond County Court 1817) (also reported in Allred, VC, op cit, p 209) because the privilege allowed to a RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SIX  254
judges in search of all the evidence devalued the public interest in religious confidence 
and doubted the existence of religious confession privilege at common law. 
 
In any event, the High Court of Australia has repeatedly reaffirmed that clear statutory 
words are necessary to extinguish a common law privilege,
143 and particularly a privilege 
that may have achieved status as a substantive common law, or even a human right.
144 
That jurisprudence will be discussed in chapter seven.  
 
The dicta of Sir George Jessel MR  
What then of the argument that Sir George Jessel MR and others have merely 
sociologically adapted the common law of England to “[t]he felt necessities of the time” 
where religious confession privilege is concerned?
145  Holmes was perhaps the most 
memorable advocate of that interpretive theory when he wrote that “[i]t is revolting to 
have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was so laid down in the time of Henry 
VI.”
146  He has also written: 
_________________________ 
 
Catholic priest in Phillips (see note 140) was denied a Protestant minister in Smith (see Reese, S, 
“Confidential Communications to Clergy” (1963) 24 Ohio St LJ 55, 57).  The Delaware Statute in 1961 is said 
to have been a response to a judicial denial of common law religious confession privilege (Reese, S, 
“Confidential Communications to Clergy” (1963) 24 Ohio St LJ 55) and Hansard reports in New South Wales 
confirm the statute in 1989 was a response to a well-publicised denial of religious confession privilege in R v 
Young (Daily Mirror (NSW) 17 August 1988; The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 April 1989 – as discussed in 
McNicol, SB, Law of Privilege, Australia, Law Book Co, 1992, p 330).  The timing of the first New Zealand 
and Victorian religious confession privilege statutes (1885 and 1890 respectively) suggest that they may 
have been a response to Sir George Jessel MR’s obiter comments in Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 
675, though the writer has not found any evidence to confirm this connection. 
 
143 See, for example, Daniels Corporation v ACCC (2002) 192 ALR 561, paras 11, 43 and 132, confirming 
the decision in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49. 
 
144 Ibid, pp 583-584, paras 85-86, per Kirby J. 
 
145 Holmes, OW, Jr, The Common Law, Howe M De W, editor, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1963, p 5. 
 
146 Holmes, OW, Jr, “The Path of Law”, in Holmes, Collected Legal Papers, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 
1920; repr Peter Smith, 1952, p 167. 
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The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.  The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow-men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in 
determining the rules by which men should be governed.
147 
 
and that  
 
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an 
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life.  I 
mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community 
concerned.  Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact 
and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public 
policy.
148 
 
While these words published by Holmes in the United States in 1881 read like an ample 
defence of Sir George Jessel MR’s Wheeler v LeMarchant
149 judgement across the 
Atlantic that same year, it must be observed that they tell only half the story.  For while 
Sir George Jessel MR, a Jew,
150 and Hill J in 1860 and a strong Ulster Protestant
151 may 
                                                 
147 Holmes, OW, Jr, The Common Law, Howe M De W, editor, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1963, p 5. 
 
148 Ibid, p 32. 
 
149 Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675. 
 
150 The son of a Jewish diamond merchant, Sir George Jessel MR was never admitted to the peerage 
(Simpson, AWB, ed, Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law, London, Butterworth, 1984, p 280).  See 
also Nokes, GD, “Professional Privilege” (1950) 66 LQR 88, 98 where he observes both that “no one would 
have suspected Sir George Jessel of a keen Christian bias” and that the uncertainty about the existence of RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SIX  256
have felt they captured majoritarian community sentiment when they made decisions 
which marginalised the Catholic religious practice of their day, there were many other 
judges who were and had been much more tolerantly inclined.  And among those in 
favour of this tolerant privilege, Cockburn CJ in R v Castro (1874),
152 Baron Alderson in 
R v Griffin (1853),
153 Best CJ (later Lord Wynford) in R v Radford (1823)
154 and Broad v 
Pitt (1828),
155 Kenyon LCJ in Du Barré v Livette (1791),
156 and Coleridge LCJ writing to 
Gladstone in 1890,
157 rank very prominently indeed. 
 
While any attempt to weigh or balance the differing judicial views on whether there was a 
religious confession privilege in the nineteenth century can only be an arbitrary exercise 
the commmentators have preferred the views of Sir George Jessel MR apparently 
_________________________ 
 
religious confession privilege may have been the result of “a conflict of a different nature – a conflict between 
those unconscious prejudices of which the Bench can never be free”. 
 
151 Per Coleridge LCJ in his 1890 letter to Gladstone about religious confession privilege (Coleridge, EH, Life 
and Correspondence of John Duke Lord Coleridge Lord Chief Justice of England, London, William 
Heinemann, 1904, Vol 2, p 365).  Note too that Nokes observed that “Lord Wynford’s [as Chief Justice Best 
from R v Radford and Broad v Pitt became] sympathy with Christianity led him sometimes into extravagance 
of language which offered a ready target for epigram” (Nokes, GD, “Professional Privilege” (1950) 66 LQR 
88, 98). 
 
152 R v Castro (1874) 2 Charge of Chief Justice 648, where Chief Justice Cockburn indicated that if a priest 
refused to disclose confessional material he would not be compelled to speak. 
 
153 R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219, where Baron Alderson said that conversations between the accused 
and the workhouse chaplain “ought not to be given in evidence”. This arguably ratio decidendi decision was 
discussed in detail in chapter four, pp 169-170. 
 
154 Unreported but referred to in R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186; 168 ER 1235 where Chief Justice Best as 
he then was, prevented a clergyman apparently willing to testify, from giving evidence about a confession in 
his court.  R v Radford was discussed in chapter four, pp 148-150, and mentioned again in chapter five, 
p 182. 
 
155 Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528, where Chief Justice Best distinguished the decision 
supposedly against his R v Radford decision in R v Gilham with the observation that a priest may disclose 
confessional material if he chose, but that he would personally never compel such disclosure.  The decision 
in Broad v Pitt was discussed in detail in chapter four, pp 148-150, and again in chapter five, p 182. 
 
156 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96, where Lord Kenyon said that he would have paused 
before he admitted the evidence allowed by his brother Justice Buller in R v Sparkes.  These cases were 
discussed supra in chapter  one, pp 14-16, and chapter four, p 147, and mentioned in chapter five, pp 181-
182. 
 
157 Coleridge, EH, Life and Correspondence of John Duke Lord Coleridge Lord Chief Justice of England, 
London, William Heinemann, 1904, Vol 2, p 365.  Referred to in chapter four, pp 175-177. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SIX  257
because they were more thoroughly articulated.  But how convincing was and is his 
logic?  Though the integrity of his belief that there neither was nor ever had been a 
religious confession privilege cannot be doubted, did his view authoritatively decide what 
the law was for the future regardless of the past?  The answer to this question lies in part 
at least in the common law doctrine of precedent which has been succinctly expressed 
as follows:  
 
Rationes decidendi of higher courts are binding on lower courts by virtue of the 
common law doctrine of precedent ...  Where the reasons for a court’s decision 
are contained in multiple judgments, it may be that no clear ratio decidendi can 
be discerned. In such a case, lower courts are only bound to apply the outcome 
of the case when faced with a fact situation not reasonably distinguishable from 
the case and not the reasoning of any of the judges who constituted the 
majority.
158 
 
Of obiter dictum, the same authors have written that “[j]udicial observations that do not 
form part of the reasoning of a case ... are not binding on lower courts nor subsequently 
on the court that makes them.”
159  That this principle is elementary, ought not blind us to 
its application where the doctrine of religious confession privilege is concerned.  Though 
Sir George Jessel MR’s dicta may have more precedential weight than those of the 
arguably lesser judges
160 who had opined more casually in the opposite direction, yet the 
                                                 
158 Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, Nygh PE and Butt P, Eds, 2
nd ed, 1998, pp 365-366. 
 
159 Ibid, p 312. 
 
160 The Chancery Act 1851, 14 & 15 Vict, Chap 83, set up two Lord Justices with the Master of the Rolls as 
the Court of Appeal in Chancery, to try and solve the bottlenecks which resulted when “appeals from 
subordinate equity judges were more than one Chancellor could despatch” (Plucknett, TFT, A Concise 
History of the Common Law, 5
th ed, Boston, Little Brown, 1956, p 210.  See also Baker, JH, An Introduction 
to English Legal History, London, Butterworths, 1970, p 48).  It is difficult to approximate the authority of RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SIX  258
learned Master of the Rolls’ dicta remains as dicta and still manifests the following 
unresolved flaws.  First, it cites no convincing authority.
161  Secondly, his reasoning 
treats all evidentiary privilege as having a common genealogical origin when historically 
that is manifestly not the case.
162  Thirdly, there is a conspicuous disregard of that 
religious tolerance which was born in the late eighteenth century, was legislated by 
various Acts of Parliament,
163 and which was noticed by various other members of the 
judiciary.
164  Though it is true that Sir George Jessel MR may have given expression to 
what his judicial colleagues had said in parliament in 1865 when they responded to 
press reports of the exclusion as evidence of Constance Kent’s confession to her 
clergyman at a depositions hearing,
165 yet they were responding only to press reports 
and equally learned extra judicial opinion took the contrary view.
166  
 
_________________________ 
 
judicial officers before and after the Judicature Acts since the Court of Appeal was a new creation.  However 
it is clear that the rules of hierarchical precedent were more precise afterwards because the hierarchy of the 
courts themselves were more clearly defined.  The ‘Judicature Acts’ are those two acts more fully named the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vic c 66) and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875 (38 
& 39 Vic c 77). 
 
161 See chapter one, pp 25-35, and chapter four, pp 145-146. 
 
162 For example, see chapter four, pp 136-140. 
 
163 For example The Roman Catholic Relief Acts of 1791 (31 Geo. 3, c 32) and 1829 (10 Geo. 4, c 7).  See 
also supra  pp 237-242.  Note also that Jeremy Bentham, whom Wigmore called “the greatest opponent of 
privileges” (Wigmore JH, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little 
Brown, 1961, Vol 8, p 877) argued strongly that religious confession privilege should be recognised 
(Rationale of Judicial Evidence, New York and London, Garland Publishing Inc, 1978 reprint of the 1827 1
st 
edition published by Hunt and Clarke, London, Vol 4, pp 586-592). 
 
164 Supra, notes 152 - 157 and supporting text. 
 
165 Discussed in detail in chapter four, pp 171-177.  The case of R v Constance Kent (1865) was not 
reported because the defendant ultimately pled guilty to the murder charged but the case occasioned 
significant debate in the House of Lords and was the apparent stimulus behind the publication of Badeley’s 
pamphlet referenced supra, chapter four, pp 173-175 and in this chapter, pp 238-240. 
 
166 Coleridge LCJ (1880-1894) had acted as counsel for Constance Kent and in his letter to Gladstone about 
religious confession privilege, expressed his personal belief in the existence of an enduring religious 
confession privilege at common law after the Reformation though it “had never been decided” and that 
Willes J would have upheld it, though he doubted that “the English Judges” would have upheld it in 1865 
(Coleridge, EH, Life and Correspondence of John Duke Lord Coleridge Lord Chief Justice of England, 
London, William Heinemann, 1904, Vol 2, p 365). 
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But there are other arguments which suggest that reliance upon only Sir George Jessel 
MR’s obiter authority against religious confession privilege is questionable. Holmes’ 
suggestion that the “felt necessities of the time” and “ the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow-men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the 
rules by which men should be governed”, is a two-edged sword where the development 
of the common law relating to religious confession privilege is concerned.  For though Sir 
George Jessel MR may well have nutshelled the conservative judicial opinion of his time, 
yet the common law has continued to develop and has accepted more fulsome notions 
of religious tolerance particularly where “free exercise of any religion”
167 is entrenched in 
modern constitutional instruments.  Indeed, the advent of the first religious confession 
privilege statutes in the British Commonwealth beginning very soon after the Jessel 
dicta
168 may be sociologically interpreted as a reaction against Sir George Jessel MR’s 
conservatism. 
 
The 1964 arguments of J Noel Lyon
169  also militate against a favourable sociological 
interpretation of Sir George Jessel MR’s dicta.  He observed that “[i]t is said by 
authoritative writers that statements made by a penitent to his priest during confession 
are not privileged at common law”,
170 but questioned “whether any common law court 
                                                 
167 Australian Constitution, section 116. 
 
168 The New Zealand Evidence Further Amendment Act 1885 (49 Vict. No. 15) c 7 was passed four years 
after Wheeler v LeMarchant was decided and the Victorian Evidence Act 1890 (54 Vict. No. 1088 c 55 five 
years later.  The first religious privilege statute in the United States was passed in New York in 1828 
(Revised Statutes of N.Y. (1828), Pt. 3. c.7.tit.3 §72), eleven years after The People v Smith, 2 City Hall 
Recorder (Rogers) 77 (Richmond County Court 1817) had denied a common law religious confession 
privilege affirmed four years earlier in The People v Phillips, Court of Session, New York (1813).  Both of 
these early New York cases are reprinted in full in Vincent Allred’s article, “Privileged Communications to 
Clergymen” (1955) 1 The Catholic Lawyer 198. 
 
169 “Privileged Communications – Penitent and Priest” [1964-65] 7 Crim LQ 327.  J Noel Lyon was then an 
Assistant Professor of Law at the University of British Columbia. 
 
170 Idem. 
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ha[d] ever considered the best reason for granting such a privilege”.
171  For Lyon, the 
admission into evidence of “confessions made to a priest would be so similar to 
admitting confessions made under duress to police that the idea should be expressly 
condemned by the common law.”
172  He went on to observe that commentative 
characterisation of religious confession privilege as “a claim to protection for a 
confidential relationship”
173 by analogy to legal professional privilege,  
 
misses the point of [legal professional privilege] ... which is not designed to 
please the legal profession, nor merely to benefit the client.  It is rather a 
recognition of the fact that in a constitutional democracy under the rule of law, 
lawyers perform the central role in the process of projecting law into the daily life 
of the community.  When legal process replaces self-help, the lawyer and his 
client must become one with respect to information which is necessary to 
bringing the client’s affairs within that legal process ... [and] to compel disclosure 
of information obtained for the purpose of properly bringing the client’s affairs 
under the law would be tantamount to compelling the client to give evidence 
against himself.
174  
 
Lyon however says that the absence of any analogous or blanket privilege for other 
confidential professional relationships does not dispose of the priest-penitent question.
175  
                                                 
171 Idem. 
 
172 Idem. Lyon’s analogy is reminiscent of the analogy to legal professional privilege used by Baron Alderson 
when he ruled against the admission of a confession to the workhouse chaplain in R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox 
Cr Cas 219. 
 
173 Idem. 
 
174 Ibid, pp 327-328. 
 
175 Ibid, p 328. 
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If it did, he asks “[i]n dealing with a suspect who is a devout Catholic, why should the 
police bother bringing him in and working him over with questions?  Just let him go to his 
priest and then subpoena the priest as a witness.”
176  It is then that Lyon makes the point 
(which reiterates McNicol’s notice of state recoil at the church/state intersection
177) that 
the reason “this does not happen ... [is] because our society has sufficient built-in 
restraints [which mean] that any police force or prosecutor’s office that went that far 
would be courting disaster.”
178  Lyon concludes that even though “common law judges 
may never be called upon to make this natural extension of the admissibility of 
confessions”
179 because “[o]ther restraints ... keep the issue from arising in court”
180, the 
“legal writers should stop stating categorically that no [religious confession] privilege 
exists at all”.
181 
 
It is also noteworthy that although Stone and Wells accepted Wigmore’s proposition that 
“practically all the decisive English authority is against”
182 religious confession privilege, 
they preferred to cite Normanshaw v Normanshaw
183 as their authority for that 
proposition rather than Sir George Jessel MR’s dictum in Wheeler v LeMarchant, which 
they set out in full very shortly before their reiteration of the Wigmore conclusion.  That 
                                                 
176 Idem. 
 
177 McNicol, SB, Law of Privilege, Australia, The Law Book Co, 1992, p 330. 
 
178 Lyon, op cit, p 328. 
 
179 Ibid, p 330. 
 
180 Idem. 
 
181 Idem. 
 
182 Stone, J, Evidence, Its History and Policies, Revised by WAN Wells, Sydney, Butterworths, 1991, p 586. 
It will be remembered that Wigmore’s original statement was that “since the Restoration, and for almost two 
centuries of English practice, the almost unanimous expression of judicial opinion (including at least two 
decisive rulings) has denied the existence of a [religious confession] privilege” (Wigmore JH, Evidence in 
Trials at Common Law, Revised by John T McNaughton, 1961, Vol 8, p 869). 
 
183 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LT 468. 
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Normanshaw v Normanshaw is a doubtful authority for the non-existence of a religious 
confession privilege in modern common law, has already been demonstrated in chapters 
four and five.
184 
 
Conclusion to chapter six 
None of the theories canvassed in this chapter prove that religious confession privilege 
has been extinguished from the common law.  A thorough legal analysis of all the 
historical evidence that can be mustered in support of the idea that religious confession 
privilege was extinguished from English common law sometime after the Reformation 
and before the end of the eighteenth century, leaves the argument wanting.  There is 
nothing conclusive.  If there was a privilege before the Reformation as this thesis 
demonstrates, then it survived the Reformation and has not been abrogated by statute or 
canon law passed since.  Whether the historical ‘privilege’ existed as an immunity or a 
privilege, it arguably endures as a fundamental right because it is a necessary corollary 
of any meaningful free exercise of religion.  Whether it does so exist and whether it can 
now only be extinguished by clear words or necessary implication in statute
185 is a matter 
which will be discussed in chapter seven.  
 
That religious confession privilege survived the Reformation is also compelling in 
disposing of the theory that the creation of Australia as a new nation without an 
established church, extinguished religious confession privilege.  For even if the new 
nation’s constitution did not guarantee free exercise of any religion, Australia’s common 
law inheritance included religious confession privilege.  It is also revolting to suggest that 
                                                 
184 Chapter four, pp 159-160, 162; chapter five, pp 184-187. 
 
185 Daniels Corporation v ACCC (2002) 192 ALR 561, paras 11, 43 and 132. 
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pure religious prejudice could have extinguished the privilege without statutory 
confirmation – a fact which enlightened and objective commentary in the nineteenth 
century
186 pointed up. 
 
This leaves only the argument that religious confession privilege had clearly gone since 
multiple legislatures have perceived a need to pass statutes to establish it. This chapter 
has suggested that no two religious confession privilege statutes have ever had an 
identical raison d’etre. While certainly some laws are passed to abrogate and completely 
rewrite the common law, others seek to simplify by codification and other statutes still, 
merely make adjustments at the edges. In any event, in context it is doubtful that Lamer 
CJ in R v Gruenke
187 was seriously proposing the view that there was no religious 
confession privilege at common law because some legislatures have passed laws to put 
its existence beyond doubt. Rather, it is more likely that he was simply disagreeing with 
Gruenke’s counsel’s strong contrary submission that statutory confirmation of religious 
confession privilege proved that it did exist at common law. 
 
Chapter seven will now discuss religious confession privilege in contemporary Australia. 
 
                                                 
186 Bentham, J, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, New York & London, 1978, Garland Publishing Inc (reprint of 
the 1827 edition published by Hunt and Clarke, London), Volume IV, pp 586-592.  See also Best, WM, A 
Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, London, S Sweet, 1849, pp 459-460. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE 
AT COMMON LAW IN AUSTRALIA  
 
Introduction 
This thesis has identified what the common law is so far as religious confession privilege 
is concerned, without significant reference to case law in Australia.  There are two 
reasons for that.  Firstly, there is very little recorded judicial comment in Australia that 
treats the issue at all; and second, the advent of statutory religious confession privilege 
in Victoria, Tasmania, the Northern Territory, New South Wales and the Commonwealth 
has meant that courts in those jurisdictions have not needed to review the common law, 
since their statutory privileges were passed into law. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to ascertain the “other” possible reasons for the 
dearth of religious confession privilege cases in Australia, though it is noted that those 
reasons certainly include the careful wish of the various arms of the state to avoid 
unnecessary conflict with the church
1 and the sacrosanctity with which Australian clergy 
                                                 
1 McNicol, SB, Law of Privilege, Australia, The Law Book Co, 1992, p 330, where Suzanne McNicol 
recognises the New South Wales Police Minister’s statement accompanying the introduction of the Bill to 
create a statutory privilege in New South Wales in 1989, where he said the statutory privilege would realise 
“[t]he Government[‘s] ... concern to minimise the possible areas of conflict” between church and state 
(Parliamentary Debates (N.S.W.), Legislative Council, 21 November 1989, p 12,805, per The Hon EP 
Pickering). 
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generally have treated confidences reposed in them.
2  There have, however, been obiter 
dicta comments in three significant cases which bear upon the privilege which provide 
some insight into how an Australian court without a religious confession privilege statute, 
might treat a claim of religious confession privilege.   
 
While Crisp J made reference to the existence of the privilege at common law in the 
Tasmanian Supreme Court in a case that concerned Tasmania’s statutory religious 
confession privilege,
3 the references to religious confession privilege by Sir Owen Dixon 
J in McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic)
4 in 1940; by three
5 of the seven members of 
the High Court in Baker v Campbell
6 in 1983 and by Spigelman CJ in the New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in 1999
7 are more likely predictive.  However, the 
unanimous High Court decision in Daniels Corporation v ACCC
8 in 2002 affirming legal 
professional privilege as an important common law immunity
9 which could not be 
                                                 
2 The Australian Law Reform Commission took notice of this apparent reason for a dearth of such cases 
when it said that “a law which enables a court to require members of the clergy to give evidence of 
confidential communications will be universally disobeyed by the clergy … It will be a law which will be totally 
unenforceable. Attempts to enforce it will simply result in incarceration of the clergy and thereby generate 
unnecessary friction between Church and State” (ALRC, Report No 38 (1987), Vol 1, para 212, p 120). 
 
3 R v Lynch [1954] Tas SR 47, where Crisp J said:  
 
At common law I have no doubt [religious confession privilege] was confined to a ritual confession 
made according to the discipline of the particular faith in so far as a privilege existed at all.  I do not 
wish to be taken as deciding that nothing other than a ritual confession is covered by the section.  It 
may be that in our statute we have gone further ... but here the confession was not made for any 
spiritual purpose. 
 
4 McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73. 
 
5 Gibbs CJ, Mason and Dawson JJ. 
 
6 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
 
7 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681. 
 
8 Daniels Corporation v ACCC (2002) 192 ALR 561. 
 
9 Ibid, paragraphs 11 (per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 44 (per McHugh J), 85 (per Kirby 
J) and 132 (per Callinan J). 
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abrogated without clear words or a necessary implication to that effect,
10 includes 
reasoning both relevant and predictive of likely contemporary Australian judicial opinion 
were religious confession privilege to arise for decision in the nation’s highest court.  
This chapter will also review in detail, three ideas seeded by current judicial opinion, that 
seem likely to have significant influence on the argument that the High Court would have 
to consider in such a case.  Those three ideas are firstly, that the High Court of Australia 
will consider international human rights obligations which Australia has assumed by 
virtue of its ratification of various human rights instruments including several which affirm 
freedom of religious belief and practice.  Second, that the implication encouraged by 
Daniels that the familiar distinction between ‘immunity’ and ‘privilege’ is no longer hard 
and fast and that ‘immunity logic’ is therefore transferable into privilege contexts 
particularly where there are constitutional issues at stake.  And finally, the notion that a 
consistent and preponderant message from evidence statutes in some Australian 
jurisdictions will exercise ‘gravitational pull’ on the common law in jurisdictions without 
similar statutory provisions – this despite the misinformed view that the High Court’s 
decision in Esso Australia Resources v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
11 abolished 
that doctrine as it had begun to flourish in Akins v Abigroup Ltd
12 and Adelaide 
Steamship Co. Pty Ltd v Spalvins.
13 
 
Chapter seven concludes by suggesting that the High Court of Australia would likely 
affirm the existence of a discretionary religious communications privilege were an 
                                                 
10 Ibid, paragraphs 11 (per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 43 (per McHugh J), 88 (per 
Kirby J) and 132 (per Callinan J). 
 
11 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49. 
 
12 Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539. 
 
13 Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 81 FCR 360. 
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appropriate case to raise the matter.  But I also observe that lower and even 
intermediate level courts in Australian jurisdictions without religious confession privilege 
statutes remain unlikely to recognise either a religious confession privilege or a religious 
communications privilege at common law until the High Court has decreed upon the 
subject.  
 
McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic)
14 
In this 1940 case, a newspaper editor sought to justify his refusal to answer questions 
put to him by a Royal Commissioner.  In rejecting his claim, Dixon J said:  
 
The law was faced at a comparatively early stage of the growth of the rules of 
evidence with the question how to resolve the inevitable conflict between a 
necessity of discovering the truth in the interests of justice on the one hand and 
on the other the obligation of secrecy or confidence which an individual called 
upon to testify may in good faith have undertaken to a party or other person.  
Except in a few relations where paramount considerations of general policy 
appeared to require that there should be a special privilege, such as husband 
and wife, attorney and client, communications between jurors, the counsels of the 
Crown and State secrets, and by statute, physician and patient and priest and 
penitent, an inflexible rule was established that no obligation of honour, no duties 
of non-disclosure arising from the nature of a pursuit or calling, could stand in the 
way of the imperative necessity of revealing the truth in the witness box.  Claims 
                                                 
14 McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SEVEN  268
have been made from time to time for the protection of confidences to trustees, 
agents, bankers, and clerks, amongst others, and they have all been rejected.
15 
 
Dixon J’s observations about religious confession privilege are a little curious.  Certainly 
the demands of his decision about a journalist’s claim to privilege merited no more 
attention to religious confession privilege than was given, but he raises more questions 
about religious confession privilege than he answers.  For example, was he denying the 
existence of religious confession privilege in a jurisdiction without a religious confession 
privilege statute?  Was he aware that some Australian jurisdictions had not then passed 
religious confession privilege statutes?
16  Or was he suggesting that the public interest 
factors which might have been argued to justify a religious confession privilege at 
common law were not “paramount” enough – and hence the advent of statutes in the 
area?  It is also possible that Dixon J foresaw the modern notion that statutes can 
influence common law development in other jurisdictions by their “gravitational pull”.
17  
Though unlikely, it is possible that Dixon J was presciently inferring that the recognition 
of religious confession privilege in three Australian jurisdictions at that time enabled the 
common law recognition of religious confession privilege in those jurisdictions which had 
not passed statutes to expressly recognise it in the interests of one seamless common 
law in Australia. It is more likely that he was simply confirming that religious confession 
privilege did not exist in Australia except as a creation of statute, since his reference to 
the rejection of claims for “protection of confidences to trustees, agents, bankers and 
                                                 
15 Ibid, pp 102-103. 
 
16 Only statutes in Victoria (Evidence Act 1890, c 55 – 54 Vict. No. 1088), Tasmania (Evidence Act 1910, 
s 96 – 1 George V. No. 20), and the Northern Territory (Evidence Ordinances 1939, section 12(1)) existed at 
the time the judgement was handed down. 
 
17 The quoted words are original to Mason, P, in Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539, 547-548.  
Both Beazley JA and James J reference the concept in their judgements in R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 
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clerks amongst others”
18 reads like a quotation from English commentaries in his era, 
which normally included clergy in the “unprotected” list.
19  There is also a question as to 
whether he was referencing religious confession privilege or a broader confidential 
religious communications privilege, as was almost contemporaneously recognised in 
Ireland
20 – even though all of the Australian statutes treating such privilege at all still 
reference “confessions” as their subject matter. 
 
While it is doubtful that this obiter statement would provide a contemporary Australian 
court with much assistance if it were required to decide a religious confession privilege 
case, it is fair to infer that it would encourage a narrow interpretation of even statutory 
privileges.  Both Spigelman CJ and Beazley JA quoted and interpreted this same 
passage
21 on their way to different decisions about the extent of the statutory sexual 
assault communications privilege claimed in R v Young in 1999.
22  And when the High 
Court was asked in Baker v Campbell
23 to decide whether legal professional privilege 
protected documents from seizure by police executing a search warrant, only Gibbs CJ 
referred to McGuinness and then only as authority for his proposition that “the public 
interest in discovering truth prevails over the private duty to respect confidence”.
24  But 
with his two brethren who did reference religious confession privilege in Baker v 
                                                 
18 McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73, 103. 
 
19 For example, Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Evidence, which was printed in 12 editions between 1876 
and 1948; Phipson’s Law of Evidence, published in 13 editions between 1892 and 1982, and of course 
Wigmore on Evidence, the third edition of which was published in 1940, the year when Sir Owen Dixon J 
made his decision in McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic). 
 
20 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515, per Gavan Duffy J. 
 
21 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 per Spigelman CJ, pp 698-699, para 85, and per Beazley JA, pp 708-
709, para 144. 
 
22 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681. 
 
23 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
 
24Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 66. 
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Campbell,
25 Gibbs CJ did signal that the view of the High Court was ‘developing’ where 
claims of privilege or immunity were asserted. 
 
Baker v Campbell 
Decided before the abolition of the sole purpose test
26 as the required premise for a 
sustainable claim of legal professional privilege,
27 the High Court split 4-3
28 in upholding 
the claim of privilege against the police search warrant. And of the three judges who did 
reference religious confession privilege in passing, only Dawson J sided with the majority 
in the result. Gibbs CJ said that the reason privilege did not extend to communications 
between priest and penitent at common law was because religious confession privilege 
was not “fundamental to the administration of justice” as was legal professional 
privilege.
29  He did however state that this justification of legal professional privilege had 
its roots in public interest and it was the “higher public interest in the suppression of 
crime”
30 which justified his recommended abrogation of legal professional privilege in this 
case.  Dawson J similarly said that the reason there was no religious confession 
                                                 
25 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. Mason and Dawson JJ also made comments about religious 
confession privilege. 
  
26 The so-called ‘sole purpose test’ was replaced by the’ dominant purpose test’ by the High Court’s decision 
in Esso Australia Resources Limited v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 
201 CLR 49.  Since this decision, for a claim of legal professional privilege to apply to documents, it has 
been necessary to demonstrate that the dominant purpose for which the document was created was to 
enable the seeking or giving  of legal advice.  The previous ‘sole purpose test’ had been laid down in Grant v 
Downs, see note 27. 
 
27 It was held in Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 “that legal professional privilege is confined to 
documents which are brought into existence for the sole purpose of their being submitted to legal advisers 
for advice or use in legal proceedings” (Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 60 per Gibbs CJ).  
 
28 The split was really 5-2 since Brennan J said that documents in the solicitor’s office that were “merely 
expressions of legal opinion” and “documents brought into existence solely for use in litigation that is 
pending, intended or reasonably apprehended” were privileged and should not be produced (Baker v 
Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 110). 
 
29 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 65-66.  
 
30 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 69. 
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privilege was because unlike legal professional privilege, religious confession privilege 
was not “part of the functioning of the law itself”.
31  
 
Mason J wished to confine legal professional privilege to “communications in aid of 
litigation and communications made for the purpose of giving and obtaining legal 
advice”
32 to avoid an “evaluation of the competing considerations which lurk beneath the 
surface”
33 of legal professional privilege.  But he doubted that communications for giving 
and obtaining legal advice had any better justification than could be advanced in favour 
of “communications for advice between client and accountant or marriage counselor … 
with litigation in view”
34 or “doctor-patient and priest-penitent communications”.
35  Indeed, 
he said “[t]he need for preservation of doctor-patient and priest-penitent confidentiality 
seems to be as strong as the need for preservation of lawyer-client confidentiality in the 
area of advice”.
36  
 
That the law relating to privilege generally was in a state of flux when Baker v Campbell 
was decided, is also manifest by how two of the judges analogised from legal 
professional privilege to self-incrimination privilege.  Mason J said that self-incrimination 
privilege rested on a “more enduring foundation”
37 than legal professional privilege. 
                                                 
31 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 128.  Note that these statements resonate with one of the reasons 
why Lamer CJ would not concede a class privilege to confidential religious communications in R v Gruenke 
(1991) 3 SCR 263, 289). 
 
32 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 75. 
 
33 Idem. 
 
34 Idem. 
 
35 Idem. 
 
36 Idem. 
 
37 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 81. 
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Dawson J said further that self-incrimination privilege was “too fundamental a bulwark of 
liberty to be categorized simply as a rule of evidence”,
38 that legal professional privilege 
“stems from a right which is no less fundamental”
39 and that the two rights were 
conceptually connected.
40  What does this Baker v Campbell obiter discussion of 
religious confession privilege contribute to understanding how a case involving a 
confidential religious communication might be decided today?  It confirms once again 
that the discrete origins and continued existence of religious confession privilege are not 
well understood, but it also confirms that legal professional privilege and self- 
incrimination privilege are improperly treated as mere rules of evidence when their 
historical origins are understood and taken into account.  Those privileges can be said to 
exist as common law rights so firmly entrenched as Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ said 
of legal professional privilege in Grant v Downs that they are “not to be exorcised by 
judicial decision”.
41  The question is, will a proper understanding of the historical origins 
of religious confession privilege lead to the same conclusion? Namely that religious 
confession privilege is also a common law right and not a mere rule of evidence. 
 
The narrow interpretation of new state legislation creating a sexual assault 
communications privilege,
42 by the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in R v 
Young
43  followed by further state legislation in the wake of the decision,
44 demonstrates 
                                                 
38 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 128. 
 
39 Idem. 
 
40 Idem. 
 
41 Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, 685. 
 
42 Division 1B of Pt 3.10 of the New South Wales Evidence Act 1995 was inserted in the Act by the Evidence 
Amendment (Confidential Communications) Act 1997 (No 122) and commenced on 1 January 1998 (R v 
Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, p 726, para 244, per James J). 
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that the law relating to privilege was still in a state of flux when that decision was handed 
down sixteen years after Baker v Campbell.  That R v Young was decided the same year 
that the High Court replaced the ‘sole purpose test’ with the ‘dominant purpose test’ in 
Esso Australia Resources Limited v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of 
Australia
45 simply underscores the fact.  And though further New South Wales legislation 
about sexual assault communications in the wake of the majority decision has reduced 
the precedential value of R v Young as a guide to understanding statutory sexual assault 
communications privilege in New South Wales, the reasoning on privilege generally 
remains instructive. 
 
R v Young
46 
Spigelman CJ led the 4-1 majority in holding that a statute amending the New South 
Wales Evidence Act the previous year
47 was not specific enough to deny Young’s 
access to the records of the various counsellors who had attended his accuser in a 
sexual assault case.  Beazley JA dissented.  However, none of the three other majority 
judges
48 wholly adopted the reasoning of Spigelman CJ. After acknowledging “because 
the truth can cost too much”,
49 that “the common law recognises a specific list of 
_________________________ 
 
44 R v Young was reversed by the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Sexual Assault Communications 
Privilege) Act 1999 (NSW) which inserted a new Part 13 into the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). 
 
45 Esso Australia Resources Limited v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 
201 CLR 49.  The nature of the two tests is briefly referenced supra at notes 26 and 27. 
 
46 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681. 
 
47 See note 44. 
 
48 Abadee, Barr and James JJ. 
 
49 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 696, para 74, per Spigelman CJ, alluding to Knight  Bruce V-C in 
Pearse v Pearse (1846) De G & Son 12 at 28-29; 63 ER 950 at 957. 
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privileges [against disclosure, which] list has been modified by statute”,
50 to include 
“clergy-communicant privilege”,
51 Spigelman CJ noted that each category “reflect[ed] a 
different form of public policy ... with its own distinct incidents”.
52  He then considered the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the recognition of new categories of evidentiary 
privilege (including a brief consideration of the Wigmore criteria in Gruenke’s case
53), but 
concluded “that the approach to determining these matters, propounded by Wigmore 
and adopted in Canada, is not open to an intermediate court of appeal in Australia”.
54 
 
He then cited the full quote from Dixon J in McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic)
55 cited 
above, and observed:  
 
The common law refused to afford privilege to exceptional sensitive confidential 
relationships.  To many people, even in this secular age, and to the 
overwhelming majority of people in times past, there was no more intimate or 
personal communication than that which occurred with a priest.  No such 
privilege was recognised until statutory modification: see Wilson v Rastall (1792) 
4 TR 753 at 759-760; 100 ER 1263 at 1206-1287; Normanshaw v Normanshaw 
and Measham (1893) 69 LT 468; McNicol, Chapter 5.
56 
 
                                                 
50 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 697, para 76. 
 
51 Ibid, para 77. 
 
52 Idem. 
 
53 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263, discussed supra in chapter five, pp 210 to 217. 
 
54 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 698, para 84. 
 
55 McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73. 
 
56 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 699, para 88. 
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He concluded “that, by a process of induction, Dixon J stated the common law rule ... 
[which though not] replicated in the other judgements in McGuinness ... does represent, 
in my opinion, the common law rule in Australia ... [and again a]n intermediate appellate 
court should be slow to develop a new category of privilege”.
57 
 
While Beazley JA quoted the same statement from Dixon J in McGuinness
58 and other 
sources to acknowledge that confidentiality simpliciter did not give rise to an evidentiary 
privilege, she cited extensive authority for her proposition that evidential immunity might 
be extended after balancing competing interests.
59  She concluded with Lord Hailsham in 
D v NSPCC
60 that “[t]he categories of public interest are not closed and must alter from 
time to time whether by restriction or extension as social conditions and social legislation 
develop”.
61  She noted McLachlin J’s case-by-case approach in M v Ryan,
62 which 
required “a balancing [of competing public interests] to determine whether the particular 
documents should be disclosed”
63 and expressed her opinion that balanced public 
interest in New South Wales, the “gravitational pull”
64 of statute law in other Australian 
                                                 
57 Ibid, pp 699-700, paras 90-91. 
 
58 Ibid, p 708, para 144. 
 
59 Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388; D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171; Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910; 
Re D (Infants) [1970] 1 WLR 599; [1970] 1 All ER 1088; Science Research v Nassé [1980] AC 1028, claim 
rejected; R v K (1993) 97 Cr App R 342; Relationships Australia v Pasternak (1996) 133 FLR 462; Finch v 
Grieve (1991) 22 NSWLR 578; B v N (1994) 35 NSWLR 140; Howe v State of South Australia (1998) 196 
LSJS 182; R v Bull (1997) 17 SR (WA) 364; M v L [1997] 3 NZLR 424, claim rejected; Jaffee v Redmond 
518 US 1 (1996); Wolfe v United States 291 US 7 (1934); Hawkins v United States 358 US 74 (1958); M v 
Ryan (1997) 143 DLR (4
th) 1. 
 
60 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 230. 
 
61 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 711, para 163, quoting Lord Hailsham in D v NSPCC. 
 
62 M v Ryan (1997) 143 DLR (4
th) 1. 
 
63 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 716, para 188. 
 
64 Ibid, p 719, para 205, quoting Mason, P, in Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 at 547-548. 
Whether statutes in Australian states exert “gravitational pull” upon the common law in other Australian 
states without such statutes, is discussed infra pp 302-307. 
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jurisdictions and the need to ensure there was “one [consistent] common law for 
Australia”,
65 justified the extension of “immunity ... to the class of documents the subject 
of the present claim”.
66 
   
For Spigelman CJ, there was no common law religious confession privilege.  However, 
his reference to McNicol
67 fails to acknowledge her statement that “there is a paucity of 
authority”
68 for this conclusion, and the authorities he chose for that statement of the law 
do not establish the attributed point.  For both of the cases he cited contain only obiter 
statements; the first in a legal professional privilege case,
69 and the second in a non-
confessional religious communications case
70 where the observations of Jeune P can be 
interpreted to support the existence of a discretionary religious communications 
privilege.
71  Nonetheless, it might be submitted that other reasoning in Spigelman CJ’s  
judgement provides room for modern recognition of religious confession privilege in the 
public interest.  For even though he rejected the case-by-case discretionary Canadian 
approach,
72 he said that  “[t]he recognition of a new category of privilege ... was 
                                                 
65 Ibid, p 720, para 211, citing Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563. 
 
66 Ibid, p 721, para 215. 
 
67 Ibid, p 699, para 88. 
 
68 McNicol, SB, Law of Privilege, Australia, The Law Book Co, 1992, p 324. 
 
69 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 699, para 88 referring to Wilson v Rastall (1792) 4 TR 753; (1792) LTR 
753; 100 ER 1283; (1775-1802) All ER 597, discussed supra in chapter four, pp 151-153, where it was noted 
that the citation of this case as authority for the proposition that there was no religious confession privilege in 
English common law by the turn of the eighteenth century is unsound since religious confession privilege is 
not even mentioned obiter in the decision.   
 
70 Idem, referring to Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468, discussed supra in chapter four, pp 
159-160, 162, and chapter five, pp 184-187. 
 
71 Supra, chapter five, p 187. 
 
72 Spigelman CJ noted the evolution of this approach (beginning with Slavutych v Baker (1975) DLR (3d) 
224 at 228; R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263 at 286, and in relation to sexual assault counselling privilege, in 
M v Ryan (1997) 143 DCR (4
th) 1) in his judgement  in R v Young at pages 697-698.  It is noteworthy that 
while Lamer CJ in Gruenke did indeed say that the application of the Wigmore criteria was not “carved in 
stone”, as Spigelman CJ pointed out (R v Young, p 698, para 81) the case-by-case discretionary approach RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SEVEN  277
appropriate [when it reflects] so widely held an opinion, that the court’s reasoning can be 
described in terms of ‘recognition’ rather than ‘creation’”.
73 
 
Beazley JA did not treat religious confession privilege at all save in her quotation from 
Dixon J in McGuinness.
74  She distinguished his reasoning with modern authority from 
various jurisdictions,
75 noted the favoured discretionary case-by-case approach in 
Canada,
76 but nonetheless preferred the creation of a new class of immunity in R v 
Young for reasons of pure countervailing public interest.
77  As noted at the 
commencement of this consideration of R v Young, the three other majority judges 
chose not to wholly ally themselves with the reasoning of Spigelman CJ
78.  Abadee and 
Barr JJ together and more simply, rested their joint decision on the simple insight that it 
was for parliament, not the court, to make “such a significant change in the rights of 
accused persons”,
79 and that in confining the new immunity for sexual assault 
counsellors to evidence adduced at trial, the legislature had affirmatively left an accused 
_________________________ 
 
(rather than the category or class approach) that has evolved since it originated in Slavutych v Baker in 1975 
has become something of a template in the Canadian Supreme Court’s consideration of privilege and 
immunity cases. 
 
73 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 700, para 93. 
 
74 McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1990) 63 CLR 73, cited by Beazley JA in R v Young (1999) 46 
NSWLR 681 at p 708, para 144. 
 
75 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 708-716.  See note 59 for a list of all her authorities. 
 
76 Ibid, pp 715-716. 
 
77 Ibid, p 721, para 215.  Note also that L’Heureux-Dubé J, who provided the minority judgement in R v 
Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263, 295-316), for herself and Gonthier J, also preferred the “class or category” 
approach to the creation of evidential privileges and immunities in the common law, in the interests both of 
certainty and long-term civil liberty. 
 
78 Abadee and Barr JJ provided a joint judgement concurring in the result with the separate majority 
judgements of Spigelman CJ and James J. 
 
79 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 722, para 220. 
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person’s pre-trial investigation rights intact.
80  James J rested his decision primarily on 
the appropriate method of statutory interpretation,
81 eschewing the ambulatory 
methods
82 that had been urged on him by counsel for the respondent and those other 
interested state parties involved
83 to ensure that the legislation hit its target.
84  He 
decided then that recognising “a new category of public interest immunity [in this case]”
85 
would unnecessarily complicate the law, since several different “balancing process[es]”
86 
could be required to determine the treatment of evidence depending on whether 
                                                 
80 Ibid, p 723, para 229. 
 
81 James J accepted that Freeman J’s (the first instance judge who interpreted the legislation to deny 
Young’s access to the notes of the various sexual assault counsellors who had attended on his accuser) 
indirect, derivative or analogical reading of the statute was available on the basis of decisions then available 
in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australia’s Media Holdings [No 1] (1997) 41 NSWLR 277; Adelaide Steamship 
Co Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 81 FCR 360 and Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539.  However, the Full 
Federal Court in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1998) 53 FCR 311 and 
the High Court in BT Australasia Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (High Court of Australia, 3 December 
1998, judgement reserved) had since effectively decided that it was wrong to read a statute derivatively if 
that derivative reading would modify the underlying common law (per James J, pp 724-730, paras 260 and 
261).  Ultimately, no decision was issued by the High Court in the BT Australasia case because the matter 
was settled (R v Young per James J at p 730, para 261).  In the Esso Australasia Resources case, the High 
Court reversed the Federal Court and held, overruling Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, that the 
dominant purpose test, and not the sole purpose test, would henceforward be the common law test for 
claiming legal professional privilege settling an “issue that ha[d] divided the courts for some years”(R v 
Young per Spigelman CJ at p 692, para 47).  The High Court also effectively affirmed the view of the 
majority of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Young that the statutory phrase “adduced in evidence” 
did not abrogate an accused person’s common law right to pretrial discovery.  The Esso case is discussed in 
more detail infra (pp 302-307) in relation to the so-called ‘gravitational pull’ of statutes on common law 
development. 
 
82 Spigelman CJ used the word “ambulatory” in his judgement in R v Young (para 15 and 32) to describe an 
approach to the process of judicial interpretation, but he did not believe it justified “the additional words 
proposed in the present case” (ibid, para 16) as, in his opinion, they went beyond the clear intention of 
Parliament in the words actually used. 
 
83 The appellant’s interpretation of the statute eventually upheld by the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal was opposed not only by the Crown, but by separate legal teams from the office of the New South 
Wales Attorney-General and the New England Area Health Service (ibid, paras 4 and 119). 
 
84 This description of the proper judicial approach to statutory interpretation attributed to Lord Diplock was 
quoted by James J (p 734, para 288) who was himself quoting McHugh JA (as he then was) in Kingston v 
Keprose Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 404, 421-424. 
 
85 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 749, para 354. 
 
86 Idem. 
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s 126H(3), s 126J, s 130 or even the common law applied to the adduction of evidence 
or pre-trial processes.
87  In any event, Parliament could intervene to clarify if it was not 
satisfied with the court’s decision.
88 
 
Despite the three different majority judgements, the court’s view that a defendant’s 
common law rights were not abrogated without clear statutory language was clear 
enough.  But if Spigelman CJ had not felt the need to expand his remarks so as to rebut 
Beazley J’s dissent,
89 it is doubtful that the religious confession privilege discussion 
would have arisen.  Though all of this obiter opinion from a court which Spigelman CJ 
characterised as an intermediate court of appeal
90 is persuasive, it is not the last 
Australian judicial word relevant to the subject of common law privileges, including 
arguably religious confession privilege.  That last word comes inductively from the High 
Court’s reasoning in Daniel’s Corporation v ACCC.
91  As that judgement is now 
reviewed, it is useful to keep in mind the joint insight of Abadee and Barr JJ in R v 
Young, who found the most compelling reason not to allow a liberal interpretation of the 
sexual assault communications privilege statute in that case, was because such 
interpretation would extinguish the established defence right of an accused person to 
test all the evidence presented against him/her. 
                                                 
87 Idem. 
 
88 Ibid, p 749, para 352.  Spigelman CJ also anticipated further parliamentary legislative involvement if it did 
not approve of the Court of Appeal’s decision (ibid, p 696, para 70, and p 702, para 105). 
 
89 Ibid, p 695, para 68, where he said he had added to his initial written decision after reading “the judgement 
of Beazley JA”. 
 
90 Ibid, p 698, para 84, and p 700, para 91. 
 
91 Daniels Corporation v ACCC (2002) 192 ALR 561; [2002] HCA 49; (2003) 77 ALJR 40. 
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Daniels Corporation v ACCC  
In Daniels, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission had denied that 
Daniels Corporation could rely on the legal professional privilege claimed in respect of 
documents the Commission required to be produced.  The Full Federal Court agreed 
with the Commission, but the High Court unanimously reversed the Federal Court finding 
that legal professional privilege was not just a rule of evidence,
92 nor even simply a rule 
of substantive law.
93  It was an important
94 and fundamental common law immunity
95 
which embodies a substantive legal and human right
96 that “is not limited to judicial or 
quasi-judicial proceedings”.
97  All of the judges traced these ideas with approval back to 
earlier High Court of Australia decisions in Baker v Campbell
98 in 1983 and Attorney-
General (NT) v Maurice
99 in 1986.  Nor did the fact that Daniels was a corporate person 
rather than a human being eliminate its right to legal professional privilege.  Though the 
concurring judgements of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ seemed to 
“assume without deciding”
100 that Daniels Corporation was entitled to the benefit of legal 
professional privilege, for Kirby J this “fundamental civil right belong[ed] ... also to 
artificial persons such as corporations”.
101  Nor did the ACCC’s argument that section 
                                                 
92 Daniels Corporation v ACCC (2002) 192 ALR 561, 564 (para 10 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ) and 583 (para 85 per Kirby J). 
 
93 Ibid, pp 564-565, para 11, per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. 
 
94 Idem. 
 
95 Ibid, pp 573-574, para 44, per McHugh J; p 583, para 85, per Kirby J. 
 
96 Ibid, pp 583-584, para 86, per Kirby J. 
 
97 Ibid, p 583, para 85, per Kirby J. 
 
98 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
 
99 Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475. 
 
100 Daniels Corporation v ACCC (2002) 192 ALR 561, 566, para 14. 
 
101 Ibid, pp 582-588, para 103. 
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155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was otiose if it did not abrogate legal 
professional privilege, make any headway with the court.  For McHugh J, the fact that 
only a small percentage of documents claimed under the section would be protected by 
the privilege
102 meant that section 155 still had meaning and practical effect if legal 
professional privilege were held unaffected by its operation. 
 
How much of the High Court’s defence of legal professional privilege as a fundamental 
common law and human right could Australians expect to see logically transferred to 
similarly defend either religious confession privilege or confidential religious 
communications privilege?  Indeed, could either of these alleged privileges be correctly 
characterised as either a common law or a human right?  The language used in the joint 
judgement of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ when stating their version 
of the historical and foundational status of legal professional privilege is a good starting 
point for analysis.  They wrote:  
 
It is now settled that legal professional privilege is a rule of substantive law ... 
Being a rule of substantive law and not merely a rule of evidence, legal 
professional privilege is not confined to the processes of discovery and 
inspection and the giving of evidence in judicial proceedings ... [it enables] 
resist[ance to] the giving of information or the production of documents in 
accordance with [other] investigatory procedures.
103  
 
                                                 
102 Ibid, p 574, para 45. 
 
103 Ibid, pp 564-565, paras 9-10. 
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Is it similarly true to say either that ‘it is well settled that religious confession privilege is a 
rule of substantive law’?  Is it more than a ‘mere rule of evidence’ if it is even accepted to 
be that?  Such is doubtful.  If it were true that ‘it is well settled’ that religious confession 
privilege is a ‘substantive rule of law’ or a well recognised ‘rule of evidence’, this thesis 
would not have been written.  Since it is not well settled that religious confession 
privilege is even a rule of evidence, is it likely that the High Court of Australia will invoke 
this same reasoning in its defence when a religious confession privilege does eventually 
come before it?  Will this thesis’ analysis or the arguable fact that religious confession 
privilege is believed to exist by the general populace
104 make any difference?  While the 
answer to this last question is sociologically beyond the scope of this thesis, the High 
Court’s use of the phrase ‘well settled’ raises precedential issues which are appropriately 
discussed here. 
 
If by ‘well settled’, the High Court means that there have been enough cases affirming 
legal professional privilege to place its existence beyond doubt, then religious confession 
privilege does not meet the standard.
105  If the test is or can be that suggested by 
                                                 
104 Though not clearly representative of the views of the ‘general populace’, in the Legislative Council of 
NSW, the Hon Franca Arena found it “strange that ... legislation should be necessary” to protect the 
immunity of religious confessions in a court of law (Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 21 
November 1989, p 12806).  The Hon BH Vaughan said later the same day that he “was particularly attracted 
to the statement made by the Hon Franca Arena when she said it came as a great surprise to her that it 
ought even be necessary to legislate for the protection of a clergyman in the circumstances I have set out” 
(ibid, p 12830) and the Hon FJ Nile “question[ed] the necessity to introduce the legislation into the House” 
(idem) but nonetheless supported it.  The recent (September 2003) introduction of the Children’s Protection 
(Mandatory Reporting) Bill into the South Australian Parliament proposing to reduce the religious confession 
privilege in child abuse cases, manifests some understanding in that state that the privilege exists at 
common law, even though it has never been confirmed there by statute. 
 
105 The following is a simple summary of the obiter (no ratio available) for and against religious confession 
privilege: 
Against: (i)Anonymous (1693) Skinner 404; 90 ER 179 per Holt LCJ; (ii) R v Sparkes (c 1790) per Buller J, 
unreported but referred to in Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96; (iii) R v Gilham (1828) 1 
Moody Cr Cas 186; 168 ER 1235 per Park J; (iv) Greenlaw v King (1838) 1 Beav 137; 48 ER 891 per 
Langdale LJ; (v) Russell v Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387; 68 ER 900 per Turner VC; (vi) Anderson v Bank of 
British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644 per Jessel MR and James LJ; (vii) Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch 
D 675 per Jessel MR. Though (viii) Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468 (per Jeune P); (ix) 
McTaggart v McTaggart [1949] Probate 94 (per Denning LJ, as he then was); (x) Attorney-General v 
Mulholland and Foster [1963] 2 QB 477 (per Denning, LJ, as he then was); and (xi) D v NSPCC [1978] AC RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SEVEN  283
Spigelman CJ in R v Young
106 – that religious confession privilege is “sufficiently definite, 
widely accepted and permanent”
107 so that it is a recognised existing privilege “as distinct 
from ... a new category of privilege”,
108 then perhaps it can expect more sanguine 
treatment if it is ever considered in the High Court of Australia.  But even if it is conceded 
with the Supreme Court of Canada, that the evidence of the existence of a confidential 
_________________________ 
 
171 (per Edmund-Davies LJ et al) have likewise been cited against the privilege ( Nokes also says that 
McTaggart v McTaggart is a case that “suggest[s] or assert[s] that no privilege exists (Nokes, GD, 
“Professional Privilege” (1950) 66 LQR 88, 98), McWilliams reads Attorney-General v Mulholland and Foster 
against the privilege though he finds the “budding of a discretion” in D v NSPCC (McWilliams, PK, Canadian 
Criminal Evidence, 3
rd ed, Ontario, Canada Law Book Limited, 1984, pp 920-922). These four cases were 
discussed in chapter five as obiter authority in favour of a broader though discretionary religious 
communications privilege.  One additional case against religious confession privilege is: (xii) Butler v Moore 
(1804-1806) 2 Sch & Lef 249.  This case before the Irish Master of the Rolls, Sir Michael Smith, which raised 
the admissibility of a priest’s evidence as to the testator’s Catholicism (which would have invalidated his will) 
was discussed in chapter six (pp 238,240).  Its precedential value has been dismissed by WM Best, ( A 
Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, London, S Sweet, 1849, pp 459-460) and Clinton (Mayor Clinton was 
the judge in The People v Phillips (1813) NY Ct Gen Sess, reprinted in “Privileged Communications to 
Clergymen” (1955) 1 The Catholic Lawyer 198) on account of its anti-Catholic bias. 
 
For:  (i) Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howells State Trials 217 per Salisbury, Northampton and perhaps Sir 
Edward Coke, as he then was; (ii) Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96 per Kenyon LCJ; (iii) R 
v Radford (1823) unreported (cited in R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody Cr Cas 186; 168 ER 1235), per Best CJ 
(later Wynford LJ); (iv) Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528 per Best CJ (later Wynford LJ); (v) 
Attorney-General v Briant (1846) 15 LJ Exch 265; (1846) Revised Reports 71; 153 ER 808 per Alderson B; 
(vi) R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219 per Alderson B; (vii) R v Castro (1874) 2 Charge of the Chief Justice 
648 per Cockburn LCJ; (viii) Ruthven v De Bour (1901) 45 Sol J 272 per Ridley J; (ix) Tannian v Synnott 
(1903) 37 Ir. L. T. 275 per Chief Baron Palles of Ireland.  Several other cases that might  be added to this 
“ayes” list are: (x) In re Keller (1887) 22 LR Ir 158; (xi) Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir Rep 515 (per Gavan Duffy J);  
(xii) R v Lynch [1954] Tas SR 47 (per Crisp J); (xiii) R v Howse [1983] NZLR 246 (per Cooke P, later Lord 
Cooke of Thorndon).  In re Keller might be omitted since all nine judges involved studiously avoided direct 
reference to religious confession privilege, though the Irish Court of Appeal granted the requested writ of 
habeas corpus which saw the Reverend Keller released from incarceration for contempt.  Cook v Carroll 
might be omitted, since it strictly dealt with religious communications privilege rather than religious 
confession privilege, though it does contain some fiery condemnation of the English Judges who opined 
against religious confession privilege on grounds of pure religious prejudice.  And Lynch and Howse are 
strictly not relevant to consideration of a common law privilege because they were decided on interpretation 
of applicable statutory provisions, though Lynch in particular does contain dicta accepting the existence of 
religious confession privilege in common law (mentioned briefly supra p 265).  An additional case in favour 
of religious confession privilege is (xiii) The People v Phillips (1813) NY Ct Gen Sess. (Reprinted in 
“Privileged Communications to Clergymen”, The Catholic Lawyer 1 (1955) 198).  The People v Phillips might 
be omitted despite its careful treatment of the English authorities because it was essentially decided on 
United States constitutional grounds.  It was considered in detail in chapter six because of Judge Clinton’s 
insights into the issue of anti-Catholic prejudice which he considered the only reason there was any English 
authority against religious confession privilege. (xiv) R v Gruenke (1991) 3 SCR 263.  This case might 
similarly be excluded from a strict analysis of English common law authority because, even though it 
represents a 9-0 affirmation of religious confession privilege in some form from the highest Canadian court, 
the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had a significant influence on that result. 
 
106 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681. 
 
107 Ibid, p 701, para 102. 
 
108 Idem. 
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religious communications privilege at common law is inconclusive,
109 there is certainly 
room in Kirby J’s language in Daniels to argue that religious confession privilege is a 
fundamental common law human right.
110  For there are at least as many constitutional 
and international human rights instruments available as interpretive helps for Australian 
courts to protect the right to freedom of religious practice as there were human rights 
instruments protecting the right to confidential legal representation at criminal trial and 
which he referenced in Daniels.
111  
 
The fact that Australia also has a direct constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious 
practice
112 may provide greater protection for religious confession privilege than is even 
provided by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
113  In Canada, that Charter 
so bulwarked freedom or religious practice that it removed any need for the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R v Gruenke 
114 to consider whether religious confession privilege 
was either an important common law right or a fundamental human right.  The protection 
is stronger in Australia not because the guarantee of free religious practice has been a 
part of the constitutional architecture since federation, but because the commonwealth 
religious confession privilege statute
115 cannot be repealed without an argument that 
such repeal is constitutionally prohibited as having no purpose other than the 
                                                 
109 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263, pp 287-288 per Lamer CJ. 
 
110 Ibid, p 701, para 102. 
 
111 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263, pp 287-288, per Lamer CJ. 
 
112 The Australian Constitution 1901, section 116. 
 
113 For details of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, see chapter five note 128. 
 
114 R v Gruenke (1991) 3 SCR 263. 
 
115 Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995, section 127. 
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proscription of a religious practice.
116  That religious confession is practiced only in some 
Christian churches does not undermine this defensive argument, because section 116 of 
the Australian Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
upon which it was modeled, both intended to protect diverse rather than egalitarian 
religious practice.  Indeed, though Kirby J’s idea that legal professional privilege is a 
fundamental human right
117 (presumably because an accused person’s right to a fair trial 
is considerably impeded if consultations with counsel are not beyond the scope of 
adversarial review
118) resonates with international human rights instruments, it cannot 
claim the express constitutional guarantee available to religious practices.  In any event, 
it is equally compelling to observe that compulsion to disclose religious confessions, is 
as germane to that freedom of conscience and belief protected by international human 
rights instruments as legal professional privilege is to the right to a fair trial in similar 
instruments. 
 
International human rights in the High Court of Australia 
Because the High Court of Australia has referred to international human rights 
instruments to protect legal professional privilege against statutes that seemed to 
abrogate it, the likely Australian judicial response to a formal claim of religious 
confession privilege at common law cannot be completely answered without further 
consideration of how the High Court currently treats international human rights 
                                                 
116 See chapter six , p 248. 
 
117 Daniels Corporation v ACCC [2002] 192 ALR 561, p 583, para 85.  See also per McHugh J, pp 573-574, 
para 44. 
 
118 Note however, the discussion infra (pp 291-297) where it is noted that this rationale for legal professional 
privilege and those traditionally advanced in favour or self-incrimination privilege and religious confession 
privilege have never been the subject of convincing objective empirical proof and are probably not 
susceptible to such proof. 
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instruments in its jurisprudence.  This consideration will not resolve the much larger 
questions of whether international treaties or customary international law have direct 
application in Australian domestic law; how the competing federal and state interests in 
the subject matter of international treaties is appropriately balanced under the Australian 
constitution; or how Australian constitutional law might be appropriately reformed to 
clarify the role of the Executive in treaty ratification though recognising the sovereignty of 
state and federal parliaments.  But I will highlight the High Court of Australia’s willingness 
to use “international norms … as an interpretive aid … to help resolve statutory 
ambiguity or to fill lacuna in the common law”.
119  While it is less likely that a lower level 
court, or even what Spigelman CJ characterised as an intermediate Court of Appeal in 
Australia
120 would give these lofty notions much time,
121 the High Court has confirmed 
that international treaty obligations have some impact on Australian domestic law.
122  
Though there has been some retreat from the influence accorded to international human 
rights instruments in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh,
123 the references 
of both McHugh and Kirby JJ in Daniels to legal professional privilege not only as a 
                                                 
119 Donaghue, S, “Balancing Sovereignty and International Law: The Domestic Impact of International Law in 
Australia”, (1995) 17 Adelaide Law Review 213, 244.  Note that the Donaghue article discusses all these 
larger questions in the wake of the decision of the High Court in Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, though it does not discuss how the High Court has apparently retreated 
since 1995.  See also notes 123 and 125. 
  
120 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 698 and 700 (paras 84 and 91 respectively). 
 
121 Note also Donaghue’s 1995 discussion of the likely future direction of the High Court in light of the record 
of the various Justices in the then past. While Kirby J is recorded as having “declined to lend [his ... support 
to the wide role for international law advocated by Einfeld J in Minister for Foreign Affairs & Trade v Magno 
(1992) 112 ALR 529, 535, Donaghue notes that Kirby J was a “vocal advocate of the importance of 
international law” while he served in the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Donaghue, op cit, p 253). 
 
122 Evatt, E, “The Impact of International Human Rights on Domestic Law” in Litigating Rights, Huscroft, G, 
and Rishworth, P, editors, Oxford-Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2002, pp 281, 293.  However, note that 
Sir Anthony Mason has doubted the strength of this assertion in the context of the High Court’s decision in 
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, ex parte Lam (2003) 195 ALR 502 (Mason, Sir A, “The 
tension between legislative supremacy and judicial review” (2003) 77 ALJ 803, 808-809). 
 
123 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh(1995) 183 CLR 273.  In connection with the retreat 
from Teoh, note two articles by Wendy Lacey (“In the wake of Teoh: Finding an appropriate Government 
Response”, [2001] Federal Law Review 9, and “A prelude to the demise of Teoh: The High Court decision in 
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam”, [2004] Sydney Law Review 7). 
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common law right, but also as a “fundamental human right”,
124 confirm that international 
human rights instruments will continue to have influence in future consideration of 
evidential privileges and immunities.
125 
 
Elizabeth Evatt, a member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee from 1993 to 
2000
126, has written that “Justices of the High Court of Australia have recognised the 
importance of developing the law consistent with international human rights principles 
where possible”.
127  But she has expressed concern that the protection of United Nations 
“[c]ovenant rights and freedoms ... on a de facto basis ... leaves them vulnerable to 
restriction and erosion by legislation [in the absence of entrenched protection]”.
128  She 
has observed High Court of Australia use of international jurisprudence in Mabo
129 “to 
recognise native title”;
130 in Australian Capital Television
131 to find “an implied protection 
of freedom of communication in regard to public affairs and political discussion”;
132 and in 
Teoh,
133 to confirm that Australian “ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the 
                                                 
124 Daniels Corporation v ACCC [2002] 192 ALR 561, 573-574 (para 44, per McHugh J) and 583-584 (paras 
85 and 86, per Kirby J). 
 
125 See for example, John Trone (“Constitutions, International Treaties and Contracts”, in The Convergence 
of Legal Systems in the 21
st Century, Moens GA and Biffot R, eds, CopyRight Publishing Company Pty Ltd, 
Brisbane, pp 47, 50-51) and Stephen Donaghue, op cit, pp 244-250). 
. 
126 She has previously served five years on the English Law Commission at the invitation of Lord Scarman; 
as Chief Judge of the Family Court of Australia from its inception in 1975, and as President of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission 
(http://www.newcastle.edu.au/services/library/collections/archives/int/evatt.html site and visited 6 December 
2003). 
 
127 Evatt, E, op cit, p 293. 
 
128 Ibid, p 290. 
 
129 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
 
130 Evatt, E, op cit, p 293. 
 
131 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
 
132 Evatt, E, op cit, p 293. 
 
133 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273. 
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Child gave rise to a legitimate expectation that decision makers would exercise their 
discretion in matters affecting children in conformity with the terms of the Convention”.
134 
 
Such international influence may increase the possibility that confidential religious 
communications privilege would receive a favourable hearing in the High Court of 
Australia, particularly since the United States
135 and Canada
136 have already recognised 
it in their common law jurisprudence and it is arguably implicit in the original United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
137  However, though the Federal 
Government eventually dropped its legislative efforts to “override” Teoh,
138 McHugh J’s 
dissent in that case denying that Australia’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child obliged domestic decision makers to act in strict conformity with that 
convention, has proven more indicative of development of the law in Australia than the 
majority view.
139  
 
                                                 
134 Evatt, E, op cit, p 293. 
 
135 Mullen v US (1959) 263 F. 2d 275. 
 
136 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263. 
 
137 Article 18 states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” 
 
138 Wendy Lacey noted in 2001 that there were a variety of efforts to “override the decision” in Teoh 
including “three Commonwealth Bills, one State Act [as well as] several ‘executive statements’ at both 
Federal and state level” (“In the wake of Teoh: Finding an appropriate Government Response”, [2001] 
Federal Law Review 9).  Elizabeth Evatt also noted that the majority view in Teoh was not shared by the 
Executive (op cit, p 293). 
 
139 Note in particular that the majority in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam 
(2003) 195 ALR 502 declined to apply the legitimate expectations doctrine articulated in Teoh, finding simply 
that Lam had not been prejudiced by any procedural unfairness in the decision to deport him, even though 
letters provided by the carers of his two children were not considered by the Immigration authorities.  See 
also Sir Anthony Mason’s view that this decision in Lam reduced the likelihood that future High Court 
decisions would override administrative decisions solely because of international treaty obligations (“The 
tension between legislative supremacy and judicial review” (2003) 77 ALJ 803, 808-809). 
  RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SEVEN  289
However, in the thesis context of privileges and immunities, it remains the fact that the 
High Court in Daniels  not only drew strength from international human rights norms as it 
reinforced the status of legal professional privilege, but the court declined to insist on the 
traditional distinction between privileges and immunities which Beazley JA had made in 
R v Young.
140  As in the House of Lords in D v NSPCC,
141 there is in the High Court’s 
language in Daniels, an elision of these concepts.  For in their majority judgement, 
Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ said that “legal professional privilege is 
not merely a rule of substantive law.  It is an important common law right or, perhaps 
more accurately, an important common law immunity.”
142  Since legal professional 
privilege may be waived, which fact is recognised statutorily in New South Wales,
143 and 
in Daniels is characterised as an immunity,
144 the old distinction between privileges and 
immunities is arguably signalled as a distinction of history with declining contemporary 
significance.  I will now review the historical distinction between immunities (protecting 
Crown self-interest) and privileges (exceptions to witness compellability to limit the risk of 
tyranny) to determine whether logic familiar in one category can now be reasonably 
inducted into the other. 
 
                                                 
140 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 704, para 126 where she noted that an immunity could not be waived 
like a privilege. 
 
141 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171.  See also discussion supra in chapter five, pp 192-206. 
 
142 Daniels Corporation v ACCC [2002] 192 ALR 561, 565, para 11, per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow 
and Hayne JJ. 
 
143 Evidence Act 1995, sections 122-126. 
 
144 Daniels Corporation v ACCC [2002] 192 ALR 561, 573-574, para 44, per McHugh J; p 583, para 85, per 
Kirby J. 
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Privilege and immunity 
Stone and Wells list six “groups of rules”
145 in the law of evidence (all of which they name 
‘privileges’) which as “considerations ... extraneous to rational inquiry … sacrifice truth 
simpliciter on the ground that otherwise some important social or public interest would be 
injured”
146 (italics original).  Their list includes “rules protecting political institutions ... 
rules protecting judicial institutions [including legal professional privilege and] ... rules 
protecting individual liberty and security”
147 including self-incrimination privilege.  All of 
these “must be protected, if necessary, by casting truth to the dogs”.
148 Since they 
describe even ‘rules protecting political institutions’ as privileges, even the Stone and 
Wells categories imply that the distinction between privilege and immunity has 
diminishing significance and that the logic is becoming transferable. 
 
The rules protecting individual liberty and security manifest “the general tendency of 
English law to prevent vexation and oppression of individual liberty disproportionate to 
the end to be achieved ... [and] is so pervasive that it tends to cover and obscure many 
rules primarily based on other considerations”.
149  Self-incrimination privilege in particular 
is justified by two arguments, the first of which Stone and Wells say is the more 
compelling: 
 
First ... without such a privilege, the universal obligation to testify would be a 
veritable terror to most in the community, for few are without sin.  Terror would 
                                                 
145 Stone J, Evidence, Its History and Policies, Revised by WAN Wells, Sydney, Butterworths, 1991, p 69. 
 
146 Idem. 
 
147 Ibid, pp 70-73. 
 
148 Ibid, p 70. 
 
149 Ibid, p 73. 
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produce evasion and prevarication and hence more truth would, in the long run, 
be lost without it than because of it.  Secondly ... though the guilty need no 
protection, the innocent do, and to compel self-incrimination would encourage 
overzealous officials and blackmailing neighbours.
150  
 
Stone and Wells’ observation of the tendency in English law to protect individual liberty 
absent a compelling interest to do otherwise
151 is the same argument which has often 
been used to support religious confession privilege.
152  For the recalcitrance of the clergy 
despite compulsive efforts, is said to be likely to bring the legal system into disrepute.
153 
Save for these subjective arguments vested in freedom of conscience, neither self- 
incrimination privilege nor religious confession privilege have been the subject of 
objective justification and it is doubtful that a convincing empirical test to prove the need 
for either could be constructed.
154  However, if it is acceptable to justify self-incrimination 
privilege, now also deemed a common law right,
155 with only statements about the need 
                                                 
150 Ibid, p 562. 
 
151 Ibid, p 73. 
 
152 For example, Bentham observed that the compulsion of confessional evidence would result in such 
“casual, and even rare” “assistance to justice” that it is outweighed by the infamy attaching to the system that 
compelled “the violation of so important a professional as well as religious duty”.  He also considered that 
the public interest in facilitating the repentance enabled by this Catholic practice and his expectation that 
priests would find ways to avert prospective mischief without breaching confidence in the absence of 
repentance, more than justified state recognition of confessional privilege (Rationale of Judicial Evidence, 
New York and London, Garland Publishing Inc.,1978 (Reprint of the 1827 ed published by Hunt and Clarke, 
London), Vol 4, pp 589-591). 
 
153 For example, McNicol SB, Law of Privilege, Australia, The Law Book Co, 1992, p 330. 
 
154 Doubtful because generalised statistical analysis of decisions in cases made where the privilege was 
ignored (if either privilege were ever completely abrogated) could not prove that a particularised decision in a 
case where either privilege was recognised was objectively aberrant.  The only convincing empirical proof of 
the value of either privilege, would involve running an identical case twice before the same judicial forum to 
measure and analyse the results.  Note, however, that attorney preparation for significant North American 
jury trials often includes the presentation of evidence and argument to simulated juries to determine strategy 
including the advisability of settlement. 
 
155 See notes 38-41 supra and supporting text. 
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to protect freedom of conscience, then such logic should also suffice to justify religious 
confession privilege.   
 
Stone and Wells’ justification for the privilege protecting communications between 
solicitor and client – “that if it did not exist no man would feel safe in obtaining legal 
advice, and hence the whole system of administration of justice would tend to break 
down”
156 – summarises all that has been written about that privilege.  However, this 
negative justification is not completely convincing even when those writers cite Best’s 
observation, “that after the first harvest of secrets immediately following the abolition of 
the privilege, there would be no more, for men would not confide in their legal 
advisors”.
157  For no one has satisfactorily shown that the judicial system would grind to 
a halt without legal professional privilege as we have come to know it.  Indeed, Stone 
and Wells seem to sense this when they endeavour to shore up the argument with the 
statement that without legal professional privilege, “[l]egal advice would become 
valueless”
158 and cross-examination the “most powerful weapon for ascertaining truth”
159 
“would be deprived of ... [its] efficiency”.
160  But they do not explain
161 except to say that 
Lord Brougham
162 dismissed the contemporary utilitarian criticism
163 that the real reason 
                                                 
156 Stone and Wells, op cit, p 71. 
 
157 Ibid, p 572.  Note once again that this argument is simply a restatement of one of Bentham’s arguments 
in favour of religious confession privilege when he said that religious confessions “would be kept back, under 
the apprehension [that they would be] … use[d] for a judicial purpose” (op cit, p 587). 
 
158 Idem. 
 
159 Idem. 
 
160 Idem. 
 
161 Stone and Wells, op cit, p 573. 
 
162 Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 1 Myl & K 98, 103; 39 ER 618, 621. 
 
163 Lord Brougham was apparently here referring to Bentham and his utilitarian disciples.  Wigmore 
(Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown, 1961, Vol 8, pp 
541-554) considered and dismissed Bentham’s strong criticisms of legal professional privilege (citing RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SEVEN  293
for the existence of legal professional privilege can be found in the “particular importance 
which the law attributes to the business of legal professors”.
164  Such circular justification 
for legal professional privilege does not provide much analogical help for a theorist 
looking for logic with which to defend religious confession privilege.  That Bentham 
criticised legal professional privilege as an unnecessary fetter on the search for truth,
165 
but believed it was unjust to compel disclosure of religious confessions, may manifest no 
more than the workings of his social conscience.  For religious confession privilege 
would benefit persecuted Catholics whereas legal profession privilege only benefited the 
wealthy who could afford to engage lawyers in both civil and criminal matters.  But his 
logic-affirming religious confession privilege vests in practicality and tolerance.
166 
_________________________ 
 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827), 7 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 473, 474, 475, 477, 479 (Bowring 
ed. 1842)).  Bentham and his disciples questioned rhetorically why the justice system would be so 
irrevocably damaged by subjecting attorney client communications to judicial scrutiny and suggests United 
States style ‘miranda’ warnings (as they are now called) by attorneys would simply limit the nature and 
content of such discussion, a result not without precedent.  The most emphatic Benthamite point apparently 
being that only those truly guilty of crime could have any protest against the removal of the privilege which 
would then make professional lawyers true ministers of justice instead of abettors of crime.  Though 
Wigmore suggests Bentham’s arguments are only superficially convincing, Wigmore’s mostly civil law 
examples to rebut the attack are not themselves convincing since it is in the criminal arena where the 
constitutional issues (the essential subject of the Benthamite criticisms) loom largest.  Indeed, Wigmore’s 
defence of legal professional privilege only begins to become convincing when he observes that legal 
professional privilege can only be deemed an evil “to the extent that the bar is unprincipled” (ibid, p 553) and 
if that sort of “treachery” (idem) which he finds implicit in Benthamite criticisms were well founded, “more 
radical remedies are needed than denial of the privilege”(idem).  
 
In light of his strong criticism of privileges generally, it is surprising to find Bentham a strong advocate of 
religious confession privilege, though his treatment of the subject as a purely Catholic issue, demonstrates 
his passion for the removal of systemic injustice in the eighteenth and nineteenth century English legal 
system in which he lived (Rationale of Judicial Evidence, New York and London, Garland Publishing Inc., 
1978 (Reprint of the 1827 ed published by Hunt and Clarke, London), Vol 4, pp 586-592). 
 
164 Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 1 Myl & K 98, 103; 39 ER 618, 621.  Lord Brougham also said that the real 
reason for legal professional privilege “is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot be upholden 
… without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence …  If the privilege did not exist at all, every one would be 
thrown upon his own legal resources; deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to 
consult any skilful person, or would only dare to tell his counselor half his case”.  
 
165 Wigmore called Bentham the greatest critic of all privileges (Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Revised 
by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown, 1961, Vol 8, p 877).  See also note 163. 
 
166 In essence, Bentham’s practical argument why “catholic confession” should be privileged, is that 
compelling disclosure will not result in any more evidence being made available to a court since either 
confessions will not be made, or the priest will accept punishment for contempt rather than disclose.  His 
tolerance argument is that it is “altogether inconsistent and incompatible” with the notion that “the catholic 
religion [is supposed] … to be tolerated” to coerce the disclosure of religious confessions (Bentham J, RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SEVEN  294
However, other rationales have been advanced to defend legal professional privilege, 
significantly by McHugh J in Carter v Northmore Hale Davy & Leake.
167  There he 
accepted that the traditional rationale advanced to defend legal professional privilege –  
“that the doctrine is necessary for the ‘proper functioning of the legal system’”
168 – 
“hardly seems applicable”
169 when the “legal advice”
170 limb of the privilege is considered 
separately from its “contemplated litigation”
171 limb
172. For McHugh J, since the High 
Court had held that “legal professional privilege is not a rule of evidence but a 
substantive rule of law”,
173 the “best explanation”
174 of ‘legal advice privilege’ “is that it is 
a ‘practical guarantee of fundamental, constitutional or human rights’”.
175  He elaborated: 
 
By protecting the confidentiality of communications between lawyer and client, 
the doctrine protects the rights and privacy of persons including corporations by 
ensuring unreserved freedom of communication with professional lawyers who 
can advise them of their rights under the law and, where necessary, take action 
on their behalf to defend or enforce those rights.  The doctrine is a natural, if not 
_________________________ 
 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Garland Publishing Inc, New York & London, 1978, Vol IV, pp 586-592).  See 
also note 163. 
 
167 Carter v Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121. 
 
168 Ibid, p 161. 
 
169 Idem. 
 
170 Idem. 
 
171 Idem. 
 
172 Mason J similarly doubted that legal professional privilege should extend to the provision of legal advice 
(Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 75).  See also p 260 supra. 
 
173 Idem. 
 
174 Idem. 
 
175 Idem, quoting A.M. and S. Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (1983) QB 878, 941. RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SEVEN  295
necessary, corollary of the rule of law and a potent force to ensuring that the 
equal protection of the law is a reality.  
 
This Court has accepted that, although the doctrine is based on the requirements 
of the public interest, its application in particular cases does not depend upon 
balancing it against other rights that are grounded in the public interest.  Not even 
the public interest in courts having all the relevant evidence before them has 
been considered sufficient to override the public interest in maintaining the 
unqualified operation of the privilege.  As Deane J pointed out in Attorney-
General (N.T.) v Maurice:
176 “Its efficacy as a bulwark against tyranny and 
oppression depends upon the confidence of the community that it will in fact be 
enforced.  That being so, it is not to be sacrificed even to promote the search for 
justice or truth in an individual case or matter and extends to protect the citizen 
from compulsory disclosure of protected communications or materials to any 
court or to any tribunal or person with authority to require the giving of information 
or the production of documents or other materials.”
177 
 
In defending legal professional ‘privilege’, McHugh J not only used the ‘public interest’ 
tool used to defend traditional ‘immunities’, he engaged the rhetoric of constitutional law 
to protect legal professional privilege as if it were the subject of a guarantee in an 
Australian Bill of Rights.  A consideration of the objective utility of this defence of legal 
professional privilege in the civil sphere is well beyond the scope of this thesis.  But it is 
significant in the context of this consideration of religious confession privilege to observe 
                                                 
176 Attorney-General (N.T.) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 490. 
 
177 Carter v Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121, 161. 
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that even McHugh J’s defence of legal professional privilege in Carter is founded in 
constitutional logic which only seems relevant where the State is pitted against the 
citizen.  With respect, that logic lacks compelling force when the State is a bystander and 
the dispute is a civil one between citizens who do not want to disclose their 
communications with their respective lawyers.
178  But when the dispute is between a 
citizen and the State as in Young and Daniels and in religious confession privilege 
cases, such constitutionally premised defences certainly have convincing power. 
Stone and Wells expect the distinction between immunity and privilege to endure when 
they write that the “privilege for state documents and communications”
179 is more than a 
“mere privilege ... [since] once it comes into play, it not only forbids … proof of [the 
contents of a document or communication through] a particular channel, but also by any 
other channel”.
180  However, they believe that the courts have the same power and 
interlocutory tools to examine and inspect in cases where State secrets are an issue, 
despite the fact that the State’s interest has been characterised in commentary as an 
immunity interest rather than as a privilege – and they believe that the courts should 
make “freer use”
181 of this power.  Indeed, Stone and Wells find that judicial self-denial of 
its right to inspect in cases where the head of the government department concerned 
personally asserts the claim of immunity/privilege,
182 is the only difference between 
government claims of immunity on grounds of the public interest, and other cases where 
different public interest factors are argued in favour of a privilege.  Again however, State 
                                                 
178 Though when exercising its powers to compel evidence, the court may certainly be seen as an agency of 
the state, the state is not ordinarily a party in civil disputes. 
 
179 Stone and Wells, op cit, p 591. 
 
180 Idem. 
 
181 Ibid, p 592. 
 
182 Stone and Wells, op cit, p 594. 
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assertions of immunity will only be trumped if it is perceived that some constitutional right 
of a citizen will be trampled if such State immunity claim is upheld. 
 
Though there remains an argument that immunities and privileges remain different since 
privileges can be waived and State immunities cannot (which Beazley JA identified as a 
significant difference between the two types of rules of evidence in her Young 
dissent
183), if a government privilege has been waived following the leak of otherwise 
privileged material into the public domain, it is difficult to see even a government claim of 
privilege withstanding judicial scrutiny.  Similarly, the doctrine that government public 
interest immunity is absolute in the sense that it does not need to be asserted to be 
found extant by a judge and that it bars secondary routes to the evidence, can be 
discounted in practice if judges retain a right of inspection as Stone and Wells assert.
184 
This insight itself recalls Best CJ’s statement in Broad v Pitt
185 in 1828 that religious 
confession privilege could be waived. Previous to the decision in R v Gilham
186 
disapproving his earlier decision in R v Radford
187 in 1823, Best CJ had similarly 
considered that religious confession privilege was absolute. 
 
                                                 
183 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 704 para 126 citing McNicol SB, Law of Privilege, chapter one.  The 
other distinctions Beazley JA notes between immunities and privilege are that immunities do not rely upon 
the assertion of a claim by the parties and that “secondary evidence cannot be given of evidence the subject 
of the claim”. 
  
184 Stone and Wells, op cit, pp 591-597. 
 
185 Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528.  Discussed in chapter four, pp 148-150 and mentioned 
in chapter five, p 182. 
 
186 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody Cr Cas 186; 168 ER 1235.  Discussed in chapter one, pp 19-22 and in 
chapter four, pp 148-150. 
 
187 Unreported but referred to in R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody Cr Cas 186; 168 ER 1235. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SEVEN  298
Privilege/immunity in a criminal setting 
Because religious confession and religious communications privilege issues are most 
likely to arise in the context of criminal cases, and because the privileges considered in 
both Young and Daniels were similarly considered in a criminal law context, the 
reasoning is more susceptible to persuasive inductive transfer than if the context were 
civil.  In both Young and Daniels, the onus of proving the case against the appellants (as 
prospective defendants in further litigation after the subject pre-trial matters were 
resolved) beyond reasonable doubt would have been significantly interfered with if the 
privilege/immunity question were decided against them.  For Abadee and Barr JJ in R v 
Young, this proposed interference with an accused person’s fundamental common law 
rights in a criminal trial was the primary reason why the statutory sexual assault 
communications privilege under consideration in that case should not be interpreted 
generously.
188  Interference with confidential religious communications privilege has the 
same practical result.  For arguably the adduction of evidence that an accused person 
expected to be kept confidential also deprives that person of a fair trial and represents a 
form of self incrimination without caution.  But to understand the validity of this 
comparison between the rights of Mr Young to have access to all the evidence (despite 
the existence of a statutory sexual assault communications privilege barring the 
adduction of a sexual assault counsellor’s evidence at trial) and an accused person’s 
claim of a common law religious communications privilege in a criminal trial, it is 
necessary to compare the historical development of both self incrimination and legal 
professional privilege. 
                                                 
188 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 721-723.  Lord Simon had also confirmed this principle in D v NSPCC 
[1978] AC 171, 232, when he said that “[T]he public interest that no innocent man should be convicted of 
crime is so powerful that it outweighs the general public interest that sources of police information should not 
be divulged.” 
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J Noel Lyon’s 1965 observation that allowing compelled disclosure of discussions 
between lawyer and client and between priest and penitent “would be tantamount to 
compelling the client to give evidence against himself”
189 is a good starting point, 
although its merger of the two privileges is superficially unhelpful to modern readers who 
see the privileges as quite distinct.  Neither privilege arose in a vacuum, but both were 
justified by similar strands of reasoning.  Stone and Wells considered that the most 
powerful historical reason which justified the self incrimination privilege, was the “evasion 
and prevarication”
190 that terror of the universal obligation to testify would produce and 
which would ultimately result in the loss of more truth than it would see adduced.
191  
Wigmore has explained that while legal professional privilege originated in “the oath and 
honor of the attorney”,
192 a professional obligation which the court understood though it 
did not hold itself competent to “judge its standards”,
193 it was superseded in the late 
eighteenth century by a new justification that “looked to the necessity of providing 
                                                 
189 Lyon, JN, “Privileged Communications – Penitent and Priest” [1964-1965] 7 Crim LQ 327, 328. 
 
190 Stone and Wells, op cit, p 562. 
 
191 See more detailed discussion of the policy behind the self-incrimination privilege supra, pp 290-292.  See 
also note 152 and 166 where Bentham used this same argument to justify religious confession privilege. 
 
192 Wigmore, op cit, Vol 8, p 543. 
 
193 Idem.  There is resonance here with religious confession privilege since, for example, in In re Keller 
(1887) 22 LR Ir 158, 160, the Reverend Mr Keller pointed out to Judge Boyd at first instance that “the nature 
and obligations of a Catholic priest or the laws of Catholic discipline, or the laws or usages of Catholic 
discipline” were subjective matters for the priest and beyond his purview as a secular judge.  In re Keller is 
discussed in chapter four, pp 159-162.  Note, however, that while the High Court of Australia in Wylde v 
Attorney-General for New South Wales (1948) 78 CLR 224, 262-263 per Latham CJ found that it was not for 
the court to determine the soundness of any particular doctrine or the wisdom of any particular ritual, the 
court went on to find that the charitable trust property matters which faced it, could not be resolved without 
making some such determinations in this case since there were no ecclesiastical courts of law to determine 
such doctrinal questions (pp 270-271 per Latham CJ).  In the United States, the Supreme Court 
unequivocally banned judicial scrutiny of ecclesiastical decisions (Watson v Jones 80 U.S. [13 Wall.] 679; 20 
L. Ed. 666[1872]) but has found ways to decide cases involving theological questions which avoid 
theological answers but arguably trivialise religious practice (for example, Employment Division v Smith 494 
US 872 (1990).  Note also that the religious confession privilege recognised by the Uniform Commonwealth 
Evidence Act (originated in NSW in 1989 by the Evidence (Religious Confessions) Amendment) makes the 
member of clergy asserting religious confession privilege, the arbiter of whether what was heard was a 
religious confession or not.  This point is discussed infra, pp 308-309. 
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subjectively for the client’s freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal advisor”.
194  
The logic is the same.  What may be even more significant in the 1743 Exchequer 
case
195 that Wigmore cites to demonstrate the new logic, are references to the 
relationship between attorney and client as a “sacred”
196 thing, invoking an “inviolable 
secrecy”
197 – terms clearly calculated to bring to mind the secrecy surrounding 
confessions made to priests and the language of canonical practice.  Baron Alderson 
was even more explicit in R v Griffin
198  in 1853 when he reversed the comparison 
because legal professional privilege had become more well known and said:  
 
The principle upon which an attorney is prevented from divulging what passes 
with his client is because without an unfettered means of communication the 
client would not have legal assistance.  The same principle applies to a person 
deprived of whose advice the prisoner would not have proper spiritual 
assistance.
199 
 
While these eighteenth and nineteenth century religious analogies are unlikely to 
persuade an Australian court in the twenty-first century where the convincing power and 
utility of religious symbolism has retreated if it is understood at all, freedom of religious 
belief and practice has found its way into human rights norms as thoroughly and 
                                                 
194 Wigmore, op cit, Vol 8, p 543.  Lord Simon explained this change in the justification for legal professional 
privilege in D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 238, as did Dawson J in Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 126-
127. 
 
195 Annesley v Earl of Anglesea (1743) 17 Howell St. Tr. 1139. 
 
196 Ibid, p 1240. 
 
197 Idem. 
 
198 R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219. 
 
199 Idem. 
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fundamentally as the right to a fair trial. Indeed, freedom of religious practice arguably 
including the right to practice religious confession according to the dictates of one’s own 
conscience
200 has greater constitutional entrenchment as a human right in Australia
201 
than the fundamental common law and human right to legal professional privilege 
affirmed by the High Court in Daniels. 
 
Young and Daniels reflect a judicial inclination to protect the rights of persons accused of 
crime or likely to be accused of crime, even greater than when self incrimination privilege 
and legal professional privilege evolved after Tudor times.  If the compulsion of evidence 
of a religious confession would abrogate free exercise of religion by a person accused of 
crime, then that evidence should be no more compellable than evidence which would 
incriminate the same person or deny that person confidential access to his legal advisor. 
For while the public interests which now justify the three privileges are distinct, it is 
difficult to argue in Australia that the public interest undergirding religious confession 
privilege is less entrenched than that which undergirds self incrimination privilege and 
legal professional privilege since only religious confession privilege can argue 
endorsement in the Constitution. 
 
However, while the First Amendment to the United States Constitution protecting 
freedom of religious belief and practice, now binds the states as well as the Federal 
                                                 
200 Wright and Graham catalogue extensive American constitutional debate as to whether the free exercise 
limb of the First Amendment mandates recognition of religious confession privilege or whether the non-
establishment limb of the same amendment constitutionally bars it.  Their commentary notes that a religious 
confession privilege statute has never been struck down on the latter ground and that all fifty states now 
have such statutes, the effective result of the debate being that while such accommodation of religious 
practice will not violate free exercise, neither will it positively mandate it either (Wright CA, and Graham KW, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence, 3
rd ed, St Paul Minnesota, West Publishing Co, 1992, Vol 26, pp 
54-78).  Note similar discussion of this American constitutional question in Mayes, JE, “Striking down the 
clergyman-communicant privilege statutes: let free exercise of religion govern” (1986) 62 Indiana LJ 397. 
 
201 ‘Greater’ since free exercise of religion is at least referenced in the Australian Constitution (s 116). RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SEVEN  302
Government,
202 section 116 of the Australian Constitution only protects free exercise of 
religion against intrusion by the Federal Government – a protection in the case of 
religious confessions which is affirmed by section 127 of the Commonwealth Evidence 
Act of 1995.  The High Court of Australia is generally considered to have 
discountenanced the idea that statutory instruments may exercise “gravitational pull”
203 
upon the common law jurisdictions without similar statutory instruments since its decision 
in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.
204 However, a 
close review of Esso’s treatment of the idea of statutory gravitational pull upon the 
common law, reveals that the idea that statutes exercise gravitational pull is alive and 
well, though it did not assist the court in that case. 
 
Gravitational pull of religious confession privilege statutes in 
Australian common law jurisdictions 
 
The High Court’s decison in Esso decided two things.  Firstly it confirmed that the 
dominant purpose test is the common law test for claiming legal professional privilege 
(rather than the sole purpose test which had been preferred since the High Court’s 
earlier decision in Grant v Downs
205).  Second, it stated that sections 118 and 119 of the 
                                                 
202 Wallace v Jaffree 472 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1985) held that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes the same 
substantive limits on US state legislative powers as the First Amendment imposes on Congress.  Everson v 
Board of Education 330 U.S. 1,8,15 (1947) had earlier held that the Fourteenth Amendment binding the 
States included the First Amendment’s establishment clause and Cantwell v Connecticutt 310 U.S. 296, 303 
(1940) contained dictum to similar effect. 
 
203 Mason P used this phrase to justify the derivative application of a statute that recognised the status of 
“legal professional privilege ... [as] a fundamental common law doctrine that furthers the rule of law” (Akins v 
Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539, 546). 
 
204 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49.  Spigelman CJ in 
R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 692, observed that Akins v Abigroup Ltd had applied a derivative method 
of statutory interpretation “in part to follow the Full Federal Court in Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins 
(1998) 81 FCR 360" which had since been overruled by the Full Federal Court in Esso.  He expected that 
the Esso appeal which was pending when he wrote his Young judgement would decide authoritatively 
“concerning the derivative application of the Evidence Act 1995", an “issue that has divided the courts for 
some years”. 
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Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995 did not abrogate the common law legal professional 
privilege in pretrial circumstances by necessary or derivative application even though 
those sections only anticipated legal professional privilege applying when evidence was 
“adduced” in court.  But the decision in Esso did not decide that the derivative reading of 
sections of the Evidence Act was inappropriate in all cases in the future. In particular, it 
did not overrule the suggestion in Akins v Abigroup Ltd that statutes in one Australian 
jurisdiction might exert gravitational pull on the common law in another.  For though 
McHugh and Kirby JJ disagreed that the sole purpose test for determining the availability 
of legal professional privilege should be changed, Kirby J affirmed that while there was 
too much statutory difference in the legal professional privilege context for any state 
statutory provision to exert influence on common law in other Australian jurisdictions,
206 
in areas of less complicated law such influence was not only likely, but desirable in the 
interests of consistency and overall common law seamlessness.
207 
 
While admitting that there was a “fundamental difficulty with th[e] line of reasoning”
208 
that uses statutes analogically “in developing common law principles”,
209 the joint 
majority judgement of Gleeson CJ and Gaudron and Gummow JJ also observed:  
 
Certain legislatures in Australia have enacted legislation concerning [legal 
professional] privilege which differs in a number of respects from the common 
law principles ... One respect concerns whether the test to be applied for 
                                                 
206 This was the reason why James J did not accept that a derivative reading of the NSW sexual assault 
communications privilege was appropriate in R v Young.  He considered that there was too much diversity in 
the Australian statute law to find a common thread of common law.  See notes 85-87 and supporting text. 
 
207 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49, 83, para 91. 
 
208 Ibid, p 61, para 23. 
 
209 Ibid, p 61, para 22. 
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determining privilege is the sole purpose test or the dominant purpose test.  
There are other differences, which are not material to the present case, but which 
should not be overlooked ... Other legislatures have not enacted similar 
legislation.  Furthermore, the legislation, even in the jurisdictions where it applies, 
in its terms leaves untouched certain areas in which the privilege may operate. In 
such a setting, there is no consistent pattern of legislative policy to which the 
common law in Australia can adapt itself.  The fragmentation of the common law 
implicit in the qualification that such adaptation should occur only in those 
jurisdictions in which the Evidence Act applies is inconsistent with what was said 
in Lange, and is unacceptable.
210   
 
These judges then noted that in unitary jurisdictions like England and New Zealand, it 
was much easier to keep the common law on a course parallel to related legislation,
211 
but that was not the position in Australia in the context of legal professional privilege so 
that analogical adaptation of related statutes did not provide assistance in deciding 
Esso.
212  Such reasoning had provided assistance in Australia in the law related to 
marital rape where there was a “uniform pattern of legislation in five states”
213 denying 
the old common law proposition “that, by marriage, a wife gave irrevocable consent to 
sexual intercourse with her husband”.
214  In that case, it was both consistent and 
appropriate to adapt the old common law so that the law in Australia was consistent and 
                                                 
210 Ibid, p 61, para 23. 
 
211 Ibid, pp 62, 63, paras 23, 24, 28. 
 
212 Ibid, p 63, paras 27,28. 
 
213 Ibid, p 63, para 25 quoting R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379, 390. 
 
214 Idem. 
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seamless, and so, as the High Court had expressed in Lange,
215 “[t]here is but one 
common law in Australia which is declared by this Court as the final court of appeal”.
216 
They also noted with approval, a federal United States case
217 where the federal 
common law had been analogically adapted to accord with the theme of related statutes 
“in every State of the Union”.
218 
 
Kirby J’s accord with the majority on Esso’s contention that statutes can and do influence 
the common law, though not in this case since the legal professional privilege statutes 
were so diverse, was expressed in these words:  
 
I am foremost in accepting the view that the common law operates in a world of 
statute law.  I do not doubt that, the elements of law being interactive, the content 
of statute law can, and in many circumstances does, influence the content of the 
common law, and has long done so.  As the influence of the Evidence Acts which 
operate in federal courts and courts of the Australian Capital Territory and New 
South Wales spreads, they may come to have an effect on the development of 
the common law in Australia.  However the Act presently extends to these three 
Australian jurisdictions alone.  The milieu of statute law in the other jurisdictions 
is quite different ...  It would therefore be premature to draw inferences from the 
Act as to the content of the uniform doctrine of the common law of privilege 
applicable throughout Australia.
219 
                                                 
215 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
 
216 Ibid, p 563, as quoted by the majority in Esso at pp 61-62, para 23. 
 
217 Moragne v States Marine Lines Inc (1970) 398 US 375. 
 
218 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49, 63, para 26. 
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McHugh J did not address the ‘gravitational pull’ point.  Callinan J made observation only 
that he rejected “the theory that the Act operates to alter the common law, so as in some 
way to make its provisions applicable to circumstances other than the adducing of 
evidence”,
220 though he did not elaborate whether he rejected analogical theory 
completely, or whether he too simply disagreed that Commonwealth Evidence Act 
abrogated legal professional privilege outside a courtroom in this case. 
 
The religious confession privilege statute law in Australia is nowhere near as 
complicated as is the statute law in relation to legal professional privilege.  There are 
seven jurisdictions with statutes confirming such privilege
221 and three without.
222  Even 
though the extant statutes express the privilege in different ways,
223 they feature an 
unambiguous consistent theme of recognition.  In light of the High Court’s confirmation 
that analogies can and should be drawn between statute law and common law to keep 
the law of Australia as consistent and seamless as possible
224, in the absence of any 
statutory instrument abrogating religious confession privilege, a decision in the High 
                                                 
220 Ibid, p 99, para 144. 
 
221 Religious confession privileges were first passed in the following states on the dates indicated: Victoria 
(1890), Tasmania (1910), Northern Territory (1939), New South Wales (1989), Commonwealth (1995), 
Australian Capital Territory (1995), Norfolk Island (2004). 
 
222 Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia. 
 
223 The statutory provisions operative in New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory, and the 
Commonwealth have been identical since 1995.  Tasmania adopted the Uniform Evidence Act including the 
identical religious confession privilege provision (s 127) and it was proclaimed effective from 1 July 2002 
(Evidence Act 76/2001).  Norfolk Island adopted the same legislation in 2004.  Only the Northern Territory 
and the state of Victoria now have religious confession privilege statutes that diverge from the 
Commonwealth template and the Northern Territory’s Law Reform Commission discussion paper which 
questioned whether the Northern Territory should also adopt the Uniform Evidence Act, observed that the 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, “[a] Parliamentary Committee of Western Australia and the WALRC” 
have all “recommended the adoption of the UEA” and that the “Queensland LRC appears to be moving in 
the same direction, though, perhaps, not as clearly” 
(www.nt.gov.au/justice/docs/lawmake/discussion_paper_uniform_evidence_act.pdf p 3, site last visited June 
27, 2006). 
 
224 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.  RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON – CHAPTER SEVEN  307
Court of Australia denying a religious confession privilege of some kind at common law, 
seems unlikely.  If it is further accepted that there is a line of authority in favour of 
confidential religious communications privilege at English common law, then finding a 
broader privilege in a contemporary Australian context is not difficult to imagine either.  
For such a privilege would not be inconsistent with any Australian statute and is clearly 
consistent with that tolerance which is enjoined by the Australian constitution. 
 
Consequences of a recognition of religious confession privilege 
at common law 
 
If the existence of religious confession privilege at common law is accepted, then 
religious confession privilege legislation will be interpreted against the backdrop of that 
common law existence.  In that context, a religious confession privilege statute affirming 
religious confession privilege will likely be seen as curing a defect in that underlying 
common law – either reducing the scope of a privilege deemed too wide by parliament, 
or strengthening a privilege interpreted too narrowly by past judges.  In the absence of 
any statute expressly abrogating privilege, it is self-evident that religious confession 
privilege statutes have generally been passed to affirm a common law privilege 
previously construed too narrowly.  That is certainly true of the statutes in New York,
225 
New Jersey,
226 Delaware
227 and New South Wales.
228  
 
                                                 
225 Wright, CA, and Graham, KW, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence, 3
rd ed, St Paul Minnesota, 
West Publishing Co, 1992, §5612, pp 46-47. 
 
226 Allred, VC, “The Confession in Court” (1953) 13 The Jurist 2, 9. 
 
227 Reese, S, “Confidential Communications to the Clergy” (1963) 24 Ohio St LJ 55. 
 
228 McNicol, S, Law of Privilege, Australia, Law Book Co, 1992, p 330. 
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The tension between the public interest in judicial access to all relevant evidence and the 
existence of any privilege circumscribing that access,
229 has recently been answered in 
favour of privileges or immunities which have achieved status as common law rights 
absent clear statutory language to abrogate such rights.
230  Though religious confession 
privilege may not in the past have been accepted as having status as a common law 
right,
231 this thesis’ proof that it existed as a customary inheritance of the common law 
which has never been reversed, gives it such status.  That understanding should lead 
informed judges to rule against the admission of religious confession privilege 
evidence
232 – and in time, that understanding should also dissuade law enforcement 
agencies from seeking the disclosure of such evidence.  In practice in the criminal 
courtroom, a more complete understanding of the origins of religious confession privilege 
would increase the burden of a prosecutor seeking to adduce such evidence. 
 
More generous statutory interpretation could include the recognition that the New South 
Wales legislature intended to leave the decision as to whether a member of the clergy 
had received a confession with that member of the clergy,
233 rather than for judicial 
                                                 
229 See, for example, Spigelman CJ in R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, p 696, para 74, alluding to Knight 
Bruce VC in Pearse v Pearse (1846) De G & Son 12 at 28-29; 63 ER 950 at 957. 
 
230 Daniels Corporation v ACCC (2002) 192 ALR 561, 564-565 (para 11, per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
 
231 See discussion supra, pp 281-285. 
 
232 In contrast to the unreported decision of a District Court Judge at Orange, New South Wales, on 1 
September 1999 (R v Mills), where the judge insisted on a voir dire despite the expressed objections of two 
clergymen that they were not obliged to disclose that a confession had taken place, let alone disclose its 
contents under section 127 of the Evidence Act 1995. 
 
233 The statutory provision which was adopted by the Commonwealth when it passed the Uniform Evidence 
Act in 1995, was originated in New South Wales by the Evidence Amendment (Religious Confessions) 
Amendment Act 1989 which inserted section 10(6) into the then Evidence Act 1898.  Section 127 of both the 
New South Wales and Commonwealth Evidence Acts have affirmed since 1995 that “[a] person who is or 
was a member of the clergy ... is entitled to refuse to divulge [even] that a religious confession was made, ... 
[and not just] the contents of a religious confession made”.  The religious confession privilege provisions in 
Victoria (The Evidence Act 1958, s 28 which provision has ancestry dating back to 1890), Tasmania (the 
original provision was s 96 of the Evidence Act 1910, though Tasmania adopted the Uniform Evidence Act in 
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determination through a voir dire.  While the statutes affirming religious confession 
privilege in Australian jurisdictions do not conclusively answer the question of whether 
the privilege belongs to priest or penitent or both, it seems likely that the more explicit 
confirmation that the priest has an interest in the privilege in the identical 
Commonwealth/New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory/Tasmania/Norfolk Island 
provision will exert some ‘gravitational pull’ on the interpretation of the statutory 
provisions in Victoria and the Northern Territory in the interests of that seamlessness 
which the High Court has extolled.
234  The Victorian statute
235 might receive the liberal 
interpretation signalled by Cooke J
236 in R v Howse
237 in New Zealand, where the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal opined that confessions received without the ritual familiar in 
traditional Christian churches were as entitled to the protection of the privilege as 
_________________________ 
 
privilege belongs to priest or penitent or both.  Nor has it been decided that the penitent has no separate 
interest in the privilege under the Uniform provision (which applies in the Commonwealth, NSW, Tasmania, 
Norfolk Island and the ACT), though it is certainly open to the priest to claim the privilege in these 
jurisdictions. 
 
234 See discussion of “seamlessness” supra, pp 303-307, and particularly the application of the concept 
established in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 in Esso Australia 
Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49.  Note that the US religious 
confession privilege statutes have been categorised by a number of writers according to whom the statute 
says owns the privilege – the priest, the penitent or both.  Julie Ann Sippel found that the penitent held the 
privilege in thirty-eight states, the priest in eleven, and equivocally, that both held the privilege in Alabama 
and Ohio (“Priest-penitent privilege statutes: Dual protection in the confessional” (1994) 43 Catholic ULR 
1127, 1128, 1134-1135).  Michael Mazza found a fourth category where the statutes “seem to be more rules 
of witness compellability that rules of privilege”, finding that penitent ownership of the privilege is clear in 
only  seventeen states (“Should clergy hold the priest-penitent privilege?” (1998) 82 Marquette LR 171, 183-
191).  However, the leading authority in the US Federal jurisdiction where there is no statutory privilege, 
excluded a Lutheran clergyman’s evidence allowed at first instance despite his willingness to give it “in the 
absence of the penitent’s consent to its use” (Mullen v US (1959) 263 F 2
nd 275, 277).  Despite this 
statement, another federal court has found that the clergy hold the privilege, though acknowledging that not 
all federal courts have yet come to the same conclusion (Eckmann v Board of Education 106 FRD 70,73 (ED 
Mo. 1985)). 
 
235 The Evidence Act 1958, s 28. 
 
236 Later President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal (1986-1996), a Member of the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council (1977-2001) and a member of the English House of Lords as a Lord of Appeal (1996-2001) 
(http://www.politicallinks.co.uk/POLITICS2/BIOG/ld_BIOGS/bio.asp?id=2208 last visited 10 July 2004). 
 
237 R v Howse [1983] NZLR 246. 
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confessions more formally received.
238  And further, that while “liberal constru[ction]”
239 of 
the statute did not cancel the requirement that the communication required some 
“spiritual response”
240 to attract the privilege, still “a person should not suffer temporal 
prejudice because of what is uttered under the dictates or influence of spiritual belief”.
241  
 
Residual common law jurisdictions 
While recent publicity in South Australia surrounding the introduction of a Private 
Member’s Bill in Parliament to reduce the ambit of religious confession privilege in child 
abuse cases suggests that a significant part of that state’s population believes there is a 
religious confession privilege at common law,
242 academic evidence text writers have 
generally denied that lay expectation.
243  The recognition that such academic assertion is 
mistaken, would see the lay belief in the existence of a common law privilege affirmed in 
not only South Australia, but also Western Australia and Queensland, where legislation 
affirming religious confession privilege has never been passed.  The acceptance of this 
thesis’ finding that there is a religious confession privilege at common law, would also 
correct misapprehension in future law reform commissions which are otherwise likely to 
                                                 
238 Cooke J said in interpreting section 31 of New Zealand’s Evidence Amendment Act 1980: “The 
discarding of the [the requirement that a privileged confession be made in the course of discipline enjoined 
by a denomination] in 1895 indicates that there does not have to be a formal confession made as a matter of 
religious duty or ritual or established custom” (ibid, p 250). 
 
239 Idem. 
 
240 Idem. 
 
241 Ibid, p 251. 
 
242 In September 2003, Nick Xenophon, an independent Member of the House of Representatives in South 
Australia, introduced the Children’s Protection (Mandatory Reporting) Bill 2003, proposing to abrogate 
religious confession privilege in cases where child abuse was alleged.  As of this writing, the legislature has 
deferred the bill and Nick Xenophon has advised the writer that he did not have the votes to see the bill 
passed into law. 
 
243 For example, the 2000 6
th Australian Edition of Cross on Evidence (Butterworths, Sydney, para 25310) 
and the 13
th edition of Phipson on Evidence in 1982 (Buzzard, JH, May, R, and Howard, MN, eds, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, para 15-09) still assert that there is no religious confession privilege at common law. 
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repeat the denials of their predecessors
244 as they have simply parroted the standard 
textual denials.
245  Such future Law Reform consideration will then be enabled to provide 
more enlightened consideration, advice and recommendations about how the law can 
most appropriately be improved in its delivery of social justice.   
 
Conclusion to chapter seven 
All of the High Court of Australia judges who have made curial reference to religious 
confession privilege first hand, have denied that it existed at common law. In each such 
reference however, the comments were obiter dicta and recognised the existence of 
religious confession privilege by statute in Australia.
246  Crisp J implicitly recognised 
common law religious confession privilege in a case that involved the interpretation of 
Tasmania’s previous religious confession privilege statute, but again his comments were 
obiter and did not manifest significant research.
247  The New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal’s majority reasoning in R v Young
248 suggests both that new privileges 
                                                 
244 The 1985 ALRC report (Report 26, Vol 1, p 253) stated that “[i]t is generally accepted that the better view 
of the common law cases is that no privilege is recognized as arising out of the priest-penitent (or minister-
parishioner) relationship”.  The Commission’s 1987 report (#38, para 210, p 119) stated that religious 
confession privilege only existed then in three jurisdictions (Victoria, Tasmania and the Northern Territory), 
and was limited to churches having sacramental confession.  The Queensland LRC (Report No 41, 1991) 
did not address the common law position but its recommendation against creating a statutory privilege 
analogous to that then recently created in New South Wales because “[t]he integrity of the legal system 
relies upon access to the truth” (ibid, p 1), implies that that Commission believed there was no privilege at 
common law.  The West Australian LRC’s 1993 summary of the common law was that “it appears [clerics 
have no right] to refuse to reveal confidential communications to courts” (Project No 90, p 75). 
 
245 The ALRC’s 1985 Report (#26, Vol 1, para 202, p 253) cites Halsbury’s 4
th edition, the second Australian 
edition of Cross on Evidence (1979), the 12
th edition of JF Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Evidence (1948), 
Phipson’s 12
th edition (1976), McNaughton’s 1961 revision of Wigmore on Evidence and Hoffman’s 1970 
South African Law of Evidence in support of this proposition.  Only Nokes’ 1950 article suggesting the 
question “might appear to be open” (Nokes, GD, “Professional Privilege” (1950) 66 LQR 88, 98) is cited to 
other effect. 
 
246 McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73, pp 102-103, per Dixon J; Baker v Campbell 
(1983) 153 CLR 52, per Gibbs CJ (pp 65-66) and per Dawson J (p 128). 
 
247 R v Lynch [1954] Tas SR 47. 
 
248 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681. 
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are unlikely to be acknowledged in Australia unless they are already recognised in 
practice in the public consciousness; and that the common law rights of an accused 
person will not be easily extinguished, particularly if a statute leaves room for doubt of 
the legislative intent.  
 
The High Court decision in Daniels
249 confirming legal professional privilege as a 
fundamental common law human right, may not be of much analogical assistance if an 
appellant were not able to convince the court that religious confession privilege is a well 
settled common law principle.
250  However, the widespread lay belief in the existence of 
religious confession privilege;
251 the “gravitational pull”
252 of religious confession privilege 
statutes in seven out of ten
253 Australian jurisdictions; the recognition of a case-by-case 
confidential religious communications privilege in the Supreme Court of Canada;
254 the 
respect due to constitutional religious freedom;
255 and the recognition of freedom of 
conscience and belief in international human rights instruments,
256 all suggest that the 
                                                 
249 Daniels Corporation v ACCC [2003] 192 ALR 561. 
 
250 The Supreme Court of Canada was not convinced that a confidential religious communications privilege 
existed at common law in Canada (R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263, 287-288, per Lamer J). 
 
251 This was Spigelman CJ’s threshold criterion for the recognition of a new privilege in R v Young (1999) 46 
NSWLR 681, 700-701, paras 93 and 102. 
 
252 Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539, 547-548, per Mason P. 
 
253 Religious confession privilege statutes have existed in Australian jurisdictions since the years shown: 
Victoria (1890), Tasmania (1910), Northern Territory (1939), New South Wales (1989), Commonwealth 
(1995), Australian Capital Territory (1995), Norfolk Island (2004). 
 
254 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263. 
 
255 Australian Constitution 1901, section 116. 
 
256 Article 18 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; Article 2.2 of the United 
Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966; Articles 2.1 and 18 of the 
United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, together with the 1966 Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by which all parties (including Australia) 
“recognize[d] the competence of the [United Nations Human Rights] Committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals ... claim[ing] to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the 
rights set forth in the covenant” (ibid, Article 1). 
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High Court of Australia would recognise a confidential religious communications privilege 
(including a religious confession privilege) in practice.  That is not to say that judges in 
lower courts would be similarly inclined in the three remaining common law 
jurisdictions.
257  In the unlikely event that a court did become aware of the potential 
evidence of a member of the clergy, the writer expects that the paradigmatic judicial 
expectation of access to all the evidence in the interest of justice, despite the competing 
public interest in clerical confidentiality, would see the conduct of a voir dire at least.  The 
only judge likely to resist prosecution access to religious confessional evidence, would 
be a judge aware of the common law outlined in this thesis, including the existence of a 
judicial discretion not to review such evidence at all.  
 
The recognition that there is a religious confession privilege at common law, will also 
have a significant influence in Australia’s seven existing statutory jurisdictions.  For the 
knowledge that this statutory privilege was not created ex nihilo but exists as modern 
confirmation of a misunderstood and ancient common law ‘right’, would burden the 
prosecution to prove why evidence of a confidential religious communication should be 
admitted.  Where a judge otherwise entitled to see all the evidence believes that a 
religious confession privilege statute is an innovation, that judge is more likely to 
construe the statute narrowly and thus burden the defence to demonstrate why the 
communication at issue is covered by the relevant provisions. 
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CONCLUSION TO THESIS 
 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to review the familiar assertion that religious 
confession privilege does not exist at common law, against the historical materials that 
are used to support that assertion.  The materials used have included the historical, 
secular and canonical practices which formed the common law before case reporting 
evolved, as well as detailed consideration of all the cases which have been discussed in 
connection with religious confession privilege.  The thesis began by observing that from 
the beginning, the treatment of religious confession privilege in evidence law texts, was 
misdirected by three foundational errors, and that misdirection has never been cured. 
 
Evidence texts 
Since texts about evidence law began to appear at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, most of them have denied the existence of religious confession privilege.  The 
first of those denials came in what Stone and Wells
1 have called “the pioneering books 
on evidence in our modern sense”
2 by Peake
 3, Phillipps
4 and Starkie.
5  But careful 
                                                 
1 Stone, J, Evidence, Its History and Policies, Revised by WAN Wells, Sydney, Butterworths, 1991 
 
2 Ibid, p 36.  
 
3 Peake, T, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence, London, E&R Brooke and J Rider & E Rider, 1801. 
 
4 Phillipps, SM, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, London, by E & R Brooke and J Rider and by E Rider 
1814. 
 
5 Starkie, T, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence and Digest of Proof in Civil and Criminal 
Proceedings, London, J & WT Clarke, 1824. 
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consideration of those texts in chapter one,
6 suggests that it was Peake who arrived at 
that conclusion, and that the others followed uncritically without apparent independent 
review of the reports of the cases Peake cited for his proposition.  There is irony in the 
template that Peake thus set.  For Peake himself was also the reporter of the only 
reported English case in his generation which treated religious confession privilege at 
all,
7 and Peake preferred the unreported conclusion about religious confession privilege 
of a circuit judge
8 only cited in arguendo
9 in that case
10 over the contrary opinion of the 
Chief Justice
11 in the case that he was actually reporting.  
 
But ‘Peake’s irony’ is only one among many ironies that have shaped the law of 
evidence with respect to religious confession privilege.  For it was not only contemporary 
text writers who followed his conclusion.  Indeed, only Best in 1849,
12 Badeley in 1865,
13 
Nokes in 1950,
14 Winckworth in 1952,
15 and McNicol in 1992
16 doubt the conclusion that 
there was no religious confession privilege at common law, and they do not trace the 
                                                 
6 Supra, pp 16-19. 
 
7 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96. 
 
8 Buller J. 
 
9 Baron Alderson used this phrase to describe the authority of the proposition that there was no religious 
confession privilege after Peake’s report of Du Barré v Livette when, as one judge on an appellate panel, he 
similarly doubted in arguendo submissions made by counsel in Attorney-General v Briant (1846) 15 LJ Exch 
265, 271.  Note that while there are various reports of Attorney-General v Briant, only the LJ Exch report 
carries the Alderson discussion with counsel.  
  
10 R v Sparkes , unreported but referred to in Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 86. 
 
11 Kenyon LCJ. 
 
12 Best, WM, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, London, S. Sweet, 1849. 
 
13 Badeley, E, The Privilege of Religious Confessions in English Courts of Justice considered in a letter to a 
Friend, London, Butterworths, 1865. 
 
14 Nokes, GD, “Professional Privilege”, 66 LQR 88. 
 
15 Winckworth, P, The Seal of the Confessional and the Law of Evidence, London, S.P.C.K., 1952. 
 
16 McNicol, SB, Law of Privilege, Australia, The Law Book Company Ltd, 1992. 
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error to Peake.  Best doubted the standard text denials of religious confession privilege, 
since he could see that religious confession privilege existed before the Reformation.
17 
Badeley said that even if the common law did turn its face against the religious practices 
of Roman Catholicism, that injustice had been cured by legislative reform since and in 
any event, confession in Anglican practice had always been protected.
18  Nokes pointed 
out that many of the cases cited against religious confession privilege since Anon in 
1693
19 were irrelevant in any consideration of the question,
20 though he noted that there 
had been many cases containing judicial statements which denied the privilege. 
Winckworth agreed with Stephen’s conclusion that the question of whether religious 
confession privilege existed had never been “solemnly decided”
21 in an English court, 
though unlike Stephen, Winckworth did not find the authority against the privilege 
compelling enough to opine that it did not exist.  And Nichols considered that there is a 
“paucity of judicial authority to support the claim that there is no privilege arising out of 
the priest-penitent relationship”.
22  
 
One of the other historical ironies in the treatment of religious confession privilege was 
Park J’s denial that religious confession privilege existed in R v Gilham.
23  That denial is 
ironic on three counts.  First, because his only cited authorites were texts written by 
                                                 
17 Best, op cit, pp 458-460. 
 
18 Badeley, op cit, p 32. 
 
19 Anonymous (1693) Skin 404; 90 ER 179. 
 
20 Nokes, op cit, pp 96-97. 
 
21 These words come from Sir James Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Evidence in 1876 (London, MacMillan 
and Co, 1876, p 171), but are reflected in Winckworth’s statement that “the question has never really been 
raised in any English court since the Reformation” (Winckworth, op cit, p 15). 
 
22 McNicol, op cit, p 334. 
 
23 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186; 168 ER 1235. 
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Peake and Starkie which both rested upon Peake’s flawed commentative conclusion
24 
from R v Sparkes as cited and disapproved by Kenyon LCJ in Du Barré v Livette.
25 
Secondly, because Gilham was not a case about religious confession privilege at all,
26 
though it was so cited in commentary between 1828 and 1881.
27  And thirdly, because 
when Best CJ, six weeks later,
28 reacted to the news that Park J had disapproved Best 
CJ’s unreported decision in favour of religious confession privilege in R v Radford
29 in 
1823 with his comments in Gilham, Best CJ apparently did not even read the report of 
Park J’s judgement, but simply responded to what he thought had been decided with a 
new and probably unnecessary distinction of his own.  The essence of all of the irony is 
that the judges and text writers who are supposed to be expert in the reading of cases to 
extract their precedential common law principles, in the case of religious confession 
privilege, have been united by their common failure to do so.  For in a yet further irony, it 
is fair to conclude that the common law of religious confession privilege as a portion of 
the law of evidence has been developed and sustained far more by a form of hearsay 
than it has been by close precedential analysis.  
 
                                                 
24 R v Gilham (1828) 1 Moody 186, 198; 168 ER 1235, 1239 where Park J criticised Best CJ’s R v Radford 
unreported affirmation of religious confession privilege with the statement that “his lordship could not have 
excluded this evidence because it was a breach of confidence in the clergyman to give it, because a minister 
is bound to disclose what has been revealed to him as matter of religious confession, Rex v Sparkes, cited 
Peake, N.P.C. 79, 1 Starkie on Evidence, 105.” 
 
25 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 96. 
 
26 Technically, the ratio decidendi of R v Gilham affirms that confessions of crime to third parties (the mayor 
and others) were inadmissible if they had arguably been induced by spiritual advice provided by a member 
of the clergy. 
 
27 The dates respectively of the decisions in R v Gilham and Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675; 50 
LJ Ch 793; [1881-5] All ER 1807.  After 1881, Wheeler v LeMarchant is cited by most text writers as the 
leading authority against religious confession privilege, rather than R v Gilham. 
 
28 In his decision in Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528. 
 
29 Unreported and only referenced in the Gilham report as an 1823 decision of Best CJ on circuit at the 
Exeter Summer Assizes. 
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That conclusion is strengthened when Sir George Jessel MR’s contribution to the 
common law with regard to religious confession privilege is analysed.
30  For though 
Winckworth suggested that Sir George Jessel also followed what Winckworth called 
“Peake’s dictum”,
31 the only authority Sir George Jessel cited for his obiter comments 
denying the existence of religious confession privilege at common law came from Lord 
Cottenham’s judgement in Reid v Langlois,
32 and Lord Cottenham referenced only 
“professional men” in a case about legal professional privilege.  Sir George Jessel and 
James LJ who sat with him in Anderson v Bank of British Columbia may have correctly 
expressed a late nineteenth century English judicial view that legal professional privilege 
was the only so-called professional privilege
33 when they both denied the existence of 
religious confession privilege at common law.  But since their obiter dicta comments 
against religious confession privilege have not been applied in any binding precedential 
way ever since, and since many British jurisdictions have enacted statutes to confirm 
religious confession privilege since their denials,
34 their statements represent dubious 
additional authority for Peake’s 1801 proposition. 
 
                                                 
30 Sir George Jessel opined twice against the existence of religious confession privilege at common law 
while he sat as Master of the Rolls in the English Court of Appeal.  First in Anderson v Bank of British 
Columbia (1876) LR 2 ChD 644, 650-651, and secondly in Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675; 50 
LJ Ch 793; [1881-5] All ER 1807.  His obiter dicta comments against religious confession privilege in the 
second case are cited much more frequently than those in the first, though he only cited Lord Cottenham’s 
authority in the first case. 
 
31 Winckworth, op cit, p 14. 
 
32 Reid v Langlois (1849) 1 Mac & G 627; 41 ER 1408.  See also chapter one, notes 82-86 and supporting 
text. 
 
33 Wright and Graham suggest that one possible explanation for the denials of religious confession privilege 
in texts about English common law is that “[b]y the time Catholics in England had regained their civil rights 
and could claim the privilege, English law had already set its face against all privileges other than the 
attorney-client privilege” (Wright, CA, and Graham, KW, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence, 3
rd ed, 
St Paul Minnesota, West Publishing Co, 1992, § 5612, p 42).  
 
34 See chapter six, note168 and supporting text. 
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Wigmore’s analysis of religious confession privilege at common law commencing in 
1904,
35 was more balanced than Peake’s had been a century earlier.  For Wigmore 
acknowledged that there might have been a privilege before the Reformation.
36  
However, his failure to identify exactly how that privilege was extinguished by the time of 
the Restoration is unsatisfactory.
37  Wigmore’s analysis is also exposed by Wright and 
Grahams’ careful suggestion that he “exaggerated … the impact of the authorities he 
cites”
38 after the Restoration, for it is simply not possible to work out which of the “dozen 
cases”
39 he cites are what he called “two decisive rulings”
40 against religious confession 
privilege.  While Wright and Graham admit that Wigmore correctly characterises four of 
his authorities as dicta, they diminish the authority of his opinion when they point out that 
three other cases he does not label as dicta “seem to fall in the same category”;
41 that 
two more of Wigmore’s authorities are the non-precedential decisions of trial courts, one 
of which was unreported, and that one of his possibly “decisive rulings” is an Irish case 
that manifests significant religious prejudice.
42  But like Peake a century earlier, 
Wigmore’s opinion against the existence of religious confession privilege has drawn with 
it a host of uncritical followers.  Though Wright and Graham conclude that the privilege is 
                                                 
35 The first edition of his monumental work on Evidence Law was published in 1904 (Wigmore, JH, A 
Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in trials at common law: including the statutes and 
judicial decisions of all jurisdictions of the United States and Canada, Boston, Little Brown, 1904). 
 
36 Wigmore, JH, Evidence in trials at common law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown, 
1961, Vol 8, p 869. 
 
37 See discussion in chapter six, pp 229-234. 
 
38 Wright and Graham, op cit, § 5612, p 41. 
 
39 Ibid, p 39. 
 
40 Ibid, p 40, quoting Wigmore, JH, Evidence in trials at common law, Revised by John T McNaughton, 
Boston, Little Brown, 1961, Vol 8, p 869. 
 
41 Wright and Graham, op cit, pp 39-40. 
 
42 Idem. 
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undeveloped in England,
43 they summarise their view that the judicial and academic 
authority against the privilege “is seldom impressive, usually consisting of one of two 
judicial opinions or a citation to Wigmore”
44 – and the writer has identified much more 
uncritical citation of Wigmore’s authority for the non-existence of religious confession 
privilege than Wright and Graham name.
45  Wigmore’s conclusion that there is no 
religious confession privilege at common law is the more surprising since he clearly felt 
that the case for such a privilege was morally compelling.
46  And indeed his “four 
fundamental conditions … recognized as necessary to the establishment of a privilege 
against the disclosure of communications”
47 have proven a foundation for the recognition 
of religious communication privilege at common law in both Ireland
48 and Canada
49 
despite the lack of compelling authority in England. 
 
After showing that the early text writers could not be relied upon to provide a balanced 
view of even the common law materials that they did review, I moved on to consider in 
detail all the materials that must be reviewed if one is to come to an authoritative 
conclusion about the existence of religious confession privilege in English law before the 
Reformation and thereafter.  That research included careful analysis of what Wigmore 
                                                 
43 Ibid, p 41. 
 
44 Ibid, p 29. 
 
45 See Introduction, notes 5-7 and supporting text.  Wright and Graham cite only “Comment, Religious 
Confidentiality And The Reporting of Child Abuse: A Statutory and Constitutional Analysis” (1987) 21 
Col.J.L. & Soc. Prob.1, 19 and “Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence and The Law of Privileges” (1969) 15 
Wayne L. Rev. 1286, 1341. 
 
46 After analysing the case for recognition of religious confession privilege according to his own “four 
canons”, he states “[o]n the whole … this privilege has adequate grounds for recognition” (Wigmore, JH, 
Evidence in trials at common law, Revised by John T McNaughton, Boston, Little Brown, 1961, Vol 8, pp 
877-878). 
 
47 Wigmore, op cit, Vol 8, p 527. 
 
48 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515. 
 
49 R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263. 
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called “an indecisive incident in the Jesuit trials under James I,
50…a statute of much 
earlier date and of ambiguous purport,
51 together with the general probabilities to be 
drawn from the recognition of Papal ecclesiastical practices prior to Henry VIII”.
52  
 
History 
I began chapter two by explaining that one must set aside modern paradigmatic thinking 
to understand English society and law before the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘common law’ 
evolved their modern meanings.  In particular, I explained first, that church and state 
were not separated in medieval minds, since ecclesiastical jurisdiction included what are 
now considered the very secular questions of marriage, bigamy, divorce and adultery, 
estate administration, crime and contract;
53 and secondly, that the modern idea that the 
common law is what one finds in the cases, is a far from adequate explanation of the 
complex relationship that existed between statutes (as the king’s quasi judicial 
settlement of petitions addressed to him), custom, the canon law as well as the decisions 
of secular and ecclesiastical courts.
54  Since Sir Edward Coke confirmed that the Statute 
Articuli Cleri in 1315 was authority for the existence of religious confession in the 
fourteenth century, I analysed the relevant provisions for two purposes.  First, I explained 
how statutes before the separation of church and state at the Reformation were used to 
express and settle the common law, rather than to simply create new positive law, as is 
the modern expectation.
55  Secondly, I tested his conclusions both that religious 
                                                 
50 Wigmore here referred to Garnet’s case (1606) 2 Howell’s State Trials 217. 
 
51 Wigmore here referred to the Statute Articuli Cleri in 1315 (9 Edward II St.1). 
 
52 Wigmore, op cit, Vol 8, p 869. 
 
53 Supra, chapter two, pp 41-48. 
 
54 Supra, chapter two, pp 48-58. 
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confession privilege clearly existed from 1315 through to 1606, and that it had been 
abrogated in cases of treason.
56  Since neither Coke as Attorney-General and 
Prosecutor nor any of the Nine Commissioners who sat with the jury in Garnet’s case 
denied the existence of religious confession privilege which Henry Garnet asserted as 
his defence, it seemed odd to suggest that the decision was “ambiguous”
57 where the 
existence of the privilege was concerned.  Certainly as a trial court decision made by a 
jury, Garnet’s case does not represent a precedential authority affirming religious 
confession privilege, but it is disingenuous to suggest that the efforts of Coke and the 
Commissioners to show that Garnet had not received a sacramental confession 
somehow denied that religious confession privilege would have been a legitimate 
defence on more appropriate facts.  Similarly, Coke’s reflective commentary twenty 
years later,
58 in which he preferred to interpret the decision as an authority for a treason 
exception to religious confession privilege (in effect affirming that the defence was good 
but that it failed because of the exception), is hardly “ambiguous”.  Clearly, early 
seventeenth century judicial opinion accepted that sacramental religious confessions 
should not be adduced as evidence in cases that did not involve treason. 
 
Canon law 
In chapter three, I traced the evolution of the seal of confession in Roman Catholic 
canon law and showed how that seal was respected in ‘secular’ laws passed before 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
56 Supra, chapter two, pp 58-75. 
 
57 Wigmore, op cit, Vol 8, p 869. 
 
58 Coke, Sir E, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, New York, Garland Publishing Co, 
1979, p 629. 
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Norman times.
59  After the twenty-first canon of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 
affirmed that the seal of confession was binding throughout the Holy Roman Empire, 
confirming much earlier respect for confessional secrecy in England which had been 
endorsed by William the Conqueror’s appointees as Archbishop of Canterbury,
60 it is not 
possible to find any suggestion that confessional secrecy was ever doubted until the 
English Reformation under Henry VIII.  History which affirms secular respect for canon 
law between the time of William the Conqueror and Henry VIII includes Henry II’s 
penance and grudging respect for the laws of the church after the murder of Thomas 
A’Becket in 1170;
61 the fact that most of the king’s secular judges were priests until Pope 
Innocent IV (1243-1254) outlawed such appointments;
62 and Edward II’s recognition of 
confessional secrecy in the Statute Articuli Cleri in 1315.  But since there has been 
considerable debate about the place of confession in Anglican practice after the English 
Reformation, in chapter three I also considered the effect of the introduction of 
conditional language into the first Anglican canon mandating confessional secrecy in 
1603, and to the respect due Anglican canon law in English secular courts since. 
 
The reason why some modern commentators do not expect English secular courts to 
respect confessional secrecy is because confession became voluntary after the English 
Reformation.
63  But the contrary view holds that the voluntariness of Anglican confession 
                                                 
59 Supra, chapter three, pp 95-97. 
 
60 Supra, chapter three, pp 91-93. 
 
61 Supra, chapter three, pp 100-101. 
 
62 Supra, chapter three, pp 101-103. 
 
63 For example, Nokes doubts “in the twentieth century” whether a clergyman would be ecclesiastically 
punished for breaching confessional secrecy under compulsion by a secular court (Nokes, GD, “Professional 
Privilege” [1950] 66 LQR 88, 101-102).  Norman Doe thinks that the secular courts do not need to respect 
Anglican canonical secrecy because the 113
th canon in 1603 is only phrased as a recommendation (Doe, N, 
The Legal Framework of the Church of England, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, p 353). 
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has not diluted the priest’s obligation to keep confessional secrets at all.
64  That no 
English judge when mentioning religious confession privilege has ever referenced the 
113
th 1603 Anglican canon appears to underscore the first view.  But there never has 
been an English case that raised the point for precedential decision either.  History 
confirms that Henry VIII found it politically expedient to retain the Roman Catholic canon 
law intact, including that in relation to confession.
65  And though confession certainly 
became voluntary, when a body of uniquely Anglican canon law was finally issued 
shortly after the death of Elizabeth I, the obligation of secrecy remained, though 
conditional language was added which seemingly confirmed Coke’s later proposition that 
there was a treason exception to religious confession privilege.
66  When Bursell’s belief 
that Nokes is mistaken in his view that a member of the clergy would not be censured for 
breach of confessional secrecy
67 is coupled with Bursell’s observation that modern 
statutory discretions allow judges “to exclude evidence … whether by preventing 
questions from being put or otherwise”,
68 it seems fair to conclude that English courts 
have tools available which they will use to prevent the unnecessary friction between 
church and state
69 which would arise if questions about confessional secrecy were 
pressed in secular courts.  Bursell also makes the understated practical point that the 
                                                 
64 See for example Blunt, JH, The Book of Church Law, 10
th ed, London, New York and Bombay, Longmans 
Green & Co, 1905, p 173, and Bursell, Judge RDH, “The Seal of the Confessional”, Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal 1 (7) (1990) 84, 87. 
 
65 See discussion supra, chapter three, pp 106-111.  Note also that the Act for the Submission of the Clergy 
in 1535 (25 Henry VIII, c.19) forbade the enactment of new church canon law “except in convocations 
summoned by the King’s writ”, and the Act of Six Articles in 1539 (31 Henry VIII, c.14) reaffirmed Roman 
Catholic doctrine as the doctrine of the by now separate Church of England. 
 
66 Note that Coke was as reluctant to cite Anglican canon law authority for his treason exception to religious 
confession privilege in his magnum opus on the common law as he was to cite French Catholic canon law 
authority (see discussion in chapter two, supra, pp 72-73). 
 
67 Bursell, op cit, pp 107-108.  See also note 63 supra. 
 
68 Section 82(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 as cited in Bursell, op cit, p 109. 
 
69 McNicol, S, Law of Privilege, Australia, Butterworths, 1992, pp 330-331, 337. 
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absence of English cases about religious confession privilege is in no small part the 
consequence of continuing clerical unwillingness to disclose that confessions have been 
heard at all.
70  
 
But what does all this canonical debate mean?  Was Wigmore right to doubt that “the 
general probabilities to be drawn from the recognition of Papal ecclesiastical practices 
prior to Henry VIII”
71 were insufficient to prove that confessional secrecy was recognised 
in English law before the English Reformation?  While there may be some doubt that 
even Anglican canon law affirming religious confession privilege would prevent a 
contemporary English court from compelling confessional evidence, that cannot be a 
correct statement of the position in the sixteenth century. 
 
Common law 
In chapter four I then reviewed each English case that has either mentioned religious 
confession privilege or has been cited in commentary as authority in relation to religious 
confession privilege.  Because the text writers were so certain that there was no religious 
confession privilege at common law, and because Sir James Stephen had observed that 
the modern law of evidence grew up at a time when it was unlikely that a Roman 
Catholic privilege would be explicitly recognised,
72 I explained how evidential privileges 
generally had evolved.  That review suggested the insight that the denial of religious 
confession privilege in the early evidence law texts may well have been a casualty of the 
need to set out the relevant material in categories, including a category that naturally 
                                                 
70 Bursell, op cit, p 89. 
 
71 Wigmore, op cit, Vol 8, p 869. 
 
72 Stephen, JF, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, London, MacMillan and Co, 1876, p 172. 
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saw religious confession privilege grouped with other evidential privileges.
73  The only 
problem that flowed from that grouping was that the great bulk of material that had to be 
catalogued concerning legal professional privilege quickly overwhelmed the material that 
could be cited in connection with religious confession privilege.  While these two 
privileges had more in common than the privilege against self-incrimination, the privilege 
or immunity that protected state secrets or spousal privilege,
74 the risk that they would 
not be properly distinguished, was realised in many of the texts that treated them.  In 
particular, the independent and antiquarian history of religious confession privilege was 
not just glossed over, it was ignored completely.
75  It is also understandable, though 
inaccurate, to observe that the importance of legal professional privilege in evidence law 
texts prepared primarily as handbooks for barristers, meant that the errors where 
religious confession privilege was concerned did not need to be corrected because the 
small number of cases raising the issue did not necessarily expose the error, as would 
have been the case if the error concerned legal professional privilege.  The habit of 
grouping legal professional privilege and religious confession privilege together in texts 
treating privilege more generally, also explains why so many cases that really concerned 
legal professional privilege are cited in connection with religious confession privilege
76 – 
both by judges (who learned their law from the texts as students and later consulted the 
same texts in practice) and text writers. 
 
My separate treatment of the legal professional privilege cases and the ‘irregular 
confession’ cases that were cited in connection with religious confession privilege 
                                                 
73 Supra, chapter four, pp 136-140. 
 
74 Supra, chapter four, p 137. 
 
75 Supra, chapter four, pp 137-140. 
 
76 Supra, chapter four, pp 136-155. 
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confirmed that neither set of cases really advances understanding of religious confession 
privilege.  Certainly analogies to religious confession privilege may have influenced the 
early development of legal profession privilege,
77 and Baron Alderson’s  reverse analogy 
back from legal professional privilege to religious confession privilege in R v Griffin
78 was 
used to justify the exclusion of confessional evidence in that case.  But after I had 
considered all the cases, I found that the Wright and Graham summary that the law 
relating to religious confession privilege has not been developed in English law
79 was 
proven.  For while some of the cases showed judges working hard to avoid confronting 
religious confession privilege when it did present itself,
80 there was no elaboration of the 
relevant law, as might have been expected in the wake of that discussion in Garnet’s 
case.  Perhaps Hill J’s decision that the evidence Father Kelly was asked to provide in R 
v Hay did not involve the disclosure of confessional material in breach of the Catholic 
seal is an exception.  But it is not convincing in light of both Father Kelly’s belief that 
such disclosure constituted a breach of his priestly obligation and his expectation that 
such breach would see him subjected to severe ecclesiastical discipline, such that 
disclosure must have seemed to him like a form of self-incrimination.  My review of the 
extra-judicial comments in the House of Lords occasioned by the publicity surrounding 
the case of R v Constance Kent did not contribute additional enlightenment either, since 
none of the Lords who contributed to the discussion were well informed and there was 
informed comment outside the House that took the contrary view.
81 
                                                 
77 Supra, chapter four, p 137. 
 
78 R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219. 
 
79 Wright and Graham, op cit, § 5612, p 41.  
 
80 For example both R v Hay (1860) 2 F & F 4, 7; 175 ER 933 and In re Keller (1887) L.R. Ir. 158 are cases 
marked by judicial reluctance to tackle the religious confession privilege issue head on.  See discussion in 
chapter four, pp 159-164. 
 
81 Supra, chapter four, pp 171-177. 
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Confidential religious communications privilege 
Though religious confession privilege may not have been developed in English common 
law, the discussion in chapter five confirms that ample material exists not only to 
advance such development but also to expand it to favour confidential religious 
communications more generally and not just the narrower class of religious confessions. 
Before the twentieth century, that material includes the comments of Lord Kenyon CJ  in 
Du Barré v Livette
82 disapproving Buller J’s reputed decision in R v Sparkes;
83 Best CJ’s 
obiter statements suggesting the existence of judicial discretion to exclude evidence of 
religious confessions if the priest did not want to reveal them in Broad v Pitt;
84 Baron 
Alderson’s clear exercise of judicial discretion in excluding the religious confession 
evidence discussed in R v Griffin;
85 and even some of the statements made by Jeune P 
in Normanshaw v Normanshaw,
86 despite the fact that those last statements have been 
frequently cited as authority denying the existence of religious confession privilege.
87 
Though there are denials in the twentieth century that judges have any discretion to 
exclude evidence that is relevant and necessary for the attainment of justice in a case,
88 
these statements are tempered even in England: by judicial interpretation of what is 
                                                 
82 Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 86. 
 
83 Unreported but referred to in Du Barré v Livette (1791) 1 Peake 108; 170 ER 86. 
 
84 Broad v Pitt (1828) 3 Carr & P 518; 172 ER 528.  See discussion supra, chapter four, pp 148-150. 
 
85 R v Griffin (1853) 6 Cox Cr Cas 219. 
 
86 Normanshaw v Normanshaw (1893) 69 LTR 468. 
 
87 See chapter five, note 27. 
 
88 For example, see Lord Denning in Attorney-General v Mulholland and Foster [1963] 2 QB 477, 489-490, 
and Lord Edmund-Davies in D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 245.  For an Australian example, see Owen Dixon J 
in McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73, 102-103.  Lamer CJ made similar comments in 
R v Gruenke [1991] 3 SCR 263, 288. 
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necessary to the attainment of justice in a case;
89 by statutory discretions;
90 by 
observations that judges can exercise considerable moral authority upon the course of a 
trial by disapproving a line of questioning by counsel;
91 and if the judge considers that 
the public interest in the preservation of a particular confidence outweighs the public 
interest in court, access to all the evidence.
92  
 
However, the twentieth century development most likely to lead to recognition of a broad 
common law confidential religious communications privilege in England, was Lord 
Hailsham’s observation that “[t]he categories of public interest immunity are not 
closed”.
93  That idea not only resonated with his brother Lord Simon in D v NSPCC,
94 but 
with Beverley McLachlin a year earlier in Canada,
95 who noticed an almost identical 
sentiment expressed by North J in Bell v University of Auckland
96 eight years earlier in 
New Zealand.  In the New Zealand case, what is more significant in the religious 
communications privilege context, is that North J adapted the same famous phrase from 
Lord Macmillan in connection with the law of negligence
97 and applied it in relation to 
                                                 
89 For example, Lord Denning said “Let me not be mistaken.  The judge will respect the confidences which 
each member of these honourable professions receives in the course of it, and will not direct him to answer 
unless not only it is relevant but also it is a proper and indeed, a necessary question in the course of justice 
to be put and answered” (Attorney-General v Mulholland and Foster [1963] 2 QB 477, 489-490). 
 
90 Bursell cites such discretion in England in section 82(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 
(Bursell, Judge RDH, “The Seal of the Confessional”, Ecclesiastical Law Journal 1(7) (1990), 84,109).  See 
also discussion supra, chapter three, pp 120-121 and chapter five, pp 223-225. 
 
91 Per Lord Simon in D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 239.  See also discussion supra, chapter five, pp 197-198. 
 
92 Per Lord Edmund-Davies in D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 245-246.  See also discussion supra, chapter 
five, pp 199-202. 
 
93 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 230.  
 
94 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 236, 241. 
 
95 McLachlin, B, “Confidential Communications and the Law of Privilege” (1977) 2 UBCL Rev 266, 269. 
 
96 Bell v University of Auckland [1969] NZLR 1029. 
 
97 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 619; [1932] All ER Rep 1, 30. 
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“the categories of privilege”.
98  That Lord Hailsham and North J should use the same 
phrase to confirm that the law in relation to both public interest immunity and privilege is 
not stationary, has proven prophetic.  For though the two “groups of rules”
99 have 
discrete origins, the significance of the historical differences between them has been 
reduced because the same public interest arguments are now used to justify both.  In 
Canada, the Supreme Court used the public interest in freedom of religion under the 
1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms to require case-by-case consideration of claims 
that confidential religious communications should not be admitted as evidence.
100 
Though the Supreme Court did not recognise confidential religious communications as a 
new class of privilege as Wigmore had suggested
101 would be the result of the 
application of his four canons, the Supreme Court did direct that Canadian judges could 
use Wigmore’s criteria to weigh the competing public interests that argued for and 
against the admission of such otherwise relevant evidence.  That result is not very 
different from the “balancing operation” that Lord Edmund-Davies described in 
connection with new categories of public interest immunity in D v NSPCC.
102  In Ireland 
too, it was public interest inspired by the Wigmore principles that lay at the heart of 
Gavan Duffy J’s decision that confidential communications with a member of the clergy 
were privileged.  As later in Canada, that decision flowed from the fact that a 
                                                 
98 Bell v University of Auckland [1969] NZLR 1029, 1036. 
 
99 Stone J, Evidence, Its History and Policies, Revised by WAN Wells, Sydney, Butterworths, 1991 p 69. 
 
100 R v Gruenke (1991) 3 SCR 263. 
 
101 Wigmore stated that his “four fundamental conditions [were] recognized as necessary to the 
establishment of a privilege against disclosure of communications” and that “a privilege should be 
recognized” “[o]nly if there four conditions are present” (op cit, Vol 8, p 527). 
 
102 D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, 245. 
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constitutional instrument entrenched the public interest in protecting the kind of religious 
freedom that was essential in Ireland.
103 
 
Religious confession privilege in Australia 
While there has not been a clear case in Australia which has invited elaboration of these 
same principles in relation to confidential religious communications, the historical 
difference between public interest immunity and privilege has been narrowed in Australia 
nonetheless.  For in developing the dominant purpose test in relation to legal 
professional privilege since the sole purpose test was set out in Grant v Downs
104 in 
1976, the High Court of Australia has used arguments that have justified public interest 
immunities in the past.
105  However, it is not just the analogical use of argument that has 
drawn the two groups of rules closer together in Australia.  In Daniels v ACCC,
106 six of 
the judges used language that confirmed that legal professional privilege was not just a 
rule of evidence,
107 nor even simply a rule of substantive law.
108  It was an important
109 
                                                 
103 Cook v Carroll [1945] Ir. Rep. 515. 
 
104 Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674. 
 
105 For example, before they made their famous statement that legal professional privilege was a common 
law right so firmly entrenched in the law that it was not to be exorcised by judicial decision, Stephen, Mason 
and Murphy JJ also said that “[t]he existence of [legal professional] privilege reflects, to the extent to which it 
is accorded, the paramountcy of this public interest over a more general public interest, that which requires 
that in the interests of a fair trial litigation should be conducted on the footing that all relevant documentary 
evidence is available” (Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, 685).  Though Jacob J’s judgement in the same 
trial wished to keep “Crown privilege” (not immunity) separate from legal professional privilege, in his 
reasoning he nonetheless noted that the same public interest factors as militated in favour of disclosure of 
legally privileged material in Grant v Downs, also militated in favour of disclosure of Crown privileged 
material when a public inquiry was required by the public interest (Ibid, p 691). 
 
106 Daniels Corporation v ACCC (2002) 192 ALR 561. 
 
107 Ibid, p 564 (para 10 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) and p 583 (para 85 per Kirby J). 
 
108 Ibid, pp 564-565, para 11, per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. 
 
109 Idem. 
 RELIGIOUS CONFESSION PRIVILEGE – THOMPSON -- CONCLUSION  332
and fundamental common law immunity
110 which embodies a substantive legal and 
human right
111 that “is not limited to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings”.
112  This 
conflation of the nature of privileges and immunities in Australia, is also obvious in the 
High Court’s decision in Baker v Campbell.  For while Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ 
had said in Grant v Downs that legal professional privilege was a common law right so 
firmly entrenched that it was “not to be exorcised by judicial decision”,
113 seven years 
later in Baker v Campbell in1983, Dawson J also said that self-incrimination privilege 
was also “too fundamental a bulwark of liberty to be categorized simply as a rule of 
evidence”;
114 that legal professional privilege “stems from a right which is no less 
fundamental”,
115 and that the two rights were conceptually connected.
116  This language 
confirms not only that public interest will be the dominating factor in future judicial 
consideration of the scope of evidential privileges in Australia, but suggests that 
international human rights norms will also be an integral part of future High Court 
decisionmaking where evidential privileges are concerned.  
 
In chapter seven, I identified the most obvious High Court of Australia decisions where 
international human rights norms have influenced Australian jurisprudence in the last 
fifteen years.
117  While the decisions in Mabo
118, Australian Capital Television
119 and 
                                                 
110 Ibid, pp 573-574, para 44, per McHugh J; p 583, para 85, per Kirby J. 
 
111 Ibid, pp 583-584, para 86, per Kirby J. 
 
112 Ibid, p 583, para 85, per Kirby J. 
 
113 Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, 685. 
 
114 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 128. 
 
115 Idem. 
 
116 Idem. 
 
117 Supra, chapter seven, pp 285-289. 
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Teoh
120 do not bear directly upon issues of privilege or immunity, various references in 
the judgements in Daniels do.  In particular, McHugh and Kirby JJ’s characterisation of 
legal professional privilege as not only a common law right but a “fundamental human 
right”
121 demonstrates this point.  In Australia, the human rights argument in favour of 
religious confession privilege is domestically unavoidable, since free exercise of religion 
is the only international human rights norm expressly entrenched in the Australian 
Constitution.
122  If the High Court could be convinced that international human rights 
norms were also a valid consideration in a common law confidential religious 
communications privilege case, the applicable norms ought to be more compelling than 
in a legal professional privilege case, since the norms protecting freedom of religious 
practice are more direct than they are for legal professional privilege.  For the best 
argument using international human rights norms in favour of legal professional privilege 
relies upon the fact that legal professional privilege is seen as an integral part of the right 
to a fair trial, and is seldom mentioned in international human rights instruments as a 
protected norm in its own right.  On the other hand, both religious confession and 
confidential religious communication directly present themselves as fundamental 
examples of free exercise of religion when any international human rights instrument is 
read.  Despite the strength of this argument, I have conceded that arguments that rely 
upon international human rights instruments will not gain much traction in courts below 
the High Court in the Australian judicial hierarchy since, for example, Spigelman CJ has 
doubted that even the New South Wales Court of Appeal as “an intermediate court of 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
119 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
 
120 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273. 
 
121 Daniels Corporation v ACCC [2002] 192 ALR 561, 573-574 (para 44, per McHugh J) and 583-584 (paras 
85 and 86, per Kirby J). 
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appeal”
123 is at liberty to improvise with new categories of privilege.
124  If the human 
rights argument is to have any convincing power at all in intermediate and lower courts in 
Australia, it will necessarily draw upon the limited jurisprudence that surrounds section 
116 of the Constitution, including the finding that a law that was expressly directed at 
proscribing an otherwise lawful religious practice, would breach this constitutional 
provision.
125 
 
However, the High Court of Australia has affirmed that what Mason P (as he then was) 
called “the gravitational pull of statutes” in Akins v Abigroup Ltd
126 will influence the 
development of the common law with respect to evidential privileges in Australia.  That is 
because Australia has “one common law … declared by th[e High Court of Australia] as 
the final court of appeal”.
127  For though there was an insufficiently uniform pattern in 
legislation with respect to the availability of legal professional privilege in pre-trial 
circumstances for the High Court to declare “one common law” on the fine privilege point 
at issue in Esso,
128 the “uniform pattern of legislation in five states”
129 had provided the 
Court with assistance in making the common law seamless where marital rape was 
concerned.
130  The High Court also noted with approval the United States Supreme 
                                                 
123 R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681, 698, para 84. 
 
124 Ibid, p 700, para 91. 
 
125 Per Pincus J in Lebanese Moslem Association v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 11 
FCR 543, 577-578, though note that his decision was overturned by the Full Federal Court on appeal who 
considered that the Minister had not intended to prohibit the free exercise of the practice of Islam when he 
had deported an Imam.  See discussion supra in chapter six, pp 246-248. 
 
126 Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539. 
 
127 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563. 
 
128 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49. 
 
129 Ibid, p 63, para 25 quoting R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379, 390. 
 
130 Idem. 
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Court decision
131 that an 1886 “federal rule”
132 that did not allow the application of 
wrongful death statutes in maritime cases “should adapt by analogy to the position 
established in the various states”,
133 since the federal position was no longer “acceptable 
in …1970 [when] every State of the Union [had passed] a wrongful-death statute”.
134 
Though there was “no consistent pattern of legislative policy”
135 with respect to the pre-
trial application of legal professional privilege “to which the common law [could adapt] 
itself”
136 in Esso, the High Court said the “fragmentation of the common law”
137 which 
only enabled common law adaptation in jurisdictions where the Uniform Evidence Act 
applied, was “inconsistent with what was said in Lange and unacceptable”.
138  Since 
there are seven out of ten jurisdictions in Australia
139 that now have religious confession 
privilege statutes, and since five of those jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform 
Evidence Act formulation of the privilege,
140 it seems reasonable to suggest that the High 
Court would “adapt” the common law in Queensland, South Australia and Western 
Australia to that Uniform Evidence Act template standard if an appropriate case were 
presented for decision in the interests of Lange ‘seamlessness’.
141  That likelihood is the 
                                                 
131 Moragne v States Marine Lines Inc (1970) 398 US 375. 
 
132 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49, 63, para 26. 
 
133 Idem. 
 
134 Idem. 
 
135 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49, 61, para 23. 
 
136 Idem 
 
137 Idem. 
 
138 Idem. 
 
139 See chapter seven, note 221. 
 
140 See chapter seven, note 223. 
 
141 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49, 61, para 23 per 
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stronger when the High Court’s willingness to invoke human rights norms from 
international law is factored into such consideration.  
 
Extinction theories 
Since the text writers are so consistent in their denials of the existence of religious 
confession privilege at common law, in chapter six I summarised the theories that have 
been advanced to explain that extinction, since those denials have not been adequately 
explained anywhere.  Those theories were first, that religious confession privilege was 
extinguished at or by the English Reformation or by the Restoration of the monarchy 
after the Cromwellian Interregnum. Secondly, that as a Roman Catholic privilege, 
religious confession privilege was extinguished by the institutional prejudice against that 
religion that lasted from the English Reformation through to the nineteenth century. 
Thirdly, that any perceived need to pass a religious confession privilege statute 
demonstrated that the privilege did not exist at common law.  Fourthly, that religious 
confession privilege does not exist in British Commonwealth jurisdictions that have not 
adopted or retained any established church.  And finally that Sir George Jessel MR’s 
dicta in Anderson v Bank of British Columbia
142 and Wheeler v LeMarchant
143 so 
captured the spirit of the common law against any privilege except a narrow legal 
professional privilege in the late nineteenth century, that his dicta extinguished any 
residue of religious confession privilege that may have arguably endured till he made his 
statements.  
 
                                                 
142 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644. 
 
143 Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675. 
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Each of those theories was analysed and dismissed as follows.  There is no explanation 
why the English Reformation or the Restoration of the monarchy could have 
extinguished religious confession privilege.
144  It is not reasonable to believe that simple 
religious prejudice could permanently extinguish a privilege that was recognised in 
antiquity absent an abrogating statute, particularly when every legislature that has 
addressed the issue since has passed an affirming statute to put the matter beyond 
doubt.
145  Statutes have a variety of moving causes.  While some religious confession 
privilege statutes may have been passed because the legislators incorrectly believed no 
religious confession privilege existed at common law, their mistaken belief does not 
retrospectively validate the incorrect interpretation of history which motivated them to 
legislate, nor does it invalidate the resulting statute.
146  In Australia, the existence of a 
constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion makes irrelevant the suggestion that 
the absence of a state church somehow removed common law religious confession 
privilege.  That the same constitutional provision which entrenches free exercise of 
religion in Australia also proscribes Commonwealth creation of a state church,
147 also 
demonstrates the misconception in this theory for extinction of religious confession 
privilege at common law.  For from the beginning of the Australian Commonwealth, it 
was intended that there be no state church but that there should be free exercise of 
religion.
148  And finally, while it is axiomatic that the common law is the capture or 
                                                 
144 See discussion supra, chapter six, pp 228-236. 
 
145 See discussion supra, chapter six, pp 236-242. 
 
146 See discussion supra, chapter six, pp 242-246. 
 
147 The full text of section 116 of the Australia Constitution states: “The Commonwealth shall not make any 
law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise 
of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the 
Commonwealth”. 
 
148 See discussion supra, chapter six, pp 246-254. 
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expression of custom,
149 both develop.  Even if Sir George Jessel MR did express the 
feelings of many judges in his age about religious confession privilege,
150 those feelings 
were the consequence of misinformation.  In any event, his feelings have been 
superseded by society’s interest in fostering free exercise of religion in the twentieth 
century.  Sir George Jessel MR did not cite any binding or convincing authority for his 
view of religious confession privilege, and though his dicta have often been cited, they 
have not been expressly followed in any precedential decision that has denied religious 
confession privilege since, because there have not been any such cases.
151 
 
Final conclusion 
This thesis therefore ends with the finding that there was religious confession privilege at 
common law before the English Reformation.  That privilege has endured and it has not 
been abrogated by statute or extinguished by common law development since.  Indeed, 
it has been reaffirmed legislatively in many jurisdictions that have felt the need to 
consider it – often because misinformed judges have denied it.  While the writer can wish 
with J Noel Lyon that the “legal writers should stop stating categorically that no [religious 
confession] privilege exists at all”,
152 the writer’s more modest hope is that this material 
will enable advocates to convince judges in the twenty-first century that proper analysis 
of the relevant common law sustains a different conclusion.  It is also to be hoped that 
the recognition that religious confession privilege existed at common law will enable the 
                                                 
149 See quotes from Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. supra, chapter six, pp 254-255. 
 
150 See the discussion about the extra judicial comment elicited by public discussion of the case of R v 
Constance Kent  supra in chapter four, pp 171-177. 
 
151 See discussion supra, chapter six, pp 254-262.  See also chapter one, pp 25-35. 
 
152 “Privileged Communications – Penitent and Priest” [1964-65] 7 Crim LQ 327, 328. 
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more generous interpretation of existing statutes suggested in chapter seven.
153  In 
essence, that argument holds that judges do not need to interpret religious confession 
privilege narrowly because the public interest requires the court to see all the evidence, 
because there is a countervailing public interest in fostering confidential relationships 
between priest and penitent.  That countervailing public interest is implicit in the need 
perceived by the legislature to pass a religious confession privilege in the first place.  If 
this analysis is accepted, the gravitational pull of existing Australian religious confession 
privilege statutes should also see state judges in Queensland, South Australia and 
Western Australia acknowledge religious confession privilege at common law, even if the 
Commonwealth Uniform Evidence Act is never adopted in those states. 
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